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Now, children, this is a court of law. The
law, based upon the Bible, and the Bible,
writ by Almighty God, forbid the practice
of witchcraft...
-Deputy Govemor Danfonh.
in dramatization of the
Salem witch trial. Act W.
Ihe Crucible, by Arthur Miller.
Every human being's life in this world is
inevitably mixed with every other life and,
no matter what laws we pass, no matter
what precautions we take, unless the people
we meet are kindly and decent and human
and liberty-loving, then there is no liberty.
Freedom comes from human beings, rather
than from laws and institutions.
- Clarence Darrow,
summation to the jury.
State v. Sweet Detroit, 1925.?
The American Constitution has its impera-
tives, but it has no certainties. It has its
mandates. but it has no moral authority -
at least, none of its own. The American
people may give it moral authority if they
choose to believe in it, and if they shape
their conduct under the law as if they do
believe in the Constitution. To do so, they
must act as if they are aware that freedom
and liberty depend upon them as much as
upon the law's institutions.
The spongest hand of authoritarian repres-
sion - whether it be a moral totalitarian-
ism "based upon the Bible," state totalitari-
anism imposed from above, or a totalitar-
ian elitism based upon class, race or gender
- cannot suppress the spirit of freedom
and liberty in the hearts of a people. Since
the American Revolution, nothing has taught
us that lesson more certainly than the mul-
tiple liberating revolutions in Eastern Europe
and in what was the Soviet Union.
Whatapeople may not do,especially in the
American constitutional culture, is to make
the founding document of government into
aparchmentdeclaration of moralcertainty.
and especially into a document incorporaL-
ing the moral certainties that particular in-
dividuals, or particular movements in the
society, may hold dear.
The America of today, it must be said, is a
society in which so much of the social and
political agenda is set- or would be set, if
they were only slightly more successful -
by hard-eyed moralists. These are Ameri-
cans who have been made so insecure by
I Penguin Books edition (1987). at p. 102.
'Reprinted in London, Ephraim, cd.. T World of Law Vol. II. The Law as Literature, Simon and Schuster, New
York (1960), pp. 349-374; this quotation is from p. 372.
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the "decline of morals" that they are deter-
mined to impose their moral judgments
upon others, and to do so by fiat, or by open
coerion rather than by the compelling force
of their reason.
There is no security, and very little moral
peace, among them. To cover for their inse-
curity, they would and have sought to enact
and enfnrce moral certitude. As the au-
thorities in 17th Century Salem covered
their moral fears by bringing the law down
harshly upon suspected religious deviants,
or as the whites in the Detroit of the 1920s
covered their fear of freedom for all by
forcing the prosecution of Harry Sweet for
defending his home against a mob. the an-
gry moralists of late 20th Century America
are increasingly determined to exorcise the
constitutional "witchcraft" of today, and to
raise the price of liberty forsomenotamong
the elect.
In the same way that literalists read the
Bible as inerrant, as definite, certain and
knowable in its mandates, for fear of dis-
covering there a siren's invitation to moral
laxity, the moral absolutists of our political
and legal culture are determined to squeeze
every tempting ounce of generous possibil-
ity out of theAmerican Constitution.
The darkening of the constitutional mood
in America today is a result of the passion-
ate, at times almost mindless belief that the
grand and yearning phrases of our
Constitution can be reduced in their mean-
ing to that of private, and highly debatable,
systems of individual moral preference.
This is a darker mood, and one thatcontin-
ues to darken further, because manyAmeri-
cans, and especially many Americans who
are willing to express themselves openly
and vociferously, are determined to con-
ven their own moral insecurity into moral
commands to the unconsenting, to those
who embrace a different view of what is or
should be morally compelling.
And, in response, those who hold other
views, and who would seem to have the in-
tellectual and the political character to remind
us all of the hazards of moral totalitarian-
ism, shrink from their opportunity for fear
of inviting the dreaded label. communi-
cated in a 30-second "sound bite," of being
"soft" or "weak" in morals.
This is not merely a difference of opinion.
It is the defining characteristic of a searing
conflict over that most elusive of human
aspirations: "moral correctness." It is, in-
deed, a combat so consuming and so perva-
sive that it must be seen as a "culture war."'
Many of the most important. most decisive
skirmishes in that "war" are argued in the
language of morals; they are, in truth, chang-
ing the very substance of American consti-
tutionalism.
In a society in which foundation ideas about
our polity, from whatever source, invari-
ably interact through the medium of instant
communication, it will not do to think of
constitutionalism as merely what the courts
say about the Constitution. We must broaden
our perspective, in order to examine the
state of the nation's constitutional mood.
This is both a legal and an extra-legal phe-
nomenon. Constitutionalism does have to
do explicitly with the law: the foundation
law of our system of government, the abid-
ing as well as the developing law that gov-
ers our daily dealings with each other, and
the potential for further development, or
retrenchment, of law as law. But it also has
to do with attitudes about the law, with the
way in which we speak of law (informally
and formally), and with the way in which
we order our affairs to accommodate - or
to frustrate - what we understand the law
to be or what we are told it is.
As important as the substance of the law is,
America's attitudes about law are equally
decisive in the "culture war," and thus
equally significant in defining the constitu-
tional mood of the nation. Harvard law pro-fessor Mary Ann Glendon has given us a
most instructive critique of the degree to
which the public discourse of the day isdominated by law: its substance, its im-
agery, its potentiality.' She has described a
"legalization" of the nation's popular cul-
ture, and has suggested that that "is both
cause and consequence of our increasing
tendency to look to law as an expression
andcarrierof the few values thatare widely
shared in our society: liberty, equality, and
the ideal of justice under law.'"
WhatismostcompellinginProfessorGlen-
don's work, for our purposes here, is her
focus upon the nature of America's "law
talk." It is, she says, primarily "rights talk":
There is no more telling indicator of the extent
to which legal notions have penetrated both
popular and political discourse than our in-
creasing tendency to speak of what is most
important to us in terms of rights, and to frame
nearly every social controversy as a clash of
rights.'
When America engages in "rights talk." as
it does almost incessantly these days, it
engages in a conversation that is heavily
freighted with notions of morality. "Rights
talk,"much of the time, is talk of the"right-
ness" or "wrongness" of granting or deny-
ing a particular right, or the "rightness" or
"wrongness" of the particular right itself.
And the substance of that conversation,
very often, is moral totalitarianism, moral
certitude, moral absolutes.
'Hunter. James Davison, Culture Wars: The Strugglc to Define America. Basicooks -Harper Collins (1991). The
same theme recurs throughout one of the angriest and most accusing writings to emerge from the "culture war" in
contemporary America: Robert H. Bork's The Tempting of America The Political Seduction of The Law, The FreePress-Macmillan, New York (1990).
'Glendon, Mary Ann. Rights Talk: The knpoverishment of Political Discourse. The Free Press.Macmillan NewYork (1991).
'ibid., as p. 3.
'ibid., at pp. 3.4. The phenomenon is well illustrated in a work by One of Professor Glendon's Harvard colleagues:Tribe, Laurence H., Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, W.W. Norton & Co., New York (1990).
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unerica has been talking like that for some
time, perhaps from the time that the "Earl
Warren Court," in its prolific expansion of
constitutional rights, began truly to agitate
our modem political discourse. One is re-
minded of that, graphically, on walking
through the Earl Warren exhibit that is now
on display on the ground floor of the Su-
preme Court's building. Among the most
prominent artifacts there is a photograph of
a roadside sign, somewhere in Dixie, placed
by the John Birch Society, trumpeting:
"Impeach Earl Warren." There is no doubt
that, whether rightly or wrongly in idealis-
tic terms, the Warren Court had made it
politically fashionable, and electorally prom-
ising, to "run against the Supreme Court."
Doing that has since become a contributing
factor in America's constitutional mood.
It seems fair to suggest, however, (although
the mere suggestion is certain to provoke
some who hear it) that the darkening of that
mood began to become most evident with
the fundamental change in the national po-
litical culture vividly manifested in the
election of Ronald Reagan as President in
1980. Mr. Reagan's years in the White
House I avebeen called, for many reasons,
"the Reagin Revolution." But certainly
one of the most revolutionary characteris-
tics of the "Reagan years" was that they
gave voice to a fundamentalist moral incli-
nation that for generations had seemed to
lie dormant in the American social and
political community - an inclination that
was alive only at the "fringes," to which it
had been consigned with derision by the
dominant liberal political culture.
However seriously that moralistic constitu-
ency had taken itself up to that time, how-
ever passionately it had believed that it was
in possession of the "morally correct" view,
it had not been heard at the centers of
power, and even the public voice that its
fervent evangelists on paid television -
was thought fit only for parody or smug
disregard by the rest of society.
But it began to be heard in the corridors of
power during the years after 1980, and its
moral absolutism began to be expressed in
a confident constitutional language that
would at first sound new and quite strange
to the nation's ears. It was the language of
"originalism," rooted, it was said, in the
very foundations of the American Repub-
lic, undefiled by the moral looseness of
liberal excess in modem constitutional
thought. In time, the form of constitutional
expression emanating from the theorists,
the philosophers and the political practitio-
ners of the New Moralism would be heard
- and, ultimately, it would gain not only
the respect (and the flattering imitation) of
the White House and the Cabinet, but in
fact would begin to be heard authorita-
tively from the benches of a federal judici-
ary rapidly changing in personnel.
In moral terms, the new ideology has seen
its special mission to be the total cradica-
tion of the "permissiveness" it identified as
the legacy of constitutional liberalism. It
blamed the moral laxity of the modem age
upon those who, it was certain, had caused
the decline of the family, the erosion of
moral and political authority, the loss of
love for America, and, most especially, the
rampant self-indulgence in ungovernable
appetites - appetites for sex (especially,
deviant sex), for divorce, for drugs, for
crime. A fervent call for return to the sim-
plistic faith of our fathers, to a past time
when moral certainty was thought to have
existed, was the message. But the mood
was one of anger, and of intolerance, and it
was quite conspicuously ungenerous. And
those in that mood seemed to want a
Constitution to match.
The Constitution, in fact, has become the
point at which the New Right in our politics
- the movement determined to bring moral
absolutism to American public affairs- is
joined intimately with the New Moralism
in our legal culture. The moral preferences
that are an absolutely essential part of the
"originalist" mode of interpreting the
Constitution are not always expressed as
blatantly as are its governmental prefer-
ences, and thus its philosophy often sounds
as if it were only constitutional in charac-
ter. The New Moralists frequently speak or
write as if they were advocating nothing
more debatable than a return to democratic
values, a revival of the fundamental article
of democratic faith that the people through
their elected representatives should make
the hard choices in public policy. Their
only aspiration, one might think from their
rhetoric, is to have a virtually wholesale
abdication of judicial authority-an act of
renunciation of power that would have few
parallels in all of the annals of government,
ancient and modem.
One of the most energetic New Moralists in
academe today, University of Texas law
professor Lino A. Graglia, is eloquent in
expressing the philosophical aspiration in
those terms. Discussing what he calls the
"explosive" expansion of constitutional rights
by the modern Supreme Court, Professor
Graglia views it as an ultimate political
profanation, a wrong-headed and danger-
ous grasp by a "self-selected elite" for the
power that belongs, in a democracy, to the
people. He has written recently:
The meaning of self-government. one of
the two basic principles [of our Constiturim
is that the choice values to be advanced by
government] is to be made according to the
collective wisdom - or at least the collec-
tive judgment- of the people. The mean-
ing of federalism, the other basic constitu-
tional principle, is that most choices should
be madeatthe state rather than the national
level. To permit the choice to be made for
the nation as a whole by a majority vote of
the nine Justices of the United States Su-
preme Court, unelected and not removable
by clections, in the form of the announce
men of constitutional rights. is to violate
both of these principles. It is to deprive us
of what are truly our most fundamental
constitutional rights.'
It overlooks a good deal of the New Moral-
ists' true value preferences, however, to
allow them to rest their case solely on
thoughts about self-government and demo-
cratic values. The structural renovation of
'Graglia, Lino A., "Of Rights and Choices," National Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 3. February 17. 1992. at p. 39.
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our constitutional polity that they seek, re-
sulting in a profound diminution ofjudicial
authority and an equally profoudd enlarge-
ment of legislative and executive power,
has cultural consequences that are easily
discernible. One of those consequences.
perhaps the most disturbing, would be the
monumental loss of opportunity for legions
of citizens to act as moral agents, to make
choices that are heavy with moral sub-
stance, and to make those choices without
being overruled by a government bent on
different moral choices.
But it is mere illusion to believe that the
New Moralists are unaware of such conse-
quences. It is, in fact, one of the keenest
desires of the New Moralists to have such
consequences ensue. They do not seek merely
neutral revisions in the distribution of gov-
emmental power; what they want, with
equal if not greater fervor, is to increase the
possibility that when government acts, it
will be able to do so in ways that advance
their visions of "moral correctness." With-
out doubt, they do have a morals agenda:
they want an America in which traditional
(usually majoritarian) morals are to be
dominanLnd enforceable in this nation's
culture of values. In simple terms, they
want to transfer moral responsibility from
the "deviants" and the untrustworthy among
us to the politically controlling among us.
The rise of the New Moralists, and the in-
creasingly prominent role they play in the
constitutionalism of today, has been watched
with developing interest in those parts of
the national political community that for so
long had looked down their noses at the
"fringe." For a time, there was, on that side
of the political and constitutional arena, a
tendency to dismiss the New Moralism
with little thought of how much of the
country it might have behind it. If there was
a "new political realty," and with it at least
potentially "a new constitutional reality,"
it was largely lost on that other side of
political America.
But the seeds that had been sown for "cul-
ture war" by the "Reagan Revolution" and
by the apparent indifference to it elsewhere
in political America matured, and open
cultural warfare broke out hotly in 1987,
after Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., retired
from the United States Supreme Court.
Later, the man who had been selected to
replace Justice Powell, Federal Circuit Judge
Robert H. Bork, would put what had hap-
pened that year into a broader historical
perspective. It was his way of confirming
what everyone already had known: that he
had been a casualty in the "culture war."
This was his view, in 1990:
The clash over my nomination was simply
an battle in [a) long-runining war for contol
of our legal culture. There may be legitimate
differences about that nomination, but, in
the larger war for control of the law. there
are only two sides. Either the Constitution
and statutes are law, which means that
their principles are known and control judges,
or they are malleable texts that judges may
rewrite to see that particular groups or
political causes win.'
When Robert Bork was chosen by Presi-
dent Reagan for the Court, he had not been
plucked from obscurity, as some later nomi-
nees to the Court would be. He was well
known as the most conspicuous proponent
of "originalism," the favorite of every ele-
ment in the New Moralism movement, and
a hero in the skirmishes leading up to the
"culture war." Ronald Reagan could not
have made a more daring. or more taunting
gesture, to those who had favored the hated
"permissiveness" that had allowed "par-
ticular groups or political causes" to win in
the war over rights.
The gesture was the bolder because, in that
summer of Mr. Reagan's discontent, he
was a quite thoroughly discredited Presi-
dent, himself a political casualty because
of the Iran-contra scandal. That had been
an affair that, peculiarly among the many
initiatives of the New Moralism in the
Reagan Administration, had illustrated the
absolute outer limits to which the Constitution
might be re-interpreted to save a "morally
correct" governmental cause (the cradica-
tion, if possible, of communism from this
hemisphere). But Mr. Reagan, wounded or
not by that scandal, remained a most will-
ing soldier in the "culture war" his Admini-
strationhadbeenwagingsince 1981 against
the vestigial remnants of the "Earl Warren
era" at the Supreme Court.
With what had become known in Washing-
ton as "Reagan luck," the President had
been presented with the most auspicious
oppotunity, at the very best time, to make
this ultimate thrust to advance New Moral-
ism in the constitutional "culture war." The
summer of 1987 was the 200th anniversary
of the final drafting of the Constitution;
there could have been no better time to
fight, and fight from a morally certain per-
spective, over the future of the Supreme
Court of the United States. And nothing
less than the future of the Court was at
stake, because Justice Powell's vote so
often had made the fifth vote for 5-4 ma-
jorities, many of which preserved or en-
larged rights that supposedly had encour-
aged "permissiveness" in society.
There is a way of looking at those events
thatsummerasif they had beenan intended
diversion from the "culture war" over the
Constitution. Mr. Reagan and his associ-
ates were fully on notice that there would
be a strong fight against Mr. Bork, pre-
cisely because of who Judge Bork was and
because of the views he was known to hold.
At the same time, the President's associates
sBork, op. cit.. p. 2. Mr. Bork, a New Moralist, uses here the language of interpretive theory - the mother tongue
of the "originalists." But these is no mistaking the fact that his "originalis" perceptions are steeped in a particular
moral preference. One will find, throughout this book of almost anbarrassing self-justification, the provocative use
of moral imagery; indeed, much of that imagery is sexual in nature, having to do with the "seductive" quality of
liberal constitutionalism - its licentious pennissiveness. Ibis is, indeed, in the very title of the book.
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also were well aware (even if he personally
was not) that the awesome threat of im-
peachment, as punishment for the Iran-
contra scandal, had not yet been lifted from
the Reagan presidency. To avoid the latter.
it might be suggested, the President's aides
were eager to shift Congress' focus to the
former. And, to continue the thought, one
might suggest that Mr. Bork became a
casualty because he was being scapegoated
for a President whom the Senate did not
yet have ite political self-assurance to
anack personally.
Those speculations, however, are not very
convincing. Their ultimate frailty is that
they assume that the "culture war"could be
tabmerged in anything else in Washington
that year. The occasion of the Constitution's
bicentennial made practically every one
in town, perhaps most of the nation, acutely
sensitive to what was at stake: Mr. Bork
represented the bearded evil of a Constitution-
wrecker to his foes, and those foes repre-
sented to the New Moralists the ragtag
band left behind by a loose-morals "Me
generation" that had too freely used the
Constitution as its personal plaything. This
was, in short, the Armageddon of the
Constitution.
Each side fought with every weapon it
could muster- sometimes, even, with rea-
son. And Mr. Bork lost. But it was a per-
sonal loss to him. For the other side, for
those who had told themselves that they
were saving the Constitution for their chil-
dren's children, the war had taken a heavier
toll. The Senate's energy was, quite liter-
ally, fully spent. When President Reagan
next turned to Circuit Judge Anthony M.
Kennedy, an engaging performance by a
most agreeable nominee was accepted by
the Senate with gratitude-and with hardly
any attempt to find out whether he was an
"originalist," whether he was one of the
morally certain New Moralists, whether he
had any greater understanding of or toler-
ance for "permissive" constitutionalism.
The word that went out, when Judge
Kennedy became Justice Kennedy, was
that Mr. Bork had lost the battle, but the
New Moralists had won that entire phase of
the "culture war." They had won because
they were far from finished.
Indeed, George Bush, the heir apparent to
Mr. Reagan, entered the White House a
carefully rehearsed and seemingly devoted
adherent to New Moralism. His morals
agenda was the same, his approach to con-
stitutionalism indistinguishable. The search
for new judicial nominees began very early
in the new Administration and, when the
opportunity arose, the New Moralists within
the White House complex let it be known,
not in subtle ways, that a government that
was "kinder, gentler" was nevertheless to
be as stubbornly intolerant of "permissive-
ness" from its judges. Whether or not they
ultimately will get what they sought in
choosing Justice David H. Souter and
Justice Clarence Thomas for the Court,
they clearly chose those two out of an
explicit expectation that they, too, were
dedicated New Moralists. Mr. Souter had
given less evidence of that in his prior ca-
reer than had Mr. Thomas, but the White
House chief of staff then, John H. Sununu,
was quick with assurances to the New Mor-
alist community that Mr. Souter was one of
them.
Thus it was that the New Moralism contin-
ued to advance in the "culture war" over
American constitutionalism - its gains
more visible because they were made in the
glaring spotlight that this nation's press
seems always to put upon the public com-
merce of Washington, D.C. It may seem
indecent that a nation's moral agenda would
be controlled even in part by its politics,
and perhaps regrenable that the moral agenda
would be determined so dominantly by a
nation's law. There is so much else in a
society's culture, so many other sources of
potential moral authority, that can mean-
ingfully shape a community's values. But,
for better or for worse. law, and the politi-
cal management and direction of the law,
have become the mode by which a morally
insecure age seeks to enact certainty.
This is not an endeavor, however, that is
pursued exclusively in Washington, D.C.,
on the national stage. It is pervasive in the
American community. Let there be a mor-
ally "permissive" activity occurring in any
community in the nation, and there will
arise, soon rather than late, a gesture or a
movement to use the law to impose "moral
correctness" upon it.
Sometimes, that is done by attempts to use
the law to frustrate the law. Using the rheto-
ric of the civil rights movement and the
technique of clever rights-based lawyer-
ing, a serious challenge can be raised to the
moral legitimacy of any use of legal au-
thority to protect "permissive" behavior. A
classic example of that, of course, is the
employment of First Amendment rights of
free expression to seek to overwhelm the
power of a federal judge to keep abortion
clinics in Wichita, Kansas. open to their pa-
tients. (In keeping with its New Morality
agenda, the Bush Administration has sup-
ported that gesture.) Indeed, in all of the
"culture war" of today, there is no better
example of the energizing power of moral
absoluteness than in the use of the law to
wage the conflict over abortion. There is so
much agony over abortion, however, that it
may be advisable to avoid adding further to
it here.
There are other examples - sadly, per-
haps, very many of them - to illustrate the
eagerness with which legal invention can
be put to work to achieve "moral correct-
ness." It is a source of alarm that so many of
the examples of this phenomenon that might
be cited have to do with the attempted
denial of moral agency for women. (That.
of course, is part of what is at stake in the
war over abortion, but we are seeking to
avert most of that conflict here.) Of all the
aspirations that the modem American woman
would seem entitled to have, surely one of
the most important to her is the ability to be
trusted to make mdral judgments. But that
aspiration seems to run quite regularly up
againsta morally insecure society's need to
impose moral superintendence upon women.
One way in which that is being done is to
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use old law to create new moral obliga-
tions. A perfect example of that is now un-
folding in the courts of the state of Florida.
There, with less visibility than the events in
Wichita had this past summer, state prose:
cutors are carrying on a legal experiment
that is based upon a starkly simple assump-
tion: women of child-bearing years may be
so deficient as moral agents that they must
be coerced into morally responsible behav-
ior. That is the essence of the case of
Jennifer Johnson.' She has been convicted
of being a drug "pusher" - for "deliver-
ing" cocaine to two of her children through
the umbilical cord in the seconds after their
birth.
Ms. Johnson is a drug addict. When she
became pregnant, she became one individ-
ual in an apparently large class of addicts
who find little if any treatment available for
their addictions. In all of Florida, there may
be no more than 135 residential beds in
treamunent centers for pregnant addicts. There
appears to be rising evidence that addicted
women are not likely to peek treatment
during pregnancy, even if the care were
available to them. A New York psychia-
trist. Dr. Carol J. Weiss. has said that "women
feel inordinate shame and guilt for their
chemically dependent behavior. This often
keeps them from seeking treatment and
contributes to their difficulties once in treat-
ment.'"
For Ms. Johnson, such prenatal care as she
received was at a county public health unit
which provides no particularized treatment
for drug addicts. When she was ready to
deliver each of her two children, she told
doctors or nurses of her addiction to co-
caine. Ultimately, that word was passed to
the Seminole County Sheriffs Department,
and Ms. Johnson was soon charged with
twocounts of illegal distribution of cocaine
to her newborn infants, Jessica and Carl.
The state's theory, upon which she was
found guilty, was that, in the 60 to 90 sec-
onds after delivery, and before the cords
were clamped and severed, Ms. Johnson
passed a derivative of cocaine to the chil-
dren. (Neither child, upon examination,
was found to have been harmed, or to be
addicted.)
It is arguable that Ms. Johnson is acasualty
in America's "culture war," a victim of
moral absolutism through the law.
Within the overall "culture war," there is a
separate conflict - the "war on drugs" -
that has become a severe test of the nation's
capacity for moral tolerance. The test is not
of a nation's tolerance for drug abusers -
if tolerance means looking the other way,
'Afier her criminal conviction in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Ms. Johnson has appealed to the Sh District
Court of Appeals. Johnson v. Stase of Florida, docket No. 89-1765. The case is awaiting a decision at that level. It
is the best known of an increasing number of prosecutions of chemically dependent mothers and pregnant women.
'
0 Weiss.Carol J., M.D., "Women and Osesisical Dependency: Stigma, Shame, Guilts,"The Drug Policy Letter. Vol.[II. No. 4, Fall 1991, at p. 5.
or affirmatively embracing some fanciful
"right" to self-abuse. There is a question of
moral tolerance raised by cases like Ms.
Johnson's, and it is what the American
Nurses Association had in mind when it
voiced its concern about how the drug war
is affecting women like her. In a policy
statement, the Association has said:
The Coalition on Alcohol and Drug
Dependent Women and Their Children
reports that an increasing number of women
are being arrested and prosecuted solely
because they used drugs while they were
pregnant. Laws are being applied that were
never intended to pertain to the behavior of
pregnant women . .. ANA joins . . . in
opposing these taends toward criminalzation
of drug use during pregnancy as constituing
extreme, inappropriate, and ineffective
responses to health problems. In order for
pregnant women to receive health care that
is sensitive to potential or existing drug
problems, women must feel that they can
seek care and give information regarding
their drug use or other problematic behavior
without fear of punishment."
The criminal prosecution of addicts like
Ms. Johnson, of course, seems to have
become an unyielding demandof the moral
absolutists in American society. They are
spurred on (as so often seems to be true) by
the discovery of a victim whose plight they
could appropriate to give legitimacy to
their efforts: the "cocaine baby," the poster
child of today's drug-menaced society.
Babies bom with drug addictions, because
women used illegal and dangerous sub-
stances during pregnancy, are a tragic new
group of casualties in the drug war. Indeed,
their plight may be the saddest of any in
that war. But the question arises: if they
were made victims by the moral laxity of
the women who became their mothers, is
the ansiwer for the children or for the mother
to be the assignment of blame, through the
coercion of the law? Or might it be some-
thing "kinder, gentler'"? Is not the response
itself a matter of moral significance?
In an era when so many seem to find it so
easy to mandate morality, why is the crimi-
nal law such a tempting instrument? The
morally certain among us persuaded them-
selves very early that the only appropriate
response to the drug war was eradication
before understanding, banishment in ad-
vance of (or in place of) treatment. The
law, if used with sufficient aggressiveness,
is a highly effective tool for banishment
and for control. And therein lies the temp-
tation. So fearful are the New Moralists of
the drug problem, and so unsure that moral-
ity can be restored to addicts by any other
means, they have been unable to resist
criminal prosecution as the sure way of
teaching moral rectitude. Is there not here a
grim reminder of the Salem witch trials?
Was it not easy to label Ms. Johnson a
witch, and the "delivery" of cocaine to her
children witchcraft? It did not matter to the
New Moralists that, before she had her
"Position staiement, American Nurses Association, Kansas City, Mo.. effective April 5, 1991. following adoption
by the Association's Board of Directors.
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babies, Ms. Johnson had no warning that
the obstttrical suite would become the scene
of a criane.
The guilty verdict in her case, as in so manX
that are the product of anxious reaching by
the morally insecure for release from sin,
was found to be satisfying because of its
moral clarity and simplicity.
So, too, to federal prosecutors must have
been the guilty verdict of a Nebraska farmer,
Keith Jacobson, of Newman Grove. Mr.
Jacobson broke no law and seemed to of-
fend nooneelse's morals knowingly when,
in 1984, he ordered two nudist magazines
and a brochure by mail from a store in San
Diego with the exotic name of Electric
Moon. A few months after that, his name
showed up on a mailing list when police
raided the Electric Moon. He thus became a
potential customer for the "American He-
donist Society."
When the mailbox at the Jacobson farm
began receiving material from that Soci-
ety, this Nebraska farmer could not have
known that he was hearing from the United
States Government. The "American
Hedonist Society" was an undercover "sting"
operation, part of the federal government's
attempt to regulate the sexual appetites of
the American people, in order to stamp out
pornography. For the next two years-plus.
Mr. Jacobson was the targetoffive separate
"undercover operations"; he received from
the Government a sexual attitude survey, a
membership application in the Hedonist
Society, a second survey, a list of "pen
pals" with appetites similar to the ones he
had mentioned on the surveys, and a cata-
logue offering depictions of little nude boys.
Outof that catalogue, Mr. Jacobson bought
a single magazine, titled "Boys Who Love
Boys."
The private reading habits of farmer Jacob-
son are now becoming a part of America's
constitutional history - and his legal woe
a reflection of the darkening mood of
American constitutionalism. His case, as
most Nebraskans probably know, is now
pending before the United States Supreme
Court. He was convicted of the federal
crime of receiving a magazine of child por-
nography through the mail. At his trial, he
took the stand and testified that he had no
idea he was committing a crime, and thus
lacked any criminal intent. His case raises
major constitutional issues about the extent
of the Government's power to use "sting"
operations as part of its enforcement arse-
nal in dealing with the problem of child
pornography.
Again, an issue of moral tolerance arises.
And, again, it is not an issue over Amer-
ica's willingness to concur in Mr. Jacob-
son's choice of reading material. In fact,
there is not a hint in his case that he wants
anyone else to endorse his choices, and not
a hint that he and his lawyers believe that
"Jacobson v. U.S., docket No. 90-1124. argued before the Cout on November 6, 1991, and awaiting decision.
distribution of pornography should not be a
crime. For our purposes here, the critical
issue is dhe extent of the Government's
moral authority toinquirc intoprivate tastes
and, on finding them to be deviant, to carry
on a campaign to draw the individual with
those tastes into a criminal episode. There
isnoquestion thattheGovermmentisreach-
ing for the widest possible constitutional
leeway in the Jacobson case. During the
hearing before the Court in November, this
exchange occurred:
JusticeBvronR Whitc Itakcityouarcnot
suggesting that the Govemnment didn't need
to have some basis for targeting this man?
Government lawyer Paul J. Larkin Jr:
Well, I am. I would be willing todefend the
proposition, and will do so now if you like.
that we don't need a reasonable suspicion
before targeting a sting. And I will defend
that both in terms of entrapment and in
terms of the Constitution."
Perhaps as remarkable as that statement is
forits breadth isthatthe Governmentwould
make it in all seriousness. That a Govern.
ment lawyer would do so is another ex-
ample of the degree to which the moral
virtue of policy (here, the attempted eradi-
cation of child pornography) would trans-
late so easily into an absolutist theory of
official power. It is not difficult to imagine
the pragmatic meaning if that theory is rati-
fled as constitutionally acceptable: there
would be no limits on a morally insecure
Government's power to create temptations
so as to trap those with ideas unacceptable
to the Government. Over the heads of all
citizens with views deemed to be morally
corrupt would hang the sword of criminal
punishment. It is difficult to look forward
to such a prospect and see it as a moral bar-
gain - unless society is served only when
the Government is able to convict the mor-
ally deficient. Whatever one may think of
the use of coercive power to regulate taste
in public places - such as in museums,
rock concerts, and arts projects funded with
federal financial aid (and that, too, is prob-
lematic for some Americans) - one per-
haps ought to look much more skeptically
at the practice of an intrusive Government
finding its way into one's living room.
kitchen - or bedroom - by the imagina-
tive use of the postal system as a porno-
graphic distribution scheme.14
It would not appear, at least as an abstract
proposition, that good morals can be co-
erced (whether by modern Government, by
ancient witchcraft trials, or even by reli-
gious evangelists threatening eternal dam-
nation). Moral responsibility, at least in
reasonably mature adults, would appear to
be a leamed perception, one that is held
subject to modification as ideas and values
"Transcript of oral argument, November 6, 1991, at p 30.
"For those who have been around Washington. D.C.. for a good while, the Government's actions in the Jacobson
case serve as a reminder of the back room that Postmaster Gencral Anhur Summerfield used to maintain, housing
a collection of ditty books and films confiscated from the mails. It was not clear what the maintenance, and the
invitation-only showing, of this material did to uplift morality in American society. Perhaps to look at it with some
frequency was to remind one of how tempting it might well be to the morally insecure.
1312
change over time and through experience.
But to force moral responsibility .upon a
person otherwise allowed to be responsible
for himself or herself is, itself, a threat of
moral degradation. Dr. Virginia Ramey
Mollenkott, who teaches English at the
William Paterson College of New Jersey,
in Wayne, N.J., has told us that there is an
"almost universal consensus that authentic
choice is an ethical necessity."" That being
so, she has argued, "To force any human
being's conscience is an act of violence."
She instructs us further in this out of her
teaching experience:
Whenever I am teaching Paradise Lost, my
state college students want to know why
God tempted Adam and Eve by placing the
Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in
Paradise and then forbidding its use. Why
didn't a loving God protect Adam and Eve
from the opportunity to sin? My response
is to explain that had Adam and Eve been
faced with no genuine choice, they would
also hr 'c been deprived of moral agency
and the opportunity to love and serve God
in a non-deterministic way.C
One need not enter the age-old debate of
whether human beings are fully free in
moral decision-making, or whether they
are in some sense guided by deterministic
forces, to know that - at least in the
context of the definition of morals in con-
temporary America - there is developing
an almost ungovernable urge among the
New Moralists to use sometimes frighten-
ing instruments of coercion to deal with
conduct that so threatens their sense of
moral well-being. To take another, and
final, particular example: the nightmarish
case of David Riggins, now a Death Row
inmate awaiting execution in Nevada.
His case is nothing less than an experiment
in the chemical manufacture- indeed, the
chemical imposition - of moral accounta-
bility on a human being. His case, now
pending at the United States Supreme Cowt,"
is an ugly matter of brutal crime and social
responsibility. It is ugly, as are all murder
cases, when one pores over the facts of the
crime: a stabbing - 32 wounds- done in
the course of a cocaine "buy." And it is
ugly, in a peculiar way, when one examines
the medical history of manufacturing men-
Lal competence for David Riggins- not to
meet his medical needs, but to satisfy the
State's prosecutorial objective.
It is an axiom, brought down to us from
ancient history but most specifically from
the famous M'Naghten trial'8 in London's
" Old Bailey" in 1843, that an accused
person is not to be held responsible in law
"Mollenkots. Virginia Ramey. PhD.. "Respecting the Moral Responsibility of Women."a speech published in an
educational series by the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights. Washington. D.C.. and available from that
organization. She was discussing the phenomenon in connection with reproductive health choices: her thoughts.
however, have application well beyond that conteat
"ibid.
"Riggins v. State of Nevada, docket No. 904466, argued before the Court on January 15, 1992, and awaiting
decision.
"The case is reported in full in 4 State Trials, N.S. 925, and briefly in X Clark and Finnelly. 198 English Reports.
Reprint 718 (1843).
for a crime concededly committed in fact.
if that individual lacked the mental capac-
ity at the Lime of the crime to know right
from wrong. The Riggins case involves a
quite bizarre variation on the competency
issue: may a person be tried, and convicted
of a crime, when the capacity to appreciate
the nature of the criminal act does not exist
in the person's "natural" state, but can be
and is restored temporarily by chemical
means? By agreement among doctors who
examined him at the time he was put on
trial, Riggins would not remain competent
if he were removed from a sizeable daily
dosage of Mellaril, an "anti-psychotic" drug.
After being arrested for murder, Riggins
was interviewed in jail by a psychiatrist. He
told the doctor of hearing voices for some
time. Thedoctor prescribed Mellaril, which
Riggins had said he had used in the past.
The prescribed dosage at that time was 100
milligrams a day. Later, he was found com-
petentby twooutof three psychiatrists who
examined him; at the time, he was still
medicated with Mellaril. Before trial, his
defense lawyer indicated that Riggins would
plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The
defense lawyer also asked that the medica-
tion with Mellaril be stopped: the trial
judge refused that plea.
In ensuing months, the dosage of Mellaril
was increased periodically, until, by the
time of the trial, it had reached 800 milli-
grams a day. The involuntary use of the
Mellaril continued throughout the trial, over
the defense's objection. The objection was
that the dosage was so heavy that Riggins
appeared to be a "zombie" and showed no
signs of emotion - thus, leading the jury
to conclude that he lacked remorse and that
this was his natural pattern of behavior, that
he was, in fact, competent. The defense
also objected that this impression could not
be dispelled by the testimony of doctors
who described to the jury the effects that
Mellaril had on Riggins.
In constitutional law terms, one of the key
issues raised in Riggins' appeal is the claim
that his defense of insanity - the only de-
fense he could plead at trial - was de-
feated by the forced injection of the anti-
psychotic drug, and thus his rights to a fair
trial and "due process" were violated. If an
accused person is to use the defense of
insanity, it is that person's burden to prove
it. Although it remained open to Riggins,
and his counsel, to try to establish that he
was insane at the time of the crime- the
point at which guilt or innocence attaches,
that lask appears to have been made signifi-
candy more difficult by the appearance of
composure- albeit, a chemically induced
calm - throughout the trial. Another claim
is that he was forced, by being made com-
petent through the miracle of chemistry, to
be a witness against himself. And a further
claim is that it was "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" to convict and sentence to death
an individual who was drugged involuntar-
ily to maintain competence until adjudged
guilty of murder.
If theConstitution is understood to embody
moral concepts, each of those questions
puts the morality of Riggins' very prosecu-
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tion into question. But what is most signifi-
cant, for our purposes, is that the State of
Nevada was so determined to hold David
Riggins criminally responsible that it was
prepared to create, through Mellaril, a
"synthetic sanity." That was, quite obvi-
ously, an act that fits well within the meth-
odology - and the belief system - of the
New Moralism.
For years, it has been a source of profound
irritation to hard-eyed moralists that an ac-
cused person could "get off' with a suc-
cessful plea of insanity. The trial of John
W. Hinckley, Jr., for the attempted assassi-
nation of President Reagan, resulting in a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,"
has been an abiding source of prosecutorial
resentment. How does one account for that
kind of reaction? Part of it, tobe sure. is due
to a perception that psychiatric testimony is
invariably suspect, and easily manipulable,
thus making it easier to slip out from under
criminal responsibility by an insanity plea;
trials focusing upon an insanity defense
become debating contests between hired
psychiatrists.
But some part of the resentment, surely, is
due to an inarticulate discontent with what
is felt to be a "soft-hearted" regard for the
psychotic criminal. A crime, perhaps a bru-
tal crime as in the Riggins case, has oc-
curred, and the demand for some kind'of
social accounting is clearly present, only to
be met with the moral void of an insanity
verdict. The prospect of a long-term proc-
ess of care, perhaps resulting in a lifetime
in a ward for the criminally insane, is not
sufficient to fill that void. The New Moral-
ity aches for more, but is left unfulfilled.
It aches for more because New Moralists
have heard too much of the argument that
criminal conduct is, often, the result of
something more than mere moral "bad-
ness" - the contention that a criminal epi-
sode might be traced to problems of child-
hood, to social deprivation, to disease of
the mind such as mere "madness," to a
multitude of determinist influences that
shape the anti-social personality. Crimi-
nal responsibility is, for many of the New
Moralists, a simple proposition: since most
crime is chosen rather than induced, ac-
countability is to follow. It is a proposition
of moral absolutism, uncluttered by sig-
nificant qualifying considerations. And it
is driven in considerable part by the per-
ceived imperative to do something - as a
first priority - about pervasive, ever-in-
creasing and incorrigible criminal conduct.
A further priority sought is that liberal con-
stitutionalism, the heritage of the Warren
Court, must cease to be an influence in
American legal and social culture. The
New Moralists need desperately to teach
some hard moral lessons again, and they
know precisely what lessons in moral cer-
tainty they wish to teach.
How strange it is, then, in this new age of
moral insecurity over crime, to read again
the words of Dr. Karl A. Menninger. of the
famous Menninger Clinic in Topeka. How
very confident and secure, in a deep moral
sense, Dr. Menninger was when he wrote
this 25 years ago:
(I)hca is m crime we all keep cnmitting,
over and over...We commit the crime of
damning some of our fellow citizsc with
the label 'criminal.' And having done this.
we force them through an experience that
is soul-searching and de-humanizing. In
this way. we exculpate ourselves for the
guilt we feel, and tell ourselves that we do
it to 'correct* the 'criminal' and make us
all safe from crime. We commit this crime
every day that we retain our present stupid,
ftile, abominable practice against detested
offenders....We are not being protected by
a system that attacks 'criminals' as if they
were the embodiment of all evil.w
To Dr. Menninger, every crime was a crisis
in "the dismal, dreary life of one of the
miserable ones," a "signal of distress, "and
of failure.n Society, he suggested, reacted
to these signals primarily outof " its annoy-
ance, its irritation, its injury."
Dr. Menninger detected those dark moods
a quarter-century ago. He could hardly
have known what those moods would do
to constitutionalism in this country, if
translated into the moral absolutes that the
New Moralists would make of this coun-
try's law.
It was Dr. Menninger's everyday work to
deal with the likes of Jennifer Johnson, of
Keith Jacobson. of David Riggins. And, as
he clearly would have recognized, this is
not a gallery of heroines and heroes we
have been discussing here: a drug addict, a
pederast, a brutal murderer. Society stands
ready. aq it should in some way, to express
its condemnation for what each of them
did. In any reckoning of entitlement to
society's sympathies, they would not rank
high. But if one spends any time around the
courthouses of America, one sees a con-
stant parade of people like those three.
They, too, are members of a community, a
community that sometimes takes pride,
justifiable pride, in living under an idealis-
tic Constitution. And deserving of it or not,
they might well benefit from something
more than indifference to their misery, to
their cries of distress. It is astonishing how
very difficult it is, when we are in a New
Moralist mood, for us to think generously
about the "miserable ones."
The issue that is most important, at this
juncture inour constitutional development,
is not whether a morally confident com-
mentator like Dr. Karl Menninger was
entirely right in his perceptions of "the mis-
erable ones," and of how the rest of us do or
should react to them. T'he issue, here at
least, is whether America has lost the ca-
pacity even to discuss, calmly and sensi-
tively, such propositions as he uttered in
"See Caplan. Lincoln, he Insanity Defense and Thc Trial of John W. Hinckley. Jr., David R. Godine Publisher,
Bonon (1984).
5Menningerl Karl Ihe Crime of Punishment, The Viking Press. New York (1966). at p. 9.
llibid.. at p. 19.
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1966. and to talk of them as relevant to the
meaning both of our Constitution and of
our morality.
A part of that question is whether Dr. Men-
ninger is to be dismissed out of hand with
the slogan that he was "soft on crime." But
an even more important part of that large
question is this: Has America lost, irretriev-
ably, its capacity even to think as Dr.
Menninger did?
Conclusion
We sometimes seem so fearful over the loss
of our morality, the loss of our moral "inno-
cence," that we prefer a mandated moral-
ity, a new orthodoxy, given to us by the
moral absolutists who would so recklessly
risk a further darkening of our constitu-
tional mood. As was said a few years ago in
a prayer in a church in Washington, D.C.:
"Our believing is swallowed up in doubt.
but we will not confess our doubt . . . .
What creativity we are capable of, we re-
press in conformity."
If America as a nation is not sobered by
such questions as those raised here, it must
reckon how far it has gone toward losing its
way morally. It could be of value to each of
us to walk along the marble exterior of the
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in
Washington, and to think again about the
meaning for our constitutionalism of the
words by President John Kennedy that are
carved on the facade there: "I am certain
that, after the dust of centuries has passed
over our cities, we too will be remembered
not for victories or defeats in battle or in
politics, but for our contribution to the hu-
man spirit."
Lewis E. Harris received the B.S. degree in 1932 and the M.S. degree in
1933, each from the University of Nebraska. He is the founder of Harris
Laboratories, Inc. From 1960 - 1968 Lewis Harris served as president of
Norden Laboratories of Lincoln, a SmithKline Beecham subsidiary, and
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Silver Writes is Alice Walker's favorite poem of the many she
wrote during the 1960s civil rights struggle. She liked the poem
not only because it revealed something about her own motivations
for joining the movement, but also because it revealed why the
term "Civil Rights" could not fully express the movement's revolu-
tionary goals. As she explained, the term "could never adequately
describe our longings and our dreams, or those of the non-black
* * 1992 by Leslie Bender and Daan Braveman. All rights reserved.
We would like to thank the Syracuse University law students in our civil rights courses
in spring 1990, spring 1991, and fall 1991 for their thoughtful participation in this
pedagogical adventure. Without their active engagement, this course would be a disaster.
We are also enormously grateful to each of the authors of the essays, articles, books,
documentaries, and poems we used for their scholarship and insights. We consider this
course a collaborative effort with them. Professor Bender dedicates this essay to her in-laws,
Arent and Kersti Swanstrom of Doylestown, Pennsylvania.
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people who stood among us" because the term is "totally lacking in
color" and "has no poetry."3 Walker wrote:
"Civil Rights" is a term that did not evolve out of black cul-
ture, but, rather, out of American law. As such, it is a term of
limitation. It speaks only to physical possibilities-necessary
and treasured, of course-but not of the spirit. Even as it
promises assurance of greater freedoms it narrows the area in
which people might expect to find them. . ..
When one reads the poems, especially, of the period, this
becomes very clear. The poems, like the songs of that time,
reveal an entirely different quality of imagination and spirit
than the term "Civil Rights" describes. The poems are full of
protest and "civil disobedience," yes, but they are also full of
playfulness and whimsicality, an attraction to world families
and the cosmic sea-full of a lot of naked people longing to
swim free.'
We have attempted to design a civil rights course that we
would hope could be more appropriately titled "Silver Writes." To
be sure, we cannot claim the poetry or imagination of Alice
Walker. Nor, thirty years later, can we pretend to share the opti-
mism of her 1960s poem. Nevertheless, our course was designed
with a similar spirit in mind, a spirit that recognizes the need to
crash existing barriers to understanding civil rights. "Silver
Writes" was our guide in creating a course that attempted to pro-
vide diverse perspectives on civil rights, perspectives that students
had not received in other courses.
Our course seeks to develop critical thinking on, and under-
standing of, civil rights issues of race, gender and class subordina-
tion. We operated on the assumption that legal education, in gen-
eral, can serve either as an instrument to conform the next
generation of lawyers to the logic of the present system, or it can
become "'the practice of freedom,' the means by which men and
women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how
to participate in the transformation of their world."5 We hoped our
civil rights course might enable students to develop a critical con-
sciousness and creative understanding of the existing civil rights
3. Id.
4. Id. at 336-37.





This essay describes our course, what we taught, and why we
selected the material. Our purpose in writing this essay is really
threefold:' to generate discussion about design of civil rights
courses; to stimulate thinking about the underlying civil rights is-
sues; and, finally, to spur exploration of the goals and methods of
legal education generally. It would be pretentious 'to suggest that
we have crashed any barriers, as would a black man running nude
on a white beach in Alabama. We do hope, however, that we have
started to make those barriers more visible and have encouraged
our students to see the possibility of crashing them.
This essay is predominantly descriptive of the contents of the
course, its organization and our goals. We have written it in the
hope that such an overview might be useful to others who want to
try to teach an alternative kind of civil rights course. To supple-
ment our discussion in this essay, we have provided an appendix
that includes our most recent syllabus.' We are also writing a fol-
low-up essay that is more reflective of our experiences in co-teach-
ing this course and evaluative of our successes and failures. It will
share how we understood and approached the materials, and how
the students reacted to us, to each other, and to the readings.
At the outset, we should say something about the "we" in this
essay. It refers to two individuals who came to the course from
somewhat different directions. Leslie Bender is a white, middle-
class female' who has been teaching for six years. Her teaching and
writing interests are in the areas of feminist and contemporary le-
gal theories, bioethics and torts. Daan Braveman is a white, mid-
dle-class male who has been teaching for fourteen years. His teach-
ing and writing interests lie in the areas of constitutional law,
federal courts, and civil procedure. On a number of occasions, he
has taught a rather traditional civil rights legislation course, using
a published casebook. And for nearly twenty years, he has been
involved in a variety of civil rights cases, representing Native
Americans in lands claim cases and victims of race, sex, and class-
based discrimination. Because our present course developed as a
6. See Appendix infra p. 959.
7. Because issues of race, gender, and class are central to our course, we believe it might
aid our readers to know our race, gender, and class positions. Our struggles about the mean-
ings of including these identifications, and the meanings of what we have left out about
ourselves, will be addressed in our subsequent article about this course.
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result of Leslie Bender's experiences when she first taught a civil
rights course, we begin with her presentation of them as
background.
When I was first approached by the Associate Dean to teach a
civil rights course for the spring of 1990, I was delighted. No other
area of law evokes more passion and commitment from me. I
wanted to share this zeal with my students and, hopefully, en-
courage some of them to choose work in this area when they gradu-
ated. Certainly there was a great deal of work to be done. The re-
cently completed 1989 Supreme Court Term had just pulled the
rug out from under what little civil rights statutory protections re-
mained. I wanted to explore how and why the civil rights struggle
had arrived at this point, so strategies for the future could be
formed.
I began to construct the course from its end. I knew that a
large part of the course would have to be an analysis of the cases
from the disastrous 1989 Term, combined with materials on the
current factual and anecdotal context of civil rights struggles. Be-
cause that would be the final part of the course and the materials
were too recent to be in the casebooks, I realized that I would have
to put together my own reader as a supplement. Then I sought out
an appropriate casebook for the earlier parts of the course. I
looked through available casebooks to see if they could help me lay
the groundwork for understanding the 1989 Term. I hoped to find
one that would help to explore the following questions: How had
the civil rights struggle within the legal system been shaped into
its currently articulated forms in the judicial and public debates?
What were the necessary silent assumptions, rhetorical strategies,
visions of our communities and polity, and workings of our legal
system that swirled together to bring about these decisions and
this way of thinking about civil rights? The civil rights casebooks,
while more than adequate to teach a traditionally conceptualized
civil rights legislation course, were not designed to help answer
these questions. I searched their pages for evidence of passion-for
any fire, whether anger or joy, frustration or hope. And I searched
them for compassion-for feelings or stories about the people
struggling, their lives, their understandings. Instead, I found that
the casebooks systematically presented cases and statutes that il-
lustrated the "elements" of different claims, the procedures, and
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the appropriate defenses." I needed more to find answers to my
questions.
My inclination was to do four things with the course: (1) raise
consciousness about dominant cultural assumptions of race, class,
gender and sexuality; (2) teach students how to analyze critically
important Supreme Court cases and legal approaches to civil
rights; (3) build context through the presentation of fact-based sto-
ries about cases and civil rights struggles in the 1960s as well as
data and examples of current discrimination in the 1990s; and, fi-
nally, (4) familiarize students with the current array of legislative
and administrative responses to perceived civil rights problems,
while they learned to reconceptualize the meaning of "civil rights."
Since most of these goals are different from the goals of typical
classes in law school, I also recognized that I needed to put to-
gether a different kind of collection of materials. The hardest part
was to keep the readings to a manageable amount per class. The
course became "Civil Rights-Readings and Cases on Race, Gen-
der, Class and Sexuality Subordination." In addition to the course
reader I compiled, we read and discussed Professor Derrick Bell's
provocative study of the civil rights struggle in America, And We
Are Not Saved.9
Some parts of the course worked wonderfully. I was very
pleased with the depth and honesty of class discussions, the level
of sharing of personal experiences and stories, the evidence of pas-
sion and caring, the exposure of biases in ourselves and the legal
system, and the students' movement toward development of criti-
cal consciousness.
Students did express grave displeasure with one component of
the course, however. To gain an understanding of the contempo-
rary framework of civil rights legislation, I had added a research
component to the course. I divided the class into groups of about
six students, and each group was assigned to research all the rele-
vant laws and regulations pertaining to some area of civil rights:
employment, shelter, voting, health care, food, education, and in-
carceration. They then compiled a report (similar to a legal memo-
8. Professor Derrick Bell's, Race, Racism and American Law, while closest to some of
the goals of my proposed course, focuses solely on race. Because I also wanted to address
gender, sexuality, and class-based issues, and because Bell's book was quite dated at the
time, I decided to put materials together from scratch. See DERRICK BELL. RACE. RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW (1980).
9. DERRICK BELL. AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987).
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randum or annotation) on the major statutes, regulations and im-
portant case law. Students expressed the general sentiment that
the research projects were overwhelming, too nebulous, and that
they needed more guidance in the particular legislative frameworks
and their practical implications. It seemed clear to me that I would
have to revise that part of the course for the next year.
It was also clear to me that the course would benefit greatly if
a more experienced civil rights litigator participated. I knew that
my colleague Daan Braveman was the right person, if only I could
persuade him to co-teach the course with me. Much to my delight
he agreed. The development of the course thus became a joint ven-
ture, and we continue our discussion of it from our combined per-
spectives. We thought that by presenting the students with our
separate perspectives and experiences and sharing our different ap-
proaches and analyses, we could enrich their understandings. Self-
ishly, we also knew we could enrich our own.
Beginning with the original reader as a base, we reorganized
and restructured the course. We have now taught Civil Rights to-
gether twice and each time it has been different, even though the
core goals and materials have been similar. We have added new
pieces, removed others, rethought different assignments and tried
to limit the amount of reading, so that we had more flexibility to
follow up on discussions. In retrospect, some of our deletions may
have been ill-advised and some additions have not worked. We are
always negotiating with one another about what has to be cut or
added. We usually seem to have too little time to discuss the read-
ings and cover all the issues. Obviously, this course is a work-in-
progress.10
The current version of the course is divided into several major
topic areas: (1) what are civil rights and what is the civil rights
struggle about?;" (2) who "we the people" aren't-historical con-
structions of race, gender and class in constitutional law;' 2 (3)
meanings of privilege and subordination/oppression;13 (4) existing
10. We are pleased to share with you our syllabus for the course in its latest rendition,
see Appendix infra at p. 959, but only with the caveat that it is embryonic, fluid and ever-
changing. We welcome your suggestions, criticisms, and insights to help us improve and
rethink the course.
11. See Appendix infra p. 960.
12. See Appendix infra p. 962.
13. See Appendix infra p. 965.
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civil rights statutes;" (5) analyses of rights-based approaches;'"
and (6) recent civil rights issues and cases."'
To help students focus their thinking about the readings and
to enhance the quality of discussion in class, we require students to
write "reflective essays" on nine of the readings during the term.
Reading these reflective pieces has been one of the joys of this
teaching experience for us. The openness of this format allows stu-
dents to be more expressive than does traditional legal writing.
Often the depth of their sensitivities, range of their talents and
experiences, and their thoughtfulness, confusion, anger and anxiety
are poignantly revealed.
We have had remarkable success requiring students to write
"reflective essays," or "journals," and highly recommend this tech-
nique to teachers in all courses. This technique advantages both
teachers, who get to know their students better, and students,
some of whom may feel uncomfortable speaking in classroom situa-
tions and would not otherwise get an opportunity to share their
thoughts about the material. Sometimes shy or tentative students
are empowered to contribute by reading parts or all of their essays
in class. In our experience, these contributions were often the most
moving and unforgettable aspects of the class. Just reading all the
essays each week is time consuming, but the information one gets
about the students' reactions to the readings is invaluable.
We also require each student to research and write a "case
note" critically analyzing a pre-selected case which arose under a
major civil rights statute." These papers are a substitute for the
research projects that were assigned in the earlier version of the
course. They definitely are an improvement, but we have not been
able to make them work in the ways we want. They seem to enable
the students to learn about the workings of a particular statute,
but generally our students have been hesitant to apply the tech-
niques of critical analysis which they learned in class to the legal
14. See Appendix infra p. 966.
15. See Appendix infra p. 966.
16. See Appendix infra p. 967.
17. The selected cases were: United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d
Cir. 1988); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); UAW
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1986); NOW v. Operation Res-
cue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
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analyses of the assigned decisions.
In the first part of the course," we ask what "civil rights" are
and what the civil rights struggle is about. In preparation for the
first day of class, we assign students three tasks: read the Alice
Walker poem, Silver Writes," with which we started this essay;
study a reproduction of a cubist Picasso painting called Still Life
with Violin and Fruit; and think about the meaning-of the phrase
"civil rights." Students consider what rights ought to be included
under the rubric of "civil rights," the source of these rights, and
the feelings generated by experiences of being denied rights. Dur-
ing the first class students discuss their interpretations of the
poem and painting. We then have a "green light" session where
students collectively generate lists of our "civil rights" and all the
possible sources of these rights. These lists, which are written on
the board, are referred to repeatedly in our class discussions
throughout the term. We also explain to the students why we se-
lected the poem and painting to begin a civil rights course in law
school.
We decided that it was important to spend a class or two at
the outset discussing our goals and techniques, because we recog-
nized that our goals for the class and our forms of pedagogy differ
significantly from those of most of the students' other law school
classes. Therefore, our second and third classes are devoted to
readings and conversations about how people learn, hierarchies
and power in law school classrooms, how curriculum and casebook
choices govern our conceptualizations of what is important in
courses, and how, at times, learning might involve some struggle,
conflict and pain. Although the course readings originally con-
tained excerpts from both Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Op-
pressed20 and from bell hooks, in later years we have limited the
readings to bell hooks' essays, Pedagogy and Political Commit-
ment: A Comment" and Toward a Revolutionary Feminist
Pedagogy,22 both in her collection, Talking Back-Thinking Femi-
nist/Thinking Black. After students have read the assignment,
18. See Appendix infra p. 960.
19. WALKER. .upra note 1. at 335.
20. PAULO FREIRE. PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
21. BELL HOOKS, Pedagogy and Political Commitment: A Comment, in TALKING
BACK-THINKING FEMINIST/THINKING BLACK 98 (1989).
22. BELL HOOKS, Toward a Revolutionary Feminist Pedagogy, in TALKING
BACK-THINKIN. FEMINIST/THINKING BLACK 49 (1989).
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they are asked to write a reflective essay and bring it to the second
class. The class is dedicated to discussing the particulars of bell
hooks' essays and how they relate to our personal learning exper-
iences. The following class is focused more on how we learn in law
school generally, how this course differs from traditional law school
courses, what we hope to do, and why.
In the second part of the course, building on this foundation,
we begin our exploration of how the Constitution, and Supreme
Court interpretations of it, have constructed legal struggles about
race, gender and class. A primary text for many of our discussions
throughout the course is Derrick Bell's And We Are Not Saved."
To begin to raise questions about who "the framers" meant when
they said "we the people,"2 5 we read chapter 1 of Bell's book, enti-
tled The Real Status of Blacks Today: The Chronicle of the Con-
stitutional Contradiction.26 Bell's chronicle invites us to see the
framers through the eyes of Geneva Crenshaw, a prominent black
woman civil rights lawyer who is magically tossed back in time,
landing amidst the "founding fathers" as they are hammering out
the details of our Constitution. Despite her valiant efforts, she can-
not convince these very typical politicians to seek a moral high-
ground outlawing slavery, instead of bargaining away the freedoms
of African Americans to promote the localized interests of "proper-
tied white men." Students reflect in writing upon the story in this
chapter and its relationship to what they had previously learned
about the framers and the Constitution. This is always a wonderful
class. The discussion is lively and emotional. Some students ex-
press deep shock and outrage upon learning what was left out
when they were taught about the Constitution and its origins. In
the first class of this part of the course, we explore the way the
Constitution and its origins are usually taught, how Bell's telling
differs from what we have learned, and we look critically at Bell's
sources.
For the next class, we read a critique of the Constitution's cre-
ation, written by Justice Thurgood Marshall for its bicentennial."
We divide into small groups of about six people for the first half of
23. See Appendix infra p. 962.
24. BELL. supra note 9.
25. U.S. CoNST. pmbl.
26. BELL. supra note 9.
27. Thurgood Marshall, Reffections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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the class to discuss three assigned questions. When we reconvene
as a whole, reporters from each group brief the class on their
group's responses to the questions about whether there was any-
thing Geneva.could have said to make a difference to the framers,
whether there is any continuing importance to the framers' moti-
vations, and what, if anything, lawyers and citizens ought to -do
about altering the dominant national understanding. of our Consti-
tution's origins."
While students are closely reading the full texts of some older
cases about race discrimination in the United States, like Scott v.
Sandford (Dred Scott),29 we spend a few classes viewing segments
of the PBS Series, Eyes on the Prize, parts I & II." This year we
showed the segment about the Attica Prison Massacre3 during the
week of the massacre's twentieth anniversary (and while our local
papers in upstate New York were filled with follow-up stories).
Surprisingly, many of the students have never seen this series, and
it is a moving experience for them. Because the films take the
whole class period, we have tried to schedule additional times in
the day for students to meet with us and each other in groups to
discuss their reactions to the films. We think it would be valuable
to have an optional film series to accompany the course for inter-
ested students. Those films could include the rest of this series,
other documentary films, and popular movies addressing civil
rights issues.
Our next class and reflective essay analyze the full text of the
first part of Dred Scott, in which Justice Taney determines that
African Americans are not citizens under the Constitution. 2 Our
discussion seeks to determine the rhetorical strategies and implicit
assumptions the Court uses to justify the oppression or subordina-
tion of a class of people. We find in the other cases we study as the
course progresses that the patterns we discover in Dred Scott re-
peat themselves, whether they be: discussions of the "nature" of
races, genders, or the poor; rhetoric of family, community and self/
other; "blame the victim"; slippery slopes and counterfactuals; ex-
tolling the "great fathers"; the separation of powers and federal-
ism; or original intent. We analyze word choices, metaphors and
28. See Appendix infra p. 962.
29. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
:10. EYES ON THE PRIZE (Blackside, Inc. 1989).
31. Id.
32. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 427.
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analogies, organizations of arguments, historical and social con-
texts, constructed dichotomies between social realities and political
or legal rights, and reliance on property and economic interests to
curb civil rights. We ask why courts rarely discuss the ethics or
morality of their decisions in their rationales.
Although most students had read excerpts or heard of Dred
Scott, they are uniformly shocked at the blatant *racist language
used by the Supreme Court. Students are also astounded at what
passed for logical legal argument. We look for these same patterns
and additional ones in the full text of the majority opinion and
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson," and excerpts from
several of the opinions in Korematsu v. United States.3" To illus-
trate a more recent replication of the same kinds of denial, implicit
racist assumptions, privileging of property over people, and trivial-
ization of harm, we read City of Memphis v. Greene," where a
majority of the Supreme Court characterizes the establishment of
a barrier blocking travel from a predominantly poor African Amer-
ican neighborhood through a predominantly upper-middle-class
white neighborhood as a minor "inconvenience" rather than as a
symbol of the city's racial discrimination.
Moving from the judicial and constitutional construction of
race to the construction of gender, we read Justice Bradley's con-
currence in Bradwell v. State,3" excerpts from Deborah Rhode's
analysis of gender discrimination case law in her book, Justice and
Gender,37 and the classic Supreme Court rhetoric denying that dis-
crimination against "pregnant people" is sex-based discrimination
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.3 This year we also read chapter
2 of Martha Minow's book, Making All the Difference,3 9 in which
she carefully illustrates five implicit assumptions relating to differ-
ence and gender that are all too often made in law. We timed the
reading of this article to correspond with Professor Minow's lec-
ture at our law school,"' so our students were also able to discuss
this reading with its author.
33. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
35. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128 (1981).
36. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
37. DEBORAH L. RHODE. JUSTICE AND GENDER 92-107 (1989).
38. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
:39. MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 49 (1990).
40. Martha Minow, Address at Syracuse University College of Law (Sept. 20, 1991).
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Our introductory readings on class-based discrimination in-
clude three cases, Dandridge v. Williams,41  Wyman v. James,4 2
and Harris v. McRae," which we subject to the same kinds of scru-
tiny used on the race and gender cases. We also read two articles
relating stories and current data on poverty and class discrimina-
tion: Daan Braveman's Children, Poverty and State Constitu-
tions," which includes an excerpt from Jonathan Kozol's book
Rachel and Her Children," and Theresa Funiciello's poignant arti-
cle about welfare mothers, The Poverty Industry."
We feared that by separating our studies of race, gender and
class we might inadvertently communicate a sense that these cate-
gories were mutually exclusive despite our continued linkages. We
therefore include several essays on the intersections of race, class
and gender, and students are instructed to read and write essays
on a sampling of them. These readings include powerful articles by
Deborah King,47 Audre Lorde," Kimberle Crenshaw,' 9 Regina
Austin" and Lucie White.51 The year before we also included an
important article by Frances Ansley"2 which we may include again
next year.
Part III of the course 3 examines the meanings of privilege and
subordination/oppression. For the first class in this part, we ask
students to write reflective essays based on their experiences rather
than on a required reading. Each student, no matter what her/his
race or gender, writes a reflective essay on what it means to be
41. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
42. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
43. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
44. Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577
(1989).
45. Id. at 584-85.
46. Theresa Funiciello, The Poverty Industry, Ms., Nov./Dec. 1990, at 33.
47. Deborah King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness, in FEMINIST THEORY IN
PRACTICE AND PROCESs 75 (1989).
48. Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER/
OUTSIDER 114-23 (1984).
49. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1989 U.
CHm. LEGAL F. 139.
50. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539.
51. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAw 40 (Fineman &
Thomadsen eds., 1991).
52. Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989).
53. See Appendix infra p. 965.
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white and what it means to be male in our society. The course
materials include two optional readings which students are free to
read for class (but we tell them we hope that they will not read
them until after they write their essays): Marilyn Frye's On Being
White from The Politics of Reality" and a chapter of Kenneth
Clatterbaugh's Contemporary Perspectives on Masculinity."
Many students who are privileged by membership in socially domi-
nant race or gender groups had never before examiried the mean-
ings of their privilege, while some others who were not privileged
in society by race or gender gained insights into how their lives are
impacted by subtle oppression.
Our next several classes explore some strategies for rectifying
the injustices suffered by those who have been traditionally ex-
cluded from the Constitution, from the protections of developing
constitutional law and from social/political/economic privilege. We
read and discuss three chapters in Derrick Bell's book in which he
explores strategies of litigation, revolution, emigration, race-based
reparations, and self-help societies." Bell brilliantly posits situa-
tions to test the efficacy and promise of each strategy. Though
these discussions generate a sense of hopelessness or despair in
many students, they are vital to the end goal of this course, which
is to prepare students to work toward future civil rights victories.
Having examined the constitutional structure, in part IV of
the course" we consider whether civil rights statutes adequately
fill the gaps we have identified in interpretations of who is in-
cluded in "we the people." We begin by considering the source and
scope of congressional power to enact civil rights laws. We read the
Civil Rights Cases" as well as the more recent decision in
Katzenbach v. McClung. 9 With regard to the former, we pay par-
ticular attention not only to the Court's limiting notions of "state
action"60 and the continuing badges of slavery, but also to its con-
struction of "[m]ere discriminations on account of race and
54. MARILYN FRYE, On Being White: Toward a Feminist Understanding of Race and
Race Supremacy, in THE POLITICS or REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 110 (1983).
55. KENNETH CLATTERBAUGH, CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON MASCULINITY: MEN.
WOMEN AND POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY 37 (1990).
56. BELL. supra note 9, at 51, 123, 215.
57. See Appendix infra p. 966.
58. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
59. Katzenhach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
60. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-19.
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color"" as "ordinary civil injury." 2 In discussing Katzenbach, we
focus on the practical and theoretical implications of relying on the
Commerce Clause"' as the source of congressional power to pro-
hibit discrimination." Justice Douglas' concurring opinion raises
the important question of whether we should equate the right of
people to be free from discrimination with the movement of cattle
and goods across state lines." We question how far we have moved
from Dred Scott in the way we think about these issues.
Following the examination of congressional power to prohibit
discrimination, we provide a very brief overview of existing civil
rights statutes. The emphasis here is on "brief." We read a sum-
mary" of the various statutes and, in two lecture-style classes,
highlight the substantive content, the procedures, and the "hot"
issues under each of the laws. Our purpose is not to provide a so-
phisticated understanding of the civil rights statutes, but simply to
alert students to the existence of the provisions.
We devote two classes to the study of section 1983" because of
its importance (now perhaps largely historical) in serving as a vehi-
cle for protecting constitutional rights. We use a hypothetical
based on the highly publicized police brutality case that occurred
in Los Angeles in 1991." The students are assigned to represent
the victim, the city, or the individual officers. To prepare for the
discussion of how they would approach the case on behalf of their
client, they read Monroe v. Pape," Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services," and a chapter from Daan Braveman's book, Pro-
tecting Constitutional Freedoms" that discusses recent judicial
developments restricting the availability of damages under section
1983. The purpose of the exercise is twofold. First, it provides an
opportunity to examine the possible reach of section 1983, as well
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 24.
63. U.S. CONsr. art. I,'§ 8, cl. 3.
64. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301-05.
65. Id. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring).
66. JAMES KUSHNER. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 7-1 to 7-52 (1990).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
68. Hector Tobar & Leslie Berger, Tape of L.A. Police Beating Suspect Stirs Public
Furor; Law Enforcement: Mayor Says He's "Outraged." The Department, FBI and District
Attorney Are Investigating, L.A. TIMES. Mar. 6, 1991, at Al.
69. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
70. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).




as the techniques the Court uses to significantly limit the potential
of that provision and civil rights statutes generally. Second, the ex-
ercise integrates theory and practice. It allows the students to con-
sider such practical matters as who would be sued, where would
the lawsuit be brought, what would be alleged, what kind of relief
would be available, what defenses would be raised, what evidence
would be needed, and how a lawyer would obtain that evidence.
Inevitably our discussion leads to questions about -whether litiga-
tion, with its structured restraints, is a worthwhile vehicle for
pushing the civil rights concerns in the case, and what might be
other alternatives.
Our discussion of congressional attempts to describe and pro-
tect civil rights leads nicely into part V of the course." Here, we
offer an analysis of the Court's various approaches to antidis-
crimination laws and a critique of "rights talk" generally. With re-
spect to the rights critique, we first discuss Mark Tushnet's argu-
ments regarding the instability, indeterminacy, reification, and
political disutility of rights talk73 and Alan Freeman's more specific
critique of civil rights law." We then consider Patricia Williams'
response to the critique in which she discusses and illustrates with
personal and fictional stories the importance of rights talk to those
who are oppressed.76 The students write reflective essays, summa-
rizing each author's position and discussing the usefulness of their
various positions in understanding civil rights problems.
Following the critique of rights, in part VI of the course," we
focus on recent civil rights issues. We begin with an examination of
affirmative action, reading Derrick Bell's chronicle, The Unspoken
Limit on Affirmative Action," an article from Newsweek on pref-
erences for wealthy white children of alumni,78 and the decisions in
the City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 79 and Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC80 cases. We cap these readings with Richard
72. See Appendix infra p. 966.
73. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
74. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407-
41 (1990).
75. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
76. See Appendix infra p. 967.
77. BELL. supra note 9, at 140.
78. Connie Leslie, A Rich Legacy of Preference, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1991, at 59.
79. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
80. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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Delgado's recent article that argues that the nonwhite poor should
look to political solutions to current problems and that their most
logical allies might be those on the principled right."
In most of the remainder of the course, we examine specific
current issues arising under selected civil rights statutes. Earlier in
the semester, the students were divided into eight groups and each
group was assigned a recent civil rights case.82 The students were
asked to write a paper that briefly describes the case, examines the
civil rights laws involved, analyzes the historical development of
the issue, and compares the methods used in constructing the issue
to those used in the cases and materials studied in the course. The
assignment is intended to give students a research experience in
the area of civil rights, enable them to gain a somewhat sophisti-
cated understanding of at least one civil rights statute, and provide
an opportunity to use the critical skills developed during the se-
mester. In the final weeks of the course, each group leads a class
discussion of its assigned case.
We conclude the course by reading and discussing the 1991
Civil Rights Act.83 The students consider specifically its impact, if
any, on the issues they researched, and more generally whether the
Act will lead to any significant improvements for the oppressed.
We also contrast the Act to the proposal in Derrick Bell's story,
The Final Civil Rights Act. 8" Bell describes a fictitious civil rights
law, the "Racial Preference Licensing Act," which allows employ-
ers and owners of public accommodations and dwellings to dis-
criminate on the basis of race and color if they first obtain a li-
cense authorizing the discrimination." In other words, the license
holder would pay the government a substantial fee for the right to
discriminate. The money collected would be placed in an "equity
fund" and used to assist black businesses, home buyers, and stu-
dents. Under the "Racial Preference Licensing Act," those who
discriminated without a license could be sued and subjected to im-
position of damages.86
In the final class we discuss the kind of action that might be
81. Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case
Arguments on Behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929, 1947 (1990).
82. See supra note 17.
83. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
84. Derrick Bell, The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L REV. 597 (1991).
85. Id. at 600-02.
86. Id. at 601.
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taken to address the problems examined in the course. Throughout
the semester we were concerned that much of the material
presented a rather pessimistic picture, lacking the hopefulness of
Alice Walker's poem. We did not want the students to leave the
course thinking that the barriers were necessarily insurmountable.
And so we talk about ways that they (and we) as lawyers, and as
members of a community, could become engaged in efforts to make





Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved (1987).
Civil Rights Reader (Braveman & Bender eds., 1991) (repro-
duced materials).
COURSE REQUIREMENTS
1. This course will involve critical thinking about issues of race,
class and gender. There will be no final exam. Students will be re-
quired to do all the readings, participate in class discussions, write
periodic reflective essays on assigned class readings, and complete
a research paper on a pre-assigned case.
2. Grading:
a. Portfolio/Journal-One-third of your final grade will be
based on your collected reflective essays. Reflective essays expli-
cate the main themes of the reading in the first paragraph and
then contain your thoughts and critiques. Short typewritten essays
are due periodically throughout the course. Please make two copies
and keep one for your records. Each student must turn in every
essay on time (or obtain prior permission from a professor to turn
it in late). Each student will be permitted to skip one of the essay
assignments, so long as s/he notifies us in writing at the time the
assignment is due in class that this is the one essay that s/he has
chosen to skip.
Some essays are based on the readings and others are based on
your reflections and experiences. The essays will be collected in a
portfolio/journal and one final grade will be given on the entire
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RIOTS, RACISM, and the COURTS
I know that you are graduating at a time when the job market
for lawyers is not what it should be -- not what it was a couple
of years ago. Starting salaries seem to have reached their peak,
at least for now, and in some cases have declined. Layoffs are no
longer a term solely in the lexicon of blue collar workers.
Still, the need for lawyers in this country is great, and that
need will continue. Your professional training will always stand
you in good stead. You are among the most fortunate, the most
blessed in this society - and you should be extremely proud of
what you have accomplished thus far. I congratulate each one of
you.
You are graduating at a time of great challenge -- and great
despair. The passing of the Cold War, so massively debilitating
to our economy, should have allowed us to turn our attention
voluntarily to the twin dangers that threaten to destroy America -
- poverty and racism. Politically, given this nation's leadership
in recent years, it is not surprising that we failed to do so.
But now, perhaps too quickly, we have been handed another chance.
We have been shown a glimpse of the future -- of events to come --
riots, racial hatred, armed warfare, and the military occupation
of our cities. We have been given the opportunity to forestall
that future -- to prevent the ugly dissolution of our society. If
we are to seize that opportunity we will have to act forcefully;
we will have to rid ourselves of our pious self-righteousness, our
self-defeating attitude of racial superiority, our thinly
concealed enmity toward all those we consider different. We will
have to deal swiftly with the massive needs of the poor, the
disadvantaged, the disenfranchised -- those we have for so long
denied a fair and equal opportunity.
Doing so would take significant personal sacrifices on all
of our parts. Our alternative, however, is to await the
inevitable -- the separation, by race, of our people into armed
camps, the creation of permanent sub-groups held in a state of
suppression by military might, and the institutionalization of
criminal conduct as the primary form of commercial enterprise in
large parts of our society.
If you think I am exaggerating, look again at the television
and newspaper pictures of an armed Korean-American community in
Los Angeles, its men lining the streets in front of their
businesses carrying rifles or semi-automatic weapons, exchanging
gunfire with members of other minority groups. Look again at the
looters, at the roving groups of blacks and Hispanics. Look again
at the recent report showing that 42% of African American male
residents of our nation's capitol between the ages of 18 and 32
are presently incarcerated, on probation or parole, or awaiting
trial -- are in one way or another involved with the criminal
justice system as "perpetrators". Look again at the flight of
White Americans to the suburbs, at the rapidly declining Caucasian
population in our cities -- Washington, DC 27%, Detroit 20%,
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Atlanta 20%, Newark 14%, and Los Angeles 36%. Despite all the
advances we have made in the area of civil rights, the unthinkable
-- open racial warfare -- is now possible. In fact it is rapidly
becoming more probable. It could well happen here!
And if you think that I am overreacting to recent events in
Los Angeles, that what occurred there is simply that gang members
took advantage of a highly emotional racial occurrence and rioted
and pilfered at will, think again. No-one should have been
surprised when Los Angeles exploded. Over a year ago, at
Stanford, I addressed a group of very conservative law students,
members of the Federalist Society. I quoted a 1989 study by the
National Research Council which said: "We cannot exclude the
possibility of confrontation and violence . . . . The ingredients
are there: large populations of jobless youths, an extensive
sense of relative deprivation and injustice, distrust of the legal
system, frequently abrasive police-community relations, highly
visible inequalities, extreme concentrations of poverty, and great
racial awareness." To this, I added, "the potential for a
recurrence of the urban unrest and riots of the late 1960's is
ever-present. A whole generation of young blacks is being lost.
The divisions between different groups in our society are
widening. Unless we continue to make substantial efforts toward
swift and full integration, we are headed toward disaster."
There is nothing unique about Los Angeles, except that we
prided ourselves on our diversity, trumpeted the success of our
multi-cultural community. Without a doubt, today's Los Angeles
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can be tomorrow's Boston, or Seattle, or Chicago, or Miami, or
Dallas, or New York or San Francisco.
This land was to be a melting pot. Yet in recent years we
have moved toward racial separation, racial isolation.
Integration of the schools - one of our noblest ideals -- has not
produced the results we hoped for. In fact, in some respects, it
never occurred. De jure segregation is no more, but de facto
segregation flourishes. In Los Angeles, the old minority schools
are as heavily minority as they ever were; and so are the new
ones; only 12.5% of the school population is now Caucasian. A
dream of a nation in which race, religion, and national origin
would be irrelevant is rapidly turning into a nightmare of
divisiveness, of separatism, of hyphenates.
The economic prognosis for minorities is grim. Statistics
regarding disparate treatment of blacks in our society are
staggering. Forty-five percent of black children live in poverty,
a figure computed after family assistance and other governmental
benefits are added to household income. While white households
have a median net worth of $39,000, that of black households is
only $3,397 -- one-eleventh of the white median. Contrary to the
mistaken perceptions of those in the present administration,
blacks are not doing well. The economic status of blacks compared
to whites has deteriorated since the 1970s -- and continues to
deteriorate. The rich are getting richer; the poor are getting
poorer. And let me note here, that although my remarks are
principally addressed to the problems confronted by African
Americans, we must be equally aware that Hispanics, native
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Americans, Asians and others are all affected by problems of
their own -- problems that cry out for our attention. You may be
surprised to learn that, according to the latest available, but
still partial, figures, substantially more Hispanics than blacks
were arrested during the recent Los Angeles riots. What that
means, no-one is certain. We do know, however, that thoughtful
people will not attach simplistic labels to all the individuals
involved in the disturbances, or ignore the wide differences in
conduct, past behavior, and motivation that marked the
participants. "Rioters" ranged from hardened professional
criminals, who took advantage of a fortuitous opportunity to
engage in violent criminal conduct and wholesale theft and
burglary, to ordinary law abiding individuals, angered and
frustrated by what they felt to be a grievous demonstration of the
racial injustice that permeates their lives, who suddenly saw
much-needed food and goods readily available and were overwhelmed
by a combination of raw emotions and their conviction that the
majority white society would never treat them fairly or afford
them the opportunity to obtain those necessities by legitimate
means.
As for those high office holders or candidates for high
office who still refuse to understand the need to solve the
underlying problems, and are interested only in trying to escape
the blame for their own failures, or to shift that blame to
others, they are simply ensuring a repetition and escalation of
the violence, on a nationwide scale. Blaming the rioters is easy
-- it's a no-brainer. On the other hand, accepting
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responsibility for our own failures requires a different breed of
person -- a breed we too infrequently find in high public office -
- it requires leaders who possess both courage and compassion.
Well, so much for the general -- now for the particular. I
address you today as fellow members of the legal profession. For
better or for worse, law schools produce most of our nation's
leaders. Some of you may one day serve in political or judicial
office. But I want to speak to the larger group - to all of you
will practice law, private or public, civil or criminal. Most of
us cannot do much about the larger problems that confront our
nation; including the problems of racism and poverty. But each of
us can do something, and in our case, collectively, that can be .a
lot.
There is something crucial lawyers can do - something crucial
lawyers must do. We can and we must restore to the minorities of
this land the belief that they will receive justice in our courts.
If we accomplish nothing else in our lives but to assist in
restoring that faith, we will have helped ourselves, our children
and our nation immeasurably.
Last week a nationwide poll showed that 84% of African-
Americans believe that they do not receive fair or equal treatment
in our courts. To me, that figure is shocking. It means that our
judicial system is failing. We have lost the confidence of those
who most need to believe in the fairness of the judiciary. And,
interestingly, in Los Angeles, approximately half of the Caucasian
population agrees that blacks are not treated fairly in the
justice system.
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Obedience to law is most likely to occur when'there is
respect for the legal system - .for its fairness, for its sense of
equality. Respect for the courts is essential to the survival of
a peaceful and democratic society. Without that respect only
brute force can command obedience. Practically, we cannot, in
this nation, enforce law by might. There are simply not enough
policemen, not enough National Guardsman, not enough regular
troops to perform that job adequately. So we are compelled, like
it or not, to maintain respect for law, for our courts, by our
deeds. We must demonstrate that our courts stand for justice or
we must face the consequences.
Why do 84% of African-Americans believe as they do - why do
they lack confidence in our courts. Why do they think that the
courts are not concerned with their needs, their aspirations?
What is most disturbing about this distrust of the judicial system
is that only a few years ago it was the federal courts - and
particularly the Supreme Court of the United States - that offered
the greatest hope to our minorities. It was the United States
Supreme Court that acted to end segregation in this country when
neither the executive nor legislative branch had the will or the
courage to do what common sense and the Constitution demanded. It
was the United States Supreme Court, dedicated to the expansion of
individual rights and liberties, that said that this nation could
no longer continue on a course of inequality, that all Americans
must be treated fairly under the law, that governmentally
sponsored racial separation must end. And in an unbroken series
of far-reaching decisions the federal courts, led by Chief Justice
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Earl Warren, expanded the rights of all citizens, helped transform
this nation into a land in which African Americans for the first
time were afforded the full rights of citizenship, a land in which
our Constitution flourished. Until a few years ago, African
Americans with problems knew they could look to the federal courts
for help -- they knew they would find a sympathetic audience, that
their interests would be protected -- that the civil rights laws
of our nation would be vigorously enforced.
All that has changed. The message the new Supreme Court has
delivered to the minority communities is clear. We no longer
care. We have other concerns. Look elsewhere for help. In 1989,
in a series of five major civil rights decisions, the Court let
the minorities know of its attitude toward civil rights laws.
The Rehnquist Court made it far more difficult for minorities to
win discrimination cases, while making it much easier for white
males to challenge the legality of consent decrees. In doing so,
the Court clearly turned away from its historic role as the
protector of the civil rights of minorities. The Rehnquist
Court's decisions were so out of step with the will of the people
and the understandings of the other branches of government, that
Congress drafted a bill to reverse a number of its cases. That
bill became the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991. Ultimately,
President Bush was forced to sign it. The Supreme Court's Civil
Rights decisions made one thing evident to all. A judicial
revolution has occurred -- a revolution that will not easily be
reversed. A Court that once served the poor, the oppressed, the
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disadvantaged now has entirely different clients, entirely
different interests, an entirely different agenda.
The Supreme Court continued on its anti-civil rights course
this term. In Presley v. Etowah County, the Court overruled the
Justice Department, the agency charged with administering the
voting rights laws -- one of the very few times in recent years
this pro-Government Court has refused to respect the
interpretation of a statute made by the responsible governmental
agency. African Americans in Etowah County had, for the first
time in recent memory, accumulated enough political strength to
elect a black to their county board of supervisors. Whites
responded by removing all power to make decisions regarding their
respective districts from individual supervisors and giving that
power to the predominantly white board as a whole. The Supreme
Court held that the Voting Rights Act had nothing to do with this
matter. Is it any wonder blacks believe they are not treated
fairly in our courts?
And civil rights decisions are not the only cases in which
the Rehnquist Court has demonstrated its hostility to the pursuit
of individual rights in federal courts. The Court has erected a
series of procedural barriers - some in the name of federalism -
that serve to limit the opportunity of minorities and poor people
to have their grievances redressed. Concepts such as mootness,
ripeness, abstention, standing have been employed to close off
access to the federal courts and to deny federal remedies to
people whose constitutional rights have been violated -- doctrines
of exhaustion, procedural default and collateral estoppel are
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regularly invoked against individuals with legitimate grievances.
Illustrative of these procedural techniques is the Court's
decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons. Lyons held that a black victim
of an LAPD police chokehold could not sue to bar further use of
that illegal technique because he could not prove that he would be
choked again. Of course, Lyons was not the only one who could not
meet that standard. No-one else could either. There are numerous
other illustrations of the Court's use of procedural obstacles to
bar meritorious claims. To name just two, class actions have been
drastically limited, and attorneys fees, which often make it
possible for civil rights actions to be brought, look like they
may well be next.
After Lyons came McCleskey v. Kemp. In McCleskey, the Court
said, openly and unashamedly, that institutional racism in our
courts is of no consequence as far as individual black defendants
are concerned. Unless a black man about to be executed can prove
that racism was the specific cause of his conviction or sentence
-- another standard that can rarely if ever be met -- the Court
will not consider a challenge based on the fact that blacks are
treated differently from whites, no matter how persuasive the
evidence is. Sophisticated African Americans knew what this
meant, and the word passed down to others quickly. The circle had
closed. For as African Americans understood only too well, when
race is a general element in the punishment of a black, the courts
will ignore it; when it is a specific element in his
victimization, juries all too often will refuse 'to acknowledge
that fact. Many jurors, like the rest of us, prefer to pretend
-10-
that racial prejudice simply does not exist -- particularly their
own.
To reiterate, what the African American community perceived
from the Supreme Court's decisions was that the federal judiciary
is no longer interested in protecting the rights of minorities,
that federal judges are far more concerned with protecting the
interests of white males. To the minorities and particularly to
black Americans, this was a bitter blow. The age of Earl Warren,
William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall was the golden age of Civil
Rights. Minorities were given the feeling that someone cared -
that government cared - that the law was on their side.
Understandably, with the Rehnquist Court in full sway, they no
longer believe that. Their earlier belief gave them hope. Their
current belief leads only to despair -- and to disrespect for the
law.
It is not, of course, only the radical change in the Supreme
Court that has contributed to the shocking poll figures. The
survey was taken shortly after the Rodney King verdict. The
reaction of African Americans to the verdict was overwhelming --
and was reflected in more than polls. As law-abiding citizens, we
cannot condone the riot, but we can understand the feelings of all
those who live in America's ghettos.
There are other aspects of our laws and sentencing procedures
that have undermined the faith of minorities in the judicial
system - the disparity between sentences involving crack, a
substance used principally by minorities, and cocaine, a favorite
of wealthy Caucasians - the harshness of some of our other
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narcotics laws and their disparate impact on young, unemployed
black males - the disparity in treatment of the types of offenses
most frequently committed by minorities and those in which
Caucasians are most often the perpetrators - between lenient
sentences for white collar fraud or theft of millions, and harsh
punishment for more traditional crimes involving far smaller
amounts of money or property. And while the large majority of
African Americans are strongly opposed to criminal conduct of any
kind, they know that most of the minority youth who turn to crime
have never had the opportunities or the advantages enjoyed by the
average white American.
There is a final overriding reason why blacks lack
confidence in the federal courts. By their appointments,
Presidents Reagan and Bush have ensured that the federal courts
will not be representative. Instead, they are a bastion of white
America. They stand as a symbol of white power. I will report
only on the courts I am most familiar with -- the federal
appellate courts, the second highest courts in the land. Because
blacks were rarely appointed to so rarified a position in the past
-- only Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson had made any such
appointments -- President Carter made a Herculean effort to
redress the existing inequity when he took office. In 1976, there
were only two black federal appellate judges on the bench.
President Carter appointed a total of 56 judges to the federal
appellate court -- 9 were blacks -- sixteen percent! Starting in
1980, however, Presidents Reagan and Bush dramatically reversed
the course once more. In his eight years in office President
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Reagan made a total of 83 appointments to the federal courts of
appeal. During that time he succeeded in finding only one black
he deemed worthy of appointment. George Bush, with 32
appointments thus far, has also been able to locate only one
African-American he thought qualified to serve -- in his case,
guess who - Clarence Thomas -- and now that Justice Thomas has
been rewarded with an even higher office because of his
outstanding legal abilities, there are no black Bush appointees on
the Courts of Appeals. In President Bush's view, Clarence Thomas
is apparently all there is out there. Clarence Thomas is black
America to our President. In 12 years Bush and Reagan have
appointed a total of 115 federal appellate court judges. Only two
of them were African-Americans. And as the Carter judges age in
years, we can expect the now extremely low percentage of African-
American appellate judges to diminish even further -- a sorry
indictment of the federal judiciary -- but more important, one
more compelling explanation of why African Americans have so
little confidence in our legal system. Incidentally, the figures
for Hispanics, Asians, and Native-Americans are even worse. But
you get the picture by now -- even if those who most need to
understand do not -- and I don't want to depress you further on
graduation day.
I do not mean to suggest that the courts are the principal
cause of all of today's problems -- or even of the civil
disturbance.we have recently experienced. There is plenty of
blame for all of us to share - Caucasians and African Americans,
rioters and non-rioters alike. Certainly the political leaders
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of this nation must accept a large measure of responsibility for
our failure. Their policy of "malignant neglect" is coming home
to roost. Also, as I have said, I am not here to suggest that you
as lawyers can, by yourselves, remedy the problems of poverty and
racism-- problems which so often seem wholly intractable. I am
here instead to suggest that there are things you can do to help
alleviate these problems as you enter upon your professional life
- as you begin the careers you have worked so hard to realize.
I suggest that you can do your part to ensure that all
individuals are treated with dignity and with respect. You can
insist that the laws be administered fairly and equally and that
the judicial system function in a just manner. When you see an
injustice, you can speak out, you can complain to the Bar
Association, you can notify the Commission on Judicial
Performance, you can file an action. You must remember at all
times that you are a part of a profession with a particular
responsibility, a responsibility to see that fairness and justice
is done, that equal treatment under law prevails. You more than
anyone can ensure that young African Americans have reason to
regain confidence in our legal system, in our laws, our courts and
our judges.
It will take time, but you can help change the underlying
philosophy that presently guides our judiciary. You can help
restore to both the federal and state courts a fundamental concern
for individual liberties and individual rights. You can breathe
fresh meaning into our Constitution. As our judicial philosophy
changed once, so it can change again. History will long remember
-14-
the era of Chief Justice Earl Warren. History will record that
time as a noble period. And history will also record the time
when we return to that judicial philosophy - a philosophy of
concern, of compassion, of understanding, of tolerance for all.
History will record the efforts of those of you, who by your
dedication to law and justice, help restore to us our true
Constitutional values. That is your challenge and your
opportunity. I hope for all our sakes that you succeed.
-15-
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The handwritten words were
heartfelt and simple, and they
touched me deeply. A law professor
wrote this to me on the day after the
Rodney King verdict, during the riots
in IUs Angeles:
"If it has not always been so, the
issue of race is now at the heart of
problems of American justice.
"It is my observation
that over the last 10 to 12
years in particular, the
justice system in Amer-
ica, as it is perceived by
non-whites,isoneofinstitu-
tional racism.
"There is a great risk
that minorities in the
United States will lose all
confidence in the admini-
stration of justice."
He then related his
personal experience as the
father of a son he identi-
fied as half-black
"He is handsome, en-
gaging and lettered. An
infantry veteran, he is a
college student with solid
grades and career aspira-
tions. He dresses well and
is soft-spoken.
"In spite of this, his
mother and I live with the
fear that he might have
any contact, however rou- Racism
tine, with the justice sys- just as
tem. His blackness, we
have learned, will cause
him to be scarred and
used badly.
"If this is true for a well-
schooled, middle-class black, what
can it be like for individuals who are
more vulnerable?"
A Time to Act
The tone of his letter was not
despairing, but showed determina-
tion to improve the system and
awaken colleagues in our profession
to the urgency of the task:
"In my career I resolve to do
more to address this issue. But I
must say-hence this letter-that
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we lawyers need to speak through
our professional associations. My ex-
perience tells me that the worst
thing is to do nothing. Let us not sit
by, allowing this issue to fester."
The professor was not alone in
voicing these sentiments. Numerous
personal statements in the media by
black lawyers, professors and other
professionals expressed similar dis-
may and frustration.
As a father, I could not help but
be moved by my correspondent's
fears for his son and by the other
personal stories. They should bring
home to us all the dismay and
frustration that our minority col-
leagues feel about the justice system.
lawyers in Los Angeles and other
communities who have come forward
to offer their help to those who must
deal with our justice system.
I am equally proud of the many
leaders.of state and local bar associa.
tions and ABA entities who have
urged me to pull together an agenda
for sustained activity by American
lawyers to address the issues of
racism in our justice system.
At its May meeting, the associa-
tion's Board of Governors approved a
small task force to do just that, and I
am confident that, by working with
all the groups, both within the bar
and outside of it, we will have a
beginning agenda to present prior to
Is the central moral problem of our society today. And It is
obvious that the white majority of our nation and the legal
profession are not doing enough to solve It.
We must listen again, this time
more closely, to each other about the
shortcomings of our justice system
that are so painfully obvious today,
but had been obscured in our preoc-
cupation with other matters.
Racism is the central moral
problem of our society today. And it
is just as obvious that the white
majority of our nation and the legal
profession are not doing enough to
solve it.
Since the Rodney King verdict
and the tragic events that followed
that verdict, I have been proud of the
the ABA's Annual Meeting in August
in San Francisco.
I know that we must begin
anew to pick up the challenge to
bring justice to all Americans, no
matter their race, gender, religion or
economic condition. And there is no
group more able to do something
than America's lawyers.
As a black law professor stated
in Newsweek, "Now it's time for some
white people to step up and say
enough is enough. If they don't, it
means they don't care enough. It's
that simple. U
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ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES: INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SUPREME COURT
Richard I. Goldsmith*
William C. Banks**
During the late 1960's, the American people became increasingly
aware of the scope and complexity of environmental problems' and of
the failure of states2 and the common law' to protect environmental
quality. Responding to this emerging awareness, the ninety-first Congress
enacted legislation that dramatically expanded the federal role in envi-
ronmental protection: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. The authors
wish to thank Ronna Cohen and Michael Werner, members ol the class of 1983 of Syiacusc
University College of Law, for their research assistance.
1. The new environmental movement encompassed a wide range of beliefs and back-
grounds: young and old, liberals and conservatives, humanists and scientists all signed on
to the movement. See Means. The New Conservative, NAT. HisT., Aug. 1969, at I1.
By 1970. more than 140 national organizations provided a framework for a more vocal
and more informed constituency. Main. Conservationists at the Barricades. FORTUNE. Feb.
1970. at 144. Membership in the Sierra Club doubled to 90.000 during 1968 and 1969.
Gilman, Private Interests and Public Lands. CURRENT HisT., July 1970, at 36. The Wil-
derness Society tripled their roster to 60,000 during the 1960's. Id. Rapid growth in these
and other groups, such as the lzaak Walton League, the National Wildlife Fedcration. and
the National Audubon Society, reflected a growing public awareness and concern about
the environment. Id. Mineral King, DDT. the Santa Barbara oil spills, the ozone layer, all
became household words.
2. Even at the state level, however, statutes specifically designed to protect the
environment were few and far between. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY. ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY - 1970, at 53-54 (1970) (1st Annual Report). Where the disaienitics of
urban or industrialized life became intolerable, they were most often dealt with as land-use
matters, thus falling within the province of local governments. See. e.g.. J. KRIER & E.
URsIN. POLLUTION AND POLICY 54-56 (1977). Although a few states had created indepen-
dent agencies to deal with the growing problem of pollution, these agencies remained under-
funded, under-staffed, and largely bereft of legislative guidance. Id. at 83-85. Lacking an
understanding of the nature or magnitude of environmental problems, those early state
agencies were poorly equipped to safeguard environmental resources. See Ackerman &
Hassler. Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act. 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1475-76
(1980).
3. Although private tort law was available to victims of environmental injuries, these
doctrines were ill-suited to cope with the environmental problems of a technologically
sophisticated post-industrial society. Hines. Nor Any I)rop to Drink: Regulaioni J Wat,r
Quality, Part I: State Pollution Control Program., 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 196-201
(1966) (inadequacies of private remedies). Litigation was cumbersome, costly, and slow.
and its rules on burden of proof created strong disincentives to the policing of civiromieital
quality through private suits. See id.
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(NEPA),' the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,' and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). 6
Congress adopted two distinctly different approaches in designing
these early environmental statutes. Whereas NEPA required the federal
government to function as an environmental planner,' the Clean Air
Amendments and OSHA required the federal government to function as
an environmental regulator.8 Nevertheless, all three statutes reflected a
substantive Congressional commitment to preserving environmental qual-
ity to the greatest extent practicable or feasible."
From the beginning, this commitment to nondegradation has had its
critics.1o In the main, they have viewed environmental problems as eco-
nomic ones. Acknowledging that environmental goods, such as clean air
or water, are poorly allocated by existing markets, they have nonetheless
argued that federal environmental laws produce "too much" environmen-
tal protection because the benefits of a statute need not be shown to
exceed the costs." Congress has found this argument unpersuasive for
at least three reasons. First, it has recognized that performing meaningful
cost-benefit analysis requires more information than is currently avail-
able.' 2 Second, as a matter of policy, Congress has decided to incur the
4. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. H* 4321-4347 (1976)); see
S. RLP. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642(Supp. IV 1980)); see S. REP. No. 1196. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). reprinted in I A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTs of: 1970. at 401 (1974).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678(1976)); see S. REP. No. 1282. 91st Cong., 2d Sess.. reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Nt:ws 5177, 5178-81.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 21-32.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 156-69.
9. This commitment is fundamental 4o the statutes. Regarding NEPA. see 42 U.S.C.4331(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); S. REP. No. 296. supra note 4, at 9; Aberdeen & Rockfish
R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U. 289, 331 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("NEPA is more
than a technical statute of administrative procedure. It is a commitment to the preservation
of our natural environment."). Regarding the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, see Hines.
.4 Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of
Clean Air and Clean Water. 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 660-97 (1977). Regarding OSHA. see
29 U.S.C. § 651t(b)(5) (1976).
10. See generally R. STEWART & J. KRIER. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 37-96 (2d ed. 078).
11. See A. KNEESE. ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 108-11 (1977); Roberts,
The Pohtica( Economy of Implementation: The Clean Air Act and Stationary Sources, in
APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978); Note, OSHA:
After American Petroleum Institute: A Proposed Regulatory Budget 33 STAN. L. REV.
917 (1981). See also Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Enviroaniental
Circanogens. 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86. 103-13 (1980) (although use of quantitative
techniques may be useful for making priority classifications, (ulse of quantitative risk
assessments to set standards . . . may induce less aggressive health protection." Id. at
II2.) But see Baram. Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and
Em iromaental Regulatory Decisionnaking. 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980) (the use of cost-
benefit analysis in making environmental decisions may not be appropriate or desirable).
12. See S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 5, at 1. reprinted in I A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
01 tm1L CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS Of 1970, at 1 (1974); Hines, supra note 3, at 651-52.
knowable, present-day costs of too much environmental protection,
rather than to risk the unknowable, future costs of too little." Third, it
has chosen to legislate in pursuance of goals othqr than economic effi-
ciency. 4 Protecting public health and minimizing environmental degra-
dation, to the extent practicable or feasible, thus constitute the substan-
tive cornerstones of federal environmental legislation."
On the few occasions when it has reviewed these statutes, the Su-
preme Court has generally construed them in a manner that reflects a
greater sympathy for the position of the critics of non-degradation than
for the policies adopted by Congress. Parts I and II of this article examine
several cases in which the Court has seemingly failed to perceive the
basic substantive content of federal environmental law. Part I analyzes
the Court's recent, disappointing treatment of NEPA in Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen." Then, Part II considers the Court's
handling of regulatory programs in two Clean Air Act decisions, Train:
v. Natural Resources Defense Council" and Union Electric v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 8 and two OSHA decisions, the so-called
Benzene'9 and Cotton Dust2o cases. These cases collectively reveal a
disturbing pattern in the Court's approach to federal environmental law.
They cannot be understood simply as instances of the misconstruction
of statutes admittedly difficult to comprehend; rather, as Part III pro-
poses, they reveal a hostility to environmental values and a failure to
appreciate the institutional role that courts must play in protecting them.
1. NEPA IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. NEPA's Path of Frustration
The contrast between NEPA's reception in the lower federal courts
and its reception in the Supreme Court has been dramatic. Within a few
years of NEPA's enactment, the lower courts had developed an elaborate
13. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 5, at 3, 9-11. reprintedin IA LEGISLATIVE illsTORY
OF THE CLEAN Ala AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 403, 409-11.
14. See generally Sagoff. Economic Theory and Environmental La., 79 Mici. 1..
Rev. 1393, 1396 (1981) (in environmental legislation Congress decided to require better than
an economically optimal level of pollution: "Laws like the Endangered Species Act flou
[the] conception of economic efficiency.") (footnote omitted).
15. Although Congress extensively revised the Clean Air Act in 1977. it withdrew
none of the substantive commitments made in 1970. See R. STtWARr & J. KRIER, supra
note 10. at 501. Section 101(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendmients of
1972, 33 U.S.C. 1 1251 (1976), incorporated these same couniliments. See R. SITwAuI &
J. KRIER, supra, at 505.
16. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
17. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
18. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
19. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrolkui Inst., 448 U.S. t>07 (1980).
20. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
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body of judicially enforceable doctrine2' designed to assure that "impor-tant legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, [were] notlost or misdireced in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.""fhe courts accomplished this, in the main, by rigorously enforcing NE-PA's section 102(2)(c), which requires the preparation of an environmen-tal impact statement (EIS) for "all major Federal actions . .. significantly
affecting the human environmeht."n' By 1975, when the Supreme Courthanded down its first major NEPA decision," the lower courts had beenvigorously implementing NEPA for half a decade, and had become the
source of NEPA's success."25
In the Supreme Court, the Act has fared far worse. Although theCourt has decided only seven NEPA cases to date,"2 each of thosedecisions read the Act ungenerously, and reversed a court of appealsdecision that had found a federal agency to be in default of its NEPAobligations. 2'
Although the effect of this line of Supreme Court cases is difficultto gauge, NEPA supporters insist that it has been negligible.2 0 Conced-edly, no single decision of the Court appears to require the lower courtsto renounce their enforcement role. The Court has written its decisions
21. See. e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449F 2d I109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see generally F. ANDtasoN, NEPA IN THE CouRTs: A LEGALANALYSIS OF T'HE NATIONAL ENVIRONMIENTAL POLICV ACT (1973); R. LiROFF. A NA-IiONAL PoLicy FOR rHE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND Ius AFTERMATH (1976).22. 449 F.2dat [Ill.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
24. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).25. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1975) (Marshall. J.. concurring in partmid dissenting in part).
26. Weinberger v. Catholic Action. 102 S. C. 197 (1981); Strycker's Bay Neighbor-hood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979);Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc., 435U.S. 519 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v, ScenicRivers Assn. 426 U.S. 776 (1976): Aberdeen & Rocklish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289(1975).
27. Catholic Action v. Biown. 643 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1980). rev'd tand reninded subnoon. Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981); Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 392d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S.223 (1980); Siora Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978). rev'd. 442 U.S. 34711979); Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir.1976) and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear RegulatoryComm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), consolidated, rev'd, and rended suab noin.Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435L.S. 519 (1978); Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd and
mameanded sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976);Sacrra Club v. Morton. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). revd and renuindesd sub anon. Kleppe< Sicrra Club. 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Students Challenging Regulatoiy Agency ProceduresI United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974). rea'd sub num. Aberdeen & Rocklishk 1. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975).28. -Se. e g., Rodgers. A Hard Look at Verina Yankee: Em-ironaental Law Underlow St tiny, 67 GEO. L . 699. 726-27 (1979) (arguing that the effect of Vernwnt Yankee
likely im be negligible).
as if they involved little more than straightforward application of con-
ventional doctrine. Few would quarrel, for example, with the observation
that "NEPA does not repeal by implication any other statute;" 9 that in
reviewing agency compliance with NEPA a court should not "substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences
of its actions;"" or that NEPA does not compel an agency "Ito] elevate
environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations."', Col-
lectively, however, the Court's decisions do more than reiterate these
basic principles of administrative law and statutory construction. By
consistently expressing disapproval of an active role for the federal courts
in the enforcement of NEPA, the Court has undermined substantive
principles underlying the statute. The most damaging decision in this
regard is probably Strycker's Bay Neighboirhood Cosunil r. Karln.
where it declared that NEPA's "mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural.""
If our reading of the lower court cases since Sirycker's Bay is correct,
the Supreme Court's mood has begun to register; today the courts are
enforcing NEPA with diminished rigor." This judicial retreat has pri-
marily taken the form of a contraction in the scope of judicial review.14
29. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289. 319 (1975).
30. Klcppc v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
31. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
32. Id. at 227 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519. 558 (1978)).
33. NEPA decisions of the lower courts since Strycker's Bay commonly include an
almost talismanic recitation of the deference supposedly due administrators. regardless of
whether the lawsuit challenges the merits of the administrative decision n question, see,
e.g., Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982); North Slope Borough v. Andrus,
486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1979). aff'd in pars, rev'd in part. 642 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
the adequacy of an agency's environmental impact statement (EIS), see, e.g., leauk Walton
League of America v. March, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Save Lake Washington v.
Frank, 641 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). Southern La. Envil. Council. Inc. v. Sand. 629 F.2d
1005 (5th Cir. 1980); Citizens for Balanced Env't and Transp., Inc. v. Secretary ofTransp.,
515 F. Supp. 151 (D. Conn. 1980). qff 'd, 650 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1981): National Indian
Youth Council v. Andrus. 501 F. Supp. 649 (D.N.M. 1980). ajJ'd suib non. National Indian
Youth v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981); National Center for Preservation of Law v.
Landrieu, 496 F. Supp. (D.S.C. 1980), aff'd 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1980). o the ;agency's
failure to write an EIS, see, e.g.. Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce. 667 F.2d 851 (90h
Cir. 1982); Aerisen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd. 637 F.2d 12 (1st
Cir. 1980).
A few judges, most notably Judge Skelly Wright and Judge David Bazelon, continue
to resist this trend toward rubber-stamp review. See Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (13izelon,
J.); People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Conin'n, 678
F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wright, J.); see also Ashcroft v. Departineni of Ainny Corps of
Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mo. 1980), aff d. 672 F.2d 1297 (8th Ci. 1982).
34. To be sure, this reduction has not been explicit. in assessing the scope ol review.
however, verbalisms can be especially beguiling. As Justice Frankfuriter once put it: -ahe
precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisonLied within
any form of words .... . Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Rclusions lid., 340
U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
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Even while retaining the verbal formulae for judicial review under NEPA
- the tests of "hard look" or "close scruliny" 9 - those tests are now
being applied differently.5 Indeed, under the influence of Strycker's Bay,
some of the lower courts now seem to be reviewing agency action under
NEPA far less closely than they review other types of agency action."
This extreme deference to the federal bureaucracy invites the mockery
of NEPA that the lower federal courts refused to allow during the first
stage of N EPA's implementation."' Whether Strycker's Bay actually re-
quires this result is an important question.
B. Strycker's Bay
Sirycker's Bay arose out of a proposal to amend an urban renewal
plan for a twenty-block area of Manhattan's Upper West Side. The
amendment redesignated an undeveloped site ("site thirty") as the loca-
35 Rodgers, supra note 28, at 701-08.
36. Before Sirycker's BaY, a court might have concluded that an agency had failed
to take a hard look" at the environmental consequences of its action if the court were not
persuaded that the agency's action was reasonable. See generally Leventhal. Environmental
Deciiotimukiig and the Role of Courts. 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 528 (1974) ("in my view
the 'hard look' metaphor requires more than subjective good faith, which would be essen-
tially untestable .... ). Any such decision would, of course. have been an exercise in
substantive" review. See Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Sibstantive
Review Under NEPA, 88 HAKV. L. REv. 735, 740 n.31 (1975).
Today the courts seem far less willing to employ this technique. See supra note 33.
Only the Eighth Circuit persists in examining the reasonableness of the agency action in
question. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Department of Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 660(W.D. Mo. 1980). aff'd. 672 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1982). In other circuits, review focuses
instead on evidence. such as an EIS. that demonstrates that the agency at least considered
the environmental consequences of its action. See, e.g., Save Lake Washington v. Frank,
641 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1981); Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n. 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Citizens for Balanced Env't and Transp.. Inc. v.
Secretary of Transp.. 515 F. Supp. 151 (D. Conn. 1980). qff 'd, 650 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1981).
Implemented this way, the "hard look" test might be more aptly called the "soft glance"
test. See Rodgers, supra note 28. at 701-07.
37. Agency actions are generally reviewed under the criteria set forth in Citizens to
Preserve OIerton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), which established a three-stage
process. Having determined first that an agency has acted within the scope of its authority.
id. at 415-16, and second that it has considered all of the relevant factors, id. at 416, a
court must go on to determine "whether there has been a clear error in judgment," id.
Although the standard of review is narrow - the court is not permitted to substitute itsjudgment for that of the administrator - the last stage is nonetheless important because
there the court must determine whether the balance that the agency struck among the
relevant factors" is consistent with the legislative design. Indeed, in Overion Park the
action in question was set aside precisely because the agency had given too little weight
to environmental values. See isfra text accompanying notes 261-65. It is thus ironic for
,umtis to end review of agency action under NEPA at the second stage, which is the result
it they focus solely on whether the agency has "considered" the environmental conse-
quences of its action. See supra note 35.
38. See generally F. ANDERSON, .supra note 21; K. Ltitoff, supra note 21.
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tion of a high-rise building containing 160 units of low-income housing. 9After HUD approved the amendment, nearby residents sued. The plain-
tiffs alleged that an influx of low-income residents would trigger an ex-
odus of middle-income residents, thus "tipping" the neighborhood and
violating the 1968 Fair Housing Act." The residents also contended that
HUD had violated NEPA by approving the amendment without first
preparing an environmental impact statement, or otherwise having con-
sidered alternatives to the action.4 1
I. The Lower Court Proceedings
The district court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
area was in danger of being tipped, and thus rejected, the plaintilff's
Housing Act claims.4z For largely the same reason, it upheld HUD'sdetermination not to prepare an EIS. 3 HUD had concluded that com-
munity anxiety over prospective residents was not, in and of itself, an
"environmental" impact within the meaning of NEPA and, therefore, noEIS was required because the proposed amendment to the urban renewal
plan would not "significantly affect the quality of' the human'
environment.""
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to HU D.4 1The court held that although no environmental impact statement was
39. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044. 1056 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
Intended as a model of racial and economic integration in urban renewal. the pioposalcalled for the construction of 2500 low-income housing units to acconmodate residcits ofthe area who had been displaced when renovation had begun. Id. at 1051-52. It envisioned
that these units would be contained in high-rise buildings that would themselves be eco-
nomically integrated, with 70% middle-income tenants and 30% low-income tenants. Id. at1049-50. 1059. Implementation progressed satisfactorily for a few years, but by the laite1960's rising construction costs had made it uneconomical for the city to provide the
contemplated number of low-income housing units in primarily middle-income buildings.Id. at 1054. Thus arose the need for the low-income units proposed for site thirty.40. See id. at 1063-75; Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
41. F. Supp. at 1075.
When an agency proposes a major federal action significantly affecting the quality ofthe human environment, it must prepare an EIS. which, among other things, includes adetailed description of alternatives to its proposal. NEPA, § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C.I 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1976). This alternatives provision has been called "the linchpin of the
entire impact statement." Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693.697 (2d Cir. 1972). Section 102(2)(E) of the Act adds further emphasis to the consideration
of alternatives by requiring that all federal agencies "isitudy, develop, and describe appro-priate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C.I 4332(2)(E) (1976) (initially I 102(2)(D), redesignated as (Ll) by Pub. .. No. 94-83 (Aug19, 1975)). See W. RoDGERs, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 7.9. at 792-98 (1977).42. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Roniney, 387 F. Supp. 1044. 1075 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
43. Id. at 1075-83.
44. Id. at 1079.
45. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
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required; NEPA nevertheless did require that the agency consider pos-
sible alternatives to the proposed change of site." Subsequently, the
agency reaffirmed its decision to amend the plan and buttressed its con-
clusion with a 200 page report, which included an evaluation of a wide
range of alternatives.41 The district court again upheld HUD's decision,
finding that the agency had glet all of its obligations under NEPA.aM
On the second appeal, the Second Circuit did not disagree with this
finding; it wrote that HUD's "careful analysis of the various sites has
shown that it has given 'consideration' to alternatives." 9 Nevertheless,
this time the court examined "the merits" of HUD's decision and set it
aside as arbitrary and capricious"' under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).5'
TheSecond Circuit's explanation of how HUD's action violated the
APA was at best unclear. At one point the court invoked "provisions of
NEPA" that purportedly "contain the substantive standards necessary to
review the merits of agency decisions under the APA."12 The court
apparently found in these provisions a commitment to the dispersal of
low income housing that was violated per sr by HUD's action." Else-
where in the opinion, the court implied that federal housing legislation,
rather than NEPA, supplied the applicable standards.14 After noting that
HUI) had found- that an alternative site could be superior from the
"standpoint of social environmental impact,"" but had approved site
thirty anyway to avoid additional construction delays, 6 the court
observed:
46. Id. at 93. While the court of appeals agreed that HUD was not obliged to prepare
an EIS, it held that section 102(2)(D) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976). imposed
an independent obligation to "tsltudy, develop and describe" alternatives to the proposed
action. 523 F.2d at 93.
47. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris. 445 F. Supp. 204, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
The agency deemed none of the alternatives that it examined acceptable. Although it
acknowledged that the high rise could bc built on another site. id.. with a less drastic
social environmental impact." Karlen v. Harris. 590 F.2d 39. 42 (2d Cir. 1978). it found
that a change in sites would delay construction of the much needed low-income housing
units by two years and that the costs of this delay outweighed the benefits, Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 226 (1980).
48.1'frinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
rev'd sub iom. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978). rev''d sub nom. Strycker's
Bay Neigiborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
Characterizing the agency's report as an "exhaustive" and "very illuminating and
factual discussion of all appropriate options." the district court concluded that "HUD gave
careful and detailed attention to all the environmental factors," that it performed its con-
sideration of alternatives "with good faith objectivity." and that its decision was *neither
arbitrary nor capricious." 445 F. Supp. at 220.
49 Karlen v. Harris. 590 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
5 . Id. at 43.
51 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
52 590 F.2d at 39.
53 Id. at 43.
54 Id. at 42-44.
55 Id. at 42.
56. Id. at 44.
But Congress, in authorizing federal aid and creating HUD itself, had
exactly " ocial environmental impact" in mind as expressed in the statute.
Neither the City in its desire to take care of its low income residents nor
HUD itself had the power to override this Congressional purpose. There-
fore, . . . we hold that delay is not to be regarded as an overriding factor
and that environmental factors, such as crowding low-income housing into
a concentrated area, should be given determinative weight."
Clearly, the court's reference to "the statute" is to the Housing Act, not
NEPA, because NEPA had neither created HUD nor authorized federal
aid.
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in the Second Circuit's decision, the
Supreme Court read it as if it rested entirely on NEPA. 9 Interpreted in
that way, the Second Circuit's decision presented an anomoly: the en-
vironmental consequences of HUD's action were significant enough to
warrant a reversal of HUD's decision on the merits, yet not significant
enough to require HUD to prepare an EIS. Indeed, if the rationale for
upholding HUD's determination not to prepare an EIS was that the
impacts of constructing low-income housing at site thirty were "social"
rather than "environmental," two questions arise: first, why HUD had
any further NEPA obligations at all; and second, how NEPA could be
construed to contemplate racial and economic integration as an "envi-
ronmental factor" to which HUD had to give "determinative weight.""'
It is hardly surprising that such a combination of illogic and hyperbole
would invite reversal.
What is surprising is the breadth with which the Supreme Court
wrote in its short per curiam opinion. Instead of simply concluding, on
the facts of the case, that NEPA had no application to HUD's decision
because the agency and the lower courts had found that no "environ-
mental" values were implicated,60 the Court chose the occasion to suggest
that federal agencies have no substantive obligations under NEPA.6' and
that the statute never permits a federal court to set aside an agency's
decision on the merits.62 After quoting dictum in Vermont Yankee that
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karten. 444 U.S. 223 (198).
59. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
60. Socioeconomic effects, such as community concern about the influx of low-
income neighbors, have generally not been held to be imipacts on the "human environment"
within the meaning of NEPA. See, e.g., Como-Falcon Community Coalition. Inc. v. United
States Department of Labor. 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979). cert. denied. 446 U.S. 93641980);
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn. 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied.
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Conn'tn v. Uitted
States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Iplcople pollution" not an impact
on the "environment").
61. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Kailen. 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)
62. Id.
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NEPA is "essentially procedural,"63 the Court went on to make some3weeping generalizations:
lince an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedurallCquilernents, the only rote for a court is to insure that the agency hasconsidered the environmental consequences*, it cannot "interject itselfwithin the area of~ discretion of the executive as to the choice of the actionto be taken."
In the present litigation there is no doubt, that HUD considered theenvironmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposedsite for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more.-4
Although this language has prompted a lower court retreat fromrigorous review of agency action under NEPA,6" whether it really man-dates such a retreat is far from clear. In a footnote, the Court indicatedthat it did not understand the Second Circuit to have found HUD's action"arbitrary and capricious."66 Instead, said the Court, (he Second Circuithad erred by requiring HUD "to elevate environmental concerns overother, admittedly legitimate, considerations"" Those who strive to readthe decision for as little as possible have seized upon this language '68 TheCouncil on Environmental Quality (CEQ), for example, has noted thatthe Second Circuit required HUD to give "determinative weight" to".environmental" factors, and then concludes on the strength of thatfootnote that Sirycker's Bay does not forbid the reviewing court fromsetting aside or modifying agency action . . . (which is). . . arbitrary orcapricious as tested by the APA and the substantive goals and policiesof section 101(b) of NEPA."'p cUnfortunately, any effort to read Strycker's Bay this narrowly foun-ders for two reasons. First, as noted by Justice Marshall in his strongdissent,?o the Court's footnote missates the crucial procedural facts. TheSecond Circuit had done precisely what the footnote asserted that it hadnot done - it had set aside HUD's decision on the merits, on the groundthat HUD "had acted arbitrarily in concluding that prevention of a delay
63.es44 U.S. at 227 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council. Inc., 435 U.S. 519. 558 01978)).64. 444 U.S. at 227-28 (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club,427 U.S. 39O, 410 n.21 (1976)).
65. See supro note 33 and accompanying text.66. 444 U.S. at 228 n.2.
67. Id.
6h. Set'. e.g.. Liebesman, The Couincil oti En vironni e,,,al Qidity's Ie'gidniiwis toImIplemnt the Nationajl Enivirunnienigol Policy Act-- Will They Fuirther NEPA 's Stibstativ'e
.Ilali'e? 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvi'L.. L. tNSi.) 50039. 50041-42 (1980); U.S. COUNCIL(N 1,S-tI. QUM Try. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
- 1980, at 376 (1980) (11h Annual
69. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
- 1980, at 376tM 10 1II n gh Annual Repov 4 27o. Stiycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen. 444 U.S. 223, 228-31 (1980)MNarshall, J., dissenting).
in the construction process justified the selection of a housing site whichcould produce adverse social (and) environmental effects, including racialand economic concentration."" On this point, the Second Circuit's opin-ion is clear. Acknowledging that HUD's "careful analysis of the varioussites [had] shown that it [had) given 'consideration' to alternatives "2the Second Circuit paused to consider what further role, if any, therewas for "a federal appellate court at this stage-of the proceedings.""Observing that "'consideration' [was] not an end in itself" and that
"(ulltimately there must be a decision."'7 the court cited the APA"7 asgiving it power to "review the merits of agency decisions.""'Second, the footnote does not explain why the Supreme Court actedas it did in reversing the Second Circuit. If the Second Circuit erred byrequiring HUD to elevate environmental concerns above others, then theSupreme Court should have remanded the case for substantive reviewunder the proper legal standard, that is, for a determination whetherHUD's action was arbitrary or capricious, giving environmental concernsno more, but no less, weight than they deserve. The Court could nothave performed its own substantive review; it decided the case on itssummary calendar and did not have the full record before it." Conse-quently, the Court's summary reversal implies not that the Second Circuiterred by conducting an improper substantive review, but by conductingany review at all.
Strycker's Bay thus holds that a federal court may not set asideagency action as "arbitrary and capricious" on the theory that the agencygave insufficient weight to the substantive goals enumerated in NEPA.As Justice Marshall put it, the Court reduced judicial review under NEPAto "the essentially mindless task of determining whether an agency 'con-sidered' environmental factors even if that agency may have effectivelydecided to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion."-7
71. Id. at 228.
72. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).73. Id. at 43.
74. Id. at 44.
75. 5 U.S.C. I 706(2)(A) (1976).
76. 590 F.2d at 43.
The Supreme Court's erroneous characterization of she Second circuit's decision wasgrounded in its misreading of the district court's decision. The Court's assersion to thecontrary notwithstanding, the district court had not "expressly concluded that IIUD hadnot acted arbitrarily or capricously." 444 U.S. at 226. Indeed, the lower court had takenthe position that HUD's decision on the merits was not before it for review. See TrinityEpiscopal School Corp. v. Harris. 445 F. Supp. 204, 22(1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In the trialcourt's view, the only question that it faced was whether tiUD had fullilled its obligatioisunder section 102(2)(D). Id. It answered this question allirmatively, tinding that "tD'sconsideration of alternatives was neither arbitrary nor capricious." Id. This wis the fidingwhich the court of appeals did not overturn. Thus the Supreme Court had its facis backwards when it said that the district couri had reviewed HUD'l deciin on Itie li illidthat the court of appeals had not.
77. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUuI I'll: COUR PAC lIt L 362-68 ih ed 1978).78. Strycker's lay Neighborhood Council v. Kailcii. 
-144 U S. 221. 231 (198 ) (M;alshall, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 7:1 1983] The Supreme Court and Environmiental Values I1I
The Supreme Court and Environmental Values 13
The Court has never spelled out the rationale for such a restrictive
view of IJEPA, although it has hinted that it reads section 101 of NEPA"
to be substantively hortatory." rather than mandatory." Such a view has
long been expressed by those who have read NEPA as nothing more
than a "full disclosure" law. Read this way, NEPA does not require
federal agencies to protect the nation's environment, but simply instructs
them to take whatever action they please as long as they keep their eyes
open to the environmental consequences. On occasion, however, the
(ourt has said that it sees more in NEPA. For example, it has declared
that one of the goals of the EIS process is to assure "that environmental
concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking."5'
In the final analysis, even if the Court does read NEPA to contain
a substantive mandate to the federal agencies, it does not believe that
the Act permits the courts to enforce this mandate. In this respect,
SitrYker's Bay is in tension with the Court's earlier decisions in the
environmental field . Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of NEPA
is at odds with that of the Council on Environmental Quality," the vast
weight 'of scholarly commentary," nearly all the circuit courts of
79. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
80. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.. 435 U.S. 519. 558 (1978).
81. For a discussion of whether NEPA requires "substantive review," see W.
RODGERS. supra note 41. § 7.5. at 738-50 ("while the substantive content of NEPA is an
issue fascinating to the commentators, its day to day significance remains to be demon-
strated"); Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMEN-
tAL LAW 238, 304-lI (E. Dolgin & T. Guildbert eds. 1974) (concluding that courts are
required to engage in some vague level of substantive review); see also Cohen & Warren.
Judicil Recognition of the Substantive Requirements ofthe National Environmental Policy
Act o/ 1969. 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 685. 689-94. 701-02 (1972) (a failure of the
courts to require compliance with the substantive policy in section 102(1) of NEPA "will
lead ultimately to frustration of the legislative purpose ofNEPA .... ); Robie, Recognition
of Suibstantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 386. 423-36 (1974).
82. See Yarrington. Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second
Generoattion of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act. 19 S.D.L. REV. 279.
285-94 (1974); Note. The Least Adverse Approach to Substantive Review" Under NEPA. 88
HARV. L, REv. 735. 737. 756-58 (1975).
83. Weinberger v. Catholic Action. 102 S. Ct. 197. 201 (1981) (quoting Andrus v.
Sietra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979)).
84. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see infra text
acconmpahying notes 261-65.
85. The Council's NEPA regulations require that agencies prepare a record of deci-
sion that identifies the least harmful alternative to a proposed action. This requirement
arguably implies an obligation to choose that least harmful alternative. 40 C.F.R. § 1505(1981); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - 1980, at 376
(1980) (1th Annual Report); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
av ' - 1979, at 584-88 (1979) (10th Annual Report).
86. See Cohen & Warten, supra note 81; Gray, NEPA-Waiting for the Other Shoe
oi Drop, 55 CInt.-KEN1 L. REv. 361 (1979); Leed. NEPA of 1969: Is the Fact of Compliance
a Pcedural or Saubsiantive Question? 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 303 (1975); Liebesmann,
supra note 81; Nolan. fh, National Environmental Policy Act After United States a'.
SCRAP The Timing Question and Sabstative Review. 4 HorsTRA L. RLv. 213, 247-53
appeal,"' and many federal agencies," including IJUD. 9 Yet, the Court
rejected all of these views summarily, without the benefit of briefs or
argument, and without offering even a word of explanation.
II. THE REGULATORY PROGRAMS IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Congress's Approach to Environmenial Regulation
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 were a dramatic response to the
belated recognition of air pollution as a "critical and growing national
problem."" Only three years earlier, Congress had declared that "the
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is- the primary re-
sponsibility of States and local governments,"', and had enacted a reg-
ulatory program that relied primarily upon air quality standards, which
were to be developed and implemented by the states.92 Before that pro-
gram got underway,93 however, Congress overhauled it in favor of an
entirely new approach - comprehensive federal regulation of all air
pollution sources. The story of this radical restructuring of the nation's
air quality control program has been told in depth elsewhere,94 but a
(1976); Robie, Recognition of Substantive Right to Environmental Qauality Under the
National Environmental Policy Act. 3 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvL. L. INST.) 50,028 (1973);
Wharton. Judicially Enforceable Substantive Rights Under NEPA. 10 U.S. F.L. REV. 415
(1976); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review,' Under NEPA.
88 HARV. L. REV. 735 (1975).
87. See. e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engine'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Comm'n. 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Frochike, 473 F.2d 664(4th Cir. 1973). Bat see, e.g.. National Helium Corp. v. Morton. 455 F.2d 650. 656 (101th
Cir. 1971); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz. 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1976). See generally N. ORLOFF & G. BROOKS, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT, CASES AND MATERIALS 295-96 (1980); W. RoDGERS, supru note 41, § 7.5. at 735-50.
88. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station Unit No. 2) 6 A.E.C.
751 (1973) (commented upon in Trubek. Allocating the Burden of Enviranental Unce-
tainty: The NRC Interprets NEPA's Substantive Mandate. 1977 Wis. L. REv. 747).
89. In its petition for certiorari in Strycder's Bay, IIUD conceded "that if an agency
gave little or no weight to environmental values its decision might be aibitraiy or capri-
cious." Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223. 231 (1980) (Marshall
J., dissenting) (citing Petition for Cert. No. 79-184. at 15 n.16).
90. S. REP. No. 1196, suapra note 5. at 1, reprited in I A L.GISLA TIVE HISTIO'RY 01
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 401.
91. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148. § i01(a)(3), 81 Stat. 485. 485 (1968)
(current provisions derived from the Air Quality Act are found principally at 42 U.S.C.II 7407-7410, 7413 (Supp. IV 1980)).
92. See J. Esrosto, VANISHING AIR 152-53 (1970); F- GRAD, ENvIaoNma.NI, l AW
3-67 (1971); Middleton, Sannary of the Air Quality' Act of 1907, 10 Akiz. I.. Rcv. 25
(1968).
93. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVrt.. QuALtIY. ENvtRoNTII NTAt. QuAl n I Y - 1970, at 83-
85 (1970) (1st Annual Report) (by the end of 1970, most states had not yet '.tlfCd o. futided
the agencies responsible for implementing the environmental laws)
94. See. e.g., Hines, sipra note 3; Stewart. The Donelemen <o A/aniituat and
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review of its major features is essential to any evaluation of the Supreme
Court's. faithfulness to Congress's intent.
By 1970, "new information" had persuaded Congress that "the air
pollution problem (was] more severe, more pervasive, and growing at a
more rapid rate than was generally believed." 3 Furthermore, Congress
had realized that the existing program was seriously flawed." Although
the 1967 Act had envisioned the development of air quality standards
that would protect public health, it had assumed that these standards
would be based on data relating various levels of air pollution to adverse
health effects.97 In addition, it had assumed that the emission reductions
necessary to meet these standards would be achieved through the use of
available pollution control technology."
Both assumptions proved erroneous. First, little was known about
the effects of air pollution." Although significant health effects had often
been observed immediately following occasional episodes of high sulfur
dioxide and particulate concentrations in the air,'on many scientists were
.eginning to suspect that the chronic, long-term effects of exposure to
low levels of these and other pollutants were even more serious, if less
dramatic.o'0 As a result, air quality standards that were designed to
safeguard against only the known effects of air pollution appeared woe-
fully inadequate. Secondly, major industrial polluters contended that
available pollution-control techniques were infeasible, either technically
or economically; as a result, states were moving slowly or not at all in
designing inplementation plans."" Thus, when the Clean Air Amend-
Quii-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessois
frotmi the Clean Air Act. 62 IoWA L. REv. 713 (1977).
95. S. RL. No. 1196. stupru note 5. at 1. reprinted in I A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AmR AMENDMENTS OF 1970. at 401.
96. See, e.g.. J. ESPOSITO. supra note 79. at 152-81; O'Fallon. Deficiencies in the Air
Quality Act. 33 LAW & CONTEuP. Paoes. 275 (1968).
97. See H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong.. Ist. Sess. 9, reprinted in 1%7 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1938. 1946 ("To assist the States in setting air quality standards . . .
the Department (of Health and Welfarel would continue to develop and publish air quality
criteria reflecting the best available scientific data on the adverse effects of individual
pollutants . . . .").
98. Thus, in actions for violation of air quality standards, courts were instructed to
give "du consideration . . . to the technological and economic feasibility of complying
with such standards." Air Quality Act of 1967, § 108(c)(4), 81 Stat. at 493.
99. See H.R. REP. No. 294. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 509, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. &' AD. NEWS 1077, 1471 (statement of Reps. Krueger. Gammage. and Satterfield)
('The Clean Air Act was passed at a time when the Congress and Federal regulators knew
comparatively little about these pollutants and their effect on air quality."); 116 CONG.
Rec. 32,920-23 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
100. See Prindle. The Distaster Potential of Cmnnuinity Air Pollution, in THE AIR WE
tIILAI HE 177-78 (S. Farber & R. Wilson eds. 1961), reprinted in R. STEWART & J. KRIER,
EmN\ IRONMIENTAL LAW AND POLICY 7-10 (2d ed. 1978).
101. See S. REP. No. 1196. supra note 5, at I. reprintedin I A LEGISLATIVE HisroRy
(I II CLEAN AIR AMLNDMENTS OF 1970, at 401; see also infra note 248.
102. See S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 5. at 2-3, reprinted in I A LEGISLATIVE
1thIour OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970. at 402-03; lileicher, Economic and
ments were before Congress in 1970, more than two and a half years
after the 1967 legislation, not a single state plan hiad been approved, let
alone enforced. 03
Congress responded to these two problems with a bold new approach
intended "to assure the protection of the health of every American."'"
First, although the scientific uncertainty about the health effects of air
pollution could not be legislated away, Congress addressed it by directing
that air quality standards be set with "margin(s) of safety" that were to
be "adequate" in the case of conventional pollulantses and "ample" in
the case of substances suspected of being more hazardous.""' Acknowl-
edging the "many gaps in the available scientific knowledge" and granting
that "a great deal of basic research will be needed to determine the long
term air quality goals which are required to protect the public health,"
Congress nevertheless decided to regulate "on the basis of the best
information available."o'0 Congress considered margins of safety to be
"essential to any health related environmental standard if a reasonable
degree of protection is to be provided against hazards which research
has not yet identified."'"
Second, Congress brushed aside industry's claim that compliance
with health-based standards might be infeasible. The statute and its leg-
islative history made clear that feasibility might be relevant to the time-
table for compliance with the environmental quality standards, the so-
called "secondary" standards." but that the health-based, or "primary,"
standards were to be attained within a short, statutorily prescribed dead-
line."10 Congress foresaw considerable expense and, in some instances,
economic dislocation, but felt that "the health of people is more impor-
tant" and that "existing sources of pollution either should meet the stan-
dard of the law or be closed down.""'
Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcemient Against Stationary Sources. 89 I IAV.
L. REV. 316 (1975).
103. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENvIRONMENIAl. QUALI Ty - 1970. at 75
(1970) (Ist Annual Report).
104. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in I A LLGISLATIVL HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN Ala AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 404 (emphasis added).
105. Clean Air Amendments of 1970. § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1980) ("allowing an adequate margin of safety").
106. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 12(b)(I)(lS), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(lB) (Supp.
IV 1980) ("provides an ample margin of safety").
107. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 5, at II, reprinted in I A LEGISLA IVE HISi ARY
OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970. at 411.
108. Id. at 9-10, reprinted in I A LEGISLATIVE IllsIORY 01f 1IE CLEAN AIR AMEN-
MENTS OF 1970, at 409-10.
109. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § I 10(a)(2)(A)(ii). 42 U.S.C.
I 7410(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
110. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970. II 0(a)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(2)(A)(i) (Sipp. IV 1980).
III. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note S. at 2-3, reprinted in I A .i (;isl A IVL Ilst 1o(
OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 402-03.
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Subsequent events, most notably the problems associated with the
catalytic converter and with smokestack scrubbers, have revealed all too
clearly the risks of a regulatory regime that forces information and tech-
nology."' Nevertheless, Congress retained these central features of the
nation's air pollution control program when, in 1977, it extensively re-
vised the Clean Air Act in prder to incorporate the lessons learned since
the 1970 Amendments."' Congress has thus evinced a continuing com-
mitment to the principle that protection of public health should not await
the arrival of either more information about the health effects of air
pollution or better pollution control technology."'
The Supreme Court, however, has never been persuaded of the
wisdom of this commitment. This attitude is clearly reflected in the
crabbed interpretation that the Court has given to the Clean Air Act.
B. Forcing Technology
The Supreme Court has twice dealt directly with the technology
forcing provisions of the Clean Air Act, first in 1975 in Train, v. NRI)C,"
and again a year later in Union Electric v. EPA." 6 In these cases, the
Court has registered its unwillingness to further the Act's technology
forcing goals.
1. The Train Decision
Train arose under section 110 of the Clean Air Act, which required
states to design plans for implementing the Act's ambient air quality
standards, and to submit those plans for EPA approval."' EPA had
approved Georgia's implementation plan,"' which included a provision
allowing state officials to grant "variances" to individual polluters, upon
determining that compliance with the standards would be "unduly bur-
densome," "unreasonable," or "inappropriate," or would cause one or
112. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN. supra note 2. at 54-56 (1977); Ackerman & Hassler,
supra note 2. at 1479-87.
113. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. IV 1980);
see R. STEWART & J. KRIER. supra note 10, at 501-02.
1 4. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 113(d). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp.
IV 1980) (final compliance orders require compliance "as expeditiously as possible," but
also impose a final deadline); Karstadt, Protecting Public Health from Hazardous Sub-
stances: Federal Regulaiion of Environmental Consantinants. 5 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL.
L. INST.) 50,165 (1975), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong.. Ist Sess. 1077. 1122(1977) ("If the decision is made to defer regulation until it can be shown more definitely
that a substance actually causes harm to humans. then regulation may occur too late to
prevent harm to the population. 'Regulation later as a regulatory approach really means
using humans as guinea pigs. and should be considered socially unacceptable.
115. 421 U.S. 60(1975).
116 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
117. 42 U.S.C. q 7410 (Supp. IV 1980).
118. Se, 421 U S. at 70.
more sources to be substantially curtailed or closed." 9 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals set aside EPA's action, 2 0 holding that the statute
contained only one mechanism under which variances could be autho-
rized: the one-year postponement available, although rigorously condi-
tioned, under section I10(f )."I The court of appeals thus rejected EPA's
argument that section 110(f) applied only where a variance would prevent
the attainment of national ambient air quality standards. '2 The court also
rejected EPA's contention that, under section I110(a)(3),121 the agency
had to accept any state-granted variance as a "revision" of the imple-
mentation plan so long as the variance did not threaten atlainment of the
ambient standards. 24
Finding no ambiguity in section I 10(f )'s applicalion to "any station-
ary source" and "any requirement of an applicable- implementation
plan," 2 3 the Fifth Circuit drew support from the "overall scheme" of the
Act for its conclusion that this postponement provision was exclusive. 2"
The court recognized that if Congress's "technology forcing" strategy
was to succeed "it was essential to include [in the Act] a device to ensure
that ambitious commitments made at the planning slage could not readily
be abandoned when the time came to meet those commitments, and to
assume the costs and burdens they entailed.""'2 As the court saw it,
section I10(f ) was that device, and Congress deliberately made post-
ponements under that provision difficult to obtain.12a
The Supreme Court disagreed.' 29 In its view, a state had no less
freedom to change the mix of emission limitations in an approved imple-
mentation plan than to adopt a mix of emission limitations in developing
the original plan; in either case, EPA's only proper concern was with the
attainment and maintenance of national ambient standards."" The Coirt
saw no reason to make it particularly difficult for a state to grant a
variance that did not threaten these standards: accordingly, it concluded
that-section 110(f) could not be read as "the exclusive mechanism for
any ameliorative modification of a plan.""
119. Law of April 14. 1967. § 88-912. 1967 Ga. Laws 581, 587. repealed by Law of
March 6, 1978, 1978 Ga. Laws 275, 308.
120. See Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Environmtact l Ptotection
Agency. 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
122. See 489 F.2d at 401.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
124. See 489 F.2d at 401.
125. Id..
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting statement of Sen. Muskie)
128. See id.
129. Train v. Natural Resouces Defensc Couincil. Inc.. 421 I.S. 64j. 99 (1975).
130. See id. at 86-87.
131. Id. at 83.
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On the surface, the Train decision has some appeal."' It effectively
created p two-tiered variance procedure, which allowed EPA to approve
"minor" variances free from the burdensome procedural requirements of
section I10(f )."I On the other hand, even if the Act did suffer from the
absence of a provision for insignificant variances, the Court had no
authority to write one. What is worse, the Court was so distracted by
the verbal exercises involved in reconstructing the statute that it utterly
ignored the decision's effect on the Act's deadlines for meeting national
standards.
The real problem, which the Court failed to face, is that the two-
tiered variance system forces someone to decide whether emissions from
a sipgle source will interfere with plan attainment. Two factors tend to
skew this decision. First, even using state-of-the-art analytic techniques
such as diffusion modeling, it is often impossible to determine the effect
of an an individual source on ambient air quality. t" Second, the state
decision-makers will be sorely tempted to grant a variance to any single
source that is faced with technical or economic difficulties."' Given the
wide latitude that the procedure offered to state officials, it is unrealistic
to expeci that the Georgia variance procedure would preserve the integ-
rity of the national ambient standards. To the contrary, such a procedure
would virtually invite state officials to value short-term local economic
factors over the air quality standards, thus vitiating the technology-
forcing requirements of the Act. As one commentator put it, by making
it easy to approve "minor" variances as "revisions," the Court "shortened
the odds on the standards being met and maintained." 6
2. The Union Electric Decision
In Union Electric v. EPA,"' the Court's disinclination to effectuate
the technology forcing provisions of the Act became explicit. Here, an
electric utility challenged EPA's approval of the Missouri implementation
plan, contending that the utility faced economic and technological diffi-
culties that made compliance with the plan impossible." 8 The Adminis-
trator took the position, consistent with Train, that he had no power to
reject a state implementation plan on the ground that it was technologi-
cally or economically infeasible." 9 The court of appeals upheld his po-
sitionpnd the Supreme Court affirmed.' The Court recognized that the
132. See W. RODGERS, supra note 41. § 3.6. at 238-43.
133. See id. § 36. at 240.
134. See Texas v. EPA. 499 F.2d 289, 299-301 (9th Cir. 1974).
135. See J. KtIEtt. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLicy 385-86 (1971), see also J.
Espomito. jupra note 92, at 190-233 (case studies about how three cities administer variance
pi ceedings).
136 W. RODGERS, iupra note 41. § 3.6. at 241.
137. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
138. See iii. at 253.
139. See id. at 256.
140. Union Flec. Co. v. EPA. 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975). afJd. 427 U.S. 246
Act's "technology forcing character" and "three year deadline for achiev-
ing primary air quality standards" were "intended to foreclose the claims
of emission sources that it would be economically or technologically
infeasible for them to achieve emission limitations sufficient to protect
the public health within the specified time.""'
Although the Court's holding was thus in keeping with the spirit of
the Act, the Court unfortunately went on to conclude its opinion with a
gratuitous discussion of what it called the "ample opportunity" afforded
by the Act "for consideration of claims of technological and economic
infeasibility."' 42 To make matters worse, the Court did not confine itself
to the "opportunities" created by Congress, namely, the carefully circum-
scribed extension and postponement provisions of sections I 10(e) and
I 10(f ).t41 Instead, it opened an enormous loophole"' by blishely declaring
that when the Administrator proceeds under .section I13'14 against a
source that is violating an implementation plan, "claims of technological
and economic infeasibility . . . are relevant to fashioning an appropriate
compliance order."1 6 The Court even went so far as to note that some
courts had suggested that the defense of economic or technological in-
feasibility might also be available in civil and criminal enforcement
proceedings.4 7
Recognizing the difficulty of squaring its dictum with its holding, the
Court tried to reconcile the two by asserting that allowing such claims
during the enforcement stage, as opposed to the planning stage, would
"not interfere substantially with the primary goal of prompt attainment
of the national standards."" This assertion is belied by the history of
failed enforcement attempts that marked the air pollution control program
before the 1970 Amendments. Under the earlier program, proceedings
against individual sources often bogged down in an endless string of'
compliance orders, in which each successive order extended the date set
in the previous one."9 The suggestion that Congress invited this enforce-
ment charade to continue contradicts its inclusion of deadlines for meet-
ing air quality standards.
In the context of an opinion that thus undermined the Act's tech-
nology forcing provisions, the Court's final words were laden with irony:
141. 427 U.S. at 257-58.
142. Id. at 268.
143. 42 U.S.C. 9 7410(e), (fI) (Supp. IV 1980).
144. LaPierre. Technology-Forcing and Federal Eswvirmnmental Protleciosgn Stiatunr.
62 IOWA L. REv. 771, 789-90 (1977) (discussing how .variance procedures undermine icch-
nology forcing).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (Supp. IV 1980).
146. 427 U.S. at 268 n.I8.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 268.
149. See United States v. Bishop 'rocessing Co., 423 F.2d 46') (4th Cir. 1970). 1rt.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); J. Esr'osnio, supra note 92. at I14-IM: (J.S. Cou It (IN
LNVTL. QUALIrY. ENvIaoNMEN I At. QuAI II - 1970. 86 Mt (1971) (Isi Ainial itepott)
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Technology forcing is a concept somewhat new to our national experience
and it necessarily entails certain risks. But Congress considered those risks
in passing the 1970 Amendments and decided that the dangers posed by
uncontrolled air pollution made them worth taking. Petitioner's theory [that
the Administrator could reject an implementation plan as infeasible) would
render the considered legislative judgment a nullity, and that is a result we
refuse to reach.15a
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in a far
more candid opinion."' Refusing to read the Act in the internally incon-
sistent manner of the majority, he conceded that Congress had "intended
that industries unable to comply with approved state implementation
plans whether because of economic or technological infeasibility, would
be 'closed down."'" Thus, contrary to the majority, Justice Powell
concluded that claims of infeasibility, even total technological infeasibil-
ity, are not relevant to fashioning an appropriate compliance order at the
enforcement stage.'" He too, however, could not resist expressing his
disapproval of the balance struck by Congress between health and eco-
nomic values; to him, the Act's "clean up or shut down" philosophy
seemed "Draconian." "4
Both the concurrence and the majority thus reflect the Court's lack
of sympathy for Congress's basic intent under the Clean Air Act: to make
economic considerations subordinate to the protection of public health.'"
150. 427 U.S. at 269.
151. Id. at 269-72 (Powell. J., concurring).
152. Id. at 270 n.I (Powell. J.. concurring).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 271, 272 (Powell. J.. concurring).
155. The Court's treatment of technology forcing under the Clean Water Act deserves
brief mention here. In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train (DuPons). 430 U.S. 112(1977). the Court construed the 1972 amendments to the Act. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. I 1251-1375 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)). The amend-
ments established two sets of effluent limitations: by 1977. industrial dischargers were to
apply the "best practicable control technology currently available" (OPT), and by 1983 they
were to apply the "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT). Id. § 301(b).
In DuPont, the Court upheld EPA's authority to promulgale industry-wide national
effluent linitations for existing plants. Industry argued that EPA lacked authority under
the stature to set effluent limitations by regulation. Rather, they argued, the limitations
prescribed by the Act must be set for each plant during the permit-issuance process. The
permit writer would only be guided by EPA's effluent limitations. In holding for EPA. the
Court fuu'nd that the statute "unambiguously provides for the use of regulations to establish
. fluent limitations." 430 U.S. at 126. Since requiring case-by-case determinations of
the technology-based effluent limitations would have inevitably slowed the adoption of the
MIT standards, the Dupont holding helped further the technology forcing goals of the Act.
ce LaPierre, supra note 144.
This apparent endorsement of technology forcing should not be overstated, however.
In DuPont, the Court found that EPA had authority to set national effluent limitations by
regulation "so long as" it.made allowance for individual plant variances. Id. at 128. EPA
had witen a variance provision into the challenged regulations, and thus the availability
of Il'T variances was not at issue in DuPont. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Act
lself contained no authority for granting BPT variances, although the Court made such
C. Forcing Information
The precautionary approach, one of the major innovations of the
1970 Clean Air Amendments,"' was also a central feature of the contem-
poraneously enacted Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).'"
Under both acts, substances suspected to have harmful effects were to
be regulated even before scientific data confirmed their effects on health.
Nevertheless, in the Supreme Court's decision. in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene),"8 a plurality of
four Justices concluded that before the Secretary of Labor could act
under OSHA to require certain industries to reduce their workers' ex-
posure to a hazardous substance, he first had to prove that existing
exposure levels presented a significant risk of harm.' 9 .
Because the plurality suggested that a contrary interpretation of the
statute might be unconstitutional,'" and because it left unclear the precise
itself contained no authority for granting BPT variances. although the Court made such
varances an apparent pre-requisite to EPA's ability to issue industry-wide regulations.
Id. at 128.
Because the Court found that reviewing EPA's criteria for UPT variances was "pre-
mature" in Dupont, id. at 128 n.19. it remained for the Court to settle that issue in EPA v.National Crushed Stone Assoc.. 449 U.S. 64 (1980). Again. the Court appeared to side
with technology forcing; it supported EPA's position that the BPf variance decision need
not consider normal costs of compliance, on the ground that the B1lPT regulations themselves
took cost factors into account. Id. at 77-78.
Dupont and Crushed Stone may be better decisions than others criticized in this
article. But it would be a mistake to read them as evidence of Supreme Court sensitivity
to environmental values. Unlike the rigorously conditioned authority in the Cian Air Actfor issuing SIP variances, see supra text accompanying note 126. Congress authorized
relatively liberal variances from the BAT effluent limitations. Pub. L. No. 92-500. Si 301(c).While the DuPont Court's assertion that EPA must provide for BPT variances is not
explicitly authorized by the Water Act, those variances can perhaps be justified by the
existence of the analogous variance provision for BATs. No such justification exists forthe Court's inference of Air Act variances in Train. see supra text accompanying notes117-36. Similarly, given that EPA considers costs in setting BPT limitations. and given that
variances for uniquely situated plants remain available, Crushed Stone's endorsement ofEPA's decision not to reconsider compliance costs when reviewing BPF variance requestsdid not require the Court to muster much environmental consciousness.
156. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency. 647 F.2d 1130,1152 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (aftirming that the Adminisiratordid not exceed his authority by noting that protection of the most sensitive groups withinthe population had to be a major consideration in determining the level at which air quality
standards should be set. lTlhe Administrator contends that LIA's interpretation is incon-
sistent with the precautionary nature of the statute ..... ).
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). See, e.g.. Iidstrial Union Dept v. Hlodgson. 499F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Society of the Plastics Indus. v. Occupational Safety andHealth Administration, 509 F.2d 1301. 1308 (2d Cir. 1975) O'Undter the conminand of OSIIA.it remains the duty of the Secretary to act to protect the workingimian, and to act even in
circumstances where existing methodology or research is deticien."). irit. dened. 421U.S. 992 (1975).
158. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrolemn ni ., 4-48 U.S. (,07 118(1 (pi-
rality opinion). .
159. Id. at 639-40.
160. Id. at 646. See infra text accompanying noes 287-88
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meaning of the term "significant risk,"'6' the decision may or may not
stand as a permanent obstacle to using a precautionary program to protect
worker health. During the next term, however, a majority of the Court
reaffirmed Benzene's holding - but arguably not its rationale - in Amer-
ican Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan (Cotton Dust).162 In light
of the similarities betweep OSHA and the Clean Air Act, the Benzene
and Cotton Dust decisions threaten the precautionary aspects of the
Clean Air Act, as well as OSHA. Closer analysis of these two cases is
thus warranted.
1. The Benzene Case
a. The Benzene Regulations
Congress enacted OSHA "to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."'.
It sought to accomplish this objective by delegating broad authority to
,he Sqcretary of Labor to establish occupational safety and health "stan-
durds, "' which section 3(8) of the Act defined as "requiring conditions
. . . reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful . . .
places of employment." 6 1 As in all of the health-protective legislation of
the era, Congress showed particular concern for toxic substances,16a
those "insidious 'silent' killers"' 6' whose causal relationships with cancer,
heart disease, and other serious chronic illnesses were then being rec-
ognized.'" This special concern led to the enactment of section 6(b)(5)
of the Act, which dealt with toxics or "harmful physical agents" by
directing the Secretary to
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on
the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee
has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the
period of his working life . ...
161. 448 U.S. at 646.
1,62. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 239-40.
163. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 1 2(b). 29 U.S.C. I 651(b) (1976).
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1976).
165. Id. I 652(8).
166. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970. § 112. 42 U.S.C. I 7412 (Supp. IV 1980)(National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants); S. REP. No. 1196, supra note
5, at 20-21, reprinted in I A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF
1970. at 420-21 (special concern about toxics and hazardous agents); see also Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. I 307. 33 U.S.C. I 1317 (1976) (Toxic and Pretreatment Efficiency
Standards).
167. 116 CONG. REc. 38,375-76 (1970) (statement of Sen. Daniels) (quoted in Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.. 448 U.S. 607. 692 (1980)).
168. S. RuP. No. 1282, supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
Au. Ntws at 5178.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
In 1978, acting under the authority of this provision, the Secretary
promulgated a rule that reduced the allowable workplace exposure to
airborne concentrations of benzene from ten parts per million to one partper million.o70 The prior standard, in effect since 1971, had been based
on evidence of benzene's non-malignant effects.'1' The new standard
took into account more recent studies that linked benzene exposure withleukemia,"'7 although there was no empirical evidence of such effects at
exposure levels below ten parts per million." After reviewing the testi-
mony of ninety-five witnesses and a fifty-volume record, the Secretary
concluded from "an evaluation of all the evidence in totality":" 4 (1) that
"benzene is a human carcinogen,"1" a conclusion that the industry did
not challenge;" 6 (2) that no safe level of exposure had been demon-
strated;'77 and (3) that the benefits in lives saved.of reducing permissible
exposure levels from ten parts per million to one part per million "maybe appreciable,"" 8 although the available epidemiological data was in-
sufficient to permit a meaningful quantitative estimate." 9 Under these
circumstances, the Secretary's policy, openly stated and subject to chal-lenge in the rulemaking process, was to set the standard at the lowestlevel feasible. 8 In his view, this approach was not only consistent with
what he found to be an estqblished "public health policy,""' but wasplainly required by OSHA's "statutory mandate" - to set an appropriate
standard that "most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity . . . ."'"2
b. The Plurality Decision
A plurality of the Supreme Court disagreed with the Secrelary'sinterpretation of his duty.' In its view, before the Secretary couldpromulgate a standard that reduced exposure to a toxic substance, section6(b)(5)' 8 4 required him to make a "threshold" determination that existing
exposure levels presented a "significant risk of harm."'" According to
170. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
171. Id. at 5918-19.
172. Id. at 5919.
173. Id. at 5941.
174. Id. at 5931.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 5925.
178. Id. at 5940.
179. Id.
180. See 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5932 (1978); Industria Union Dep' v. American Pcro-leum Inst.. 448 U.S. 607, 624 n.19 (1980).
181. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5925 (1978).
182. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. § 0(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655th)(5i(1976) (quoted in 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5940 (1978)).
183. Industrial Union Dep't v. American P'etroleum tnst., 4418 U.S. 607 (1980).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976); see supra text accompanying note 169.
185. 448 U.S. at 642.
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the plurality, that requirement was implied by section 3 (8 ),'" which was
construed to require that all standards under the Act be "reasonably
necessary and appropriate" to provide safe or healthful employment.' 81
The plurality thus avoided deciding whether, as the court of appeals
had held,'"1 ' the benzene standard was invalid because it was not sup-
ported by a showing that the costs of compliance were "reasonable" in
relation to the anticipated health benefits.' 89 The proper role, if any, for
cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation had become the subject
of a heated national debate over "regulatory reform,"'" and perhaps the
plurality preferred to set aside the benzene standard on what seemed to
be less controversial grounds.' 9'
Unfortunately, the record contradicted the plurality's assertion that
the Secretary had not made a "significnt risk" finding. The Secretary
had explicitly concluded both that mne hazards of benzene exposure at
currently permissible levels are serious. inough to justify an expenditure
of hundreds of millions of dollars,"" and that the number of cancers
prevented by the new standard "may be appreciable."'" It was thus a
gross distortion of the Secretary's action to suggest that he had been
pursuing the "chimera" of "perfect safety" 94 or the elimination "with
absolute certainty of any risk."'" The Secretary had clearly and consis-
tently stated his rationale throughout the rulemaking: he set the benzene
standard at one part per million because, given the uncertainties about
the magnitude of the cancer risk from exposure to benzene, he believed
that OSHA required him to set the standard at the lowest level feasible.I"
In reality, the plurality set aside the "significant risk" finding that
the Secretary had made, and thereby intruded far deeper into the admin-
istrative process than it was prepared to admit. It never clearly stated
the reasons for this intrusion. Indeed, in its effort to articulate a plausible
rationale for what the dissenters called "nearly de novo review of ques-
tions of fact and regulatory policy,"'17 the plurality disintegrated. Justice
Powell's concurrence disavowed the plurality's determination on the
186. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976); see supra text accompanying note 165.
187. 448 U.S. at 642.
J88. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub
m19.Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
189. See 448 U.S. at 639-40.
190. Ser Rodgers. Binjits, Costs, and Risks: Oversig hf Hiealth and Eivironmtientaitl
Decissinunaking, 4 HARY. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
191. Justice Powell, however, was ready to address the issue. See 448 U.S. at 664
aPowell. J., concurring).
192. Id. at 666 (Powell, J.. concurring); See Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk As-
wivnents: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, II ENVTL.
L. 301. 304 n.16 (1981).
193. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5940 (1978).
194. 448 U.S. at 664 (Burger. C.J., concurring)
195. Id. at 641.
196. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918. 5932, 5941 (1978)
197. Id. at 695 n.9 (Marshall. J.. dissenting).
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Secretary's findings.'"9 Chief Justice Burger, although concurring on the
threshold requirement, asked only that "the Secretary retrace his steps
with greater care."'"
Notwithstanding their differences, however, the three opinions of
the plurality did evidence a common concern over the Secretary's failure
to make a quantitative estimate of the risk of exposure to benzene con-
centrations of ten parts per millon.w This failure was error, said the
plurality, because the statutet 'requires that the risk from a toxic sub-
stance be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize
it as significant in an understandable way." 20' Just what this explanation
means is hard to say; indeed, while the Chief Justice joined in this portiop
of the plurality opinion, he confessed that he had no idea what it meant.
Justice Powell's concurrence203 helps illuminate the plurality's holl-
ing. Focusing on the Secretary's determination "that available quantifi-
cation techniques are too imprecise to permit a reasonable numerical
.stamate of risks,"2 " Justice Powell limited himself to the conclusion that
.he record did not provide substantial evidence for the Secretary's de-
cision.2 o0 Justice Powell's approach thus makes it clear that the other
three justices of the plurality thought that the "statute requires quantifi-
cation of risk in every case,"'" even where meaningful quantification is
impossible, 01 since that had been the Secretary's finding and neither the
court of appeals2oa nor the plurality'" had set this determination aside.
The plurality's position is implausible on its face. Section 6(b)(5) of
the Act directs the Secretary to set standards for toxic substances at the
level "which . . . asshres . . . that no employee will sulTer material im-
pairment of health," 10 and, in anticipation of the difficulties that the
Secretary would face in regulating "on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge," 21' permits him to act on the basis of the best available evidence.212
Such a provision cannot reasonably be understood to prohibit the
198. See id. at 664 n.t (Powell. J.. concurring) (specifically not joining the plurality'sdetermination on OSHA's findings).
199. See id. at 663 (Burger. C.J.. concurring).
200. See id. at 644-45 (plurality opinion); id. at 663 (Burger, CJ.. concurring); id. al666-68 (Powell, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 646.
202. Id. at 663 (Burger, C.., concurring).
203. Id. at 664-71 (Powell, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 667 (Powell. J., concurring).
205. See id. (Powell. J., concurring).
206. Id. at 666 (Powell, J., concurring).
207. Contra id. at 702-03 (Marshall, J.. dissenting); 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5941 (1978)
("(Because here] it is impossible to precisely quantify the anticipated benefits. OSI IA masl
select the level of exposure which is most protective ... .").
208. See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSiHA. 581 F.2d 493. 504 (5th Cir. 1978)
209. See 448 U.S. at 659.
210. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
211. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F 2d 467, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
The Supreme Court and Envirowtnetulal Values
Secretary from acting to reduce occupational health risks simply be-
cause the existing health-effects data cannot be meaningfully quantified.
Although section 6(b)(5) alone could not be understood this way, the
plurality insisted that it could be so understood when read in conjunction
with section 3(8),213 which, said the plurality, authorizes only "reasonably
necessary or appropriate $tandards."2 4 As the dissenters noted, this was
a rather novel approach to the interpretation of what appeared to be a
non-substantive definitional provision." It was an approach that ignored
long-standing precedent, as well as common-sense canons of construc-
tion.216 More significantly, it flew in the face of the "special concern" for
toxic substances that was central to all of the health-protective legislation
of the early 1970 's .27 The plurality simply denied that any such special
concern was manifest,"" and then invoked section 556(d) the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act' 9 to support its view that the Secretary was re-
quired "to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, that it is at least
more likely than not that long-term exposure to [ten parts per million] of
benzene presents a significant risk of material health impairment" because
"[olrdinarily, it is the proponent of a rule or order who has the burden
of proof in administrative proceedings." 220
Technically, section 556(d) did not apply to the benzene proceeding,
which was not a formal rulemaking;" t but even if the proceedings had
213. Id. I 652(8) (1976).
214. See 448 U.S. at 642-43.
215. See id. at 708-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("the plurality's reasoning ... is foreclosed by
every applicable guide to statutory construction").
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted statutory charges to agencies similar
to OSH(A's "reasonably necessary or appropriate" clause as conferring broad regulatory
authority consistent with the purposes and policies of Congress, rather than as imposing
some threshold requirement or otherwise limiting agency authority. See FCC v. National
Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775. 796-97 (1978); Mourning v. Family Pub-
lications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356. 369 (1975); FPC v. Texaco. Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 394
(1974); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham. 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969). For example,
where the the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, I 507. 21 U.S.C. I 357 (1976),
authorized the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to promulgate regulations "necessary"
to public health, the, Court, in sustaining the FDA's regulations, observed that "lilt is
enough for us that the expert agency charged with the enforcement of remedial legislation
has dglermined that such regulation is desirable for the public health ..... United States
v. An Article of Drug . .. Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 394 U.S. 784, 786 n.2, 791-92 (1969). Indeed,
before the Benzene decision, the Court had never held that a *'reasonably necessary or
appropriate" clause superseded a specific statutory directive. Furthermore, the Court has
routinely held that regulations adopted pursuant to such provisions must be sustained
unless they are inconsistent with statutory goals or requirements. See FCC v. National
Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting. 436 U.S. 775, 794 (1978); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947);
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944).
217. See supra note 166.
218. 448 U.S. at 649 n.54.
219. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
220. 448 U.S. at 653.
221. The section 556 iequireinenls apply only to "formad agency hearings under
sections 553 and 554. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976). OSHA rulemakings arc "informal" within the
meaning of the APA, and thus beyond the reach of section 556(d).
been formal, section 556(d) would not have required the Secretary to
shoulder a burden of proof from which OSHA had relieved him."2 The
plurality recognized that section 6(b)(5) authorized the Secretary to reg-
ulate in advance of "scientific certainly,""' and even instructed him to
"risk[] error on the side of over-protection rather than underprotec-
tion." 224 Consequently, the plurality had no basis for maintaining that the
Secretary bore some traditional burden of proof.2" In this crucial respect,
the plurality essentially contradicted itself.
Fortunately, the possible implications of the plurality's rationale in
the Benzene case were let loose to bemuse regulators for less than a
222. Section 556 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976), provides f6r specific exemptions
"as otherwise provided by statute," even in formal proceedings. See. e.g.. Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 431 U.S. 925
(1977) (in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Congress shifted the
traditional burden to require the registrant to establish safety in a pesticide suspension
proceeding).
223. 448 U.S. at 656.
224. Id.
225. At least one commentator has argued that, by failing to specifically legislate a
burden of proof in OSHA. Congress expressed its intention to maintain the traditional APA
burden. See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Adninistrwuive Re.soluion
of Science Policy Questions: Rggulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSIIA. 67 GEo. L.
729, 791 (1979). This argument apparently stems from the presence of a more explicit
burden shift in the Federal Insecticide. Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 222. Short of a specific provision, however.
the burden shift in OSHA could hardly be clearer. Congress's preference to err on the side
of worker protection, which is made manifest by the structure of the statute, see 29 U.S.C.I 651-678 (1976), in tandem with its recognition of the need for anticipatory regulation
because of scientific uncertainty, see supra text accompanying notes 156-58. may fairly be
said to accomplish a burden shift, at least when the agency has used the best data available
in making its predictive judgments.
Before the Benzene decision, the lower federal courts consistently recogniLed the
pragmatic burden shift in OSHA, as Congress intended. Once the agency questioned the
health and safety implications of an industry practice and responded with a standard, the
burden of persuasion shifted to the industry to show that the standard was not feasible.
See Rodgers, supra note 190, at 216 n.169 (citing American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA.
577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (coke-oven emissions);
Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421
U.S. 992 (1975).(vinyl chloride); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (asbestos dust)); see also Rodgers, supra note 192. at 305 n.22; Doniger. Federl
Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Lawt and Policy of Toxic Substances
Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497 (1978); LCape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation
of Environmental Carcinogens. 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 86 (1980).
The Benzene plurality's reasoning was weakest in the section of its opinion where it
mistakenly applied the traditional APA burden of proo to require the Secretary to show
by substantial evidence "that it is at least more likely th;11 nt" that exposure to hcnzcnC
at the 10 ppm level *'presents a significant risk of material health impairment." 448 U.S. at
653. This analysis faltered when the plurality acknowledged that -significance is a policy
question for the agency, reviewable by some lesser. unidemilied slandard. Id. at 655-56
n.62. It fell flat when the plurality admitted that the 'best available evidcnce" standard of
section 6(b)(5) calls for a measure of deference when OSIIA is operating "on the frontics
of scientific knowledge." 448 U.S. at 656 (citing Society of tie lalstics Indus. v. OSIIA.
509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975). cert. denied. 421 U S. 99.3 (19751; Indusitial Unlion
Dep's v. Hodgson, 449 F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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year.. Although affirming the Benzene holding, the Court in Cotton Dustu26
refused to apply the Benzene rationale.
2. The Cotton Dust Case
In Cotton Dust, the textile industry challenged the OSHA standard
for workplace exposure.to cotton dust."' This case squarely presented
the issue that the Court had tried so hard to avoid in Benzene: whether
the Secretary of Labor was required to Support a section 6(b)(5) standard
with a showing that the costs of complying with the standard would bear
a reasonable relationship to the health benefits.22 The Court could not
avoid this issue here, in contrast to the dearth of reliable information
concerning the health effects of benzene, an abundance of empirical data
established the serious adverse health effects of cotton dust, even at
exposure levels below the proposed standard.2 9 This data enabled the
Secretary to use a dose-response curve to assess, and to express quan-titatively, the health risks of cotton dust exposure at both the existing
and the proposed levels; thus, he was able to comply with the SupremeCourt's decision in Beinzene.3 1"
In responding to the textile industry's contention that section 6(b)(5)
standards were invalid unless supported by a cost-benefit analysis,"' the
Court easily rejected the industry's two primary arguments. In the
Court's view, such analysis was required neither by the word "feasible"
in section 6(b)(5)23 nor by the general definition of an occupational health
and safety standard in section 3(8)." As it had in Benzene.211 the Court
examined OSHA's "language, structure and legislative history." 231 This
time, however, the Court found that, by enacting stringent standard-
setting criteria for toxic substances in section 6(b)(5), Congress had itself
226. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ci. 2478 (1981).
227. Id.
228. See id. at 2483.
229.
(OISHA expressly found that -exposure to cotton dust presents a significant health hazard to
cmployees. 43 Fed. ticg. 27,350, 27.350. col. I (1978). and that "cotton dust produced significant
health effects at low levels of exposure." id.. at 27.358. col. 2. In addition, the agency notedthal "grade tone-halfl byssinosis and associated pulmonary function decrements are significant
hadhth effects in themselves and should be prevented in so far as possible." /it., at 27.354. col.
2 in making this assessment of significant risk. OSHA relied on dose response curve data (the
Merchant Study) showing thai 25% of employees suffered at least Grade (one-half) byssinosis
at a 500 pig/m' PEL. and that 12.7% of all employees would suffer byssinosis at the 200 pg/m'
PEI. standard. Id. at 27,358, calls). 2 1&1 3. . . . OSHA concluded that the -prevalence of
byssnosis should be significantly reduced" by the 200 pg/m' PEL. Id. at 27.359. cut. 3.
Id. at 2488 n.25.; see 101 S. Ct. at 2485. 2487.
230. 101 S. Ct. at 2488 n.25.
231. See supra text accompanying note 169.
232. Id. at 2491-92.
233. Id. at 2492; sec sopru text accompanying note 165.
234. Sec Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607. 642-44
11980).
235. 101 S. Ci. at 2490.
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balanced the costs and benefits of occupational health and had placed
"the 'benefit' of worker health above all other, considerations save t hosemaking attainment of this 'benefit6' unachievable"26 Furthermore, theCourt recognized that it would eviscerate section 6(b)(5) of the Act isection 3(8) were read to impose the additional requirement of a "rea-sonable relationship" between the benefits and costs of section 6(b)(5)
Congress intended the general terms of section 3(8) to countemn the
specific . .. requirement of section 6(b)(5). "2-18The Cotton, Dust majority thus squarely rejected the premises of theBenzene plurality that section 6(b)(5) was not a special provision for toxicsubstances239 and that the requirements of section 3(8) applied to section6(b)(5) standards as well.24u Even though Cotton Dust thus deprivedBenzene of its logic, it left the conclusion of the Benzenie plurality undis-turbed. Ironically, that conclusion was, to a limited extent, endorsed bythe Cotton Dust majority in a footnote in which the Court cautioned thatsection 3(8) was not devoid of substantive conten. 24tI The Court explainedthat although section 3(8) was held not to require a balancing of the costsand benefits of standards issued under section 6(b)(5), this holding "doesnot mean that section 3(8)'s 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' lan-guage might not impose additional restraints on 1the Secretary). "24' Asan example, the Court cited the Benzene holding that "all section 6(b)(5)standards must be addressed to 'significant risks' of material healthimipairment. "243
The result is odd, to say the least. To malnain that section 3(8)constrains section (6)(b)(5) for some purposes, hut not othiers, forces a
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2492.
238. Id.
While the Cotton Dus case was pending before the Court President Reagan signedExecutive Order Number 12,291. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). it soughtto control agency rulemaking by requiring the very cost bcneli analysis that was at issuein Cotton Dust. See 101 S. Ct. at 2489. The scope and consliulionl legitimacy at theOrder are now the subject of hcated debate. See Flopmand, Cos-Bentut Ana i told Aethe,DecisionMakig. An Analys s of Executi Order Nn. 12.291. 23 Agtiz. I.. Rt'v. 1195,1195.98 (1981); Rosenberg, Beyond thet Ljujtj of Exete.. I'1c,'resjdlh.,i ('0ttrt o/Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12.291. 801 Micti. L rtv. 193 (1981). lheOrder's requirements, however, expressy apply only to the extent pemitted by law.Exec. Order No. 12.291, ' 'a), supra, at 128. Because section 6(b)(5) o OSHA expresslyprecludes cost-benefit dt "Fionmaking. as the Court has conftrtted, seo spro text accotitpanying notes 235-36, th. Order does not apply to 'the seting of txics stand.tds andcOSHA. See Sunstein, Ctss-Benefit Analy.si< and tohe1 Strtifnt of "meran, 23 Ai n.Rev. 1267, 1278 n.38 (1981).
239. 101 S. CI. at 2492.
240. Compare suprat text accompanying note,, 237-38 id supra lest accoipanyingnotes 183.87.
ns 241. l 1 S. 0 . at 2493 n.32 (cting industral Union )cIt v. Amic aic nm P l'eioc omnInst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980)).242. 101 S. Ct. at 2493 n.32.
243. Id. (citing 448 U.S. at 642).
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distinctipn where Congress apparently intended none. Neither the lan-
guage of the statute nor its legislative history support such a distinction.""'
Either section 3(8) affects section 6(b)(5) rulemaking or it does not; if it
does, section 6(b)(5) is "nugatory." 24'
As a practical matter, the so-called "threshold" determination of
"significance" required by Benzene is nothing less than a determination
that benefits will result from a reduction in existing exposure levels.
Section 6(b)(5) is no more eviscerated if the Secretary must determine
that benefits are reasonably related to costs than if he must determine
that benefits are significant. Moreover, it makes no sense to prohibit the
Secretary from reducing the benzene standard from ten parts per mtillion
to one part per million, but acknowledge that he cot 'd have reached the
same result if only he had started, say, at the 100 ppm level, where the
risks of benzene exposure are demonstrably "significant."
Given the difficulty of plausibly reconciling the approach adopted by
the Benzene plurality with the better-reasoned holding of the Cotton Dust
majority, the Benzene decision should be viewed as an accident of its
anarchical five opinions, and accordingly be given little precedential
weight.246 The disjunctive character of the "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate" language, which the Benzene plurality twice misquoted by
substituting "and" for "or," 241 further supports the Secretary's view that,
even if section 3(8) has any substantive content, it still allows him wide
discretion to fashion an "appropriate" rule.
The most generous reading of the two decisions is that they give the
Secretary guidance in setting standards for workplace exposure to toxic
materials. They create a two-step process, calling, first, for a demonstra-
tion of significant risk of harm and, second, for a finding that the proposed
standard will reduce that risk to the extent feasible, though no cost-
benefit analysis need be performed.
There is little, however, to recommend such a benevolent synthesis.
The resulting principles stray far from Congress's intent in controlling
workplace toxics by limiting the Secretary's ability to promulgate stan-
dards when faced with indeterminate - and hence unquantifiable -
risks. In a regulatory environment of uncertainty, on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, Benzene's "threshold" requirement eviscerates sec-
tion 6(b)(5) just as effectively as a cost-benefit requirement would.
Benzeie thus thwarts the precautionary, information-forcing approach
that Congress adopted in OSHA. as well as in the Clean Air Act.
244. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.. 448 U.S. 607, 710-It
J19so). Section 3(8) is not mentioned even once in the entire legislative history. Id. at 710.
245. 101 S. Ct. at 2492.
246. Its failure to do so may be explained by the presence of Justice Stevens in the
( ttn I )ut miajority; Jusiice Stevens authored the plurality opinion in Benzene.
247. See 448 U.S. at 639; Rodgers, Jusdicia Review of Risk Assessments: The Itole
o) Deistwn Theory in Unscraabling file Benzene Decision, 11 ENvTL. L. 301. 303 n.14
( 1981 K Note. Americain Petroleum Insiute v. OS1A, 10 ENvTI.. L. 664, 667 (1980).
111. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
A. The Role of the Courts in Environmental Regulation
As individuals and as a society it is not easy to incur present costs
in order to reap future benefits. Environmental protection often requires
us to do just that, to make investments today to safeguard against harms
that would not materialize for years.245 Consequently, in any effort todevelop sound environmental policies, we must rely on decisionmaking
institutions that can cope effectively with the intergenerational dimension
of environmental problems. 49
As is widely recognized, the marketplace fails miserably at thislask.250 Market decisions are inevitably shortsighted because our eco-
nomic system discounts the future by assigning a lower value to goods
that will be received in the future than to identical goods received cur-
rently.251 Indeed, at the discount rates that are now in use, even resources
critical to future well-being have virtually no present value to a rational
economic decisionmaker.52
The remedy for this market failure is governmental intervention.25 'Of course, laissez-faire politics, like laissez-faire economics, often pro-duces outcomes that society finds intolerable. Democratically elected
248. See. e.g.. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, GLOBAL ENERoY FUTrURE ANDTHE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM 58 (1981) ("Widespread and pervasive changes" in global
climate may occur within 70 years unless there is a reduction in the large-scale combustion
of fossil fuels); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY. ENVIRONMENTAL QuAITrY - 1975,
at 27-28 (1975) (6th Annual Report) (cancers caused by exposure to chemicals commonly
have latency periods of between 15 and 40 years).
249. The intergenerational aspects of environmental problems are discussed generally
in B. COMMONER. THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971); P. EHRLICH, A. EHRLICH & J. HOLDEN.
EcoscIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES AND ENvmRONMENT (1977); D. MEADOWS, 1).
MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS IlI, THE LIMITs to GRowTH. A REPORT FOR THECLUB OF ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT Of MANKIND (1972); M. MESAROVIC &
E. PESTEL, MANKIND AND THE TURNING POINT: THE SECOND REPORT TO THE CLUB Of
Rome (1974); E. MtSHAN. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT (1977); E.
MISuAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1967); J. TINGERGEN, RESHAPING THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A REPORT TO THE CLUB of ROME (1976); Boulding. The Eco-
nomics of the Coming Spaceship Earth. in ENviRONMINTALL QUALITY IN A GRoWIN
Economy 3-14 (H. Jarrelt ed. 1966).
250. See 6 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL. AFFAIRS, 95t11 CONG.
2D SESS.. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION 9-22 (1978) (defining market failures as con-ditions under which regulation can increase efficiency).
251. See, e.g.. Boulding. supra note 249, at 3-14: Fisher & Krutilla, Riwarce Con-
serv'ation, Environm-ental Preservation aond the Rate i/ Discouns. Q.J. EoN.. Aug. 1975.
at 89.
252. At a discount rate of five percent, the present value of a one dollar benefit 0lol
years in the future is about one and one-half cents. See lioulding, supra note 249, at 3-14.
The implications for future environmental values are devasating Set I)ochnan, Oin the
Social Rate of Discount: The Case jur acroenvionmnal llPolic. 2 l:NV I . 1:1 ils 4S(1980).
253. See R. SITEWART & J. Kkicait. .upr note 10, at 107-16.
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legislatures, like the market, tend to be shortsighted decisionmakers. 254
How, then, can society rely on Congress to protect environmental values
by "legislating temperance"?'"
In theory, the answer is that the collective will of society will oc-
c.Isionally rise above individual preferences.5 6 This theory is borne out
by the spate of environmental protection legislation enacted around 1970.
That was a remarkable era, however, one in which visions of imminent
ecologic catastrophe provided the impetus to social action and legislative
response."' Furthermore, most of the statutes enacted then were broadly
worded commitments for the federal bureaucracy to shape and imple-
ment. Congress thus avoided making explicit, politically difficult trade-
offs between present costs and future benefits. Aware, perhaps, of its
own institutional inability consistently to make such trade-offs, Congress
delegated management of the nation's environmental resources to other
institutions less susceptible to short-term political pressures - the ad-
ministrative agencies and the courts.
At first, these statutes prompted the intended response: a flurry of
administrative ruleniakings, closely supervised by the judiciary. Agencies
such as EPA and OSHA made real, though seldom explicit, trade-offs
between the economy and the environment in setting exposure standards
and emission limitations for environmental contaminants, and the lower
federal courts reviewed these decisions with more than the customary
rigor.258 Although the most appropriate division of decisional responsi-
bility between agency and court provoked spirited debate, 59 the lower
courts generally recognized that Congress had given them an important
role in environmental policymaking and were quite willing to undertake
it. A "new era" of partnership between agencies and courts was said to
have arrived.2""
254. See id. at 173-82.
255. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 39
(G. DeBell ed. 1970)
256. See R. STEWART & J. KRaER, supra note 10, at 178.
257. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text; see also Sagoff, Economic Theory
and L, Eni Lonmnenitl Law. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1395. 1418 (1981).
258. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846.849 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (mindful
of the "novel, sensitive and formidable tasks" entrusted to the agency, the Court required
a fuller rbcord in the setting of Clean Air Act standards); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus. 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (health interests "have always had a special
claim to judicial protection").
259. Most of the discussion was phrased in terms of the "scope of review." See
Rodgers, supra note 28, at 722-23.
260. Judge Bazelon proclaimed the "new era" in 1971:
We sduad on the threshold ofa new era in the history of the long and fruitful collaboration of
adiminisiralave agencies and reviewing courts . . . . lClouris are increasingly asked to review
administiative action that touches on fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty.
These interests have always had a special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the
economic interests at stake in a ratemaking or licensing procceding.
Invironmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584. 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ended this "new era" shortly after
it began. In reviewing the important environmental legislation of 1969
and 1970, the Court often failed to comprehend either Congress's objec-
tives or its vision of the courts' role in achieving them. The Court's
misconstruction of this legislation reflects its own limited sympathy for
environmental values, as the key opinions analyzed in Parts I and II
reveal. This Part of the article reviews some additional cases that further
illustrate the Court's attitude and that bear more directly on the issues
of institutional responsibility.
B. The Supreme Court's Abdication
1. Initial Activism: Overton Park
Perhaps the most startling feature of [he Court's apparent hostility
toward environmental values is how abruptly it appeared. As recently as
1971, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 1' the Court gave
an expansive reading to an environmental protection statute that autho-
rized the Secretary of Transportation to provide federal funds for the
construction of highways through public parklands only if there were no
"feasible and prudent alternative." 62 Rejecting the Secretary's argument
that the statute left him broad discretion to conclude that a more disrup-
tive and expensive route was not a "prudent" alternative, a unanimous
Court held that in balancing these concededly relevant factors the
Secretary was nevertheless required to give preeminent weight to park-
land values. 263 Moreover, although the Court purported to adopt the
traditionally deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review,2t
its remand to the District Court for a "careful," "searching," "in-depth."
"probing," and "thorough" examination of the administrative record2i"
gave new meaning to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. The Court
thus seemed to place its imprimatur on judicial activism in environmental
cases. The next year, the Court reinforced that impression, by issuing
an expansive grant of standing to the plaintiff environmental group in
Aberdeen and Rockfish Railroad v. SCRAP (SCRAP 1).216
2. Retreat
In the early 1970's, the appointment ol' Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens26' dramatically altered the composition of the
261. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
262. Id. at 411.
263. Id. at 413.
264. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
265. 401 U.S. at 415.
266. 409 U.S. 1207 (1972) (granting standing to a group of law students who used
national parks and forests and who were challenging an Interstate Comitete Conunission
(ICC) order increasing railway freight rates on the theory that the increase would raise the
cost of recycling materials, causing a surge in mining operations that would adversely elies
parks and forests).
267. Chief Justice Burger was appointed in 19t>., Jitvice Illackinun in 197(l, Jutwsc
Powell and Rehnquist in 1972. and Justice Slevei'. in 1975.
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Court. With that change came a marked reduction in enthusiam for
environmental values. By 1975, when the Burger Court reached full
complement, cases such as Train v. Natural Resources Defense
CounciP'* indicated that the Court was less willing to find substantive
content in federal environmental laws than it had been in Overton Park.
Then, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Court
sharply limited the availability of attorneys' fees for "private attorneys
general," thus curtailing an important source of funding for environmental
groups. 6 9 Alyeska made clear that the Court's concern with assuring
environmental plaintiffs access to the courts, which had been a central
concern in SCRAP 1,270 was a thing of the past.
a. Vermont Ya'nkee
The Court's 1978 opinion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
Natural Resources Defense Council"' dispelled any remaining doubts
about the extent of the Court's retreat from judicial activism in the service
of'environmental values. There the District of Columbia Circuit had taken
the "hard look" that characterized the "new era" in judicial review under
NEPA. After doing so, the court set aside two actions of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), because the agency had failed to give
environmental values the consideration required by NEPA."' In a
sharply worded opinion by Justice Rehnquist, which drew no dissents,
the Supreme Court reversed and delivered a stinging rebuke to the lower
court for what it called "judicial intervention run riot":"'
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it may
not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy ....
The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress ...
are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of
judicial review of agency action."'
268. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc.. 421 U.S. 60 (1975); see supra
text accompanying notes 119-36. See also Aberdeen & Rocklish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S.
289 (19751(SCRAP 11) (holding that the ICC gave adequate consideration to the environ-
mental effects of railway freight rate structures and that no EIS was required before the
agency increased rates); Nolan. The National Environmental Policy Act After United States
v. SCRAP: The Timing Question and Substaniive Review. 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 213 (1976).
269. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
270. 409 U.S. 1207 (1972) (holding that fees could be awarded only where authorized
by specific statutory provision).
271. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
272. See Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n. 547 F.2d 622
(D.C Cir. 1976) and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulaiory Conm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976). consolidated. rev'd, and remanded
,i nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
ln.. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
273. 435 U.S. ai 557.
274. Id. at 557-58 (emphasis in uriginal).
This charge of judicial obstructionism was wrong in its major prem-
ise. Congress had not resolved the "fundamental" policy questions in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.1' By authorizing the NRC to license nuclear
power plants when it found that they could operate with "adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public,""' Congress simply
passed these policy questions forward to the agency and the courts.2"
By discouraging probing judicial review, the Supreme Court converted
the policymaking partnership envisioned by Congress into a dangerous
sole proprietorship, managed by an agency with a history of callous
indifference to environmental values."7
b. Benzene and Cotton Dust Revisited
Vermont Yankee might be read as a call for a return to Congressional
primacy in environmental policymaking; if understood that way, the
decision is principled, albeit impractical. All pretense of principle, how-
ever, was exploded by the Benzene decision." 9 In Benzene, the Court
ignored an express Congressional policy in favor of protecting worker
health and safety, and set aside an agency's implementation of that policy
without demonstrating any of the deference for agency expertise that it
had demanded in Vermont Yankee.no Justice Rehnquist's opinions bring
into sharp focus the inconsistency in the Court's handling of these two
cases;" he was apparently able to find much more substantive content
in the word "adequate," as used in the Atomic Energy Act, than he
could find in the-word "feasible," as used in OSHA. 28'
275. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
276. 42 U.S.C. I 2232(a) (1976).
277. See. e.g.. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978) (NRC may issue operating licenses in
advance of developing a plan for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive wastes);
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367
U.S. 396 (1961) (Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, predecessor of NRC) may issue a
"provisional" construction permit in advance of a "delinilive" safety determination).
278. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regu-
latory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded. 434 U.S. 1030 (1978);
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109(D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Yellin. Judicial Review and Nuclear Power: Assessing the
Risks of Environmental Catastrophe. 45 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 969 (1977).
279. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 213-74. See also Kleppe v. Sicira Club, 427
U.S. 390 (1976) (determination of the.proper scope of an EIS requires agency "cxpertie"
and "special competence" to which courts must defer).
281. Compare Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrolkum lnst., 448 U.S. o07,
671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Coil). v
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Rehnquisi, J.)
282. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976) (AEC to licensc power reactors if they "wilI pIovI k
adequate protection to the healti and safety of tle public-) (euphasis adical.
283. 29 U.S.C. § 655(h)(5) (1976) (piotectiio of emiployees f11ull1 naenlcial iiponiaiiiicnu
of health 'to the extent Jeasible") (emphasis added).
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Anoiher disturbing aspect of Benzene is its misuse of the non-
delegatidn doctrine.2 14 Especially troubling is the plurality's use of that
doctrine to suggest that a statute empowering the Secretary of Labor to
eliminate unquantifiable health risks from the workplace "would make
such a 'sweeping delegation of legislative power' that it might be uncon-
stitutional under the Court's reasoning in Schechter Poultery . . . and
Pananta Refining . . . ."28
These citations are inapt. While a Congressional decision to establish
a risk-free workplace might be unwise, it would present no delegation
problems because it would be a decision by Congress. 56 Apparently, the
284. Derived from a literal reading of the Constitution, the essence of the non-
dclegation doctrine is that it is unconstitutional for Congress to delegate ridemaking to
subordinate officials because Article I states that "All legislative powers ... shall be vested
in a Congress." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, I I (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court
has not used the nondclegation doctrine to invalidate an act of Congress since 1935, see
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). the doctrine is not dead. See infra note 285.
285. Id. at 656.
Until Benzene, the non-delegation doctrine seemed limited to the proposition that
Congress may not delegate certain powers. such as the power to tax. See generally Freed-
nan. Review: Delegation of Pow.'er and Instituitional Competence, 43 U. Ct. L. REv. 307
(1976). Long since dead and buried, at least until exhumed by Justice Rehnquist's Benzene
concurrence. 448 U.S. at 671-88. was the simplistic notion that our ideal of democratic
government required Congress to accompany rulemaking authority with some "standard"
or "intelligible principle" sufficiently definite to guide its exercise. Indeed, in the context
of economic regulation, the court had repeatedly sustained delegations that were in fact so
broad as to contain no "standards" at all. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
The citation to Schechter and Panasna as twin cases is terribly misleading. Schechter
struck down as too "sweeping" a delegation of authority to the President that was virtually
coextensive with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The case remains
good law. Ht see L. TRiBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 5-17. at 290-91 (1978).
Panania insisted that a delegation to the President of the authority to halt interstate
shipments of oil, produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amounts permitted
by state authority be accompanied by a standard delimiting its use. That case was no longer
good law until Justice Rehnquist resurrected it. Compare National Cable Television Assoc.
v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), iwith Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Algon-
quin, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
284. Even Justice Rehnquist conceded as much in his Coaon Dust dissent. American
Textile Alfrs. Inst. v. Donovan. 101 S. Ci. 2478, 2508 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
After arguing, as he had in Benzene, that section 6(b)(5) of the OSHA ran afoul of the
nondclegation doctrine because "the 'feasibility standard' -is no standard at all," he went
on to assert that the statute "would not have created an excessive delegation problem" if
the feasibility" limitation had been dropped and the statute had "simply required the
Secretary to 'set the standards' which most adequately assures, on the basis of the best
aailable professional evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health."
1J
The plurality. however, would have had even greater "non-delegation" problems with
such a statute, apparently taking the position that the authority to eliminate insignificant
workplace health risks could not be delegated at all:
It the Government were correct in arguing that neither § 3(t) nor § 6(b)(5) requares that the risk
littn a 1oxic substance he 4 uanthied sufficiently it enable the Secretary to characierize 
it is
plurality's doubts about the constitutionality of such a statute have a
source other than the non-delegation doctrine. 'The sentence that imme-
diately precedes the plurality's reference to the non-delegation doctrine
provides a clue:
In light of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in
the workplace that have been identified as carcinogens or suspect carcin-
ogens the Government's theory (that the statute. authorized the Secretary
to set exposure standards for carcinogens at the lowest level feasibleI would
give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if
any, discernible benefit."'
In other words, the plurality disagreed with Congress's policy decision
to incur large, present-day economic costs in order to secure indetermi-
nate future benefits. Given, however, that the doctrine of substantive
due process is still as thoroughly entombed as the non-delegation doctrine
was once thought to be,28 the Court's attempts to cast doubt on the
constitutional validity of OSHA lack a principled foundation.
3. Duke Power
The Court has been less troubled when Congress has made the
opposite, politically easier choice to pursue present-day economic gains
at the risk of future losses. Congress made such a choice in the Price-
Anderson Act of 1957,28' in which it limited the nuclear power industry's
aggregate liability in the event of a catastrophic accident to $560 million'
in order to encourage private sector investment in nuclear power 9.' In
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,2'2 the
plaintiffs had alleged that the potential losses in such an accident would
vastly exceed the Act's ceiling on liability, and argued that the Act
therefore violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
fifth amendment."' The District Court had agreed, and had declared the
signigicani in an understandablc way. the statute would make such a "sweeping delegation of
legislative power' that it might be unconsitutional ...
Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum tist., 448 U.S. 607, 640 11980). No
authority or rationale was offered for this conclusion and, as noted by the four dissenters,
it seems "plainly wrong," id. at 647 n.30 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
287. 448 U.S. at 645 (footnote omitted).
288. See generally L. TRibE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 427-55 (1978).
289. 42 U.S.C. I§ 2012(i). 20140). (k). (m). (p). (q), (1), (w). 2039, 2210 (1976).
290. 42 U.S.C. I 2210(e) (1976).
291. The purpose of the Price-Anderson Act is to "protect the public and . . . en-
courage the development of the atomic energy industiy." 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976). See iai
438 U.S. at 83 ("it is clear that Congress' purpose lin enacting the Price-Anderson Act)
was to remove the economic impediments in order to stimulate the private development ol
electrical energy by nuclear power . . . ..
292. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
293. See id. at 68 n.12.
The fifth amendmnt's due process clatuse has been held to have an eqtuul protcion-,
component. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe. 347 U S. 497 (1954.
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Act unconstitutional. 94 Unanimous on the merits, the Supreme Court
reversed.2'9 Terming the statute a "classic example of economic regula-
tion,"'* a characterization that entitled it to the extremely deferential
review traditionally reserved for commerce clause regulation of business
practices,'91 the Court had no difficulty concluding: (1) that the promotion
of private sector investment in nuclear power was a valid legislative
objective; 91 (2) that a limitation of liability for the consequences of a
nuclear accident bore a "rational relationship" to that objective;2* and
(3) that the specific "congressional decision to fix a $560 million ceiling"
on liability was neither impermissibly arbitrary nor unreasonable.nn
The problem with the Court's analysis is that it does not go far
enough. Instead of assessing whether Congress acted rationally in sub-
sidizing, the nuclear industry with a liability limitation, the Court should
have examined the rationality of requiring that the victims'of a future
accident provide this subsidy, rather than some other group that stood
294. Carolina Envil. Study Group. Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n. 431 F. Supp.
203. 222-25, 226 (W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd suab noin. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtil.
Study Group. Inc.. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
295. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart each separately concurred in the judg-
ment, but they questioned the plaintiffs' standing and the justiciability of the issues.
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens also questioned the Court's jurisdiction. See id. at 95-102
Rchnquist, J.); id. at 102-03 (Stevens. J.); id. at 94.95 (Stewart, J.).
296. Id. at 83.
297. Id. at 83-84. See McCloskey. Economic Die Process and the Suprene Court:
An Exrhuniiriono nd Rehriiiii. 1962 Sul'. Cr. R1iv. 34; Note. A Suib. niive Due Process
Auakle on the Price-Andersotn Act: Duke Power Co. v. Curohnn Enviroinetiu Study
Group. Iic.. 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 756, 768.
298. 438 U.S. at 84.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 87.
The Price-Anderson Act is not in fact the kind of regulation of business practices that
has received maximal judicial deference. To make the Price-Anderson Act fit into the
"business practice" rubric, the Court in Duke Power relied on the broad definition of
economic regulation in Usery i. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.. 428 U.S. 1 (1976). That case
characterizes economic regulation as an attempt to make rules regarding the "burdens and
benefilt'of economic life." Id. at 15. This language was arguably only dictum, however,
oecause the challenged regulation in Usery, an extension of remedies to miners with job-
related disabilities. qualifies as a regulation of the business practices of mine operators.
IFurthermore. Usery did not explain of provide authority for its expansive language. See
428 U.S. at 15.
The Price-Anderson Act is a limitation on common-law tort liability that alters the
rights of the nuclear industry and potential accident victims. If the Act affected industry
busness practices at all. the effect would be to reduce safety precautions. The Court itself
decided that the Act does not provide an incentive for less plant safety, thus tacitly
acknowledging that the liability limit affects no business practice. See Duke Power, 438
U .S. at 87; Dickerson, Limtiied Liability for Nuclear Accideits: Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
em iulineald Steedl Grolp. Inc., 8 EcotoGY L.Q. 163, 170 (1979). Accordingly, the
slandard of review in Duke Powier should have been one that balanced bendits and burdens.
Set, McCloskey, supra note 297.
to benefit more directly from commercial nuclear power. Here the equal
protection challenge to the statute seems strong. 0
The Act looks even worse if the intergenerational dimension of the
classification is considered. Equal protection analysis provides greater
than normal scrutiny when "fundamental rights" or "suspect classifica-
tions" are involved.'0 The Duke Power Court should have recognized
that the Act impinges on a fundamental due process interest in being
protected from nuclear accidents, and that the Act creates a suspect
classification that discriminates against politically powerless future
generations. 41
IV. CONCLUSION.
As the Price-Anderson Act shows, legislatures cannot be expected
forever to avoid the temptations of short-run economic benefits that are
so often in conflict with public health and environmental quality. Despite
their limitations, courts must play a major role in protecting environmen-
tal values. This article has discussed a number of cases that collectively
demonstrate the Supreme Court's failure to fulfill this responsibility.
The greatest irony of the Court's uneven approach has been its
suggestion, by reference to the non-delegation doctrine, that Congresshas abdicated its legislative responsibility to make fundamental policydecisions regarding the degree of environmental protection it seeks. This
charge of institutional irresponsibility stands the world of envirtonmental
law on its head. To enact regulatory statutes that express a willingness
301. Although the issue had not even been argued before it, the Court decided the
equal protection issue in Duke Power in one paragraph. See 438 U.S. at 93. It relied onthe "general rationality" of the liability limitation as "ampile justificatio" for treating
nuclear accident victims differently from victims of other accidents. Id. The liability limi-
tations do rationally serve the statutory goal of promoting nuclear power, but this argumentis a due process argument, not an equal protection argument. See Dickerson, .supra note300, at 178-91. Under the equal protection doctrine. the Court should have considered the
rationality of the classification. rather than the "general rationality" of the law. See I.
Titm, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 994-96 (1978), The Court in Duke
Power failed to analyze the Price-Anderson Act's classilication in relation to the its purlpose
438 U.S. at 93.
Even if the Court had examined the rationality of the Aci's classilication. howevea.
it apparently would have analyzed the wrong classification. The Court perceived a "diler-
ence in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries ale
derived from other causes." Id. at 93-94. A more accurate characterization is that the Act
singles out nuclear accident victims to the exclusion of everyone else. So viewed, ii is
impossible to conceive of a rational relationship between tlie class singled ulit and tile
purpose of promoting nuclear power. Thus. the Piice-Andeison Act tails it pass iimster
even under the traditionally deferential equal proicelion review.
302. See L. TIuE, supra note 301, § 16-6. at 100t0-402.
303. See genrally Gunther. /i Seerch ol/f1 Eling Doti in m ai C0 ning Ciort
A AModel jur a Newer Equal Protcilion. 86 IIAlv. . Rtv. I f1972) (plposilng sli Icls
scrutiny of classifications).
(Vol. 7:1I38 Harvard Environmentail Law Review 1983)1
40 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 7:1
to bearacurrent economic costs in order to reap future quality-of-life
benefits, Congress first had to overcome its own institutional weaknesses.
Its success in so doing is an example of legislative responsibility of the
finest sort. By contrast, the Court's tendency to disregard the underlying
purposes of environmental legislation - protection of human health and
the environment - is an ac't of judicial abdication.
Justices Make It Harder to Press
Environmental Enforcement Cases
By Ruth Marcus
Washington Post Stiff Writer
The Supreme Court yesterday
made it harder for environmental
groups to sue to enforce environ-
mental laws, drawing an angry dis-
sent from Justice Harry A. Black-
mun that a majority on the court
engaged in a "slash-and-burn expe-
dition" to keep environmental plain-
tiffs out of court.
The court on a 7-2 vote dis-
missed a lawsuit challenging the
Bush administration's view that
U.S. agencies funding development
projects overseas do not have to
comply with the Endangered Spe-
cies Act.
The court did not rule on the un-
derlying question of whether the
law's provisions extend abroad, but
rather dismissed the case on the
technical legal ground that those
challenging the administration's
position lacked standing to sue.
Lawyers for both environmental
groups and the government agreed
yesterday that the court's ap-
proach-a continuation of its in-
creasingly strict rules on allowing
plaintiffs into court-imposed ad-
ditional hurdles on environmental
lawsuits challenging actions in this
country as well as overseas.
"It's going to make it very, very
difficult for citizens to get any kind
of relief in court when the govern-
ment decides to destroy the envi-
ronment," said Brian O'Neill, who
argued the case on behalf of De-
fenders of Wildlife. "This opinion, at
its core, is just hostile to any kind of
environmental lawsuit."
Interior Department spokesman
Steven Goldstein said department
officials were "gratified" with the
ruling and "hope this decision will
limit the number of unsubstantiated
court challenges to our programs
and policies."
Coincidentally, the ruling-which
conservation groups warned could
threaten hundreds of endangered
species overseas-came as Pres-
ident Bush spoke at the Earth Sum-
mit in Brazil. Bush has been under
fire from environmentalists and oth-
er countries for his decision not to
sign a biodiversity treaty aimed at
protecting threatened plants and
wildlife.
"It's ironic that Bush arrived at
the Earth Summit and the court
almost simultaneously told the
world what the U.S. thinks about
protecting endangered species,"
said Teresa Telecky, associate di-
rector of wildlife and habitat pro-
tection at the Humane Society of
the United States, one of the plain-
tiffs in the case. "It's a tragic deci-
sion for Americans and for
wildlife.. . . This basically gives the
go-ahead for agencies of the federal
government to support activities
that destroy wildlife in other coun-
tries."
Interior Department spokesman
Goldstein disputed that view. "All
along we have stated that this ad-
ministration is committed to up-
holding the Endangered Species
"This opinion, at its
core, is just hostile




attorney for Defenders of Wildlife
Act," he said. "This case was not
about that issue. This was about
whether United States environmen-
tal policy would supersede that of
economic and foreign policy, and
the court clearly ruled 7-2 in our
favor."
Under the 1973 Endangered
Species Act, federal agencies must
consult with the Interior Depart-
ment to make sure their actions are
not likely to jeopardize endangered
or threatened species or destroy
their habitats.
In 1986, the Interior Department
reversed its previous position and
announced that the law did not ap-
ply to U.S.-funded projects over-
seas. Defenders of Wildlife, other
environmental groups and their
members challenged the depart-
ment's interpretation of the law.
A federal appeals court agreed,
saying that the Endangered Species
Act "clearly demonstrates congres-
sional commitment to worldwide
conservation efforts. To limit the
consultation duty in a manner which
protects only domestic endangered
species runs contrary to such a
commitment."
In its ruling yesterday in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the high court
neither agreed nor disagreed. In-
stead, it said those challenging the
law lacked legal standing to pursue
their case because they had not
proved that they faced "imminent
injury."
Defenders of Wildlife President
Joyce Kelly had asserted that she
would suffer harm because of the
Bureau of Reclamation's project to
rebuild the Aswan High Dam in
Egypt, threatening the endangered
Nile crocodile. Another member,
Amy Skilbred, said she would be
harmed by the Mahaweli water re-
source project in Sri Lanka, funded
by the Agency for International De-
velopment, which threatened the
endangered Asian elephant and
leopard.
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for
the court majority, said that al-
though both women had visited the
area of the projects and expressed
their intention to return, that was
not enough to demonstrate they
were in immediate danger of suf-
fering harm.
Scalia also said the fact that the
Endangered Species Act contains a
specific "citizen-suit" provision al-
lowing individuals to challenge vi-
olations of the law does not mean
that any person can sue to force the
government to comply with re-
quired procedures.
He said such plaintiffs also must
prove that they suffer individual,
concrete harm as a result of the
government's procedural violation.
Otherwise, Scalia said, Congress
would be allowed "to transfer from
the president to the courts the chief
executive's most important consti-
tutional duty, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."
Blackmun, dissenting, said the
decision "reflects an unseemly so-
licitude for an expansion of power of
the executive branch." He warned
that the "principal effect of foreclos-
ing judicial enforcement of such
procedures is to transfer power into
the hands of the executive at the
expense-not of the courts-but of
Congress, from which that power
originates and emanates."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
joined Blackmun's dissent. Justice
John Paul Stevens agreed that De-
fenders of Wildlife had standing in




Supreme Court's environmental law docket blossoms
BY DAVID 0. STEWART
In our history, waves of govern-
ment regulation tend to trigger
litigation asserting legal ,and..
constitutional limits to the new
measures.
In the late 19th century, rail-
road rate regulation spawned many
constitutional battles, while social
legislation in the Progressive Era
drew a wide range of due process,
equal protection and contract
clause challenges. Disputes over
constitutional limits on New Deal
initiatives brought the Supreme
Court to the brink of crisis as
President Franklin Roosevelt
floated his "court-packing" proposal.
Over the past 50 years, the
constitutional impact of new regula-
tory initiatives has been muted by
the increasingly deferential doctrines
of administrative law. The courts
have tended to retire into the wings
in favor of the presumably expert
discretion of executive agencies.
However, environmental regu-
lation in the past 20 years has stirred
up legal contests that go to the heart
of our legal and constitutional proc-
esses, as reflected in nine environ-
mental law rulings in the Supreme
Court's last term.
The cases raised pivotal issues
of federal-vs.-state power (New York
v. U.S., No. 91-543), the power of
Congress to control the courts (Ro-
bertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,
No. 90-1596), the commerce clause
(Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
v. Hunt, No. 91-471; Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. u. Michigan
Nat. Res. Dept., No. 91-636), stand-
ing (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
No. 90-1424) and the takings clause
of the Fifth Amendment (Yee u.
Escondido, No. 90-1947; Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, No.
91-453).
Strikingly, the justices were gen-
erally disinclined in these rulings to
adapt or accommodate legal and
constitutional principles to environ-
mental exigencies. As Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor wrote in New York
v. U.S.:
"[The Constitution] divides pow-
ers among sovereigns and among
branches of government precisely so
David 0. Stewart is a partner in
the Washington, D.C., office of Ropes
& Gray.
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that we may resist the temptation to
concentrate power in one location as
an expedient solution to the crisis of
the day. The shortage of disposal
sites for radioactive waste is a press-
ing national problem, but a judiciary
that licensed extra-constitutional gov-
ernment with each issue of compara-




by seeking to coordinate both federal
and state regulatory efforts, raises
such substantial federalism issues
as the 10th Amendment question in
New York v. U.S.
By 1980, the U.S. economy was
producing millions of cubic feet of
waste from low-level radioactive ma-
terials used in luminous watch dials,
smoke alarms, measuring devices,
medical fluids and research materi-
als. But only three states-Wash-
ington, Nevada and South Carolina-
had disposal facilities for that waste.
In 1980, Congress enacted leg-
islation to encourage states to de-
velop disposal sites. By 1985, how-
ever, little progress had been achieved
and Congress turned to the problem
once more.
The resulting legislation pro-
vides incentives for states to estab-
lish facilities for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste by 1993 or to enter
interstate compacts with other
states for cooperative disposal sites.
The principal incentive is finan-
cial: The legislation sets out a sched-
ule of increasing surcharges for in-
terstate shipments of the waste, as
much as $40 per cubic foot in 1992.
The federal government then may
distribute those surcharges back to
nLLUSTRATION BY JOHN SCHMLZER
states that have met certain dead-
lines for addressing the waste
disposal problem.
The most controversial provi-
sion requires that, if a state had
not arrang(a-by 1996 for the
disposal of all .19w-level radioac-
tive waste generated within its
borders, the state must then take
title to and possession of all such
waste. The state also would be
liable for all damages caused by
its failure to take title.
Although 46 states met the
statutory deadlines set by the
1985 legislation, New York in
1990 filed suit, challenging the
statute as a violation of its rights
under the 10th Amendment.
By a 6-3 vote, the Court upheld
most. of the incentives as proper
exercises of Congress' spending power.
As Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court, financial incentives allow res-
idents of a state to "retain the ulti-
mate decision whether or not the
State will comply."
But the "take title" provision,
the Court ruled, unconstitutionally
attempted to " 'commandeer' state
governments into the service of fed-
eral regulatory purposes," thereby
violating "the Constitution's division
of authority between federal and
state governments."
O'Connor reasoned that since
Congress cannot order a state to
enact waste-disposal legislation, and
cannot order a state to take posses-
sion of waste, "it follows that Con-
gress lacks the power to offer the
States a choice between the two."
Justice Byron White, in a tartly
written dissent joined by Justices
Harry Blackmun and John Paul Ste-
vens, argued that the 1985 legisla-
tion was largely the result of negotia-
tions among the various state gov-
ernments, including New York, and
that New York should be estopped
from challenging it.
Pointing to "a crisis of national
proportions in the disposal of low-
level radioactive waste," White wrote,
"For me, the Court's civics lecture
has a decidedly hollow ring at a-time
when action, rather than rhetoric, is
needed to solve a national problem."
Federalism also played a role in
Arkansas u. Oklahoma, Nos. 90-
1262, et. al., which concerned the
Clean Water Act's "partnership be-
tween the States and the Federal
Government."
In unaninusly upholding the
issuance of a water discharge permit
to the city of Fayetteville, Ark., by
the Environmental Protection Agency,
however, the justices' principal mes-
sage was the need for courts to defer
to agency expertise.
A more dramatic federal-state
conflict arose in U.S. Department of
Energy v. Ohio, No. 91-1341, in
which Ohio attempted to sue the
federal government for environmental
damage at a nuclear site. (See "Ad-
vantage Government,"July 1992ABA
Journal, page 46.) The Court ruled,
6-3, that sovereign immunity barred
the action for civil fines.
What's Nexus?
Environmental litigation tradi-
tionally has generated extensive dis-
putes over standing, which date at
least to Justice William 0. Douglas'
proposal in 1972 that, to "protect
nature's ecological equilibrium," the
courts should confer "standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their
own protection." Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727.
The current Supreme Court, how-
ever, took a somewhat narrower view
of the question in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, finding that the plaintiffs
had no standing under the Endan-
gered Species Act to contest U.S.
funding of projects that might threaten
endangered species abroad.
As Douglas noted 20 years ago,
standing can be tricky whon legisla-
tion is designed to protect trees or
animals or habitats, none of which
have ready access to the federal
courts. The human litigants who do
go to court often have considerable
difficulty articulating how they have
suffered "injury in fact" that gener-
ated a concrete case or controversy.
In Defenders of Wildlife, one
named plaintiff complained that fed-
eral funding of the Aswan Dam
project in Egypt was threatening the
habitat of the Nile crocodile, which
she had observed in 1986 and hoped
to observe again.
A second named plaintiff tar-
geted federal funding for a Sri
Lankan project that could threaten
elephant and leopard lands she had
visited in the past without seeing
either animal, although she hoped to
see them in a future visit.
By a 7-2 margin, the Court
ruled that these allegations did not
establish sufficient real injury to
create standing, and rejected theo-
ries titled "ecosystem nexus," "ani-
mal nexus" and "vocational nexus."
With some exasperation, Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia's majority opin-
ion protested, "Under these theories,
anyone who goes to see elephants in
the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a
keeper of elephants in the Bronx Zoo,
has standing to sue."
The Court also refused to en-
force a "citizen-suit" provision in the
Endangered Species Act that au-
thorizes "any person" to bring a suit
to enjoin the federal government
from violating the act. The Court
insisted that Congress cannot enact
legislation that dispenses with the
concrete-injury requirement without
exalting the courts above the execu-
tive branch.
The courts, Scalia explained,
can only vindicate individual rights,
not "the undifferentiated public in-
terest in executive officers' compli-
ance with the law."
Blackmun's dissent, in which
O'Connor joined, argued that the
named plaintiffs had articulated a
sufficient basis to conclude that they
would return to the sites of the
disputed projects, and criticized the
Court's "rigid principles of geographic
formalism."
The dissenters also argued that
the act's citizen-suit provisions cre-
ate an enforceable right of action
that should be sustained against
"what amounts to a slash-and-burn
expedition through the law of envi-
ronmental standing."
Importing Weste
In two rulings handed down in
June, the Court invalidated state
restrictions on the importation of
waste, finding them unconstitutional
restraints of interstate commerce.
In Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt, the Court ruled 8-1 that
Alabama cannot impose a surcharge
on waste brought to its landfills from
other states.
Justice White wrote for the Court
that "No State may attempt to iso-
late itself from a problem common to
the several States by raising bar-
riers to the free flow of interstate
trade." Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist dissented.
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Michigan Nat. Res. Dept.
concerned legislation that permitted
each county in Michigan to develop
its own solid waste disposal plan and
to exclude all out-of-county waste.
By a 7-2 vote, the Court found
that the ban on out-of-county waste
did not save the corollary restriction
against out-of-state waste. Rehnquist
again dissented, this time joined by
Blackmun.
In both commerce clause rul-
ings, the Court emphasized that
state and local governments may
limit waste disposal at landfills or
other sites, or close them altogether.
However, states may not ration ac-
cess to those sites on the basis of the
origin of the waste.
For Rehnquist, the Court's hold-
ings are short-sighted, penalizing
those states that have provided for
solid waste disposal. The Court's
decisions, he predicted in Fort Gra-
tiot Sanitary Landfill, will only "en-
couragle] each State -to ignore the
waste problem 'in the hope that
another will pick up.the slack."
The spotted owl of the forests of
Oregon and Washington generated
an unusual legal problem when Con-
gress attempted to legislatively short-
circuit pending litigation under the
Endangered Species Act and several
related measures.
The 1990 legislation provided
that the federal government should
be deemed to be in compliance with
all of those statutes as long as it
suspended timber harvesting in the
areas designated in two other provi-
sions of the legislation.
Environmental groups chal-
lenged the new legislation as "pur-
portling] to direct the results in two
pending cases, violat[ing] Article III"
of the Constitution.
In a unanimous opinion by Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas, the Court held
that the compromise "compelled
changes in law, not findings or re-
sults under old law." Consequently,
the Court did not even reach the
Article III question.
Land Use
For almost 15 years, the Court
has flirted with the question of when
environmental land-use regulation,
such as zoning, achieves a taking
that triggers a right to compensation
under the due process clauses of the
Fifth and 14th Amendments.
In Yee u. Escondido, the plain-
tiff owners of a mobile-home park
claimed that a local rent-control ordi-
nance, when combined with state
restrictions on their ability to evict
residents, resulted in an unconstitu-
tional taking.
O'Connor's opinion for a unani-
mous Court stressed that there had
been no physical taking or invasion
of the property involved. The chal-
lenged regulations might be deemed
to cause a "regulatory taking," O'Con-
nor continued, but that issue was riot
properly before the Court.
And in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, the Court voted 6-3
to hold that public regulation could
require compensation to a landowner
if that regulation denied the owner
all "economically viable use of his
land." a
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October Term. 1991. started outwith the Supreme Court seeminglypoised to bulldoze forests of
precedents in a militant march to the po-
litical and jurisprudential right. It ended in
a series of stunners-pleasant surprises for
those who prefer a Court controlled by
judicious centrists in the common-law
tradition, rather than by conservative or
liberal crusaders. It was almost, as Alex-
ander Meiklejohn said of New York Times
v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "an
occasion for dancing in the streets."
But not quite. For in the big cases
handed down this June, the centrist jus-
tices (Sandra Day O'Connor. Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter) and their
sometime liberal allies (Harry Blackmun
and John Paul Stevens) struck some false
notes. sowed unnecessary confusion, and
took one substantive wrong turn. The
irony is that they most palpably under-
scored doubts about the constitutional
rootedness of their decisions when they
wore their craving for "legitimacy" and
consistency most grandiloquently on their
sleeves.
The good news (for us centrists) pre-
dominated: In a less-than-friendly take-
over of the "Rehnquist Court," the new
centrist triumvirate embraced a Har-
lanesque conception of the Court as
guardian of individual liberty, exercising
"reasoned judgment" under a gradually
evolving constitutional common law.
"Liberty" was both the first and the last
word in their joint opinion in the abortion
decision. Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60
U.S.L.W. 4795 (June 29. 1992). In this
and the school-prayer decision, Lee v.
Weisman, 60 U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24.
1992). the centrists rejected the three ab-
solutist conservatives' selective attacks on
the idea of an evolving constitution.
The not-so-good news (dwelled on here
because it's less familiar) is that the cen-
trists let a self-conscious concern for the
appearance of legitimacy-for how they
would look--muddy the rationales for the
decisions on abortion and (in Kennedy's
case) prayer. They also carried the urge to
make symbolic gestures of disdain for ra-
cial discrimination to the perverse result of
making it harder in Georgia v. McCollum,
60 U.S.L.W. 4574 (June 18. 1992) (over
O'Connor's dissent) for black criminal
defendants to avoid all-white juries. The
same impulse contributed in United States
Y. Fordice, 60 U.S.L.W. 4769 (June 26,
1992) to an 8-1 decision sowing confusion
about how Southern states should reme-
dy the legacy of segregation in their
universities.
In striving for a tone of Holmesian
profundity, the centrists opened them-
selves to the savage ridicule flowing so
freely from the pen of Justice Antonin
Scalia. who accused them of "almost
czarist arrogance." The most unfortunate
of the centrists' lines came in the stare
decisis section of their abortion opinion:
"To all those who will be tested by fol-
lowing, the Court implicitly undertakes to
remain steadfast." Responded Scalia. not
inappropriately: "The Imperial Judiciary
lives."
Admitting Error 'Under Fire'
The broader problem with the Casey
opinion is that the centrists' under-
standable lack of confidence in the con-
stitutional basis for the ri&ht to abortion
they reaffirmed led them to advance an
unprecedented and unsupportable notion
of stare decisis. In cases involving an
"intensely divisive controversy" such as
Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), "to
overrule under fire in the absence of the
most compelling reason to re-examine a
watershed decision would subvert the
Court's legitimacy." they declared. It
might, the centrists said, seem a "sur-
render to political pressure."
This perversely seems to suggest that
passionate and sustained public protest
against an arguably erroneous constitu-
tional precedent is an affirmative reason
for the Court to refuse to admit error. The
reasoning lets "a fetish for legitimacy
penalize freedom of expression." Chief
Justice William Rehnquist said in dissent.
Beyond that, and contrary to the major-
ity and the dissenters alike, sustained.
massive public and scholarly opposition to
a precedent is an argument in favor of re-
examining it. The centrists themselves
backhandedly recognized this when they
noted that Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S.
45 (1905). was properly overruled in part
because by 1937, "most people" were
sure it was wrong.
Courts are not exempt from the prin-
ciple that governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed.
And when they are farthest out on the limb
of inherently subjective extrapolation from
the Constitution's text. public doubts
about a precedent's wisdom as policy
compound nagging questions about its
standing as law. It follows that a constitu-
tional decision's ultimate claim to respect
as precedent depends on its intrinsic power
to win public acceptance over time. The
Court thus should not seek the appearance
of legitimacy in a stubborn refusal to ad-
mit error "under fire."
Listening to the Public
This is not to deny that stare decisis had
a critical role to play in Casey. The Court
in Roe may well have been wrong to cut
down so suddenly and violently the es-
tablished laws of most states. But just as
the convulsions Roe set off in the body
politic heighten doubts about that deci-
sion. the convulsions that would now be
set off by overruling Roe strengthen the
argument for adhering to it. For Roe's
central holding has. over time. galvanized
even more public and scholarly support
than opposition. Put more baldly. Casey's
outcome gains legitimacy from votes and
polls showing its rough consonance with
the views of a growing majority of the
public.
This flouts the conventional wisdom
SEE CENTRISTS, PAGE 522
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that constitutional interpretation should be
indifferent to public opinion. But that re-
flects the fact that we have already aban-
doned the more fundamental postulate that
interpretation is confined to formalistic
application of fixed and immutable rules
set forth in the Constitution's text. Those
who embrace the notion of an evolving
constitutional common law cannot have it
both ways by insisting that the judges who
supervise the evolution arm (or must ap-
pear) so infallible that their decisions are
forever, no matter what the public opposi-
tion. That would be an imperial judiciary
indeed.
Rather than glorying in steadfastness
"under fire," the centrists might more
modestly have stressed the need for new
justices to temper their personal constitu-
tional visions with respect for the evolving
tradition embodied in the Court's prece-
dents. That tradition justifies erring on the
side of individual liberty in the hardest
cases, which involve debatable extrap-
olations from constitutional premises and
discretionary judgments that cannot be
reached with complete confidence. Instead
of talking down to a public "tested by fol-
lowing." such an opinion would recall
Learned Hand's wisdom that "the spirit of
liberty is the spirit which is not too sure
that it is right."
It would also highlight the centrists'
fundamental difference with the approach
of the conservative Rehnquist-Scalia-
Clarence Thomas bloc (often joined by
Justice Byron White): the balances they
strike between individual liberty and ma.
jority rl.
Scalia contends that the Court may
displace the will of the majority only to
protect liberties explicitly enumerated in
the Constitution or firmly anchored in
"the longstanding traditions of American
society." Rejecting that view, the cean-
itrisis nave angncu ticinscives warn intr
Court's own longstanding (if not always
candidly acknowledged) assumption of the
cautiously activist role of stretching the
meaning of the Constitution's broadc '
phrases incrementally to protect un-
enumerated liberties.
There is some truth in Scalia's charge
that Roe and Casey represent "raw judi-
cial policy choices." camouflaged by
reliance on imaginary penumbras and
emanations from the Constitution. But this
reflects the larger truth that issues affect-
ing individual liberty do not fall neatly
into two mutually exclusive categories.
with some calling for judicial application
of constitutional principle and others for
legislative policy choices. Rather, judges
cannot escape making policy choices, and
the difference between those premised on
constitutional principle and those reflect-
ing naked political predilection is ul-
timately one of degree, not of kind, and
one informed not only by text and tradition
but also by the evolving values of the
American people.
In attacking others for reading personal
values into the Constitution. conservatives
like Scalia throw stones from a glass
house. Their own devotion to "original
meaning" evaporates when, for example.
they attack congressional affirmative-
action preferences as unconstitutional
discrimination against white males: It is
utterly clear that no provision of the
Constitution was originally intended to bar
Congress from engaging in racial or gen-
der discrimination of any kind. Scalia also
extrapolates heroically to derive from the
Constitution's structure a mandate for a
rigid "separation of powers"-words that(like "right to privacy") appear nowhere
in the text.
The centrists put forth another shaky
rationale for a sound (if debatable) iesult
in Kennedy's opinion for the 5-4 majority
in Lee v. Weisman. It barred public
nouai imnon inciuuing prayers teven
non-sectarian. non-participatory onesi
by clergy members in their graduation
ceremonies.
The problem was Kennedy's holding
that such prayers amounted to compulsion
of dissenting students-" required par-
ticipation in a religious exercise." This
flies in the face of the facts and will sow
confusion in the law. The prayer to which
Deborah Weisman and her parents ob-
jected was a rabbi's brief. non-sectarian
invocation of God's blessing. Students
and.their families were not asked to join in
the prayer. only to stand or sit silendy.
But Kennedy. drawing on gauzy
psychological notions of adolescent peer
pressure. said "the dissenter of high
school age" would have "a reasonable
Kennedy's
holding flies in




perception that she is being forced by the
State to pray in a manner her conscience
will not allow." This statched the idea of
legally meaningful compulsion past the
breaking point.
If this prayer amounted to "religious
conformance compelled by the state," as
Kennedy held. then it not only established
religion but also violated the free exercise
thereof. So did the recitation (without re-
carded objection) at the same graduation
ceremony of the Pledge of Allegiance.
which incudes the words "under God."
Nor would Kennedy's logic stop at re-
ligion. It would, for example, require
barring patriotic songs or any recitation(by anyone) of the Pledge of Allegiance at
school ceremonies. Aside from the "under
God" part, dissenters' free speech rights
would be violated whenever they are
asked (not required) to stand or sit quietly
for (not to recitc) the Pledge.
It was not compulsion, but rather state
endorsement of religion. that made the
graduation prayer violate the establish-
ment clause, if it did. This "sends a mes-
sage to nonadherents that they are out-
siders. not full members of the political
community." as Justice O'Connor put it
in her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
The endorsement in the Weisman case
might be deemed de munins and arguably
outweighed by the majority's interest in
solemnizing an occasion. As Scalia main-
tains in dissent. a non-sectarian, non-
participatory graduation prayer seems a
small imposition on the few people of-
fended by it; and upholding their objection
carries the cost of banishing from civic
occasions the "expression of gratitude to
God that a majority of the community
wishes to make."
It may be that allowing such non-
sectarian prayers starts down too slippery
a slope, toward school-sponsored sec-
tarian prayers that tend to ostracize those
who armn't members of the dominant sect.
Such concerns were implicit in Justices
Souter's and Blackmun's well-crafted
concurrences. each of them joined by
Stevens and O'Connor. They reaffimed
what Souter called "the foundation of Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence." the
doctrine that states may not favor or en-
dorse either religion generally over non-
religion or one religion over others.
Weisman's more ominous message is
that this doctrine may no longer command
five votes. The four dissenters emphati-
cally rejected it. requiring proof of com-
menial endorsement. So did Aenneuy
himself, in 1989. in his dissent in Ai-
leghenv County v. American Civil Liber-
ties U.Inion. Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.
492 U.S. 573 (1989-wath which the re-
suIt in Weisman seems difficult to rec-
oncile. But rather than admit he erred in
1989. Kennedy relies on an ersatz notion
of compulsion. clouding the future of the
establishment clause for the sake of a
foolish appearance of consistency.
Appearance of Race Neutrality
Justice Kennedy's concern for appear.
ances was also on display in Georgia v.
McCollum. where he held for the majority
that criminal defense lawyers may not take
race into account in exercising their per-
emptory challenges in jury selection. The
appearance Kennedy coveted was that of
eradicating racial discrimination from the
courtroom. "If race stereotypes are the
price for acceptance of a jury panel as
fair." he said, the "price is too high to
meet the standard of the Constitution."
The unfortunate reality is that (in Justice
Thomas' words) "black criminal defend-
ants will rue" the decision because it will
increase their risks of facing all-white
juries. As a result of McCollum. defense
lawyers can't strike whites from juries in
the hope of making room for blacks who
might.feel more affinity for a black
defendant.
McCollum subjects defense lawyers to
equal-protection scrutiny by holding. ab-
surdly, that they act on behalf of the state
in making peremptory challenges. This is
another step down the mistaken path of
Kennedy's opinion in Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077
(1991). which barred race-based peremp-
tories by private litigants.
Scalia's sardonic dissenting comment
then applies equally to McCollum: "Al-
though today's decision neither follows
the law nor produces desirable concrete
results, it certainly has great symbolic
value. . . . [Wlhat a magnificent demon-I
stration of this institution's uncompromis-
ing hostility to race-based judgments.
even by private actors! The price of this
demonstration is, alas, high, and much of
it will be paid by minority litigants."
Scalia seemed similarly on the mark in
his lone dissent in this term's Fordice. In
that case, the Court considered the per-
sistence of segregation at Southern uni-
versities due to admissions policies and
student preferences for campuses where
their own race predominated. The major-
ity held (and Scalia to some extent agreed)
that a state cannot remedy the legacy of dejure segregation merely by adopting race-
neutral policies. But Justice White's opin-
ion provides hardly a clue about what
should be done: it contributes to the con-
fusion over whether phasing out histori-
cally black colleges. despite black support
for them, is a necessary-or an accept-
able-way of integrating student bodies.
In dissent. Scalia accused his eight col-
leagues of unleashing "years of litigation-
driven confusion and destabilization" in
the Southern states' university systems. to
little end "except the public recognition
that any Court that would knowingly im-
pose it must hate segregation."
Criticisms aside. the past term's central
and salutary message is that, by the nar-
rowest of margins, the Court still takes as
its touchstone the capacity of common-law
justices to serve as guardians of liberty in
an evolving constitutional scheme.
The framers may not have envisioned
such an expansive judicial role. But
neither did they envision the powers other
governmental bodies have assumed:
Congress using its commerce power to
desegregate lunch counters, for example;
presidents waging congressionally un-
declared wars all over the globe: or states
regulating doctor-patient relations. As
governmental powers have grown with the
expanding needs of the nation and the
changing values of its people. so. too. has
the need for the Court's evolvine protec-
COURTSIDEBY TONY MAURO
Delay, Dissent Mark High Court Term
T he republic is safe. The SupremeCou t has left town.
ie Justice William Rehnquist is
high-tailing it up to his probably
television-free home in Vermont. Clar-
ence Thomas is moving to a bigger, pre-
sumably newspaper-free house in Vir-
ginia. Antonin Scalia heads to Austria to
teach.
This is one summer when not many
people will be sorry to see the justices go.
It has been a chaotic term. one in which
justices seemed to devise more ways than
manars uay UIonnor wrote that
Roe v. Wade is stil good law.
usual to delay decision-making and avoid
having to agree with each other.
Concurrences. separate statements,
multiple opinions proliferated. Forests
were decimated to provide paper to enablejustices to state carefully why they were
concurring in pan, dissenting in part, and
shrugging their shoulders in part.
Tom Glessner of the Christian Action
Council offers this comment about the
Tony Maure covers the Supreme Courr
and legal issues for USA Today and she
Gannerr News Service. His column on the
Court appears every other week in Legal
Times.
abortion decision-184 pages long-but
he could be talking about a half-dozen
other decisions when he says. "It gets
sickening after a while. Why can't they
give you one opinion?".
The answer. it seems, is that the justices
haven't got the slightest interest in giving
the public a single, understandable opin-
ion. Witness Justice Sandra Day O'Con-
nor's rcitation from the bench of inter-
national Society for Krishna Conscious.
ness v. Lee. No. 91-155. a decision up-
holding a ban on solicitation in which
Rehnquist wrote the majority. O'Connor
filed a concurrence, and David Souter
dissented. But a separate opinion, with its
own dissents, found that leafletting had to
be protected.
"If anyone can figure that out, they are
doing well." O'Connor cracked. No one
can, because the decisions together make
little sense.
Scalia seems to be the chief bomb-
thrower on the Court. Dmuglas Kmiec of
Notre Dame Law School thinks the
"growing animosity between Scalia and
O'Connor undermines their ability to
stitch together an opinion."
Kmiec also thinks Anthony Kennedy
has undergone a "sea change" in the last
three yeas--as evidenced by his surpris-
ing votes in Lee v. Weisman. No. 90-
10 14, and Planned Pernthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. No. 91.
744. But he doesn't buy Judge Laurence
Silberman's thesis that changes like Ken-
nedy's can be attributed to seduction by
the news media. "If justices are geting
their guidance from newspaper columns.
we're in serious trouble." says Kmiec.
With Kennedy adrift. Scalia picking
fights. O'Connor and Souter testing their
moderate-sounding voices, the Court was
a strange place to be this term.
No wonder Rehnquist leaves town. We
surmise that he may be without a tele-
vision in Vermont-or at least without
cable--because he asked C-SPAN to pro-
vide him with a videotape of his July S
appearance on the cable channel.
C-SPAN managed to land an interview
with Rehnquist for the show "Book-
notes"---his first interview since talking to
the Public Broadcasting Service's Paul
Duke for a documentary on the Court
several years ago. The chief justice will be
discussing his book Grand Inquests: The
Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel
Chase and President Andrew Johnson.
C-SPAN's Brian Lamb says it took a
William Rehnquist granted his
first interview in several yeas.
month or so to negotiate: he thinks sending
Rehnquist tapes of past "Booknotes"
tsmed the trick.
The only ground rule. says Lamb, was
simple: no discussion of cases newer than
the Steel Seizure decision of 1952.
"Either you take the ground rules or you
don't talk." adds Lamb.
Rehnquist was "very relaxed, not at all
apprehensive" for the interview. Lamb
says-this, even though the interview took
place June 23. at the height of the final
week's push to get opinions out.
Of course. Rehnquist wasn't the onlyjustice off task that day. Justice Thomas
was given a surprise birthday party at the
Court in the afternoon. Presumably some-
one was working that day, putting final
touches on the abortion ruling.
By June 29. the day of the Court's final
session, anticipation was at a high pitch.
Would Justice Harry Blackmun resign?
Would the Court put off the abortion case
until fall for political reasons?
The first clue came in the Supreme
Court cafeteria Monday morning. Black-
mun was eating breakfast with his law
clerks, as he often does. The justice
seemed genuinely chipper and cheery as
he ch'atted. and his clerks looked the
same-not the ambiance one would expect
if Blackmun was about to retire or to pre-
side over the demise of Roie v. Wade.
But even that clue wasn'I adc4uatc
preparation for the amazing sight to conic
Justices O'Connor. Kennedy, and Souter
reading different sections of O'Connor's
majority opinion. each paying homage to
Roe v. Wade.
Some had guessed that O'Connor would
be given the task of writing the Court's
ruling in the case. But no one could have
guessed the overnding theme of her opin-
ion-that Roe is still good law. Fors
nearly 20 minutes. the three held sway.
over the crowded courtroom: O'Connor.
first, trotting out her undue-burden stand-.,
ard as if it fit neatly into Rne; then
Kennedy. like O'Connor a Reagan ap-
pointee. alsio paying homae to Roe and
talking of the *unique human condition:
of motherhond.
Finally it was Soiutcrs turn tio speak aha
common-law judge rciting cionunon la4'
principles of adherencc it precedent: ,Ti-
break precedent here. Souter said. would.
be to "surrender to political pressure "and
would *subvert the Court's lcgitimacy..:
It was Rehnquist who had the final
word, though, as he suggested that the
triumvirate's espousal of Roe was illusory-
at best. The Court's opinion. Rehnquist
said. "can just as easily be viewed as po-
litical surrender."
With little show of emotion. Rehnquist
ended his dissent and turned to the staff
assembled in the courtroom to thank them
for excellent service during a busy term.
The gavd banged. The high drama was
over. Roe. or some version of it. was still
alive. At the Court. wonders never cease.
Revealing Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas' concurring
opinion in Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-
372. handed down June 18. proved to be a
rich source of clues about the Court's new-
est justice.
The Court ruled in the case that a crim-
inal defendant-like a prosecutor-may
not exclude potential jurors strictly for
reasons of race.
Thomas wrote separately to indicate
that if the case had come to the Court as
SEE COURTSIDE, PAGE 12
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a matter of first impression, he would
have been with the dissenters. on the
grounds that because peremptory chal-
leages by a defendant do not constitute
sate action, they cannot violate the 14th
Amendment. But because of recent prec-
edent. Thomas said, the opposite conclu-
sion was required.
Thonas did add, however, that "black
criminal defendants will me the day that
this court ventured down the road that will
inexorably lead to the elimination of per-
emptory strikes." Securing blacks on a
jury for a black defendant. he suggested.
"may help to overcome racial bias and
provide the defendant with a better chance
of having a fair trial."
The Thomas concurrence was interest-
ing not only for what he said. but for how
he said it. The concurrence represented
what appeared to be Thomas' first refer-
ence to his own race in a decision. In that
reference. he opted for the term black.
Thomas' predecessor Thurgood Mar-
shall, the Court's first black justice. used
the term Negro long after it fell out of fa-
vor. Then in 1989. Marshall adopted Afro-
Ame'rian. at least in his written opinions.
His switch came shortly after Rev. Jesse
Jackson popularized the term African-
American. Marshall opted for Afro-
Americr. he said at the time, only be-
cause that term was in the dictionary and
Jackson's appellation hadn't yet made it.
A year ago, when Marshall retired and
held a press conference to answer ques-
tions. he scolded a white reporter who
asked him whether black people are bener
off now than when he first sat on the
Cour.
"In the first place. I am not a black
people. I am an Afro-American." said
Marshall. "Now, you want to talk about
Afto-Americans?*"
What to make of Thomas' decision to
use the term black? It clealy departs from
Marshall's practice and is interesting as
such. But Harvard Law Pmfessor Randall
Kennedy. a former Marshall clerk, says
not much more should be read into it.
"It doesn't tell me anything." says
Kennedy. "All the designations are fine
with me."
The McCollum concurrence also
showed that Thomas. or one of his un-
edited law clerks. is unaware of the much-
litigated difference between the NAACP
and the completely separate NAACP Le-
gal Defense and Educational Fund Inc.
In Footnote 2 of his opinion. Thomas
noted that "ItIhe NAACP has submitted a
brief." But where he quoted from the
brief. the citarion indicated that the brief
was filed not by the NAACP. but by the
fund. No small lapse.
Finally. the concurrence suggested that,
despite his much noted practice of ignor-
ing the newspapers. Thomas occasionally
finds them useful. To support his conten-
tion that the public appears to believe that
the racial composition of a jury can make a
difference in the verdict, Thomas noted in
a footnote that "jal computer search ..
reveals that the phrase 'all white jury' has
appeared over two hundred times in the
New York Times. Chicago Tribune, and
Los Angeles Teres."
True. Thomas didn't actually read the
papers: Nexis apparently did the distaste-
ful job for him. But at least he recognizes
the fourth estate as some kind of barom-
cler of public opinion. For his own sake.
and to save taspayer dollars. let's hope he
doesn't continue on this path by ordering a
search for the words Clariesce Thomas.
Stevens the Raconteur
At the 6th Circuit Judicial Conference
in Columbus. Ohio, last month. Justice
John Paul Stevens used the customary re-
view of the past term to chide gently his
strict-constructionist colleagues on the
Court.
In commenting on the five cases from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Cir-
John Paul Stevens chided his
strictconstructioniat colleagues.
cuit before the Court this term-all five
were reversed-he noted a recurring
themt According to his colleagues. they
were adhering to the words of statutes in
interpreting them.
Stevens suggested that their adherence
was, in fact, selective. and he also said
that such a rigid approach to judging can
be misguided. "In searching for consis-
tency," Stevens said. "maybe we've
overreacted a bit." In addition to strictly
interpreting laws. common-law judges
should be allowed to "think a little bit
about what is just and fair."
Earlier in the speech. Stevens had his
audience rolling in the aisles with a
lengthy story about correspondence he has
had with a Denver man.
His recent publicized bout with prostate
cancer. Stevens said. has prompted -a
large number of very welcome letters.
very complimentary and encouraging.
from members of the public.
It reminded him, he said, of a litter he
received soon after the publicity that at-
tended his appointment to the Court in
1975. Stevens read from a rambling letter
sent to him by a Denver man who fondly
recalled conversations he had had in the
playground of his local elementary school
with a young John Stevens in 1932.
Stevens said he had written the man
back to thank him for his reminiscences
but said he told the man that 'unfortu-
nately. I'd grown up in Chicago.~
The man wrote back. refusing to believe
Stevens' version of his past and plead-
ing with him, "I really would like you to
reconsider."
Stevens remarked to much laughter.
"As with most petitions for rehearing. I
put it in the file."
But still the correspondence did not
end. Again. the man wrote (t Stevens.
refusing to believe that the justice was not
the same person he remembered fondly
from his Denver youth. "I will always feet
hurt that you cannot remember your Den-
ver days," the man wrote.
Stevens said that before he decided to
mention the correspondence in his speech.
he had felt an obligation to get the man's
permission. Stevens located the man in
Denver and called him. identifying him-
self as Justice Stevens.
Without missing a beat, according to
Stevens. the man replied. "Hello. John,
how are you?" as if he were talking to,
well, a childhood playmate.
By the end of their phone conversation,
however, "I think I convinced him." said
Stevens. that he was not the John Stevens
the Denver man recalled. 0
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
BY TERENCE MORAN
The Future of the Past at the High Court
istory." said Henry Ford, "is bunk."
The great industrialist was speaking
of the need to break free of the
shackles of the past, but he might as well have
been talking about Supreme Court opinions. Thejustices often parse American history with no more
care than some of Ford's successors used in
designing cars. This term, there were some real
clunkers.
But there were also some surprises. The big
story about the Court led by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist was how the six justices appointed by
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush
splintered in the most controversial cases of the
term. One reason for the fractures was
historiographic; the justicesexplore the past with
different tools, turning up different truths.
Take Clarence Thomas ("Please." come the
cries from the gallery). In his first term., Thomas
revealed a didactic approach to history that led him
to march in lockstep with Antonin Scalia.
Meanwhile, David Souter proved that all those
years spent in the stillness of the New Hampshire
woods weren't wasted. Souter is emerging as the
Court's most careful and sensitive historian. The
contrast between the two newest justices says a lot
about the struggles on the Court today.
For years, justices and commentators in the
"originalist" school of reading the Constitution
have claimed that history is on their side. The
argument is straightforward and appealing: Judges
must find a warrant for telling people what to do
that is independent of the judges' own personal
opinions, or else they're just despots. That warrant
is history, the record of what people meant when
they wrote and adopted the Constitution and
subsequent laws. By finding out what history tells
us we ought to do under the law, judges can rest
their power on an independent and therefore
legitimate source.
Fine and dandy. Now the hard part: What does
history tell us? Thomas has adopted an untenable
position on this question. His approach to
America's past simply cannot be squared with his
own oft-stated ideals, or with the body of law that
liberated him from apartheid and put him on the
Court in the first place.
As one of the most voluble first-term justices in
recent times, Thomas has provided plenty of
evidence of his judicial methods. But the case that
most clearly revealed where the newest justice
stands when it comes to history was Hudson v.
McMillian. Thomas did Scalia proud in that one.
The case posed a simple question: Is getting
smashed in the teeth by prison guards "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment, even if you suffer no serious or
permanent injury? Thomas, dissenting from a
majority opinion that declared such treatment
unconstitutional, provided a simple historical
answer. His words are bound to come back and
haunt him.
Since, he argued, "prison was not a more
congenial place in the early years of the Republic
than it is today," the framers of the Constitution
could not have meant to outlaw the kind of
"hardship" that inmate Keith Hudson had to
endure at the hands of his guards. Surely, Thomas
reasoned, the nastiness of colonial and early
American prisons and the tradition of judges
allowing wardens great latitude in managing their
charges mean that today's Court ought not to
extend the Constitution's protections into prison
life. Hudson. Thomas said, is out of luck.
This is history at the fourth-grade level, if that.
The criminal-justice traditions of colonial America
to which Thomas refers were expressed in statutes
that were, in reality, infrequently enforced. They
served a complex, hortatory purpose very different
from our laws-a difference Thomas ignored.
Moreover, there were far fewer people in jails at
the time of the founding than the stem moralism of
the colonists' laws leads one to expect. Conditions
weren't great, but there weren't millions of
* citizens enduring them. Thus, the framers were
naturally more concerned with sentences than with
conditions of imprisonment when they wrote the
Eighth Amendment; Hudson's experience might
well have shocked Madison. The river of
American history runs deep, but Thomas' opinion
is painfully shallow.
He has not always looked at the past with such
mechanistic certainty, and with good reason.
Reading all of the Constitution as Thomas reads
the Eighth Amendment means that Brown v. Board
ofEducation, and all that flows from it, is
illegitimate. The historical method of Hudson,
when applied to the 14th Amendment. leads
directly to Plessy v. Ferguson. Thomas cannot
believe that-and he does not.
" '[Tlhe jurisprudence of original intention'
cannot be understood as sympathetic to the Dred
Scott reasoning, if we regard the 'original
intention' of the Constitution to be the fulfillment
of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.
as Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, and the founders
understood it," Thomas wrote of the pre-Civil
War Constitution in a 1987 article.
That's a historical argument. The dissent in
Hudson v. McMillian is a book report. How
Thomas resolves these conflicting ways of
approaching history will be crucial in determining
his place on the Court. Either he follows Scalia in
the reductionist school of originalism and gives up
his beliefs about the Declaration's impact on
constitutional history, or he fashions a special area
of his jurispmudence just for African-Americans
where the Constitution is allowed to breathe in the
open and more opaque atmosphere of America's
tragically complicated past. Ironically, the latter
choice, which seems more likely, would lead to
the development in Thomas' decisions of precisely
the kind of exemption he deplores: "Negro law."
Thomas could, on the other hand, listen to
David Souter. Souter's opinions are fewer and
farther between than Thomas', but when they do
come, they're for real-xhaustively researched,
densely argued, contemplated rather than
announced. They bear the mark of a man who has
read deeply in history and knows that the study of
the past, like all intellectual endeavors. is hard and
uncertain work. "a raid on the inarticulate with
shabby equipment always deteriorating." as T.S.
Eliot said of writing poetry. Souter seems to know
that the best way to approach the meaning of the
past is with humility rather than bravado.
Souter faced off with Scalia on this subject in
the term's surprising ruling in Lee v. Weisman,
which held official prayers at public-school
graduations to be unconstitutional. Scalia scorned
the majority's holding and cited a few passages
from early inaugural addresses to bolster his
argument that publicly sponsored prayer has
always been accepted in this country. In attacking
the wall-of-separation reading of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment, Scalia was
building on Rehnquist's historical summary of this
conservative argument in the 1985 decision of
Wallace v. Jafree.
Souter's response, a concurrence to Justice
Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion, was
pointed. Look closely at the adoption of the
amendment, he argued, at the republican ferment
of the times, at the spirit of rationalism and
tolerance abroad in the land, and you see a much
more complicated and realistic historical picture
than the one Rehnquist and Scalia paint.
He carefully tracked which words were
proposed and rejected when the First Amendment
was drafted, looked at the state-constitution
background, and came to a mature conclusion:
"[OIn balance," Souter wrote, "history neither
contradicts nor warrants reconsideration of the
settled principle that the Establishment Clause
forbids support for religion in general no less than
support for one religion or some." As for those
early presidents and framers who prayed during
their inaugurals, the Yankee schoolboy Souter
cited his Horace: "Homer nodded." It was a
splendid performance.
And one that presages the coming struggle
among the Court's conservatives over "original
intent." Now that, for the most part, the
penumbral school of constitutional interpretation
has receded, the battleground in the most
controversial cases will center more and more on
the history and meaning of the founding of the
nation, on what happened to us and why. This is a
profound conflict. one that the bookworm from
New Hampshire seems exceedingly well-prepared
for. Souter may be schooling Thomas, and calling
Scalia's bluff, for years.
"Capital Accounts," by Assistant Managing
Editor Terence Moran. appears every other week
in Legal Times.
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Lightening Scales of Justice:
High Court Trims Its Docket
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Spem to The New YWk fmes
WASHINGTON. March 6- The Su-
preme Court issued its final schedule of,
arguments for the current term the
other day, and while the choice of April
22 for the Pennsylvania abortion case
made news. the real story was the
April calendar itself. Bearing only 8
cases for a schedule designed to ac-
commodate 24, the calendar is the
most compelling evidence yet of the
extent to which the Justices, for rea-
sons known only to themselves, are
shrinking the Court's docket.
The new calendar made it clear that
the Court was headed for its lightest
term in 21 years. The term will
produce, at most, 109 decisions, match-
ing the 109 issued in the 1970-71 term.
This is a decline of nearly one-third
from the peak workloads of the 1980's,
when two consecutive terms produced
151 decisions each, and most terms
yielded in the 140's or the high 130's.
The downward trend has been evi-
dent for the last few years. The ques-
tion is why. The Court offers no expla-
nation, and no student of the Court has
come up with a definitive answer. It is
not even clear whether the shrinkage is
the product of a collective decision o
whether it reflects the accumulated
individual choices that each Justice
makes hundreds of times a year.
A Mostly Empty Bench
But almost certainly there are sev-
eral explanations for the decline. After
years of complaining about their work-
load, the Justices may have taken mat-
ters into their own hands, aided by a
1988 law that gave the Court more
complete control over its docket. The
lower Federal courts, now dominated
by Republican appointees, are more
pro-government than they were a de-
cade ago. producing fewer rulings of
the kind that this Supreme Court feels
obliged to review.
The April schedule is so light that for
the first time in recent memory the
I Justices will be on the bench for only
one week of the month instead of two.
The entire second week, plainly
marked on a yearly calendar that the
Court issued more than 13 months ago,
has been "canceled for lack of inter-
est." as une Supreme Court employee
said in a quizzical tone.
Yet there is no lack of interest
aminng people seeking the Court's at-
tention. The number of appeals reach-
ing the Court continues to rise; 3,928
have been filed so far this term, com-
pared with 3,583 a year ago. But the
Justices have agreed to hear only 71
cases, compared with 96 at the same
time last year.
Of the seven monthly argument ses-
sions, only October and November had
a full complement of hourlong argu
ments. For the next two-week session,
beginning on March 23, the Justices
will sit only in the mornings, hearing
two cases a day instead of four.
Votes to grant or deny review, called,
"certiorari," are typically not ex-
plained, and the Court's own rules offer
little gudance to the multitudes seek-
ing the Justices' attention. "A review
on writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion," the
Court's Rule 10.1 pronounces sternly,
adding. "A petition for a writ of certio.
rari will be granted only when there
are special and important reasons
therefor."
In so small a group, individual pref-
erence matters a lot The votes of at
least four Justices are needed to grant
a writ of certiorari. Meeting in a week.
ly closed-door conference, the Justices
review new appeals on the basis of
their law clerks' recommendations.





1990, was the last Justice to look at all
the appeals himself. Most commit their
law clerks to a "pool" that divides and
shares the work.
It is tempting to speculate that the
shrinking docket might reflect a con-
servative Court's notion that the judi-
ciary should not necessarily have the
last word on every subject. But the
Court's diffidence is selective at best;
for example, the Court appears to wel-
come cases that give it a chance to
curb the Federal appeal rights of state
prison inmates or, as in several cases
granted this year, to examine the level
of constitutional protection for private
property.
A Matter of Jurisdiction Another measure of the chang
The most apparent of the reasons for the appeals courts is the sharply dimin
the decline is a technical matter of the ished number of Supreme Court ap-
Court's jurisdiction. In 1988, peals filed by the Federal Government.
ing to years of requests from the Court. In the mid-1980's the Solicitor Ger-
Congress gave the Justices virtually al's office was filing 50 or more appeals
complete discretion over their docke. every Year. The Court granted nearly
The long-sought change eliminated a all these cases which often formed the
category known as "mandatory furis- backbone of the docket.
diction," which had required the Court But as the Government loses fewer
to decide particular types of cases, and fewer cases in the lower courts, its
including any case in which a lower P in the supreme Court has
court declared a Federal law unconsti- diminished steadily. The Solicitor Gen-
tutional. In the last term before the eral has filed 17 appeals since last
change took effect, the Court heard October, for an annual rate less than
arguments in 32 mandatory appeals. half Of that in the peak years.
Had the Court still been required to Even if the entire gap in the Court's
decide such cases, it would almost cer- docket is explained by the loss of man-
tainly have granted review this week, dator appeals and the dwindling num-
for example, in the Bush Administra. bers Of conflicts and Government ap
tion's appeal in a case dealing with peal questions remain: Why have the
"indecent" radio and television broad- Justices not chosen other cases to fill
casts. A Federal appeals court had the gap? Have they decided they can do
ruled that a law barring all such mate- a better job with 109 decisions a year
rial from the air violated the First rather than 150? Can they? Is the bene-
Amendment Whether because the Jus- fit worth the loss of the opportunity to
tices thought the lower court was cor. resolve 40 or 50 important legal ques-
rect, or because the case did not inter- tions a year?
est them, they refused to hear the Kenneth S. Geller, a Washington law-
Administration's appeal. yer who practices before the Supreme
RepublicanCourt and who has studied its docketRepubicanHomoeelty for years, has a theory. The traditional:
The single biggest category of cases categories once filled so much of the
the Court has accepted are those pre- Courts docke he said the other day.
senting issues on which the lower Fed- that the Justices now simply lack a
eral courts disagree. The Court tries to system for identifying other cases that
resolve conflicts among the lower require their attention.
courts in its view that a Federal law "The Court is institutionally incapa-
a provision of the Constitution should le of judging what's really impor-
mean the same thing in every part of tant," Mr. Geller said. "Their plate
the country. used to be full anyway. But take that
But this category, too, appears to be away, and they're at sea."
diminishing as the Federal appeals
courts emerge from a decade of ideo-
logical ferment. In the early 1980's,
judges appointed by President Ronald
Reagan brought dramatically different
voices to the lower courts, and deci-
sions could vary widely, depending on
the makeup of the three-judge panel
that heard a case. It was in this period
that the Supreme Court's docket
reached its peak.
Eleven years of Republican appoint-
ments. however, have restored a kind
of homogeneity to many lower courts.
By the end of 1991. Presidents Reagan
and Bush had appointed 64 percent of
all Fdderal appellate judges, achieving
majorities or pluralities in each of the13 Federal appellate circuits. Differ-
ences still emerge, but more often the
appeals courts speak as one, and in atone that is music to the SupremeCourt's cars.
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Washington Talk
Justices Define Limits of Own Power
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Special z The New Yor Times
WASHINGTON,
Nov. 21 - The long.
twilight of liberal-
ism on the Su-
preme Court, the
two decades during which the Warren
Court era faded gradually from view,
was marked by the inability of either
.liberal or conservative Justices to
achieve success on their own terms.
The Court was so closely divided on
so many important issues that only
by making a play for the center could
either side find a majority. With the
need for compromise as a constraint,
change tended to be incremental and
at the marains of existing law.
,Nowtheconservatives':day has
dawned, raising the question of what.
constraints will be encountered by
the conservative Justices who appear
comfortably in control of the Court
,for the foreseeable future.
The conservatives will still have
,disagreements among themselves, of
course; this group of Justices is not,
.unanimous on method or even priori--
ties.,But needing to iron out internal
differences is a far cry from having.:
to compromise across ideological.
lines on fundamental principles.-
With the imperative of compromise
gone, what are the practical limits on
the conservatives' use of the power
they waited so long to achieve?
While it is too early to know, one
hint came earlier this month when
the justices heard arguments in a
church-state case, one of a number of
cases on politically sensitive topics,
including racial discrimination and
abortion, now before the Court.
.The narrow question in Lee v. Weis.
man is whether public schools can in-
clude prayers in graduation ceremo-
nies. Since the answer under the
Court's precedents is quite clearly
"no,".the deeper question is whether
they should be discarded to permit
explicit Government "accommoda-
tion" of religious practice.
That is almost certainly what the
Court had in mind last spring when it
agreed to hear this case, an appeal
from Providence, R.I., school offi-
cials. Two lower Federal courts had
declared the graduation prayer un-
constitutional under existing law. The




What will they do
with it?
Administration, is asking for a new
test that would permit official reli-
gious observances as long as no one
was "coerced" into going along.
Four Justices had endorsed such a
"coercion" test only two years ago,
dissenting from a decision that
barred the display of a Nativity scene
in a Pittsburgh courthouse. All four
dissenters are still on the Court, while
two members of the 5-to-4 majority
have since retired.,
So the Providence case, both in its
timing and in the bland, nonsectarian
nature of the prayer at issue, ap-
peared to provide an irresistible op-
portunity for rewriting the constitu-
tional law of church and -state. That is
what it may well prove to be.
Nonetheless, the Court's discomfi-
ture was evident during the argu-
ment this month, as the lawyer for
the Providence school board pressed
his view of how the First Amendment
would look if "coercion" were the .
only definition of an unconstitutional
"establishment" of religion.
Charles J. Cooper, a former assist-
ant attorney general in the Reagan
Administration, told the Justices that
a state could even designate an off i-
cial religion as long as no one was co.
erced into practicing that faith. .
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and
Antonin Scalia, two vigorous advo-
cates of a revised approach to the Es-
tablishment Clause, were visibly
troubled at the prospect that Mr. Coo-
per's vision might indeed be the logi-
cal stopping point of the journey on
which they had embarked-*
Providence might still win its ap-
peal, of course. But it was less clear
after the argument that it would,
much less on the broad grounds it
was urging on a Court that appeared
to be getting a case of cold feet
0. * *0.
So if there is a constraint on the
new majority, it may comedown to
this: ideas that are inviting as theory.
and that gain force in the freewheel-
ing rhetoric of dissenting opinions,
may be less appealing when cast in
the form of a majority opinion that
could change the way people live as
well as how they view the Court.
Richard J. Cardamone, a Federal
appeals court judge in New York, put
it this way in a decision several years
ago: "Howone wishes to decide a
case comes lightly. to mind, on a
wing; but often how one must decide
it comes arduously, weighed down by
somber thought."
Power on the Court, as anywhere
else, offers exhilarating opportunity.-
.This Court term may tell whether
power also is its own constraint
STEVENS v. BLACKMUN v. THOMAS v. SCALIA ...
Voting alignments in Supreme Court cases decided during
the term that ended last week:
JUSTICES MOST LIKELY TO AGREE
On the left, John Paul Stevens
and Harry A. Blackmun,
87 percent of cases.
In the middle, Anthony M.
Kennedy and David H. Souter,
85 percent of cases.
On the right, Clarence
Thomas and Antonin Scalia,
85 percent of cases.
JUSTICES MOST LIKELY TO DISAGREE
Scalia and Blackmun, in agreement less than
48 percent of the time.
Next most likely: Thomas and Blackmun, 51
percent; Stevens and Scalia, 53 percent;
Stevens and Thomas, 54 percent.
Kennedy (92 percent
of the time) and
Souter (92 percent),






Kennedy's changing voting pattern since
1988. Increasingly, he has disagreed withScalia. The two agreed:
93 percent in 1988-89
89 percent in 1989-90
85 percent in 1990-91
76 percent in 1991-92
PIVOTAL VOTERS
Justice who holds the balance:






majority in only 4
of the 5-4 rulings.
Most common 5-4 grouping: Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, in 5 of
14 such rulings.










Compiled by Ruth Marcus
HIGHLIGHTS OF SUPREME COURT TERM
Free Speech
a Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic-
tims Board. 8-0. New York's 'Son of Sam' law designed to keep
criminals from profiting from books and movies about their mis-
deeds is unconstitutional.
a Burson v. Freeman 5-3. Tennessee law prohibiting electioneer-
me within 100 feet of polling places does not violate First Amend-
a Burdick v. Takush. 6.3. Hawaii ban on write-in voting does not
violate First Amendment.
a R.A. V. v. St. Paul. 9-0. St. Paul, Minn., hate crimes law violates
free speech.
a International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee. 6-3. Ban
on solicitation at airports is upheld; 5-4.ban on leafleting is struck
down.
Religion
a Lee v. Weisman. 5-4. Prayer at school graduation ceremonies
violates separation of church and state.
Crimihial Law?.
a Jacobson v. U.S. 5-4. Nebraska farmer caught up In child por-
nography sting operation was illegally entrapped.
a U.S. v. Williams. 5-4. Prosecutors are not obliged to present ev-
idence favorable to a defendant to grand jury weighing Indictment,
a Foucha v. Louisiana. 5-4. Declared unconstitutional state law
permitting those acquitted by reason of insanity to be held indef-
initely in mental institutions after they are no longer insane.
o Rigns v. Nevada. 7-2. Forced administration of antipsychotic
medication during trial violated defendant's rights.
a U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain. 6-3. Criminal defendant kldnoapies,
from his country may be tried in U.S. courts, even if the United
States has extradition treaty with foreign country and foreign gov-
ernment protests.
Prisoner Rights
a Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 6-2. Court made it easier
for prison officials to be released from consent decrees.
a Hudson v. McMillian. 7-2. Use of excessive physical force
against prisoner may constitute cruel and unsual punishment even
if inmate does not suffer serious injury.
Civil Rights
a Presley Y. Etowah County Commissidn. 6-3. Voting Rights Act
preclearance requirements do not apply to changes in division of
authority among elected officials or transfer of power from them.
a Franklin v. Gwinnett County Puble Schools. 9-0. Federally
funded educational Institutions may be sued and required to pay
damages for sexual harassment.
a Freeman v. Pitts. 9-0. Formerly segregated schools can achieve
'unitary' (desegregated) status in piecemeal fashion.
a Georgia v. McCollum. 7-2. Prohibition on racially discriminatory
use of peremptory jury pool challenges extended to criminal defen-
dants.
a U.S. v. Fordice. 8-1. States that once operated segregated col-
lege systems must do more than simply declare schools open to
both races.
Labor Law
a Lechmere v. National Labor Relations Board. 6-3. Companies
may bar union organizers from distributing leaflets on company
property unless there are 'unique obstacles' to access.
Federal Courts
a Suter v. Artist M. 7-2. Provision of federal adoption law that re-
quires states to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal of
children from homes and to facilitate reunification does not give
private parties right to sue.
a Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 6-3. Environmental group lacked
stinding tosue to have provisions of Endangere Species Act apply
overseas.
Busines*
eGpolland v. 4igtG ind72' Ftderatclprette labeliiglaw
does not completely/shield tobacco companies from belim sued In
state courts
6.jforales v. Trans WorldAlrines. 5 3 I aIrline deregulation
aw preempts. states from .prohibitangirlne fare adver
.s ng.. 
.. .
. c. . . -*SQuiv. Nprth Dakota. 8-1. States may not tax mail order sales of
Ic-nanies w.hriit ohvsical presence In state.
.Preperty ilglts
inLucas v. South Catofina C4tastal:Coissronm. 6-3. Property own-
ers. must be compensated lf go et regulation completely
eliminates value of property and property does not-constitute pub-
lic niisanee
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Supreme Rites and Wrongs
By Charles Paul Freund
COURT, n. Offen a place where, by
careful sifting of evidence and
consequent deliberation, it is
determined whether a policeman, a
layer, a judge or a jury is guilty or
innocent of a procedural mistake.
COURT, SUPREME, P. Sages enabled
by appointment to divine the
1onstitution's framers' intentions,
owever hidden, and the meaning
of their words, however elastic.
.tese divinations stand as the final
word on the Law until a subsequent
Supreme Court divines such
intentions and meaningsto
have been entirely different
The balance of
omniscience and
arbitrariness the Court must
strike makes it the most
delicate of our three
branches. Because its
authority is in part
dependent on the public's
trust and regard (rather as
in the case of the currency).
it is a relief that the
president fills its vacancies
with demonstrablejudicious care.
DOCNEF, n. The legal
menu. The Supreme Court makes
its choices a la carte, and this last
session seems to have lost much of
its appetite. ferigs that past
Courts enjoyed chewing on are now
fistidiously refused- the Rehnquist
Nine is on a capital punishment-
free diet, fir erample. Many of the
Court's selections and decisions this
emion have been accompanied by a
hearty whine.
- Some are concerned that this
Court is letting the states, law
enforcers and property interests
cook up what they will, and that it
would enjoy taking a bite out of
the Bill of Rights.
FREE SPEECHn. The means by
which others are allowed to voice
the opinions you hold.
INTERPRETATlON, n. On the Court,
the discovery that the Constitution
mampsemds atou uantittb mean.
President Bush says he favors a
Court that engages in Interpretation
EaN MC-fW WAS.anoe at
rather than legislation. The
distinction would be more useful if
legislators were willing to
legislate, especially on such issues
as abortion. See- ims Tst.
JUSTICE, n. A judicial outcome that
is satisfactory to you.
LAW, x. Right and wrong as drafted
by latyers and deliberated by
politicians, and consequently
understood by no one. Fortunately,
these parties are willing to make
their understanding available to
anyone who can pay for it.
LAWYERS, n. Persons schooled in
finding reasons why the law does
not apply to their customers.
LITIGATION, n. The American way
of business.
LITMUS TEST. The folly of actually
determining the views ofa person
being considered for high office,
especially the Supreme Court. That
such view may affect the lives f
much of the populace is less
significant than they may first afct
its votes.
President Bush continues t any
that he is against applying an
abortion JUs Tes to his
Supreme Court nominees, despite
the fact that he says he holds -
strong anti-axrtion views himselL.
if you put aside the factor of mere
political cowardice-or even if you
don't-you are led to the .
conclusion that the president
regards either his views or his'














come conservatives who beg
admittance so they can appoint
.i ges to overtubw R0v. WADE.
The keeper tells themSarc You
was is aan Slkg as yes
confound the Senate, appoint whom
yus please." 7e caservatives peer
nervously Aougig.OeAoor. 'Seems
dangeross, don'rjg hiaok? they
ask. The keeper shmagz 7s your
door" he says.
continue to arm beher te Law.
7 dunno,' Usey gambleyeenossly.
-I dont wana apply a litarus test
or anything.' It's your door,"says
the keeper.
Finally, a conservativecomes to
the end of his term amid general
disapproval. 'How is it,* he asks,
'that no one else comes to this
door.' "Because," replies the keeper,
"Tis door was meant only for you,
and eventually Im going to dose it."







The court again refused to
hear domestic relations




In criminal cases, the court
addressed issues that had been





brought more confusion, as the
court tinkered with precedent
By Bernard James. Page S8.
Eabeas Actions
Are Defeated
I'he court continued to chip
tway at habeas protections. By
Vivian Berger. Page S10.
idividual Rights
're Preserved
n adherence to precedent was
ot ignored in response to




strong resurgence of stare
:cisis principles was evident.
i Mark L. Evans. Page S14.
omplete Overview
of 1991-'92 Term AP/Wie WorPo
immaries of all cases decided IN THEIR OWN WRITE, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor. Anthony M. Kennedy





Emergent center is the
term's big surprise.
BY MARCIA COYLE
Nais." Lw Jan. eail s" Ree,
WASHINGTON
THE US Supreme
Court opened its October
1991*3I1'92 term, a cornuco-
UWpia filed its table*~ abor-
WWtion, prayer at public
school ceoemonies. state prisoners' ac*
coss to federal courts. "hate" speech.
property owners' fight to be compen-
sated far government regulation of
their land, and other Issues.
But when the term ended, this consti-
tutional bounty had been nibbled at the
edges only. and some justices' appetite
for more held firmly in check - at
least for now - by a surprising trio.
The Supreme Court. constitutional
scholars often caution. is an Institution
that. In general, moves incrementally.
Although the court, for the first time in
decades, stood seven conservatives
strong last fall, three of the seven -
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor. Antho-
ny X. Kennedy and David H. Souter -
slowed what could have been a canon-
ball shot to the right.
In a few of the court's most contro
versial decalons. these justices ex-
plained why this court would not run
from Warren and Burger court prece-
dents, however wrongly decided some
conservativer belre them o be. In an
unusual, joint abortjon ruling, in par-
ticular, they revealed the glue that
joins them - concern for the Lnstitu-
tion's usedibility, respect for past deci-
sions and reluctance to travel new
roads without a clear vision of where
they lead.
"What has emerged is a moderate
conservative wing that stresses the in-
stitutional continuity of the court."
says Prof. Robert A. Sedler of Wayne
State University School of Law. "They
are not likely to extend the precedents
of the Warren and Burger courts, nor
are they likely to make radical
departures.
Treading Wartly
Last October, two high court actions
came together. promising to breathe
new life in the old. conservative Rea-
gan-Bush legal agenda and to Inflict
new pain on the already battered liber-
al legal establishment
Four months earlier, the high court,
in the final decision of the 1990'91
term, appeared to signal open season
on stare decisis, a court policy of
standing by past decisions in order to










biequst 11 2 8 - 5 1 3 2 2 4 4 0 21
White 16 2 7 0 - 1 1 3 0 4 4 2 15
SltOutuwn 10 13 8 5 3 - 2 4 9 5 3 1 32
Sevens 12 12 18 7 3 2 - 4 5 3 2 4 30
O'Coaner 15 11 11 2 2 4 0 - 4 4 3 0 19
Sb" 12 13 13 1 5 4 2 3 - 4 5 0 24
thundy 11 9 4 0 4 0 0 1 t - 2 0 8
Smuter 13 5 3 2 0 2 0 2 1 1 - 0 8
Thmns 9 S 7 1 3 3 2 5 1 6 3 - 24
w109 2 79182517 10 24 23 31 261 7 181


























































Push Toward the Right
Voting Alignments on the Supreme Court* 1991-'92 Term
Justice Al cases Civil cases Criminal cas
Rehnquist Agreed most often with Kennedy (85%) Kennedy (86%) Scalia (88%)
Agreed least often with Stevens (58%) Stevens (59%) Stevens (52%)
White Agreed most often with Kennedy (87%) Kennedy (87%) Souter (88%)
Agreed least often with O'Connor (72%) Stevens (73%) Thomas (57%)
Blackmun Agreed most often with Stevens (89%) Stevens (89%) Stevens (88%)
Agreed least often with Thomas (53%) Thomas (55%) Thomas (48%)
Stevens Agreed most often with Blackmun (89%) Blackmun (89%) Blackmun (88%)
Agreed least often with Thomas (52%) Thomas (56%) Thomas (39%)
O'Connor Agreed most often with Souter (79%) Souter (82%) Blackmun (84%)
Agreed least often with White. Blackmun. Ste- Stevens (71%) Thomas (48%)
vens. Thomas (72%)
Scalia Agreed most often with Thomas (89%) Thomas (89%) Thomas (91%)
Agreed least often with Blackmun (53%) Blackmun (56%) Blackmun (44%)
Kennedy Agreed most often with Souter (88%) Souter (89%) White. Souter (84%)
Agreed least often with Thomas (70%) Blackmun (72%) Thomas (52%)
Souter Agreed most often with Kennedy (88%) Kennedy (89%) White (88%)
Agreed least often with Blackmun (71%) Blackmun (68%) Thomas (65%)
Thomas Agreed most often with Scalia (89%) Scalia (89%) Scalia (91%)
Agreed least often with Stevens (52%)
Costisued from page Si
provide aecurity and certainty in the
law.
Stare decials concerns are at their
zenith. wrote Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist. primarily In cases involv-
Ing property and contract rights.
Standing by precedents affecting indi-
vidual rights. he added. la of lesser Im-
portance. and precedents decided by 5-
4 votes are particularly vulnerable to
change because they don't command
strong support by the court. Payne v.
Tennessee. 311 S. CL 2597 (1991).
With the arrival of the new term, the
high court had on its calendar a num-
ber of cases raising aisues that had
closely divided the justices In the past
and affected Individual rights - abor-
tion. church and state. death penalty
and speech restrctions. Justice Thur.
good Marshall had retired. and a new.
and as it turned out. very conservative
justice - Clarence Thomas - was ex-
pected to take his seat on the court.
With the words from Payne looming
over all. the time never seemed riper
for major revisions in the law.
But despite aggressive advocacy by
the Bush administration and others. It
never happened.
The surprise of the term is there
wasn't quite the rollback of rights ex-
pected." says Supreme Court scholar
Prof. Christine Kellett of Dickinson
School of Law. "They had the opportus
nity to do more than they did."
Center Takee Control
In Pwmsed Pareathood of Southeast-
e Pemsepgiana v. Casey, 60 U.S.LW.
4795, a joint opinion by Justices O'Con-
nor. Kennedy and Souter served plain
Contimed on follotsing page
Blackmun (55%) Stevens (39%)
I
All/ ,1 l B (Unanimous A + 8 (percentwith concur- of totalTerm A (Unanimous) rence) opinions)
1991-*92 20 21 38
1990-191 26 15 37
1989-90 23 22 35
1988.89 24 27 38
1987-'88 47 19 44
1986-.87 22 18 27
1985-'86 18 21 26
1984-'85 34 22 40
1983-84 43 22 40
1982-'83 34 23 35
1981-'82 31 23 32
1980-'81 23 20 31
1979-80 - 31 6 25
1978-79 33 17 36
1977-78 24 13 27
1976-77 28 20 34
In te October 1991-92 term, Juadcas Byron R. White and Harry A. Blackmun
wrote Ute largest number of unanimous opinlons, seven each.
Justices in 5-4 Majority










The court spit 54 in a total of 14 casm. Juse Oseid H. Souter was most aten in the
maorkiy in these decialon, 13 at te 14 opion.' Chief Juice WZIam H. Rehnquist, who
was Most often in the najorty in the Ocluber 1990W91 terns 5-4 aplit was. a"lng with
Jusimo Claere Thomes. lest: oftn in the majrity at the last terms 5-4 decisions - 4 of
the 14 opi .
Beeides Jusece Soutaer. Jutces Hany A. Sladaram asd John Paul Stevens were in the
maoty ig 9 and 10 apiin. respecIvely. There were folI by Justices aran R. White
and Andiony*M. Kermedy - 8 of the 14 casse; Jusime Seed Day O'Comor. 7, and Justice
AlAnitn Scala. &
notice that they are the new center on tnC a.* majurily a remarkable 14
the court and are taking controL says time Me appearance was followed
Professor Kellett. closely by Justices Stevens and Black-
The high court, in Its 8-4 ruling. mun. Also. Justices White. oConnor
firmed a woman'a constitutional right and Kennedy were in the majority at
to have an abortion before the fetus least 50 percent of the time.
reaches viability. The O'Connor-Ken- Least often in the majority were the
nedy-Souter trio, joined by Justices chief justice and Justices Scalia and
Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Ste* Thomas four. five end four cass. re-
vens. voiced concern about the court's spectively). These numbers are partic-
credibility and the "nation's commit- ularly striking when compared to the
ment to the rule of law" if the land- most-closely divided cases of the 1990-
mark Roe v. Wade - under which a 9 term. Chief Justice Rehnquist was
generation of women had lived and re- most often in the majority - 75 per-
lied upon - were overruled. cent of the 22 cases.
At the same time, the court upheld Another significant sign of the new
nearly all of Pennsylvania's abortion c emergence is in the dissenting
restrictions under a new standard Pro. votes cast in the term just ended.
viding less constitutional protection to There were 101 signed opinions. Jus-
the abortion right than Boa, tices Kennedy and Soutar each cast
But neither the Bush admInistration only eight dissenting'votes. That con-
nor the chief justice and Justices trasts dramatically with their other
Thomas. Byron L White and Antonin conservative coeagues - the chief
Scalia prevailed in their attempts to justice, who cast 2L and Justices Sca-
overrule Boe outright or afford it the lia and Thomas. each 24
least constitutional protection avail-
able.
Justices O'Connor. Kennedy and Son Major crimnal law challenges un-
ter are a "moving center that moves der the Fourth. Fifth and Sixth amend-
slowly." explains Professor Keilett. C ments dominated the high court docket
say. she adds, was "clearly a rollback in recent years. but were not on the
of a right" It should serve notice, she calendar last term.
says, that other precedents are likely At least one decision. Georgia v.
to go. "but not too rapidly," under the McCoUu, 60 U±LW. 4574. is likely to
current court, have longerm importance for trias.
sehamiTwo other, add to the emerging plc-
66gm ture of & new ceter reluctant to make
0Caser offeret the meet obvious sign radia turn In dhvctoL And, still
that a moderate center had emerge in others offer a revealing glimpse of the
response to rig ru pushing from the n w" Justic. Claence Tomas.
etreme right Inside and outside of tme Im mooUu. a 64 cout held that
court.' 3A: there were ;mre subtle criminal detadants an t
sns rouhoute term. cannot use their peremptor chl-
Shortly before the abortion on lenge to eliminate potential jurors
came down. the high court.,ina a 4 solely because of their rae The dad-
rullag. held that the 'rst Amend* siox written by Justice Blachmm. was
ments establishment claums prohibit- an extension of the cours 29" rulng
ad public school officials from
including non-sectarian prayers in a o on page SM
middle school graduation ceremony.
Lee t. We.smaa r 60 UancLW. 47fl.
As with the abortion case, the majorma
Ity rejected arguments by the Bush ad-T
ministratiaj and others that a major
Chacng In course was needed In thisand
aOf the law, one that would permit trn w omr togreatel government ousyodie of rail-
Elan.. M 1TEFS~ asfr
Writing s' , a. majorityJusuc 9 em. athef Jtcet Renqut ftew
Kennedy declined6 to ther~revl or- ".ms ften inye ortit - 7pe
jettson a 1 precedent thct sets out a .Cases
teat for determining eblih' e t ern is irnmisent
clause violations. Insteid he, Joined byj
Justices Blackmun. Stevens, O'Connr. The high court her ar c a
and Souter. Applied a line of high court aruments In 109 cases last term. Only
precedents banning veranssn- 13 women appeared before the justices.
ored school prayer. The court found anUofterpestdsaesr
the role of government here pervasive the federal government.
and sw coercion in peer g p pe A few had the rae chance at repeat
sure to attend and participate even i a performances during the same term.
student felt the prayer was offensive. Assistant to the Solicitor General
Although the majority opinion re- Maureen &. Mahoney argued fourjected the dissenters' desire to rewrite cases; her colleaue Assistant to the
establishment clause doctrine. It a Solicitor General Amy ch Wax, argued
did not go an far as Justices Bm un three. New Jersey Deputy Attorney
and Stevens would have in General Mary R. Hamill appeared
g nAmne from supporting domatwice before the justices.
alal There also were some repeat
As with Casey and abortion, Lee does appearanca by mate lawyers also a
not represent the dnal word on where ,rather unusual opportunity for
this court Is headed In the church-state lawyers outside of the office of
solicitor general.
"I still think there's going to be more H. Bartow arr i of Washington.accommodation in of vote Klein. Farr. Smith & Taranto
Kennedy eaestwiClnthare Thoas.Th
than in a Brennan vote," says courtc he
scholar AZ. Dick Howard of the Uni- justices ordered rearguments in
versity of Virginia School of L..aw. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc,460
"Let's wait for the next (parochia U.&LrW. 4073, the cigarette smoking-
schooisanald case. ure-emption cpse; Mr. Facr
Justices Kennedy and Slouterl he represented Ligget. His partner. Joel
adds, show a "healthy willingness- t Klein, also argued two cases, including
come to grips with the court's docket one of the more surprising victories of
as It Is rather than as It in perceived the many. prankin v G111116f CountyZee oPublic SC.SWn. 60 U. 7W. 416, In
m wthwhich the court found a right to
Shifts by Splts recovreruamages underTitle D
Casey and Lee were 5-4 decisionr Other repeat appearances were
The high court split 5 4 in a total of made by Prof Steven H. Goldblatt of
cases. some of which also involved ma- Georgetown University Law Center.
jor questions about federal habeas cor- director of the appellate litigation
pus and restrictions on speech. These clinic, and Timothy B. Dyk of the
decisions also indicated a shift in the Washington. DC. office of Jones, Day.








National Law Journal Staff Reporter
WASHINGTON - With a stunning de-
cision on abortion and an important
ruling on property rights, the U.S. Su-
preme Court closed out a term that
both confirmed and
An crushed the expecta-
*NW0 tions held by many
about the high court'sNeWS "youngest" members.
Analysis The alliances forged
and the votes cast by
Justices Anthony M-. Kennedy, David
H. Souter and Clarence Thomas in less
than a dozen cases last term erected
revealing signposts along the court's
continuing trip to the right.
All three justices have taken their
seats in just the past four years - a
remarkable rate of change for an insti-
tution that traditionally measures
change, at least in the law, by incre-
ments.
And the actions of all three during
the past term have left those who chart
or cross the path of the high court with
feelings of short-term relief and long-
term anxiety, or short-term dismay
and long-term optimism. -
Because of recent retirements and
the political sensitivity of many of the
Continued on page 40
Newest Justices Bring Surprises
Continued from page 1
cases decided, this term was more re-
vealing of Justices Kennedy and Sou-
ter than prior terms. But. court schol-
ars caution, nothing revealed should be
considered permanent or viewed out of
the context of what this court is.
"This is still a more conservative
court than it was two years ago. It's a
court that is still sliding to the right."
says Prol A.E. Dick Howard of the
University of Virginia School of Law.
A Lonely Alliance
More than willing to join those jus-
tices pushing hardest to the right and
taking the narrowest view of the
court's role. is Justice Thomas. Ap.
pointed to the high court last year by
President Bush, the first-termer, say
critics and supporters alike, has found
both mentor and soulmate in conserva-
tive Ideologue Justice Antonin Scalia.
A quick survey of voting patterns
last term show Justice Thomas voting
more often with Justice Scalia than
any other justice. And it was not un-
usual to find the two in a lonely alli-
ance In certain cases.
'Scalia to carrying the Intellectual
ball and It is the strength of his reason-
ing that has captured Thomas." says
conservative court watcher Bruce
Fein. "Where the two disagreed last
term. It was in cases of no conse-
quence."
The two justices, he says, are alike in
their dislike of legislative history as a
tool in Interpreting statutes; their re-
fuaal to find "new" rights in the Consti-
tutian: their adherence to the plain
meaning at statutes, and their desire to
overrule entirely the court's landmark
abortion ruling. Roe v. Wade.
Justice Thomas has "lived up to con-
servative expectations." agrees Rich-
ard Samp. chief counsel to the pro-
business Washington Legal Founda-
tin. adding the justice has voted to
uphold criminal convictions and bol-
ster property rights.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 91-453. Justice Thomas signed
onto Justice Scalia's majority opinion
in one of the most important property
cases of the term. A 7-2 court an-
nounced a "categorical rule" that gov-
ernment regulations denying a proper-
Justice Anthony M. Justice David H. Souter
Kennedy surprisingly remains the most
has distanced himself enigmatic of the
from Justices Rehnquist justices, say both his
and Scalia. critics and supporters.
ty owner all economically viable use of
his land constitutes a regulatory tak-
ing that requires compensation.
Lucas is an important building block
and a "return to balance" in the prop-
erty rights fight. says Mark Pollot of
the Pacific Research Institute for Pub-
lic Policy and main author of the Rea-
gan administration's takings guide-
lines.
A separate concurrence by Justice
Kennedy. he adds, shows that he may
not be willing to move as far and as
fast as Justice Scalia In this area. But
Justice Thomas' vote reflects no such
inhibitions.
O'Connor Rebukes Thomas
Particularly revealing last term, say
court watchers, was Justice Thomas'
dissent in Hudson v. McMillian, 90-6531.
A 7-2 court held the use of excessive
physical force against a prisoner can
violate the Eighth Amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment even
when there is no showing of serious
Injury.
Shared only by Justice Scalia. Jus-
tice Thomas' view of the Eighth
Amendment's history and court prece-
dent drew a sharp rebuke from Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor who. quoting
from earlier opinions, said It ignored
the "'concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency'
that animate the Eighth Amend-
ment' "
Justice O'Connor again challenged
Justice Thomas' view of history in
Wright v. West, 91-542. Justice Thomas,
in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist. indicated a willingness to virtu-
ally end federal court review of state
prisoners' constitutional claims.
In a scathing opinion. Justice O'Con-
nor reviewed and disputed Justice
Thomas' analysis of habeas prece-
dents, case by case. He drew a similar
OWNER- David Lucas stands on his South Carolina proper. said the regulation of his land may constitute a 'taking'tv, which Is at the center of a oivotal case. The hih court under the Constitution.
Justice Clarence
Thomas has found both
mentor and soulmate in
conservative ideologue
Antonin Scalia.
rebuke from Justice Byron R. White in
Foucha v. Louisiana. 90-53844, which
held that Louisiana could not continue
to confine someone found not guilty by
reason of insanity in a mental institu-
tion when that person Is no longer
mentally ill but still dangerous.
Justice Thomas. again joined by the
chief justice and Justice Scalia, would
have allowed confinement on danger-
ousness alone. In the majority opinion.
Justice White accused him of deliver-
ing an "incomplete" rendition of state
laws to support his dissent
With just a few paragraphs In Hud-
son, the Eighth Amendment case. Jus-1
tice Thomas shows himself totally
open to re-examining precedents and
perhaps even to re-reading original in-
tent. says the University of Virginia's
Professor Howard. And. in one passage
in Foucha, he adds. the justice voices a
very narrow view of fundamental
rights and substantive due process.
Justice Thomas "swore he was not
an ideologue and had no agenda" dur-
ing his Senate confirmation hearings.
says Prof. Burt Neuborne of New York
University School of Law. Proof to the
contrary, he contends. came with his
vote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
91-744. 902. in which he signed onto dis-
senting opinions by the chief justice
and Justice Scalia, saying that Roe
should be overruled and states should
be free to permit or ban abortion.
"The man swore he had never dis-
Cussed or thought about Roe, but when
confronted with the question for the
first time, he swallowed a predigested
ideological line," says Professor Neu-
borne. There was no evidence. he adds,
that Justice Thomas "grappled. strug-
gled or wrestled" with the issues.
Justice Thomas has been an atypical
freshman, says Professor Howard. "He
has been quiet on the bench, but when
he takes pen to paper, he has no
inhibitions.'
It is too early to tell whether Justice
Thomas' alliance with Justice Scalia
will stand the test of time or go the
way of the early alliance between for-
mer Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justice Harry A. Blackmun (aka. the
Minnesota Twins), he says.
"Justice Blackmun took two or three
terms to find his feet. Here, there
seems to be a clear kinship with Scalia
that is likely to last." Professor How-
ard says. 'Thomas already is getting
intellectual backing from Scalia and
has a more complete sense of what
he'd like to do."
Continucd on followinU pagye
Changed Pa
Justice Sandra Day OConnor
I Justice David H. Souter
justice Anthony M. Kennedy
th for Court?
New Balance Is Held
By 3 Cautious Justices
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Sp~acea ewe YeMrakTne
WASHINGTON, June 25 - Defying
'almost all expectations. the Supreme
Court has rebuffed the Bush.Adminis-
tration within the past week on two
Issues the Administratfod cares most
-about. religion and habeas
corpus.News The setbacks were star-Analysis tling. raising these ques-
tions: Did the Administra-
tion's lawyers simply miscalculate.
taking for granted that the Court would
be receptive to their arguments? Or is
the Court itself changing, so that legal
arguments that appeared perfectly cal-
ibrated for success when they were
dispatched to the Court ended up miss-
ing the target by the time they landed?
There are no clear answers, given
that the Court has not yet ruled in the
Pennsylvania abortion case or several
other major cases it is scheduled to
decide before the term ends next week.
But intriguing evidence from the term;
so far gives weight to the notion that,
the Court is in transition toa new phase
barely a year after what appeared to
be the arrival of a firmly consolidated
conamve majority.
TdIaezu elrectrve coniatil or the
Court has passed to a subgroup of the
majority, a moderately conservative
middle group of three Justices. Sandra
Day O'Connor. Anthony M. Kennedy
and David H. Souter. The group's hall-
marks appear to be a generally cau-
thous approach to deciding cases. a
hesitancy to overturn precedents and a
distaste for aggressive arguments.
whether those presented to the Court
or those made by the Justices them-
selves in written opinions.
This group does not always vote to-
gether. but when it does, its views
prevail as in the school-prayer case on
Wednesday and the habeas corpus case
last week. The Court decided. 5 to 4.
that prayers at public school com.
mencements are unconstitutional. And
it voted 6 to 3 to reject the Administra-
tion's efforts to sharply restrict the
ability of Federal judges to re-evaluate
the convictions or sentences of state
prisoners.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clar.
Cminmued on )'age A16. (iflurmn I
Three Cautious Justices Changing Path of Court
Conlinurd From luge Al
eace h o dm a
tration's arguments in both cases.
One who has no doubt of the signifi-
cance of the pattern this'year is Ken.
neth W. Starr, a former Federal ap-
peals court judge who is the Bush Ad-
ministration's Solicitor General, in
charge of presenting the Federal Gov.
ernment's cases to the Supreme Court.
In an interview today. Mr. Starr
called the school-prayer decision "just
stunning." adding: "If there is one
thing I'm not doing, it's downplaying it.
It says something very significant
about the mood of the Court. It's really
a new Court."
"There's a Kennedy-Souter center to
the Court now, and that's a cautious
center." Mr. Starr said. While includ-
ing Justice O'Connor to a lesser de-
gree. he said: "As Kennedy and Souter
go, so goes the Court, and I see in them
the spirit of Lewis Powell."
I Courtly Powell Recalled
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.. a courtly
and conservative Virginian who retired
in 1987 and was succeeded by Justice
Kennedy, for years held a position at
the center of a sharply polarized Court.
Among the issues on which he held the
balance of power was religion.
In fact, the mood of the Court now is
strikingly reminisceut of the 1984-85
term. when Justice Powell cast the
deciding vote in two cases in which theCourt rejected the Reagan Adminstra-
lion's arguments for expanding state
aid to parochial schools. What is re-
markable about that historical parallel
is how different the Court looks today
from the Court of 1985,
In addition to Justice Powell, Jus-
tices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thur-
good Marshall. two staunch liberals
gree of separation between church and
state, have retired, as has Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger. Justices Scalia,
Kennedy. Souter and Thomas have all
arrived, and there was little reason to
expect that the Court would take the
same approach to religion cases.
-Kenedy Switches Stance
In fact, the Bush Administration's
lcgal position in Lee v. Weisman, the
commencement-prayer case the Court
decided Wednesday, was essentially a
response to an invitation that Justice
Kennedy issued in a dissenting opinion
in a church-state case three years ago.
The majority in that case refused to
allow a Christmas display in a Pitts-
burgh courthouse.
Back then, Justice Kennedy. joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice
Scalia and Justice Byron R. White,
strongly attacked the Court's prece-
dents in the religion area as reflecting
an "unjustified hostility toward reli-
Rion." He called for overturning the
precedents and for permitting govern-
ment sponsorship of religious obser
vance as long as no one was forced to
participate and no "establishment" of
a state religion occurred.
Key Habeas Corpus Case
But it was also Justice Kennedy who
on Wednesday rejected the Bush Ad-
ministration's argument for taking ex-
actly that apprmach in the school pray
er case.
In similar fashion, it was the Court
itself that framed the issue in the habe-
as corpus case. Wright v. West. that it
Senator Joseph R. Blden Jr. warns
Prsdeat Bush to consult the Senate
before aornatag any future Su-
..... .... . . . m
decided last week. In granting review
in what appeared to be a routine case,
the Court went beyond the technical
questions the parties had presented
and ordered argument on the funda-
mental question of how much authority
Federal judges should have, in han-
dling appeals from state prisoners, to
reassess the way the state court ap-
plied the law to the facts of the case.
In past cases, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy had appeared particularly ea-
ger to limit the scope of Federal habe*
as corpus review. The Administration,
which has failed to persuade Congress
to amend the Federal habeas corpus
statute, filed a friend-of-the-court brief
urging the Court to require Federaljudges to defer to the findings of the
state courts in most cases.
Given what had come before, the
result was unexpected: only Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas
and Scalia took the Administration's
view, in an opinion by Justice Thomas.
Justice O'Connor wrote an unusually
sharp separate opinion, using words
like "misdescribes" and "mischarac-
terizes" in a point-by-point rebuttal of
Justice Thomas's analysis. She also
said that because Congress had re-
fused "on 13 occasions" to amend the
habeas corpus law to require deference
from Federal judges, the Court itself
should not now take that step.
The evidence for change within IpeCourt raises the further question:
Why? Are the middle three Justices
responding almost viscerally to the
swashbuckling reach of Opinions byJustices Scalia and Thomas?
Has the Administration's presentation
perhaps caused these Justices to re-
examine their own premises, to con-
front, in light of aggressive legal argu-
ment, the logical consequences of ideas
that sounded appealing in theory but
suddenly look troubling in the context
of real cases with implications for real
people?
Last November, as the commence-
ment-prayer case was being argued,
something of that sort seemed to be
going through Justice Kennedy's mind.
Responding to the argument that pray-
ers at commencement are of minimal
concern because students who object
can skip the ceremony and still receive
their diplomas, he looked deeply trou-
bled. "In our culture, graduation is a
key event in a young person's life," he
told Charles J. Cooper. the lawyer for
the Providence, R.1, school board, who,
along with Solicitor General Starr, was
arguing in favor of permitting the
prayers.
Whether the two lawyers lost Justice
Kennedy's vote at that moment is im-
possible to say. But in his opinion on i
Wednesday, he returned to the point
using almost the exact words he had
uttered spontaneously from the bench.
"Everyone knows," he wrote, "that in
our-so ty;-and-in-our- wtte, high-
school graduation is one of life's most
significant occasions." He then
brought that personal observation to a
constitutional conclusion: "The Consti-
tution forbids the state to exact reli-
gious conformity from a student as the











That was the story of this surpris-
ing and fascinating Supreme Court
term, a term that appeared only
months ago to have all the makings of a
conservative counterrevolution but that in
the end produced powerful, if qualified, reaf-
firmations of some of the Court's most im-
portant modern precedents.
In a cascade of decisions during the last
two weeks, the Court seemed to address
almost every issue roiling the political land-
scape or bedeviling the national psyche, from
abortion to race to religion to hateful speech.
'Te term, which began Oct. 7 and ended
last Monday, saw the emergence of three
Justices, moderate conservatives appointed
by Presidents Reagan and Bush, who con-
trolled the outcome in some of the most
important cases. ITe approach of Sandra
Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and
David H. Souter was marked by respect for
precedent and a mistrust of sweeping argu-
ments and aggressive advocacy.
"You're asking the Court to adopt a stand-
ard, and I think we ought to know where the
standard would take us," Justice Souter said
to Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr during
the April 22 argument in the Pennsylvania
abortion case. Mr. Starr, representing the
Bush Administration, was asking the Court to
overturn its 1973 precedent, Roe v. Wade,
which established the constitutional right to,
abortion, but was resisting the Justices'
questions about whether the Administra-
tion's approach would permit states to make
abortion a criminal offense.




from abortion to race
to hateful speech.
reaffirming the right to abortion in an opin-
ion written jointly by Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy and Souter.
When these three Justices voted together,
they were not on the losing side in any case
this term. Justices Souter and Kennedy were
hardly ever on the losing side at all, each
dissenting in only eight of the 108 cases that
the Court decided with full opinions.
Justice Souter was in the majority in 13 of
the 14 cases that the Court decided by 5-to-4
votes, a category that included the abortion
case and a decision that reaffirmed the
Court's school prayer precedents and barred
prayers at public school graduations.
In both of those cases, the Court's two most
liberal members, Justices Harry A. Black-
mun and John Paul Stevens, joined Justices
Souter, Kennedy and O'Connor to make the
majority. Occasionally but less often, Justice
Byron R. White also voted with this group.
As a result, the Court's three most conser-
vative Justices, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Chief Justice William H. Rehr-
quist, often found themselves in dissent.
These three voted together in 39 cases in
which the Court was not unanimous, and in 11
of those they were on the losing side. Chief
Justice Rehnquist himself, with 19 dissenting
votes, was in dissent in a slightly greater
proportion of cases this term than he had
been two years ago, before the retirement of
two strongly liberal Justices, William J.
Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall.
The voting pattern this term meant that
Justice Thomas, the newest Justice, was
unable to make a substantial impact on the
outcome of cases. But he did make his views
known, establishing a distinctive voice-
through separate concurring or dissenting
opinions. He displayed a willingness to over-
turn precedent and a dislike of a number of
modern legal doctrines.
His dissenting opinion in a prisoners'
rights case was an example. The Court, in a
7-to-2 opinion by Justice O'Connor, found that;
the use of excessive force by guards against
a prisoner can violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment even if the prisoner is not seriously.
injured. Justice O'Connor said that "contem-
porary standards of decency are always vio.
lated" when prison officials maliciously use
force to-hurt a prisoner.
Justice Thomas said that such actions
were "deplorable" but not unconstitutional
because the Eighth Amendment "is not, and -
should not be turned into, a national code of
prison regulation." Justice Scalia joined Jus-
tice Thomas's dissent. The two voted .in 62
cases in which the Court was not unanimous,
and agreed in 50 cases, or 81 percent of the
time.
While this was the highest rate of agree-
ment of any pair of Justices, it was not
significantly higher than the rate of agree-
ment between Justices Stevens and Black-
mun, who voted together in 79 percent of the
non-unanimous cases. Justices Souter and
Kennedy agreed 76 percent of the time in
non-unanimous cases.
Of the Court's 108 decisions - the lowest
number of cases decided in more than 20
years - 34 were decided by unanimous
Conservatives Were Picked,
but the Court Stays Centered
Cintinued from page I
votes. That is roughly the proportion of cases the Court
decided unanimously in the years when it appeared, at
least on the surface, to be much more ideologically
polarized. There are many points of view even on a
Court with a working conservative majority.
. - That the Court came to rest in the center this term
d6es not mean it is bound to remain there. Justice
Blackmun, tue Court's oldest member, underscored
that point with his deeply personal separate opinion in
the.abortion case: "I am 83 years old. I cannot remain
ott this Court forever." He predicted with "regret" a
bitter confirmation fight over his successor. Coming
on-the final day of a term that began with the searing
battle over Justicq Thomas's confirmation, Justice
Blackmun's words served as a reminder that any
Suipreme Court term is just a snapshot in time, of an
institution that is neither isolated nor unchanging.
- Following is a summary of some of the Court's
maitor decisions this term.
Abortlo'-
Newly Restricted,
Roe v. Wade Decision
1R mrains Law by One Vote
By a vote of 5 to 4, the
Court reaffirmed what
i' i the majority called the
"essential holding" of
Roev. Wade: that a
woman has a constitu-
ttonal right to an abor-
tion before the fetus at-
tains viability at rough-




- .- O'Conor. Kennedy
- -- - . and Soutersaid that
the right to an abortion was part of the concept of it-
erth aTthe ConstitutnaU arantee of due process
protectits. d that to abandon the 1973 precedent
"urder fire" would damage the both the Court and
"the nation's commitment to the rule of law." Justices
Blackmun and Stevens joined this portion of the opin-
ion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, No. 91-744. :
- At the same time, the Court adopted a new stand-
ard for evaluating restrictions on abortion. Previously,
it had required that any restrictions serve a "compel-
ling" state interest Now, under an "undue burden"
standard, it will uphold restrictions that do not amount
to a "substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion. Applying that standard, the three
authors of the opinion upheld Pennsylvania's 24-hour
waiting period and informed-consent requirements,
while striking down a requirement that married wom-
en notify their husbands of their abortions in advance.
-While Justices Blackmun and Stevens would have
struck down all the restrictions, four others - Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas and
White - would have overturned Roe v. Wade and up-
held the entire Pennsylvania law.
- The Court did not decide another case related to
atlprtion, deferring until its next term a decision on
whether Federal judges have authority under a Recon-
struction-era civil rights law to order anti-abortion
protesters to stop blocking access to abortion clinics.







its precedents that bar
state-sponsored prayer
* in the public schools,
ruling tht the prayer





wrote the 5*od opin-
ion, finding that at
.. least in the contest of
public schools there
was no need to revisit the Court's longstanding ap-
prdaite to deciding what type of officially sponsored re-
ligious activity amounts to the "establishment" of reli-
gioathat the First Amendment prohibits.
Justies Souter. Blackinun, Stevens and O'Connor
joined the opinion, Lee v. Weisman, No.90014. Jus-
tices Scalia, White, Thomas and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist dissented.
. The outcome of the case, which concerned a rab-
bl'swionsectarian prayers at a middle school gradua-
sion'in Providence, LL., was a surprise because a ma-jorlty of the Court had appeared ready to rewrite the -
Court's establishment clause precedents. Five days
latef, the Court turned down a dozen appeals in other
establishment clause cases. indicating that the Ju
tices have said all they plan to say on the subject for
thejmmediate future.
Free Speech
Bigots Can Still -
Burn Crosses, Criminals




in an unusually wide




With the principal ex-
caption of two rulings
on election and cam-
paign regulations the
I term had a decidedly
pro-speech tilt.
. menm e .. In the Court's first
encouner with laws singling out "hate speech" or
"bias crimes" for special punishment. all nine Jus-
.tices agreed that a St. Paul. MaLn., hate-crime ordi-
'tance violated the First Amendment. (R.A.V. v. St.
paul,'No. 90-7675.) The law made it a crime to engage
in speech or behavior likely to arouse "anger or '
alarm" on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion or
gender." The Court split sharply in its rationale, how.
ever. Justice Scalia, Joined in a majority opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy. Souter
and Thomas, said the flaw in the ordinance was that ir
prohibited expression based on the message ex-
pressed. The First Amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from "silencing speech on the basis of its con-
tent."
This was a broad rationale that casts doubt on vir-
tually all hate crime laws as well as on speech codes at
public colleges and urversities. Justices White, Black-
mun. O'Connor and Stevens would have struck the St.
Paul ordinance down on narrower grounds.
The Court also relied on the First Amendment to
strike down New York's prototype "Son of Sam" law,
which enabled the state to take a criminal's earnings
from books or movies about his crime and place the
money in a special fund to compensate the criminal's
victims. New York enacted the law in 1977. following a
series of murders by a killer who identified himself as
the Son of Sam, and 41 other states then adopted simi-
larlaws.
With Justice Thomas not participating, the vote to
strike down the law was 8 to O (Simon & Schuster v
New York Crime Victim's Board, No. 90-1059). In her
majority opiion. Justice O'Connor said that a state's
interest in ensuring that criminals did not profit from
their crimes could not justify a law that singled out
earnings from "expressive activity" and not other
sources of income.
The Court also applied the First Amendment to
overturn a death sentence that a Delaware jury had
imposed after the jurors were informed by the prose-
cutor of the defendant's membership in a white racist
prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood.
In an 8-to-I vote with the majority opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist (Dawson v. Delaware, No. 906704).
the Court held that the defendant's "abstract beliefs"
and personal associations could not be the basis for a
death sentence unless the state could demonstrate that
the information was relevant In this case, racism evi-
dently played no role in the murder at a white woman
by the white defendait. Justice Thomas, in a dissent-
ing opinion, said that the jury could make a more accu-
rate appraisal of the defendant's character by learn-
ing of his connection with the gang.
By a S-to-4 vote. the Court declared unconstituion-
al a Georgia county's ordinance that imposed a fee of
up toS1,000, payable in advance, for permission to hold
a public demonstration.
The fee's purpose was to offset the anticipated
costs of maintaining order at demonstrations: the
more trouble expected, the higher the fee. In his ma-
jority opinion, Justice Blackmun said the First
Amendment did not permit handing government offi-
cials such "unbridled discretion" to put a price On
speech "simply because it might offend a hostile .
mob." Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scallaand Thomas dissented. (Forsyth County v. Na-
tionalist Movement. No, 91-53X)
The Justices split sharply over whether the First
Amendment permits bans on soliciting money or hand-
ing out literature at publicly owned airports. The case
was a challenge by the Hare Krishna movement to a
policy of the Port Authority of New York and New Jer-
sey, barring the two activities in the terminals of the
three New York City-area airports.
Finding that an airport is not a "public forum"
and that speech restrictions there are permissible as
long as they sie*reasonable," the Court upheld the
ban on direct solicitation of funds by a 6-to-3 vote. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, with dis-
senting votes by Justices Souter. Blackmun and Ste-
vens But on the question of handing out literature. the
balance on the Court shifted. The Court ruled that the
First Amendment protected this acuvity, with Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor joining Justices Souter,
Blackmun and Stevens to provide a 5-to*4 majority.(International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee., Nos. 90-155 and 90-339.)
The Court rejected First Amendment challenges
to two types of election regulation. By a 5-to-3 vote, it
upheld a Tennessee law, similar to laws in many
states, placing a 100-foot "campaign-free zone"
around polling places on election day. Justice Black-
muw wrote a plurality opinion upholding the law.
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Kennedy. (Burson v. Freeman, No. 90-1056.) Jus-
tice Scalia also voted to uphold the law. Justices Ste-
vens, O'Connor and Souter dissented, and Justice
Thomas did not vote.
In the second election case. the Court upheld a H
waii election law and ruled 6 to 3 that states may con
stitutionally prohibit write-in voting as long as cand
dates can get on the ballot in other ways such as peti-
tions or primary elections. Justice White wrote the
majority opinion, and Justices Kennedy, Blackmun








reading t the constitu.
tional guarantee of
equal protection of the
law. In a decision that
will have an impact in
courtrooms across the
coury, the Justices
extended a 1986 ruling
.and held that criminal
defendants cannot use
race as a crtterion for
-- *- excluding people from
serving on juries.
The 7-to-2 decision. Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-
37Z wrttsen by Justice Blackmun. completed a redefi-
ritmion by the Court of the ancient concept of the
Peremptory Jury challenge, under which either side in
a case can remove jurors without giving an explana-
tian. In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that
prosecutscould not challenge jurors en the basis of
race. Last year, the Court extended that principle to
both sides In civil cases.-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White. Ste-
vens. Kennedy and Souter joined the majorfty opinion.
Justice rhomas filed a separate concurring opinion,
warning that black criminal defendants would "rue
the day" that they had lost the ability to create through
peremptory challenges juries most likely to be fair.
In its first encounter with the legacy of segrega-
tion in higher education, the Court ruled that formerly
segregated public universities must do more than sim-
ply open their doors to all in a nominal policy of equal
access.
Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter from the S-
to-I decision, which held that Mississippi had still not
proven its compliance with constitutional standards 30
years after admitting the first black student to the all-
white University of Mississipp
The majority opinion by Justice White sent the
case back to the lower courts for review of various
"constitutionally suspect" practices that keep the





races largely apart in the eight-college state system.The decision. United States v. Fordice. No.90-1205 left
many questions unanswered. including the ultimate fu-tureof black colleges.
Ruling in a public school desegregation case from
the Atlanta suburbs, the Court held that a formerly
segregated school district can. under carefully moni-
tored circumstances, win gradual release from Fed-
eral court supervision as it achieves equality in vari.
ous facets of its operations. even if some "vestiges" of
segregation remain. The vote in Freeman v. Pitts. No.89-1290, was 8 too. with a majorityopinion by Justice
Kennedy and several concurring opinions JusticeThomas did not paricipate
The Federal law barring sex discrimination in
schools and colleges does permit students to sue for
damages for sexual harassment and other forms of
sex discrimination, the Court decided. By a vote of 9 to0. with a majority opinion by Justice White. the Court
rejected the Bush Administration's argument that thelaw. known as Title IX did not authorize suits for mon-
etary damages. (Franklin v. Gwinnett County.No. 90.
91&)
The Court ruled that the Federal Voting RightsAct, which requires Justice Department approval be-
fore Southern states and parts of some Northern states
can make certain electoral changes, does not require
approval for internal government reorganizations.In this case, Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
sion. No. 90-7II, newly elected black commissioners in
two Alabama counties brought a Voting Rights Act
suit after finding that the previously all-white county
boards had taken away some of the individual board
members* traditional authority. Justice Kennedy
wrote the 6-4o3 decision, with dissenting votes by Jus-
tices Stevens, White and Blackmun.
In a major ruling on the civil rights of prison in.
mates, the Court ruled that a beating or other use of
excessive force by a prison guard may violate the Con-
stitution even if it does not result in a serious injury to
the prisoner. The 7-to-2 ruling, with a majority opinionby Justice O'Connor. was based on the Eighth Amend-
ment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment Jus-
tice Thomas dissented in an opinion joined by Justice
Scalia. (Hudson v. McMillian, No. 90-4531.)
Criminal Law
Doors of Federal Courts
Closed to State Prisoners,
Continuing a Pattern
Continuing a trend
of the last several
years, the Court raised
I , further obstacles in the
path of state prison in-
mates seeking Federal




ruled, 5 to 4, that in-
mates can lose the
right to a Federal court
hearing if, through a
- . . lawyer's neglect or
similar reason, they have first failed to present their
case properly in the state courts.
The decision, Keeney v. Tamavo-Reyes. No. 90-1859, overturned a Warren Court precedent that had
assured prisoners the right to have their petitions for
writsof habeas corpus heard in Federal court unless
they had deliberately bypassed the state courts. That
earlier ruling, Townsend v. Sain, dated to 1963.Justice White's majority opinion was joined byChief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter
and Thomas. Justice O'Connor dissented in an opinionthat Justices Kennedy. Blackmun and Stevens joined.Their dissenting votes indicated some concern on thepan of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who hadjoined in the Court's earlier habeas corpus decisions,that the Court might be going too far in restrictingFederal court access.
Those concerns were more fully on displayin a
subsequent case this term. Wright v. West, No 91-542.The Court voted 6 to 3 to reject a sweeping argumentfor restricting habeas corpus that was put forward bythe Bush Administraisn TheAdminisiraiion sargu-
ment would have required Federal judges naany
cases to accept the findings of state court judges with.
out further evaluation. Only Chief Justice Rehne* **t
and Justices Scalia and Thomas accepted the Admin-
istration's arguments, while the other Justices ap-
proached the case on narrower grounds.However, the Administration prevailed in another
important case, winning the Court's support for its
view that the United States can kidnap a criminal sus.
pect from a foreign country, over that count ry's ob sec-
tion and without following the procedures set out in an
extradition treaty.
The decision, United States v. Alvarez Macham.
No. 91-712, removed a jurisdictional barrier to putting
a Mexican doctor on trial in Los Angeles for participat.
ing in the 1985 torture and murder of an American nar-
cotics agent in Mexico. The United States had spon-
sored the doctor's abduction across the border. The
vote was 6 to3. with a majority opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and dissents by Justices Stevens.
Blackmun and O'Connor.
Criminal defendants fared better in other con-
texts. The Court overturned a Federal pornography
conviction on the ground that the Government had en-
trapped a Nebraska farmer into ordering child por-
nography through the mail when he would not be oth-
erwise predisposed to do so. Justice White wrote the 5-
to-4 decision, Jacobson v. U.S.. No. 90-1124. joined by
Justices Blackmun. Stevens, Souter and Thomas. Jus-
tices O'Connor. Scalia. Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented.
In two cases, the Court gave mentally ill criminal
defendants new constitaional protections. In Riggins
v. Nevada. No. 90-8466, a 7-to-2 majority ruled that a
state cannot force a mentally ill inmate to accept anti-
psychotic medication during trial without an "overrid-
ing justification." Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion.
with dissents by Justices Thomas and Scalia.
In the second case, the Court ruled that an inmate
imprisoned after a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity cannot be kept in prison once he is no longer in-
sane. Justice White wrote the 5-to-4 decision, Foucha v.
Louisiana. No. 90-5844, joined by Justices Blackmun.
Stevens. Souter and O'Connor. Justices Thomas. Sca-
Ita, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Federal-State Relations
A Warning-Label Ruling
That May Be Hazardous




state authority in a va-
riety of contexts with-
out apparent consis-tence.
A 7-to-2 majority





S suffice to shield manu-.
facturers from liability
under state law for the health effects of smoking.
.. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, No.90-1038. the
Court ruled that lawsuits basedon theories that the
manufacturers committed fraud or deliberately hid
the truth about the dangers of smoking were not pre-
empted by Federal law. Justice Stevens wrote the plu-
rality opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
But the Court gave the airline industry a victory
over state regulators, ruling 5 to3 that Federal law
preempts all state efforts to regulate the way airlines
advertise their fares. Justice Scalia wrote the major-
ity opinion in Morales v. Trans World Airlines. No, 90-
1604. Justices Stevens. Blackmun and Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented, and Justice Souter did not vote.
The Court declared unconstitutional a central por-tion of a Federal law aimed at making the states take
responsibility for the low-level radioactive waste gen-
erated within their borders. Voting 6 to 3. the Court
struck down a provision forcing the states to assume
legal responsibility for the waste if they do not have a
disposal plan in place by 1996. But Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion. New York v. U.S., No.91-543, stopped
short of the major ruling on federalism that some had





Stay Frozen at Low Levels
The Court turned back
a constitutional chal-
lenge to California's
Proposition 13, a prop-
erty tax system based
on the date of purchase
that has created sharp
discrepancies in the
tax burdens that Cali-
fornia property owners
bear. Those who owned
their homes before the
proposition took effect
in 1978 have had their
assessments frozen at
low levels, regardless of the home's current value.
The 8-o-1 opinion by Justice Blackmun said the
system had a "ptausible" basis as policy and did not
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter in Nord-
linger v. Hahn, No. 90-1912.
The Court reaffirmed its longstanding ban on
state taxation of mail-order sales made by out-of-state
catalogue companies, but aithe same time made clear
that Congress is free to lift the ban through legislation.
as part of the congressional power to regulate inter-
statecornmerce. With 53 billion in tax revenue at
stake, the states are highly motivated to press Con-
gress to act on the Court's invitation. Justice Stevens
wrote the majority opinion. Quill Corp. v. North Dako-
ta. No. 91-194. Justice White dissented.
The Court also reaffirmed, this time unanimously,
its approach to state taxation of the income of out-of-
state companies that conduct some business within the
state's borders. In Allied-Signal v. New Jersey, No. 91-
615, the Court said that only those activities that are -
part of a company's "unitary business," integrally re-
lated to its operations as a whole, may be subject to tax
by a state in which the company does not have its
headquarters. By a 5-to4 vote, the Court then ruled
that New Jersey had transgressed that limit by seek-
ing to tax an out-of-state company's capital gains from
a stock investment Justice Kennedy wrote the major-
ity opinion.
Justices Souter, Thomas Follow Separate Paths
By Ruth Marcus
Washin.PaMSarwt
On the two occasions that he has
selected a Supreme Court justice,
President Bush said he was looking
for lawyers who would interpret the
law, not make it. The two men he
has chosen, however, have in their
short time on the bench interpreted
the law in markedly different ways.
Justice David H. Souter, dubbed
the "stealth nominee" for his pau-
city of expressed views at the time
he was nominated in 1990, has
emerged as a cautious, moderate
conservative.
Devoted to precedent, given to
writing abstruse prose, a searcher.
for the middle-ground at oral argu-
ment and with his colleagues, Sou-
ter has fallen far short of the "home
run for conservatives" that then-
White House Chief of Staff John H.
Sununu promised allies.
By contrast, Justice Clarence
Thomas, after his belated arrival at
the court during the term that con-
cluded last week, came out as a
both-guns-blazing conservative. He
has positioned himself solidly in the
conservative wing of the court' join-
ing most often with Justice Antonin
Scalia and Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist in their piush for a mus-
cularly conservative philosophy of'
the law.
Thomas told the tenate 'Judiciary
Committee that he had never de-
bated the merits of the court's land-
mark 1973 Sbortion ruling, Roe v.
Wade, and he is nearly silent at oral.
argument. But in his written work,
prodigious for a' new justice. Thom-
as has been quick to express depid-
ed views on everything from *the
principles of statutory construction
to cruel and unusual punishment.
"There could not be a greater
contrast between the first terms
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Center-Right Coalition Asserts Itself
Moderate Core of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter Is Reagan-Bush Product
By Al Kamen
WasingO Pos Sta Wrtw
The new controlling center-right bloc on the Su-
preme Court-Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
M. Kennedy and David H. Souter-is the unintended
moderate creation of two of the most conservative
presidencies in this century.
It has confounded conservative backers, and delight-
ed liberals, in several cases this term, most prominently
last week's ruling on school prayer.
But yesterday's ruling on abortion surprised observ-
ers on both sides who had confidently predicted the
ruling would demonstrate solid conservative domination
of the high court.
For conservatives, the emergence of the new bloc
recalls Dwight D. Eisenhower's oft-repeated lament
that the two biggest mistakes of his presidency were
naming to the high court Earl Warren and William J.
Brennan Jr., both of whom turned out to be staunch
liberals.
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National Law Journal Staff Reporter
WASHINGTON - As the October 1991-
'92 term rapidly drew to a close, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in decisions on
school prayers, hate speech and school
desegregation, revealed an Intense in-
ternal tug-of-war among its conserva-
tive members over whether to craft
new law or stick with the old, as well
as an independent streak certain to
dismay the Bush administrationW
As The National Law Journal went
to press June 26, the high court had yet
to issue what could be its most contro-
versial decision - a ruling on chal-
lenges to Pennsylvania's anti-abortion
law. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 91-
744. Also expected on June 29, the
court's final day, Is a property rights
case that has galvanized the business
and environmental communities, both
of which see the potential for a major
shift in court doctrine. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission, 91-453.
* Fee enhancement rejected. Page 3.
* Habeas question ducked. Page a.
* Another habeas ruling. Page 17.
lackmun's concurrence. Page 39.
* Tobacco liability bar Ifted. Page 39.
In the week ended June 26, the justices
issued decisions in some of the most
closely watched cases of the term. And
while the meaning and impact of those
rulings will be debated for some time,
it also seems clear from them that the
Rehnquat Court, now dominated by
conservatives, is not controlled by con-
servatives of one stripe.
The rulings showed the possible
emergence of a cautious, moving cen-
ter on the court, composed of Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M.
Kennedy and David H. Souter. And be-
sides reflecting conservative differ-
ences, the most recent decisions also
were notable for significant rebuffs of
Bush administration positions.
Up for Grabs
The future of the .establishment
clause following the high court's 5-4
ruling June 24 in Lee v. Weisman, 90-
1014, say many First Amendment reli-
gion experts, Is up for grabs.
In Weisman, the narrowly divided
high court, led by Justice Kennedy,
held that a clergyman's invocation and
benediction at a Providence, .I., pub-
lic school graduation ceremony violat-
ed the constitutional separation of
church and state.
The high court's decision produced
three significant surprises, say estab-
lishment clause scholars:
*The majority rejected strong urg-
Continued on page 38
Independent Streak Appears on High Court
Continued from page 1
ings by the Bush administration and
others to abandon a 1971 precedent
that set out a three-part test for deter-
mining whether government action vi-
olates the establishment clause -
Lemon v. Kurtsman, 403 U.S. 602.
* The one considered most ready to
jettison Lemon and rework establish-
ment clause doctrine, Justice Kennedy,
wrote the majority opinion declining to
do so.
* And in a detailed, finely nuanced
Blackmun. in a separate concurrence
joined by Justices Stevens and O'Con-
nor, reaffirmed Lemon, saying it was
not necessary to show coercion and
government preference for a particu-
lar religion, only government advance-
ment of religion. to violate the clause.
In a bitter, sarcastic dissent, Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White and Thomas,
called the majority opinion a "psycho-
journey." The graduation prayer, he
said, was consistent with the nation's
general history and tradition of pray-
FAYE MA
NO SOLICITING: The court held that airports may bar such groups as Hare
Krishnas from soliciting donations but must allow them to distribute leaflets,
concurrence tracing the history of the
establishment clause, Justice Souter
revealed that he, un1lke fellow Bush
appointee Clarence Thomas, finds no
adequate historical basis for abandon-
ing the courts precedents in this area
of the law.
Cases raising establishment clause
issues have seriously divided the court
in recent years. But the Wetaman case
took on special importance this term
for two reasons. First, Justice Kennedy
dissented in a 1989 case striking down
a Pittsburgh Nativity scene display.
He said. -Substantial revision of our
establishment clause doctrine may be
in order." He felt that government
could sponsor a religious activity as
long as no one's participation was co-
erced and the activity showed no pref-
erence for a particular religion.
Allegheny County v. ACLU. 192 U.S. 573
(1989).
Second, although only three justices
joined his dissent - Chief Justice Wil-
lam H. Rehnqutst and Justices Byron
P. White and Antonin Scalla - the
Bush administration saw that with the
addition of Justices Souter and Thom-
as to the bench, there could be a new
opportunity for a change in doctrine to
allow greater government involve-
ment in religion.
'Pervasive' Involvement
The administration seized the oppor-
tunity in Weisman, urging the court to
overrule Lemon. "Civic acknowledge-
ments of religion in public life do not
offend the establishment clause," ar-
gued the solicitor general. "as long as
they neither threaten the establish-
ment of an official religion nor coerce
participation in religious activities."
But Justice Kennedy. writing in
Weisman, said It was not necessary to
reconsider Lemon to decide the case.
Government involvement in these
prayers, he said, was "pervasive." and
the high court's school prayer prece-
dents dictated the result.
Joining Justice Kennedy were Jus-
tices Souter, O'Connor, Harry A. Black-
mun and John Paul Stevens. Justice
ers at public ceremonies.
"There is still a raging debate about
the standard in the establishment
clause area," says Prof. Ruti G. Teitel
of New York Law School who sees the
decision as a 4-1-4 split.
The first block of four, with which
Justice Kennedy aligned himself in
Weismun, she says. holds onto Lemon.
The second block. led by Justice Scalia.
uses a history and majoritarian tradi-
tlion test. And Justice Kennedy, she
adda, either stands alon or Is rethink-
ing his position of three years ago in
Allegheny County.
In Welsman, Justice Kennedy, note
Professor Teitel and others, pointedly
limited his rationale to the public
school context, which means a re-ex-
amination of Lemoa in some other con-
text could still occur.
Rethinking Speech?
While the more traditional approach
to the establishment clause prevailed
in Weieman a not-so-traditional ap-
proach marked the court's first ven-
ture into the emotionally charged
arena of hate crime laws and codes.
In BA.V. v. St. Paul, 90-7675, the jus-
tices unanimously found unconstitu-
tional a St. Paul, Minn., ordinance
prohibiting the display of symbols like-
ly to incite anger or alarm on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender.
But that is where the unanimity ended.
The justices were sharply divided on
how to analyze the ordinance under
First Amendment principles. Justice
Scalia, who wrote for a majority that
included Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy. Souter and Thomas.
took an approach which. he insisted.
had always been implicit in the high
court's precedents. But Justice White.
who wrote a blistering opinion concur-
ring in the judgment. accused the ma-
jority not only of lacking jurisdiction
to decide the case on Its chosen ratio-
nale but also of disregarding two es-
tablished First Amendment principles
"without providing a coherent replace-
ment theory."
"This court must love lawyers." says
First Amendment scholar Bernard
James of Pepperdine University
School of Law. The splintered ap-
proaches, he predicts. will spur more
suits over hate crime ordinances and
campus speech codes, as well as more
business for lawyers serving as consul-
tants to those seeking to restrict hate
speech and conduct.
Indeed. says Mark Weits of Minne-
apolis' Leonard, Street and Deinard.
the court's decision doesn't give much
practical guidance.
"I believe the court is inviting St.
Paul to try again, but I don't know how
to satisfy the majority opinion and not
end up back in the court with a differ-
ent five- or six-member majority"
says Mr. Weits, who represented the
Anti-Defamation League of Bnal
B'rith in a friend-of-the-court brief sup-
porting the city ordinance.
The constitutional challenge to the
St. Paul ordinance as vague and over-
broad came from "R.LV.," a juvenile
charged with burning a cross on the
front lawn of a black family in the city.
The Minnesota Supreme Court up-
held the ordinance by restricting Its
application only to conduct that was
found to be "fighting words" or de-
signed to produce "Imminent lawless
action." expression unprotected by the
First Amendment
Writing for the high court. Justice
Scala said the First Amendment gen-
erally prohibits government from re-
stricting speech or conduct because of
the Ideas expressed.
Even though the court has found
that the First Amendment does not
protect certain categories of expres-
sion - such as fighting words, obsceni-
ty, defamation - he wrote. they are
not "entirely invisible" to the Canstitu-
tion. They can be made "vehicles" for
content discrimination unrelated to the
reason they are generally unprotected,
he added, which was the case with the
ordinance here.
Si. Paul banned fighting words that
communicate messages of racial. gen-
der or religious intolerance, he wrote,
adding. "Selectivity of this sort creates
the possibility that the city is seeking
to handicap the expression of particu-
lar ideas."
But Justice White, joined by Justices
Blackmun. O'Connor and. in part, Ste-
vens, said the case could "easily be de-
cided" within traditional First Amend-
ment law by finding the ordinance
fatally overbroad because it criminal-
izes not only unprotected expression
but expression protected by the First
Amendment Justice Scalia. he wrote,
is wrong In saying that fighting words
are not wholly unprotected by the First
Amendment.
First Amendment experts disagreed
on whether the Scalla opinion - hold-
ing that government can't regulate un-
protected speech on the baals of
viewpoint - was an aberration
"The court simply reaffirmed what
had always been in its opinions: you
cannot regulate speech on the wisdom
or merits of what's being said." says
Prot. Martin Redish of Northwestern
University School of Law.
But the court has never said the obli-
gation of neutrality extends to the cat-
egory of unprotected speech. counters
Steven R. Shapiro of the American Clv-.
i Liberties Union Foundation in New
York. which opposed the ordinance in
the high court case.
Mr. Shapiro agrees with Professor
James that the decision invites "a lot
more litigation." Hate speech laws and
codes, they say, are in greater legal
jeopardy than ever.
More Differences
Another important decision reflect-
ing the divergent views of the court's
conservative majority came in a habe-
as corpus ruling June 19. In Wright v.
West. 91-42. the justices rejected a
Bush administration request that fed-
eral courts be required to deter to a
state court's application of federal con-
stitutional law to the specific facts of a
state prisoner's habeas claim.
Only three justices appeared willing
to abandon a standard of federal re-
view that has been used for nearly 40
years.
But the final week was not all gloom
and doom for the Bush administration.
In an 8-1 ruling, the justices on June
26 held that the 5th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals erred in finding that Missis-
sippi had dismantled its dual system of
SURPRISE. Justice David H. Souter
may turn out be an unpredictable ap-
poIntment for President Bush.
higher education by abolishing its sep-
arate-but-equal requirement and eas-
tablishing race-neutral policies at Its
colleges and universities. U.S. v. For-
dice. 90-1205.
The Constitution, wrote Justice
White, requires an examination of
whether existing "racial identiflabi-
lity" at Misalslpp's institutions is at-
tributable to the state. A wide range of
factors must be looked at. the court
held. to determine whether Mississippi
has perpetuated its former segregation
in any facet of the higher education
system.
The court called "constitutionally
suspect" widespread duplication of
programs at the historically black and
historically white colleges, as well as
an admissions test that treats black
and white students differently.
The justices sent the case, brought
by the United States and a group of
Mississippi parents, back to the lower
courts to examine the full range of the
state's higher education activities un-
der the high court's standard.
And also on June 26. the court. In
another somewhat schizophrenic First
Amendment ruling, held that airports
may bar organizations from soliciting
donations in their terminals but must
allow them to distribute leaflets and
other literature.
The justices split 6-3 In upholding the
solicitation ban Imposed by the Port
Authority of New York and New Jer-
sey, and 5-4 in striking down the leaf-
leting ban. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 91-155
and 91-339.
A majority of the court did find that
airport terminals are not "public fo-
rums." The justices issued two sepa-
rate opinions in the case. After
summarizing the various voting fac-
tions from the bench. Justice O'Connor
concluded, "Now if anyone can figure
that out, they're doing welL"
High Court Wanders From Path to Right
By PAUL M. BARREr
Staff Reporter of Tir WALLSTarEr JounJNAL
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court's
march to the right has stalled in many
areas, leaving members of the conserva-
tive majority walking in circles, kicking up
dust and generally creating confusion
about important legal questions.
The court certainly isn't reversing
course; many of its decisions continue to
be overwhelmingly conservative. But in
such areas as abortion, school desegrega-
tion and church-state relations. Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist failed this term to
sustain the momentum of the court's right-
ward turn of the late 1980s.
: Instead, the appointees of the Reagan
and Bush presidencies are asserting in-
creasingly different judicial personalities
that don't conform to conventional political
labels.
Purist Vision Falters
' Most strikingly, Justices Sandra O'Con-
nor, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter
made it clear in major cases this term that
they won't go along with the purist vision
of Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia's cam-
paign to narrow constitutional protections
and curb judicial authority has won him
only one consistent ally, Clarence Thomas.
the newest justice.
Justice Scalia's call for overturning Roe
vs. Wade and getting the high court out of
the business of reviewing abortion laws
failed earlier this week. An opportunity to
clarify the court's muddled church-statejurisprudence likewise evaporated when
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-person
majority, rejected proposals that govern-
ment be permitted more involvement with
religion.
. Over Justice Scalia's objection, the
court also failed for the second consecutive
term to issue clear instructions on how
quickly federal judges should return con-
trol of historically segregated school sys-
tems to local officials. On these and other
issues, legal standards remain murky. The
result is that litigation will continue apace,
and the justices will undoubtedly have to
return to the same topics.
For the moment, the court appears
poised in an uncertain position, with future
directions very much in question.
To liberals, the situation is reason for
some relief. "The court has done some
damage, but not nearly as much damage
as people feared six months ago," says
Elliot Mincberg, legal director of People
for the American Way.
Fans of recently retired Justice William
Brennan's expansive brand of constitu-
tional interpretation now applaud exem-
plars of "judicial restraint." Of Justices
Souter and Kennedy, Mr. Mincberg says,
"They have the ethic of judges. Judges are
not supposed to reach out and decide issues
that aren't before them; they are supposed
to move cautiously."
Justice Kennedy in particular appears
to be a man in the middle. He is attracted
at times to Justice Scalia's unwavering
philosophy. But he is also willing to depart
from theory when the circumstances of a
case so move him; disputes related to
racial discrimination and the First Amend-
ment especially tend to elicit moderate-to-
liberal views from him. Portions of his
opinion in last week's split decision on
restricting political and religious activities
in airports "could have been written by
Brennan," says Mr. Mincberg.
Precedent for Split
Conservatives, meanwhile, are aghast
at what they see as defections from their
ranks. "Something other than a principled
reading of the Constitution, or even consis-
tency with his own prior opinions, seems to
be driving Justice Kennedy right now,"
complains Thomas Jipping of the Free
Congress Foundation, citing abortion and
school prayer.
Other conservatives compare Justice
Kennedy's migration away from Justice
Scalia with the split that developed be-
tween Justice Harry Blackmun and his
longtime friend and fellow Minnesotan,
retired Chief Justice Warren Burger. Mr.
Blackmun was derided as a "Minnesota
Twin" until he began moderating his views
on the bench.
Justice Souter, meanwhile, is develop-
ing a distinct judicial persona. A former
judge on the New Hampshire -Supreme
Court, he unravels legal problems in the
manner of a state common-law jurist.
He argues, usually in dense prose, thatjudges ought to follow the teachings of past
decisions and eschew sharp departures
unless there is a compelling reason other-
wise. Only this approach, the argument
goes, will assure people that courts are
operating according to principle, and not
merely on the basis of political power or
personal preference.
This thinking animated the controlling
opinion in the abortion decision issued
Monday, in which he. Justice O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy served notice that the
current court won't overrule Roe vs.
Wade. The main opinion upheld abortion
restrictions enacted by Pennsylvania, but
signaled that laws banning abortion would
be struck down.
In characteristic fashion, the court es-
sentially invited further litigation over the
question of where it would draw the line
between permissible and impermissible
abortion restraints.
Statistical Highlights of the 1992 Term
a Most Consistent Allies: Harry Blackmun and John Stevens, who voted together
87% of the time, often in dissent. Runners-up.WereAntonirnwcalla Clarence
Thomas, only a few tenths of a percentage point behind' , 9
N Least Agreeable Pair Justice Blackmun voted wih Justice Scallionly 50% .of
the tIme. That was only slightly less often than Justice Blackmun sided with.Justice
Thomas.
* Emerging Center Justices: Sandra O'Connor., Anthony Kennedy and David Souter
voted for the same results 71% of the time. -
a Unanimous Decisions: represented 39% of-the total, up slightly from last.year.
1 New Man on the Bench: Justice Thomas voted with the majority or plurality 75%
of the time. After missing some early cases because of his rocky confirmation bear-
Ings, he wrote nine main opinions for the court, one-restricting union organizers-
was ona major case.
Middle-road threesome
is hailed and denounced
By Tony Mauro
USA TODAY
After a decade of fretfully ducking
the issue, Justice Sandra Day O'Con-
nor on Monday finally faced the
question squarely: what did she think
of Roe vs. Wade, the 1973 ruling that
legalized abortion?
The court's first and only woman
answered it simply: "The essential
holding of Roe vs. Wade should be
retained. ... The Constitution pro-
tects a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy in its early stages."
Sixty pages later, her decision on
key provisions of Pennsylvania's
abortion law left some analysts
doubting she meant what she said.
But her success in forging a mid-
dle-ground bloc with Justices Antho-
ny Kennedy and David Souter as a
way out of the bitter abortion debate
won praise and criticism Monday.
"Make no mistake," said Justice
Harry Blackmun in his written con-
currence. "The joint opinion of Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
is an act of personal courage and
constitutional principle."
Randall Terry, founder of the anti-
abortion activist group Operation
Rescue, put a different spin on the
trio: "Three Reagan-Bush appointees
have stabbed justice in the back.
That is an incredible betrayal."
Gary Bauer of the Family Re-
search Council, a former Reagan
aide, called the three justices "a
wimp bloc who are quickly becom-
ing an embarrassment to the presi-
dents who appointed them."
For O'Connor, who has approved
most abortion restriction in the past,
voting against the provision of Penn-
sylvania's law requiring spousal noti-
fication marked a turning point
"O'Connor has finally met a regu-
lation she did not like," said Frances
Kissling of Catholics for Choice.
The decision also marked Souter's
first comments on abortion rights
since joining the court in 1990.
He focused on adhering to prece-
dent for the court's credibility.
As for Kennedy, the decision to
embrace Roe marked a sharp shift
from earlier indications that he was
ready to overturn it
"Kennedy has shown a consider-
able evolution," said Solicitor Gener-
al Kenneth Starr.
The forces that moved the three to
support abortion rights should come
as no surprise, said Tom Glessner of
the Christian Action CounciL
"It's not unusual for justices to do
this once they are appointed for life.
They move in strange ways."
Thomas lets conservative vote do the talking
During confirmation hearings last fall,
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thom-
as stunned senators by claiming that he
had never debated Roe vs. Wade, the
court's 1973 abortion ruling.
As the newest justice, Thomas still
hasn't spoken or written publicly about
abortion. But his vote Monday on Penn-
sylvania's controversial abortion law was
crystal clear.
Thomas joined the court's three most
conservative members - Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin THOMAS
Scalia and Byron White - in calling the
majority view upholding Roe's right to an abortion
"outrageous." The four would have upheld all provi-
sions of Pennsylvania's law. And they made it clear
*har vt-1i hava vntpd for a law that outlaws abor-
I
tions altogether.
By voting as he did, Thomas, unlike Da-
vid Souter who was named to the court a
year before, delivered on the expecta-
tions of conservatives who supported him
during his confirmation battle.
"Justice Thomas is showing he's 100%
conservative on judicial issues and is like-
ly to be a solid vote for a long, long time,"
said Gary Bauer of the Family Research
Council, a Thomas supporter.
JSA TODAY Why didn't Thomas write separately on
the issue? "He's wise to wait awhile be-
fore he asserts himself on opinions. Over
time he will grow, and when I say that I don't mean he
will grow more liberal," said Bauer.
- Tony Mauro





WASHINGTON - The Supreme
Court has just finished a dress re-
hcarsal for a future that may soon be
reality, a new era of moderation no
longer symbolized by its Identity as
"the Rehnquist Court.'
Even without a change in its
membership - although that seems
to be coming, perhaps in just anoth-
cr year - the court led by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist Is al-
ready offering strong evidence that
his style of deep conservatism is not
likely to remain the majority style.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has given
not only his name to the court, as
chief Justices always do. but has
been able In recent years to draw it
deeper into the conservatism he per-
sonally has espoused for 20 years as
ajurist
Now, amid rising speculation in
legal circles and at the court that he
will retire at the bcginning of next
summer. perhaps along with the.
court's senior liberal. Justice Harry
6A. Ilackmun. the RchnquLst cra" of
conservative dominuon appears to
Q
ASSOCRTED MSS
Justice David H. Souter is dem-
onstrating powerful intellect in
questions. rulings. (Article. 1OA.)
be waning.
The court. the evidence from the
term that closed last week suggests.
Is not now. and probably is not going
to be..controlled by the most com-
mitted conservatives - the ones
closest to Chief Justice Rehnquist In
philosophy.
-Thc tribunal most clearly is oper-
ating now under the moderate influ-
cnec of three justices: Sandra Day
O'Connor. the calming. *balance-
whccl JusUcc who holds the court
close to the middle AnthonylM. Ken-
ncdy. the conspicuous constitutional
scholar with no ideological agenda:
and David H. Souter. the two-year
Justice who already is well on his
way to intellectual leadership.
A rather odd tribute to their seem-
Ing control. almost any time they
choose to exert It. came on the last
day of the term in the historic abor-
tion decision, when thcirJoinUy writ-
ten opinion stirred Justice Antonin
Scalia Into an outpouring of open
wrath. It was a slashing gesture of
the kind he made against Justice
O'Connor alone in the last abortion
decision three years ago.
In just one example. Justice Scal-
la assailed those three for 'almost
czarist arrogance' for their refusal to
overrule Roe vs. Wade - the 1973
abortion decision that he wants.
with considerable passion, to cast
aside.
If the court's membership does
undergo a change at the end of the
next term. the O'Connor-Kcnnedy-
Souter trio sCems likely to hold sway
over much of the court's work at




least In the transition to a new cJustice, no matter who that is.
President Bush. or a differ
president if Mr. Bush is sent hc
by the voters in November. may
tually have two nominations to m
next year.
Over the past secvral months.
talk of changes - long focuscd
Justice Dlackmun - has tur
more toward the chief justice.
deed. on the last day of the JI
ended term. the speculation aChIdJustice RChnquis's future
cren more active than it was ov
voluntary departure by Just
Blackmun.
In a perhaps telling remark. I
67.yearold head of thcJudiciary ti
a cable TV Interviewer on C-5P
last week thaL while he liked his)1 wouldn't want to hold it forever.
JusUce Blackmun. who began
a moderate conservative and has 1
come notably lIberal on most issu
fand was the author of Roe i
Wadel. once toyed with the idea
retiring when he reached 75. He w
be 84 In November.
In a separate opinion he wrote
the latest abortion case he r
marked: 'lam 83 years old. I cann
remain on the court forever."
That case was decided on a 5.
vote.
A replacemrent for JusUce Dald
mun. If chosen by Mr. Bush. coul
help turn the court around on (i
abortion issue. That would occur
two new Dush appointeca are n
crutted as allIes by Justice Scaba.
It was clear by the end of the 1a:
term, though. that Justice Scalia
who by dint of personality and broa
Intellect had scImer likely somneda
to make the court "his.," found him
self in something of an cipse. Ht
-orays to the moot conservative aid
of major disputca generally had Idhim short of a majority. He has
drawn the dependable support a
new Jusice Clarence Thomas. thi
frequent support of Chief Justa
Rehnquist. and the fairly frequen
support of Justce Byron R. White.
Thoes four, indeed. were the dis
senters In the abortion decision. and
they also were together In dissent ia
two othcr5-4 rulings on major isue
- barring prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies. and casing
the way for more protest marchcs.
Another measure of the term's
trend away from Justice Scalba's po-
tcntial Influence was that he was on
the losing end of five of the court's
5-4 rulings on 10 key cases. Justice
Thomas, who has made a place for
himself as a conservative close be.
aide Justice Scalia. was In dissent in
asf of thoe cases.
Those two justices' voting pattern
reportedly was mocked by the
court's departing law clerks at a rL.
cent party. with suggestions in a skit
that anyone who won Justice Scal-
La's vote actually could claim two.
Together. though, they turned out
to be no match for the O'Connor-
Kennedy-Souter grouping.. Those
three held control in a variety of
ways throughout the term. and the
statistics show IL On the court's 49
most Important ruffngs, the three
were together in the majority on 32.When the top 20. the "biggest of
the big." decisons are sorted out.
those three were in the majority to.gather In 13.
Among those were the three na*jor surprise decisions of the term thedecision to reamrm Roe vs. Wade(white limiting the abortion right
considerably). the new ban on
prayers at public school graduation.
and the landmark decision ordcring
once-segregated state rolieges an
I universitics to get on promptly withthe task of descgregaung
Not one of those outcomes seemed
likely earlier in the term.
When one of three justices in the
moderate trio broke off from the oth-
era to dissent. as happened in II
separate cases among the major
ones, the other two stayed together
and helped make a majority.
Justice O'Connor. although she
showed a slightly greater tendency
than the other two to vote with the
ourt*s two remaining liberals (Jus-(tice Blackmun and Justicc John
Paul Stevens), was by no means a
heavy dissenter. That, too. reflected
her leadership role.
Out of the court's total of 107
written decisions in the term. Justice
O'Connor wrote 15 - the most ex.
capt for Justice White with 16.
Justice White votes frequently
with the most conservative bloc. but
still retains an occasional independ.
cat streak. moving either way.On the term's 'top 20r decisions.
Justices O'Connor and White nearlytied: She was an author. alone or
with a partner, on five of those most
algnificant rulings, and he was the
sole author on five.
Among the nine Justices. onlyJustice Thomas. who joined the
court late after his Senate confirma.
lion. wrote none of the -top 20 nil.
Ings. lic was active in writing dis-
sents. howcvcr.
Justice Kennedy. a longtime
teacher of constitutional law as a
sideline to judging, continued to
emerge during the term as a philo-
sophical leader on major disputes
under the Constitution.
He was the author. for example
of the rulings against school prayers
at graduation, writing one of the
terma most extensive historical es-
asyson the Constitution.When groups allied with the
court. or outside groups, seek a jus-Uce to make a speech on the Consu-
tution. not Infrequently they askJustice Kennedy. and he usually
obliges. He has not written constitu-
tional history books, as the chiefjus-
tice has. but he appears to be work.
Ing diligently at building his
reputation as a scholar of the na.
tion'a baale government document
When that Interest is transposed
by Justice Kennedy into a court
opinion, there is no sign of astubborm
ly held Idological premises.
Although Justice Kennedy is in-
clined to vote somewhat more frc.
quently than ilther Justices O'Con-
nor and Souter with the court's must
conservative justices. he exhibits
none of the Scalia bloc's routinetenkncy to insist that only their ap
proach is corct.
T1c Kennedy*O'Connor-Souter
alliance appears to be able to control
outcomes without alienating their
brcthren.
. Significant rulings
The Supreme Court's most significant decisions during the1991-1992 term that closed last week. The justices' votes are given in
parentheses.
Ioaborwo';1g now narrowed sanificantly.Opknon by-Justices K
Y.J hL X aWr~andae tho olSoutheastnnsylvsnla~
0 School prayers: (54) It is unconstitutional for public school offk-
cials to arrange to have any ayers said at student exercises. includ*
kIg graduation ceremonies, on by Justice Kennedy. Lee vs. Weis.
man.
el atiom~da nothave to: adopt'busftan'-other "herch. mea
-'sre' o- . reen f-retumrnto.ona~raca sthoolsZO liy 'Justces
a 1)sttcolleges and unIversinies that onewere segroldG ,-clalyhavean 'Allirnative duty.Vto dismantle ation s
~and Program.OPk0nnby-Justice.Whie- U.&.vs. FdiAor rsvs
0 Cross-bumilng (6-3) The government may not single out certain
hate mssaes. b Speech or symbolic gesture, such as burning a
cross an a ala w s lawn, and outlaw only those that the govern.
ment disapproves. Opinion by Justice Scalia. R.V. vs. SL Paul.
Smoki ahalth. (-2)7 eeral cigarette warnIng-label lawsM'flot baal: state court. lawsuits seeking-dameges fromobac
!Oompanies for alegodly* cveringu the health hazards. of.'smolnrg
0 Airport teminais: (5-4) Government-run airports are not public
forums open to all speechmaking. leafleting or fund raising. Opinions
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Sou-
ter. Krisarva Consciousness vs. Lee.
Srts-in vot (6 Conistitution does not gievoters any
right to express thir displeasure with the candidates or-the ballot byl
!'wriing in thername of someone else. n by JustWhie.
C Race and judes:(7-1) It is unconstitutional for defense lawyers in
cases of Interracial crimes to use race as a factor In selecting the jury.Opinion by Justice Blackmun. Georgia vs. McColum.
0 Parade and demonstrations:(5-4) Loal govemments. may notjfores rgane olfControversial marches and protests to pay the costti
r-of Providing polie to protect themn. Ocenlon by.Justls- Blacktmun. For-.
0 Kidnapping: (6-3) The U.S. government violates no American
law. although it may break intemational law. If it goes to another coun-
try to kidnap a citizen there, to bring that person back to this countryfor a criminal triaL Opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist U.S. vs. Alva-
ret-Machalin.
i..O Pomographyr.(5-4) An Indlivdual may not be convicled.ol.y
the ma if the government secreby elitlead
period of to b suduataLQ Mrby
0 Crtme stories: (8- It is unconstitutional for states to single out
criminals' profits from te their crime stories In books. and turn the
money over to their victims. Opinion by Justice O'Connor. Simon &Schuster vs. New York State.
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THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT
Reflections on the Recent Past and the Future
Section: The Past Term in Perspective
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES MAKE THEIR MARK
Press Commentary
Kennedy Emerges as Key
to Court's Moderate Bloc
n Judiciary: Once a strong Rehnquist ally, he has joined
with O'Connor and Souter to form a middle camp.
By DAVID G. SAVAGE
TIMES STAFF WRITER
WASHINGTON-It was an un-
usual scene. One morning in late
May, an hour before the Supreme
Court convened, Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist and Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy were stroll-
ing around the court building
locked in argument.- As they
walked, Kennedy was gesturing
with his hands as Rehnquist
frowned.
- What could these two have had
to argue about? Kennedy has been
the chief justice's most steady ally.
During the last week, the answer
became clear. In two stunning
decisions, Kennedy bolted from the
conservative camp led by Rehn-
quist and allied himself with Jus-
tices Sandra Day O'Connor and
David H. Souter to build court
majorities for startling decisions on
a ABORTION MEASURE
House Judiciary Committee ap-
proves a bill that would forbid
state abortion restrictions. A15
such emotion-charged issues as
school prayer and abortion.
In the process, Kennedy has
helped build a new bloc within the
court that could turn it in unex-
pected directions in the years
ahead. Where the ultraconserva-
tism of Rehnquist and Justice An-
tonin Scalia had seemed certain to
Please see COURT, A14
Continued from Al
dom.inate future decisions on major
policy questions, it now appears
that Kennedy, O'Connor and Sou-
ter may exert a significant moder-
ating influence. .
'He has moved in a thoughtful
and moderate direction. And with
Justices O'Connor and Souter, they
have formed a moderate bloc that
can control the court." said Har-
vard law professor Laurence H.
Tyibe. The hallmarks of the mod-
erate coalition appear to be caution
and respect for precedent, not the
ideological conservatism practiced
by Rehnquist and Scalia.
These three justices are far from
liberal. They do not even fit easily
under the old "moderate" label.
And Souter's views, in particular,
remain unknown on a great many
sibjects.
S till, it is already clear thatjustices who used to be counted
as solidly predictable members of
the Rehnquist camp are no longer
prepared to follow wherever the
chief justice may choose to lead.
In recent years, Rehnquist and
the fiery Scalia had pushed the
court ever further to the right.
With the arrival of Justice Clar-
ence Thomas, the chief justice
apparently believed that he had a
majority this year that would
sharply undercut the separation-
of-church-and-state doctrine and
overrule. the Roe vs. Wade ruling
that made abortion legal.
But the push from the right
apparently proved to be too hard
for Kennedy, the mild-mannered
native of Sacramento, and for Sou-
ter, the quiet former state Supreme
Court justice from New Hampshire.
As for O'Connor, the only woman
ever to serve on the court, she had
already signaled that she would not
always follow Rehnquist's lead.
And when Kennedy, Souter and
O'Connor sided with Justices Har-
ry Blackmun and John Paul Ste-
vens on the church-state issue,
they created a five-member major-
ity, ruling that even a brief reli-
gious invocation at a junior high
school ceremony went too far.
The same three created a new
majority to solidly reaffirm the
principle that a woman has a right
to make the "ultimate decision" on
ending her pregnancy. For Kenne-
dy, the abortion vote represented
an apparent switch from an earlier
ppsition in which he had seemed to
support Rehnquist
. At this time last year, retiring
Justice Thurgood Marshall was
predicting that the Rehnquist
Court would dramatically reverse
precedents on abortion, school
prayer, affirmative action and
criminal law. Suddenly, those pre-
dictions sound exaggerated or flat-
ly wrong.
COURT: Kennedy Impact
As Souter said from the bench
Monday, the court's reputation is
dependent on its resistance to the
winds of "public pressure."
"Like the character of an indi-
vidual, the legitimacy of the court
must be earned over time," Souter
said, and that legitimacy could be
"undermined" if precedents are
simply tossed aside.
During his 1990 confirmationhearings, Souter stressed his
belief in precedent and his sup-
porters called him a "non-ideologi-
cal" judge. During her 11 years on
the court, O'Connor has established
a: record as a moderate conserva-
Live. She has refused repeatedly to
go along with moves to outlaw
affirmative action, reverse the
abortion right or. permit official
school prayer.
But virtually no one predicted
that Kennedy. would abandon
Rehnquist this, year to join the
middle camp on the court
In 1988, when Kennedy joined
the court as Ronald Reagan's third
appointee, he quickly lined up with
the Rehnquist majority to cut back
on civil rights laws in a series of
5-4 decisions.
In his first year, he voted with
Rehnquist in 92% of the cases.
: On abortion, he joined a Rehn-
quist opinion in 1989 that would
have given the states a free hand to
outlaw abortion and he wrote that
the laws must show respect for the
"other human life that lies within
the embryo." Last year, he joined
Rehnquist's 5-4 ruling upholding'
the so-called "gag rule" that pro-
hibited counselors at federally
funded family planning clinics
from discussing abortion.
But his decisions of the last week
have shocked conservatives and
given liberals a new optimism
about the court.
: Scholars who follow the court
suggested that the radical brand of
conservatism practiced by Scalia
and Rehnquist may have driven
Kennedy away.
"He is clearly the biggest sur-
prise of the term and I think it
could be a reaction to Scalia," said
George Washington University
professor Mary Cheh. In vitriolic
dissents, Scalia has slammed
O'Connor's views as "irrational"
and "not to be taken seriously,"
while he recently denounced a
Kennedy opinion as a "jurispru-
dential disaster."
"If anyone could push someone
toward moderation, it is an intem-
pe- ate extremist. And that's Scal-
ia," Tribe said. "He regularly dis-
misses their views [O'Connor's and
Kennedy's] as banal and outra-
geous.
To be sure, there have been
hints all along that Kennedy woulk
emerge as a more moderate figure.
In his first years on the court, he
distanced himself from several of
Scalia's sweeping opinions. Kenne-
dy also sounded reluctant in joining
some conservative majorities.
In all manner of disputes, Ken-
nedy has appeared to view himself
as a case-by-case judge, rather
than an ideologue.
"It's easier to be Rehnquist or a
Scalia than a Kennedy," he once
commented in an interview in his
chambers.
Abortion clearly has not been an
easy issue for him. As a conserva-
tive iudge and a Catholic, he told
law clerks years ago that he found
abortion troubling and the Roe
ruling questionable as a matter of
constitutional law.
In the 1989 Webster case, Ken-
nedy sounded genuinely torn as
Reagan Administration lawyers
urged that Roe vs. Wade be re-
versed. He questioned them about
the privacy right but eventually
signed on to Rehnquist's opinion,
saying that abortion was not the
"fundamental right" that Black-
mun had called it in his 1973
opinion.
This month, new arrival Thomas
was ready to supply a fifth vote for
that view.
Except that Justice Kennedy
would not go along.
Kennedy's Constitutional Journey
In the 1991-92 Term, Associate Justice's Conservatism
Took On a More Personal, Less Ideological Tone
BY TIERENCE MORAN
Call it "The Curse of the Third
Nominee."
That's how some superstitious con-
servatives are describing--only half injest-what's happened to Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy. In one major
case after another this past term. Kennedy
has confounded, disappointed. and even
scared many of his early supporters and
admirers on the right, reminding them-as
a fresh image might bring back an old
nightmare-of Justice Harry Blackmun's
early career on the high court.
Thus the curse: Both Kennedy and
Blackmun were the third choices of Re-
publican presidents whose two previous
selections to fill Court vacancies never
made it.
"You saw Justice Kennedy this term
beginning to waver a bit on how faithful
he was going to be to a strict-interpretation
approach," says William Bradford Rey-
nolds, who, as a top Justice Department
official in President Ronald Reagan's
administration, helped to place Kennedy
on the Supreme Court.
"He's allowing himself to worry too
much about the result that would come out
of a strict-interpretation approach," adds
Reynolds. now a partner at D.C.'s Dick-
stein, Shapiro & Morin. "It's a start-up
not unlike the one Blackmun had, and
that's ominous."
For now, Reynolds' comparison is more
a parlor game than an analytical frame-
work, as he readily acknowledges.
Kennedy is no liberal, and he can only be
described as a moderate justice in the con-
text of the deeply conservative Supreme
Court that Reagan and President George
Bush have shaped over the past 12 years.
Nevertheless, the 55-yearold jurist has
stunned many conservatives-including
some on the Court-with a number of his
opinions and dissents this past term. From
abortion to school prayer to property rights
to free speech to the obscure-but-crucial
SEE KENNEDY, PAGE 20
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doctrine of standing-Kennedy broke
ranks with the right.
After an earlier career on the Court in
which he proved a dependable conserva-
tive vote. Kennedy this term forged key
majorities and frequently joined with Jus-
tices Sandra Day O'Connor and David
Souter in a formidable moderate coalition.
Time and again the three thwarted the ef-
forts of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justice Antonin Scalia to rewrite
whole fields of the law.
And it wasn't just Kennedy's votes this
past term that puzzled Court-watchers of
all stripes. In big cases, his mode of anal-
ysis has changed; he frequently takes into
account social forces and psychological
factors far afield from the historiographic
confines of original-intent jurisprudence.
Kennedy is also finding a distinctive
voice in his.opinions, a rhetorical style
that is plain-spoken, pedagogical, and at
times frankly emotional. If there is a
stylistic opposite on the Court to Scalia's
biting academic brilliane, it is Kennedy's
gently introspective informality.
It's as if the nation's 104th justice is
striking out on a path of constitutional
discovery, defining his role by articulating
more of a personal than an ideological
conservatism.
"Certainly his votes and opinions rep-
resent instances of quite evident moder-
ation and centrism of a sort one would nor
have been confident one would find a few
years ago," says Laurence Tribe. profes-
sor at Harvard University Law School and
a leading liberal constitutionalist. "He's
become very much more his own man."
Those who know Kennedy well agree.
"He listens, and he's still evolving in
his thinking," says Judge Alex Kozinski.
who both clerked for Kennedy and served
with him on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit. "'lat's the hallmark of a
great jurist-that you haven't come to a
point where you can't listen. That's
death."
Exhibit No. I in the case for Kennedy's
conversion is Lee v. Weisnman, in which
the Court last month ruled that prayers at
public-school graduation ceremonies
violate the First Amendment's prohibition
against the establishment of religion by the
state. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
for the Court, flooring Scalia and emaging
the religious right.
The reason Kennedy's opinion in Lee is
so startling is that three years ago he is-
sued a stinging dissent in another es-
tablishment-clause case, a dissent that














led by Scalia, seeking to allow more reli-
gious expression in civic life. Prayers at
graduation looked to be a logical extension
of this principle.
In that 1989 case, Allegheny County v.
Greater Pitrburgh ACLU. Kennedy dis-
sented from the Court's decree that a mu-
nicipally sponsored nativity scene in
Pittsburgh was unconstitutional. He de-
clared, in words Scalia hurled back at him
in Lee, that government establishes
religion only when it coerces people into
participation.
That standard, many liberals feared and
Scalia says now he assumed, meant that
nothing short of statutorily mandated par-
ticipation in religious observances would
violate the separation of church and state.
But Kennedy had a different notion, at
least this year. In Lee. he found dat "re-
search in psychology supports the com-
mon assumption that adolescents are often
subject to pressure fmm their peers toward
conformity," and thus that high-schoolers
arc effectively "coerced" into joining
graduation prayers. Scalia could not con-
tain himself.
"Iinterior decorating is a rock-hard
science compared to psychology practiced
by amateurs," Scalia wrote, referring to
one critic's description of the Court's hol-
iday-display cases as resembling decora-
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state officials have 'coerced' students to
take part in the invocation and benediction
at graduation ceremonies is, not to put too
fine a point on it. incoherent."
Parting Company
If Lee was the most dramatic instance of
Kennedy's willingness to depart from the
strict historicism of the "originalists"
with whom he has been associated in the
past, there were plenty of other examples
of his newfound expansiveness this term.
In the much-ballyhooed property-rights
case of Lucas v. South Carolina. for ex-
ample, Kennedy dashed the hopes of free-
marketeers that he would join in their
campaign to use the takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment as a hammer against the
regulatory state.
"The State should not be prevented
from enacting new regulatory initiatives in
response to changing conditions," he
wrote in a concurrence to Scalia's majority
opinion. "The Takings Clause does not
require a static body of state property
law."
Again, in Society for Krishna Con-
sciourness v. Lee. Kennedy refused to go
along with Rehnquist's majority opinion.
which held that airports are not traditional
public forums and, thus, not subject to
many First Amendment limitations on the
regulation of speech.
"In my view, our public forum doce
must ... allow the creation of public
forums which do not fit within the narrow
traditions of streets. sidewalks, and
parks," Kennedy wrote. "We have al-
lowed flexibility in our doctrine to meet
changing technologies in other areas of
constitutional interpretation, and I believe
we must do the same with the First
Amendment."
Even when it came to the doctrine of
standing-which requires plaintiffs seek-
ing relief from courts to be genuinely af-
fected by the law they challenge or the
conflict they join-Kennedy did not too
the strict constructionists' line. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, Kennedy agreed
with Scalia's majority opinion that a pub-
lic-interest group had failed to show how it
was actually injured by the Bush adminis-
tration's manner of enforcing the En-
dangered Species Act, but he wrote sepa-
rately to distance himself from Scalia's
narrow view of standing.
"As government programs become
more complex and far-reaching, we must
be sensitive to the articulation of new
rights of action that do not have clear
analogs in our common-law tradition."
Kennedy asserted in a concurrence joined
by Souter. "Modern litigation has pro-
Kennedy shows centrist signs.
for example. feels a bit duped; he says he
spoke with Kennedy about privacy rights
in Justice Deparunent interviews prior to
Kennedy's nomination.
"We did have a discussion that he in-
itiated in that area, along the lines of fun-
damental privacy rights." Reynolds re-
calls. "He was quite emphatic that that
sort of discovered right was not something
that he found embedded in the Constitution,
but something that came from the Court."
What accounts for Kennedy's shift to-
ward the middle of the Rehnquist Court is
the subject of much rumor, calumny, and
psychoanalysis in the Court-watching
community. The speculation runs from the
conspiratorial to the bizarre.
To some conservatives, Kennedy has
been bewitched by one of his law clerks.
Michael Dorf. a student of Tribe's who
wrote a book with the Harvard professor
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gressed far from Marbury suing Madison
to get his commission."
This note of evolutionary justice, of
accepting, even urging, that the Constitu-
tion be adapted to changing times. reached
an extraordinary pitch of intensity in the
opinion Kennedy wrote with O'Connor
and Souter in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. the
Court's June 29 decision reaffirming Roe
Y. Wade's declaration of a woman's right
to choose abortion.
Middle Ground
The day the Court handed down that
ruling. Kennedy joined O'Connor and
Souter in reading parts of their joint opin-
ion from the bench. As a packed court-
room sat transfixed by the drama of the
moment. Kennedy described, in his soft,
slightly nasal voice, what be believed was
at stake in the case.
. "At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life." he said. "Beliefs
about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed
under the compulsion of the State."
Kennedy, who is a devout Catholic.
went on to conclude that majorities cannot
insist upon their traditional vision of a
pregnant woman's duties, "however
dominant that vision may be in the course
of our history and our culture."
More than the result in the Casey case.
it is lines like these that have dismayed
Kennedy's erstwhile admirers. Reynolds.
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last year. This theory holds that Kennedy
is easily swayed by brighter minds and
will ebb and flow with the year-to-year
predilections of his young assistants. Of
course. many justices are described as
tools of their clerks by those who disagree
with their opinions.
Kennedy's former clerks ridicule the
notion that they held mysterious and ex-
traordinary power over their old boss.
"The idea that on abortion-or any
major issue before the Court-some law
clerk is going to fool him is extremely un-
likely." says Peter Keisler, who clerked
for Kennedy in his first year on the bench
and who now is an associate at Sidley &
Austin. "No justice is going to abdicate
on those."
Tribe, who testified on Kennedy's be-
half during the latter's 1987 Senate con-
firmation hearings. calls the strong-clerk
explanation "a paranoid and stupid idea
which insults his intelligence and in-
dependence and overstates my influence
over my students."
Another theory circulating on the right
is that Kennedy is being seduced by the
Washington establishment. Whether out
of a craving for approval by The New York
Times and other organs of respectability,
or because of a desire to assimilate into
the upper echelons of D.C. society, or in
excessive contemplation of his place in
history. Kennedy, the argument goes.
is reaching for results rather than for
reasons.
This explanation, too, strikes old
friends and colleagues of Kennedy's as
entirely out of character.
"He couldn't care less about Wash-
ington society," says a recent Kennedy
clerk who asks not to be named. "People
who say that don't know him."
Grounded in Reality
Kennedy's old friends and colleagues,in contrast, find his recent rulings pretty
much in keeping with the man they know.
These acquaintances cite the years that
Kennedy spent as a general practitioner of
the law in Sacramento-taking everything
from big lobbying clients to small di-
Anthony Kennedy, In His Own Words
During the recently completed term. Justice Anthony
Kennedy emerged as a major voice in some of the most
contentious cases before the Supreme Court. In key opin-
ions for the Court and in dissents, Kennedy evinced a knack
for clarity in judicial writing and a frankness in confronting
the social and constitutional values in the Court's actions.
What follows are excerpts from afew of Kennedy's more
notable opinions and dissents of the past term. Footnotes
and references have been omitted.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey
From the joint opinion of Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor. Kennedy. and David Souter. Kennedy read this
section from the bench on June 29:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage. procreation. contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education....
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, am central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is thie right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attri-
butes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.
These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's
interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it, for
this reason: though the abortion decision may originate
within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a
philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act
fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who
must live with the implications of her decision; for the per-
sons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the
spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowl-
edge that these procedures exist. procedures some deem
nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human
life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential
life that is aborted. Though abortion is conduct, it does not
follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all in-
stances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake
in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to
the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is suh-
ject to anxietics, to physical constraints, to pain that only
she must bear. TIat these sacrifices have from the begin-
ning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride
that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant
a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist
she make the sacrifice, Her suffering is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without mom, upon its own
vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision
has been in the course of our history and our culture. The
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society.
Lee v. Weisman
From de majority opinion holding that prayer at public-
school graduations is unconstitutional:
. . . (AIttendance at graduation and promotional cere-
voies-as a crucial part of his makeup.
He knows, from an experience that some
other justices do not share, that his deci-
sions are not abstractions.
"He had to deal with all kinds of people
in that community, and he knows that the
most immediate impact of a decision is on
the parties," says Judge Kozinski of the
9th Circuit. "There was more of an air of
reality to the stuff he did than in other
kinds of legal work."
Indeed, Sacramento may have much to
do with Kennedy's recent moderation.
Thc small city that he grew up in has long
vanished beneath a Sun Belt boom, but
friends say that he retains the neighborly
manner and traditional conservatism of his
hometown.
That, some say, accounts for his reluc-
tance to send the country careening
through a conservative judicial revolution
just as it adjusts to the great liberal cru-
sades in the law.
"He's got a lot of respect for authority
and respect for tradition," says Joseph
Genshlea. a Sacramento lawyer who grew
up on the same block as Kennedy and who
has kept in close touch.
monies is voluntary. Petitioners and the United States, as
amicus, made this a center point of the case. arguing thatthe option of not attending the graduation excuses any in-ducement or coercion in the ceremony itself. The argumentlacks all persuasion. Law reaches past formalism. And to
say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high
school graduation is formalistic in the extreme. True, Deb-
orah [Weisman] could elect not to attend commencement
without renouncing her diploma: but we shall not allow the
case to turn on this point. Everyone knows that in our soci-
ety and in our culture high school graduation is one of life's
most significant occasions. . . . Graduation is a time for
family and those closest to the student to celebrate success
and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to
the end of impressing upon the young person the role that it
is his or her right and duty to assume in the community and
all of its diverse parts.
... The Constitution forbids the State to exact religious
conformity from a student as the price of atending her owr
high school graduation. This is the calculus the Constitution
commands.
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
From a concurrence in which Kennedy agreed with the
Court's majority that local govenments can ban solicita-
tion from airports, but took issue with the majority's notion
that airports are nor "public fornts":
... Public places am of necessity the locus for discus-
sion of public issues, as well as protest against arbitrary
govermment action. At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the
principle that in a free nanon ciizens must have the right to
gather and speak with other persons in public places. The
recognition that certain government-owned property is a
public forum provides open notice to citizens that thei
freedoms may be exercised there without fear of a censorial
government, adding tangible reinforcement to the idea that
we are a free people.
... Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains
no relevance in times of fast-changing technology and in-
creasing insularity. In a country where most citizens travel
by automobile, and parks all too often become locales for
crime rather than social intercourse, our failure to recognize
the possibility that new types of government property may
be appropriate foruns for speech will lead to a serious cur-
tailment of our expressive activity.
One of the places left in our mobile society that is suitable
for discourse is a metropolitan airport.
Burdick v. Takushi
From a dissent in which Kennedy disagreed with the ma-jority's upholding ofHawai's ban on write-in voting:The majority's approval of Hawaii's ban is ironic at a
time when the new democracies in foreign countries strive
to emerge from an era of sham elections in which the name
of the ruling party candidate was the only one on the ballot.
Hawaii does not impose as severe a restriction on the rightto vote. but it imposes a restriction that has a haunting sim-ilarity in its tendency to exact severe penalties for one who







"He remembers and he values the good
things we had in America as we were
growing up," adds Genshlea. now a
partner in Sacramento's Weintraub
Genshilea & Sproul. "There was stability.
predictability. You knew where things
stood."
Adds John Hamlyn, another boyhood
friend of Kennedy's and now a partner in
Sacramento's Downey, Brand. Seymour
& Rohwer: "I don't think he's changed
much-he's always done a lot of soul
scarching and he's always tried to do what
he feels is the right thing."
More than anything else, it is probably
that hankering to be fair, that well-
meaning aspect of Kennedy's placid
character. that accounts for whatever
departures he has been making from the
conservative party line. And those de-
partures, in just a few notable cases, can
easily be made to stand for too much. He
is, as all who know him attest, a conserv-
ative man.
But it is a conservatism of character
more than one of ideology that seems to
drive Kennedy's reasoning. Values, per-
haps, count for more than theories with
him.
He touched on this notion when he said
goodbye to his students at the McGeorge
Law School in 1988, just before coming to
Washington. In an emotional farewell at
the campus where he taught for two dec-
ades. Kennedy spoke of his ideals.
"I really love the classroom," he told
the students. "I hope I've been able to
teach you that rules alone don't make the
law and that knowledge of the rules
doesn't make you a lawyer." O
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The Loner
Despite Expectations,
Scalia Fails to Unify
Conservatives on Court
Given to Strong Opinions
He Is More Idiosyncratic
Than a Consensus Buildej
Offending Justice O'Connoi
By PALL.M. BARRr
Stafr Reperset of THE. H 4u SarrT Johat
WASHINGTON - When Antonin Scalajoined the Supreme Court an 1956. recalls a
friend. federal Judge Alex Kozzrski. "Com-
mentators said. 'Ths is the guy who.
through his charm and intellect. will forge
a conservative consensus.*
But it hasn't exactly worked out that
way. 'He hasn't done it.- says Judge
Kozinski.
Associate Justice Scaha dazzles court
watchers with an absolutist philosophy that
slices ei: )rtless!y
through Sr ay legal
problerr.. The un-
disputed star of the









But in his sixth 9
year on the court. Antonin ScabaJustice Scalia is no
consensus-builder. He revels in dissent-
and even when he votes with the majority.
he often tosses jurisprudential hand gre-
nades that send other conservative justices
scrambling for cover.
A good example came last month, when
the high court cautiously eased the way for
formerly segregated school districts to free
themselves from federal court supervision.
Justice Scalia joined the majority but
wrote a separate opinion urging courts to
get out of the desegregation business alto-
gether-and the sooner the better.
The expectation some observers had
that Justice Scalia would become a conser-
vative version of William Brennan. the
master of accommodation on the Warren
and Burger courts. was wrong. The former
law professor's gregariousness and infor-
mality were mistaken for a willingness to
compromise. If anythng. he has become
less accommodating on the Supreme Court
than he was as a federal appeals courtjudge an Washington from 19S2 to 1986.
when he had to follow high court precedent
and cope with a much bigger caseload.
-Nino," as he is known to friends. "is
happiest going off on his own. winting a
dissent.' says a former colleague. Chief
Judge Abner Mikva of the L.S. Court of
Appeals in Washington.
Former Scalia law clerks describe a
ritual of his chambers: The justice. com-
pleting a stinging one-man dissent for even
a concurring opinion e. presses the "Pnnt -
button on his word processor. marches into
the adjoining clerks office where the
printer is located and does a dramatic
reading of his work as it materiahes. page
by page. Then. the Scalia sign-off: "Well.
we got em again-
"it wasn't clear who. . .we were getting
again." laughs one former clerk. since
Justice Scalia takes shots at all of his
bench-mates. both in published opinions
and in prolific private memorandums
known around the court as "Ninograms"
Still Fuming
Those shots aren't appreciated by his
colleagues. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
for one. is stil fuming over his attack on her
in a 19i9 abortion case. Indeed. in a number
of cases. Justice Scalia's approach has
fractured a conservative bloc rnisper-
ceived by many people as monolithic.
That is what happened in the case of
Ronald Harmelin last term. Mr. Harmelin.
who had been sentenced in a Michigan
court io a mandatory life prison term for
possessing a pound and a half of cocaine.
had appealed to the Supreme Court. con-
tending that the penalty was unconsttu-
tionally disp-oportionate 'to his cnrme. In
a private conference in November 199W. thejustices voted 5-to-4 to reject his claim-
presaging a narrowing of criminals' rights.
But the majority splintered when Chief
Justice William Rehnquist assigned Justice
Scalia to write the maim opinion.
Rather than applying the court's most
recent precedents to the facts of the case.
Justice Scalia used the opportunity to am-
plify his theory that the only legitimate way
for judges to interpret the Constitution's
seemingly broad terms is to give them the
meaning they had when they were enacted.
The Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel
and unusual punishments." he asserted.
never Implicitly guaranteed that punish-
ment had to be proportional. The court s
past interpretation to the contrary was
"simply wrong."
No Compromise
That argument drove off Justices
O'Connor. Anthony Kennedy and David
Souter, who all had voted to uphold Mr.
Harmeln's sentence but couldn't abidejunking the proportionality principle. Jus-
tice Scalia refused to compromise. The
result: Justice Kennedy. joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter. ended up writing a
separate opinion defending precedent and
concurring only in a two-page secuon of
Justice Scaha's 36-page opus. The trag-
mented result nullified the decision's value
as a guide to interpretuing the Eightn
Amendment.
To be sure, the differences on the nght
don't prevent the court from producing
conservative results in most cases with an
ideological component. And Justice Scalia
has had influence on such issues as tne
proper method of interpreting statutes: he
favors reliance on the law's "plain mean-
ing" and dismisses the significance of legs-
lative history as reflected in floor state-
ments. committee reports and the dike.
Moreover, this term Justice Scalia may
have found his firs: true ally in Clarence
Thomas. The cour!'s newest member has
adopted Scalia-esque principles in a nurn-
ber of opinions. including his most contro-
versial: In February. Justice Thomas.joined by Justice Scalia. dissented from a
rulig that the beating of an inmate by
prison guards may violate the ban on cruel
and unusual punishment even if it doesn 't
cause a serious injury. The Thomas dissent
said that without "sigmicant harm." there
can't be a violation of the constitutional
protection.
But Justice Scalia still "can't keep five"
votes for his more controversial revisionist
views. observes Robert Giuffra. a New
York lawyer who clerked for Chief Justice
Rehnquist in the 1956-69 term.
"I don't think he particularly cares
whether he gets a lot of (votes) for his
opinions right now." says Judge Kozmski.
who sits on the federal appeals court in San
Francisco. "He's building a doctrine before
he necessarily goes for consensus." Justice
Scalia declined to be interviewed for this
article.
Not Much Back and Forth
Acknowledging his frustration in a hu-
morous vein. Justice Scalia periodically
asks his own clerks: "What's a smart guy
like me doing in a place like this"' Among
other things. he thinks the court's internal
discussions are too perfunctory. Too often,
he believes, the justices in their confer-
ences merely state their views and vote,
rather than debate the issues raised by
cases. In contrast. Chief Justice Relinquist.
who runs the conferences. makes no secret
of his expectation that few justices arrive
open to persuasion and that the meeting
ought to wrap up by lunchtime.
Even if there were more give-and-take
at conference. it's unlikely that many of
Justice Scalia's ideas would be winning
favor. He fundamentally rejects the weigh-
ing and balancing of competing interests
that Justices O'Connor and Souter use to
reach conservative results and that Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens deploy in
more-lib eral opinions. Whether he is read-
I ing the words of the Constitution or tracing
I the history of Anglo-American propert-
law, Justice Scalia finds answers n black-
and-white. not in shades of gray.
His split ar feliow Reagan appointee
O*Connor is prooaosv the most pronounced.
Although they remain ccrd:al in social
settings. Justice OConnor has come to
resent her junior colleague s rigid positions
and his sometimes-vitriolic assaults on her
thinking. "Justice O'Connor does not ap.
preciate Ninograms." says one of her for-
mer law clerks.
The most lasung emotional wound ap-
parently was his attack on her in the 1959
abortion case Webster vs. Reproductive
Health Services. The decision, which pro-
duced five separate opimuons, in effect in-
vited states to impose more-restrictive
abortion laws. but it stopped short of over-
turning Roe vs. Wade and allowing states to
prohibit abortion.
Justice O'Connor. though a critic of Roe.
wrote that the "fundamental rule of judi-
cial restraint" prevented the court from
reversing the precedent precipitously.
That prompted a withering rebuke from
Justice Scalia. Justice O*Connor's view. he
wrote. "cannot be taken senouslv." Insist-
ing that the court had no constitutional
basis for questioning states' abortion regu-
lations in the first place. Justice Scalia
dismissed the O'Connor search for middle
ground as -irrational. -
The two have clashed lately over Justice
Scalia's adamant contention that all high
court decisions in civil cases should apply
retroactively. Justice OConnor is con-
cerned about the unpredictable effects of
such a rule. In a case argued in March. she
interrogated a lawyer challenging a state
tax on federal persiors about whether he
was seeking ma.ss:ve refunds that could
push state governments across the country
into the red.
The lawyer tried repeatedly to deflect
the refund question. provoking a visibly
dismayed Jusuce Scalia to interrupt: "You
don't think it's bad." he demanded of the
lawyer - with impilci: reference to Justice
O'Connor - -if these retirees money has
been taken from them unconstitutionally.
(that it should be given back? You're not
apologizing for that, are you?" The court
this month unanmously struck down the
tax but ducked the refund question.
More than Justice O*Connor has done.
Justice Kennedy has flirted with the Scalia
view of using litera. tex: and a rigie view of
tradition to curb expansive interpretation
of constitutiona; protections. But with in-
creasing regularity. Justice Kennedy has
abandoned the Scalia approach when faced
with compelling issues such as discrimina-
Lion. In two cases last year. Justice Ken-
nedy wrote majority opinions broadening
the court's prior ruling that prevented
prosecutors from trying to keep blacks offjuries in trials of black defendants. He
wrote that white defendants as well may
object to removal of black jurors and that
even parties in civil cases may not exclude
'urors based on race. In a stirring perora-
uon. he declared that. of all places, the
courtroom must be free of bigotry's taint.
Case of Colorblindness
In a sarcasuc dissent. Justice Scalia
wrote: "What a magnificent demonstra-
tion of this institution s uncompromising
hostility to race-based judgments. even by
private actors: " J:stice Kennedy's "newly
discovered Law of the lnd.*" he warned.
will add "yet another complexity . .. to an
increasingly Byzantine system of justice
that devotes more and more of its energy to
sideshows and less and less to the merits of
the case." White defendants. he argued.
shouldn't have standing to protest exclu-
sion of black jurors. and private litigants.
unlike the government. should be able to do
as they please when it comes to jury-pick-
Ing.
Even Justice Scalias biggest break-
through has been undercut by subsequent
conservative defections. In 1990. he wrote a
majority decision upholding enforcement
of an Oregon law prohibiting use of the drug
peyote. The challengers were adherents of
a Native American religion that uses the
hallucinogenic cactus derivative in wor-
ship. Reversing three decades of First
Amendment religious-freedom jurispri-
dence. Justice Sca-a said that a statute of
"general application" (such as the law
against peyote ' that isn't intended specifi-
cally to restrict religion would almost al-
ways be deemed constitutional.
A year later, in June 1991. the court was
faced with another challenge to what Jus-
tice Scalia called a "general law regulating
conduct and not specifically directed at"
First Amendment protecuons. This time
the context was freedom of expression. the
conduct was nude entertainment in a go-go
bar, and the law was an Indiana statute
requiring strippers to wear G-strmngs and
pasties.
For Justice Scalia. it was an easy call.
Citing his one-year-old opinion in the peyote
case. he found no First Amendment prob.
lem at all. INeutrallaws of general apphca-
bility don'i violate the First Amendment).
The Indiana law was indeed upheld, but the
conservatives split among three opinions.
none of which got five votes. The plurality
opinion. written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and joined by Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy. employed the type of multi-factor
balancing test that the peyote case was
supposed to have eliminated. Justice Sca-
lia's purist position got prectsely one vote-
his own.
kouter: Unlikely Anchor at Court's Center
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Specuil to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 2 - Few
eople outside New Hampshire
ad ever heard of David H. Souter
then President Bush presented his
irst Supreme Court nominee to the
ountry two years ago this month.
:ven fewer had any idea of where
lis state court judge without a
rack record on any major issue
tight fit on the ideologically-polar-
:ed Court.
It took a while, but by the time
ie Supreme Court term ended on
tonday, the picture was clear.
istice Souter's home is at the
nter of the Court, a center that to
striking degree he is anchoring
id helping to define.
To put it another way: to find out
here the Supreme Court is, look
r David Souter.
In the 108 decisions of the term
at ended Monday, Justice Souter
as in the majority in 100. His
ght dissenting votes put him in a
: with Justice Anthony M. Ken-
:dy for the fewest dissents of the
rm - in contrast to Chief Justice
illiam H. Rehnquist, who was in
nt 19 times, and Justice Clar-
Justice David H. Souter.
ence Thomas, the newest member
of the Court, who cast 23 dissenting
votes. Justices Harry A. Blackmun
and John Paul Stevens, the Court's
two most liberal members, were
each in dissent 31 times.
Justice Souter's role at the cen-
ter came into sharpest relief when
the Court was most closely divided.
The 14 cases the Court decided by
5-to-4 votes included some of the
term's most important rulings,
such as the decisions to reaffirm
the constitutional right to abortion
and to bar prayer at public school
graduations. Justice Souter was in
the majority in those, as he was in
13 of the 14 decisions decided by 5-
to-4. No other Justice came close to
that record.
Justice Souter's essentially mod-
erate approach to judging and re-
spect for precedent are in them-
selves no particular surprise, not-
withstanding the boast that John
H. Sununu, then the White House
chief of staff and former Governor
of New Hampshire, made to con-
servatives in 1990 after the Souter
nomination. Mr. Sununu assured
those who expressed doubts about
Judge Souter that the nomination
would prove to be a "home run"
for their cause.
Nothing in David Souter's previ-
ous career qq Attorney General of
New Hampshire and as a member
of the state's Supreme Court sug-
gested that he was an ideological
crusader. In fact, his testimony at his
confirmation hearings and his admi-
ration for the late Justice John M.
Harlan, a conservative member of
the Warren Court known for schol-
arly and judicious open-mindedness,
suggested the opposite.
What was less expected, and what
he gave little sign of in his first year,
on the Court, was how actively Jus-
tice Souter would help lead the search
for the Court's lost common ground.
His role this year was defined not
simply by his votes, but by what
appeared to be a deliberate and quite
public effort to work through, to his
own satisfaction, a position on some
of the core issues facing the Court.
These issues included not only sub-jects like abortion and religion, but
questions of process: how to ap-
proach constitutional interpretation,
how to read statutes, how to decide
what the 14th Amendment's due-pro-
cess guarantee protects.
On these questions, all subjects of
heated debate within the Court, Jus-
tice Souter engaged the Court's most
conservative members on their turf,
and on their terms. Often, he conclud-
ed by disagreeing with them; more
significantly, he expressed his own
conclusion in ways that are likely to
frame the next round of the debate.
For example, in the school prayer
case, Lee v. Weisman, Justice Souter
signed Justice Kennedy's opinion, for
a 5-to-4 majority, which found that
organized prayer at a public school
graduation amounted to an unconsti-
tutional "establishment" of religion.
But he went further, in a 23-page
concurring opinion, which Justices
Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor
also signed, laying out his own theory.
Going Against Rehnquist
In a section addressed directly to.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, he reviewed
the history of the First Amendment
and used the historical evidence to
rebut the Chief Justice's view, ex-
pressed in a 1985 opinion, that the
Constititution- only forbids govern-
ment from preferring one particular
religion over another.
The "more powerful argument"
supported by the historical evidence,
Justice Souter said, is that the First
Amendment requires the Govern-
ment to adhere to a position of neu-
trality not only between different
sects, but as to the choice between
religion in general and no religion.
Acknowledging that several of the
Founding Fathers occasionally en-
dorsed action that appeared to favor
religion, Justice Souter said those in-
cidents prove that "public officials,
no matter when they serve, can turn a
blind eve to constitutional principle."
Justice Souter has engaged Justice,
Antonin Scalia in a running .debate
about how to define the Constitution's
due-process guarantee. He staked his
ground early, with an opinion a year
ago that "history and current prac-
tice are significant indicators of what
we as a people regard as fundamen-
tally fair." But in going on to say that
the definition of due process is. "al-
ways open to critical examination,"
he put himself in the camp of jurists
who view the Constitution as a flexi-
ble set of principles that can evolve.
Although Justice Souter's opinion:
in that case, Schad v. Arizona, upheld:
a murder conviction, Justice Scalia$
refused to sign it because he dis-
agreed with the suggestion that histo-:
ry does not provide the final verdict
on due process. "It is precisely the
historical practices that define what
is due," Justice Scalia wrote.
'The Inescapable Fact'
This debate reached a climax, if not
a conclusion, in Planned Parenthood




v. Casey, the Pennsylvania abortion
case the Court decided on Monday.
While the majority opinion was
signed jointly by Justices Souter,
O'Connor, and Kennedy, it appeared
strongly to reflect Justice Souter's
views on due process as he had ex-
pressed them in earlier opinions.
The opinion, joined also by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, identified the
right to abortion as an aspect of "lib-
erty" protected by the 14th Amend-
ment's due-process guarantee. Quot-
ing at length from Justice Harlan's:
most famous opinion, a dissent in a
1961 case called Poe v. Ullman, the
majority opinion on Monday said that
the 14th Amendment guarantees due
process of law in broad terms, limited
neither by the concept of due process
that prevailed at the time the Amend-
ment was adopted, nor by the rights
the framers chose to protect in the
Bill of Rights. "The inescapable
fact," the opinion said, is that judges
trying to decide what due process
means for the current age have to
arrive at the answer through "rea-
soned judgment."
This was a central part of the opin-.
ion, important far beyond the context;
of abortion, marking the first time a
majority of the Court had explicitly
adopted this expansive view. It drew
a scathing dissent from Justice Sca-
lia, who declared that "The Imperial
Judiciary lives."
Guided by Reverence?
The part of the abortion opinion
that Justice Souter read from the
bench, on the importance to the Court
of adhering "under fire" to the Roe v.
Wade precedent, appeared to repre-
sent his most deeply-felt views about
the role of the Court. Justice Black-
mun commended the three authors of
the opinion for "an act of personal,
courage" in voting the way they did.j
Not all of Justice Souter's writing
has been so smooth. His opinions car
be opaque, with a complex sentence
structure and archaic style.
One rather .typical sentence from
an opinion this term, King v. SL Vin-
cent's Hospital, expressed the view
that a Federal law was clear even
though it did not deal explicitly with
the particular problem at hand. "But
to grant all this is not to find equivo-
cation in the statute's silence, so as to
render it susceptible to interpretive
choice," Justice Souter wrote.
On the bench, however, Justice Sou-
ter is clear, direct and precise. He is
an active questioner, probing the in-
consistencies and limits of the attor-
neys' arguments, in a genteel manner
that still commands attention.
What is singular about Justice Sou-
ter's opinions is not so much their
style as their structure. Court observ-
ers on both ends of the political spec-
trum have noted that Justice Souter,
much more than most judges, tends
to acknowledge the weight of oppos-
ing arguments and to discuss and
defend his own choices from among
competing rationales.
Mr. Slobodin said he thought Jus-
tice Souter's approach was a "posi-
tive" trait in a judge, while noting
that some of Justice Souter's views
';;ve us great concern." Among
them, he said, was Justice Souter's
tendency to favor the states against
the Federal Government in cases
dealing with Federal pre-emption of
state laws and regulations.
Whether this dismay is shared by
the Administration that appointed
Justice Souter and argued vigorously
for various positions he has rejected
is unclear. On Wednesday, President
Bush was asked during a television
appearance for his reaction to Justice
Souter's vote in the .abortion case.
The President said the vote proved
that "I was telling the truth - that
thet e was no litmus test on that."
And Mr. Sununu, who calmed con-
servatives at the time of the Souter
nomination, declined comment to-
day.
Liberal scholars find themselves
intrigued by Justice Souter's ap-
proach. "His opinions give a sense of
a mind working through a problem in
a serious, utterly judicious way," said
Paul Gewirtz, a constitutional law
professor at Yale Law Schoo. "He's
facing up to large constitutional is-
sues and taking the challenges seri-
ously. Every opinion he works on
seems to crystallize and set an opin-
ion or an outlook for him. It's like a
series of snapshots that are gradually
converging into a judicial philoso-
phy."
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SUPREME COURT
Justice Souter makes mark with power
of intellect as Rehnquist era nears end
By Lyle Dcnniston
Washington Dureau
WASHINGTON - Two years ago.
David Hackett Soutcr's image was
dour. indeed: the bachelor no one
knew and ascetic New Englander
who lived alone in the woods. quietly
reading heavy legal tomes by pale
candiclight
After his sophomore year as a Su-
preme Court justice. however. Mr.
Soutcr already Is well on his way to
becoming one of the most Influential
members of that tribunal. regularly
displaying the solid capacity of a
soon-to-be dominant jurtsL
He has been observed closely by
court analysts because so little was
known of him when he was plucked
from obscurity to be President
Bush's nominee to succeed one of
the giants of modern court history.
Justice William J. Drennan Jr.
Because Mr. Souter is an Intcnse-
ly private person who does not yearn
to be conspicuous. even in one of the
most powerful and public Institu-
tons in Washington. what there has
been to observe was his role in court
hearings and his opinions.
On the bench. he often sits back
and down a littIe in his chair. not
rcturning a smile if one is sent his
way. a graying and thin man going
on 53 years - the reserved image
that millions of Americans saw on
the witness stand before the Senate
Judiciary Committee In 1990.
He is a pallid figure in comparison
to the man scated to his left. Justice
Antonin Scalia. who is vividly
charming. verbally combative. open-
ly funny. Intellectually spirited -
and occasionally pedantic with reci-
tations of ancient legal maxims in
apparently flawless Latin.
But then there will be moments
- last term there were many -
when Justice Souter will Ican for-
ward, at seemingly the most critical
point In a lawyer's presentation. and
the spectators will then be treated to
some of the smartest. crispcst. clear-
est. most penetrating questions
heard in an entire argument.
A lawyer may try to wriggle away.
but such a move is foolhardy. Mr.
Souter. patiently but doggedly. keeps
pushing to the heart of the matter.
He does not indulge in mind-play
with far-fetched hypotheticals. as his
colleague. Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, does with relish. With austere.
Incisive Inquiry, he gets what he
wants - and. frequently, telegraphs
where his vote might go.
Taking either side in Supreme
Court hearings Is an art form. and
Justice Souter has become, in two
terms. an artist at it.
When he has been the author of a
final decision. he indulges himself
just a bit in a moment of solitaryjudicial theater - the moment when
a justice announces an outcome. Mr.
Soutcr does that with the patence of
a teacher. his New England accent
evident throughout.
On Monday. he had one of the
richer moments of theater yet open
to him, as he took his turn - for six
rivcting minutes - to discuss the
historic new ruling on abortion
rights. It was his dramatic task to
explain why the majority had re-
sisted the demands that It overrule
Roe vs. Wade outright.
The Intellectual force of his writ-
ten opinions is strong and apparent.
as In his separate 23-page opinion
when he joined a 5-4 majority to
strike down prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies.
That was not one of those occa-
sions. and there have been several.
when a Soutcr opinion reads as If It
were meant for students of antiquar-
Ian English. An opinion of his in a
death penalty case. for example was
nearly indecipherable.
This opinion. seemingly most fit-
ting for a ruling of the importance of
the school prayer ruling. was a vivid
essay on religion and the U.S. Con-
stitution. with a courtly bow to the
thought that everyone ought to be
sensitive to each other's faith.
And it was an opinion obviously
written with full awareness that he
was rejecting flatly a constitutional
position urged by the administration
of the president who had put him on
the court.
Silent Thomas
WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION nominated Clarence Thomas last
year to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall on the U.S. Supreme
Court, the president and his spokesmen said they had found a
worthy successor. Judge Thomas, they said, could make the same sort of
contribution. that Justice Marshall had made to the court.
Both are black men who have personally confronted racial bigotry and
struggled against great odds to become lawyers and jurists..So it was
hoped by some that Justice Thomas could bring that sort of union
perspective to the court.
So it is somewhat sad to hear silence from Justice Thomas on a recent
case decided by the Supreme Court. In LA.V. v. City of St Paul, 90-7675,
the justices decided 5-4 that St. Paul, Minn.'s "hate. crime" ordinance is
unconstitutional.
It is a somewhat foolhardly enterprise to guess what anyone would
have said had he or she been in Justice Thomas' shoes. But It's fairly safe
to predict that Justice Marshall, a peerless First Amendment advocate,
would have concurred in the result, saying that no speech, however
hateful, should be barred. But It is also safe to say that Justice Marshall
also would have forcefully and eloquently conveyed to the nation what it
means to be the subject of unreasonable hatred and bigotry.
Thomas' First High Court




Thomas. it came as a total sur-
prise-and this time it was a pleas-
ant one.
Nearly 100 friends and col-
leagues gathered at the Supreme
Court one afternoon in late June.
Thomas entered the ornate recep-
tion room planning to attend a
party for departing clerks only to
learn that-surprise!-the crowd
had gathered to celebrate his 44th
birthday.
"It was so wonderful to see him
with his old friends. the people who
labored in the fields for him." said
Ricky Silberman. vice chairman of
the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission and one of many
who fought for Thomas during his
bruising confirmation battle. "He
laughed and joked. It was like it
never happened."
While his old friends surprised
him, he has not surprised them.
During his first term, he allied
himself with the court's most con-
servative members: Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia. He joined them last
week in calling for the outright
reversal of the ruling that made
abortion legal and for allowing
more religion in the public schools.
"To this point, he has been just
what the conservatives hoped for
and the liberals feared," said USC
law professor Erwin Chemerinsky.
Since he took his seat in Novem-
ber, Thomas has immersed himself
in the work of the court and
isolated himself from the public.
He avoids the Washington social
scene and has turned down all
speaking engagements. He has told
friends that he refuses to read all
Please see THOMAS, A6
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newspapers or watch television
news.
"He said one of the best. days of
his life was the day he canceled his
subscription to the Washington
Post," Silberman said.
Another friend visiting Thomas
in his chambers earlier this year
commented on the loss of "Roots"
author Alex Haley. who had died
about two weeks earlier. Thomas
reportedly looked startled. He
didn't know.
If there is a lingering unease over
the sexual harassment charges
that marred his confirmation hear-
ings, it apparently has not affected
his relationship with his fellow
justices. "They have treated him
like a member of the family." one
friend reported.
On the bench. Thomas has been
notably silent. While the other
justices have questioned attorneys
in the court's public sessions, the
newest member of the tribunal
mostly has listened and taken
notes.
But he has been anything but
muted when called upon to write
opinions or dissents. In his writing,
the newest justice has shown him-
self to be bold, provocative and
decidedly conservative.
For example, when the justices
on a 7-2 vote upheld an $800
judgment won by a Louisiana pris-
on inmate who was held by guards
and punched repeatedly in the
mouth. Thomas dissented and said
that the Constitution's ban on
"cruel and unusual punishment"
limits only the official sentences
imposed on prisoners, not their
treatment once in prison.
Thomas also proposed sharp lim-
its on a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." Tradi-
tionally, this has meant that an
accuser must testify in court
against the accused.
In a child molestation case from
Illinois. Rehnquist said that there
are occasional exceptions to this
rule. For example, the police offi-
cer who interviewed the child soon
after the incident could testify in
her place, he said.
But Thomas said that the court
should go further and declare that
the Sixth Amendment does not
actually give a defendant a right to
confront his accuser in court. He
reasoned that accusers who refuse
to testify are not "witnesses
against" the accused. Therefore, he
maintained. the defendant's rights
are not violated if only third-party
witnesses appear and offer "hear-
say" testimony.
On the last day of the term.
Thomas joined with Rehnquist,
Scalia and Justice Byron R. White
in declaring that the 1973 Roe vs.
Wade ruling was "wrong" and
should be overruled in its entirety.
Last year, Thomas told senators
that he had never discussed Roe
and had not "made a decision one
way or the other" about the issue.
"I was not surprised by anything
I saw," said Silberman, calling
Thomas a thoughtful jurist who is
guided by the principle of "judicial
restraint."
"He is fiercely independent. And
he has very strong opinions on the
issues of the day," said Clint Bolick.
a longtime friend and an attorney
for the conservative Institute for
Justice. "Clarence Thomas listens
to his own drummer, and he is very
happy to go it alone."
His critics, however, see it dif-
ferently.
"It is pretty clear he will be
aligned with the right-wing ele-
ment of the court," said George-
town law professor Louis M. Seid-
man. "He has also shown a real
ideological edge this year. To put it
mildly, I would say there is a lot of
tension between his performance
so far and what he told the Senate
Judiciary Committee."
At his confirmation hearing.
Thomas said that he would bring
no "ideology" to the court but
rather would try to "strip down"
any preconceptions so that he
could approach each case as an
impartial judge.
A lthough the new justice linedup in major cases with Scalia
and Rehnquist, Thomas showed
special concern in several instanc-
es over how rulings would affect
African -Americans.
For example, the court in March
reversed the death sentence given
to a Delaware murderer named
David Dawson because prosecutors
told the jury about his membership
in a white racist prison gang. On an
8-1 vote, with Thomas the lone
dissenter, the court said that mere
membership in a group cannot be
used against a defendant.
Thomas argued that Dawson's
membership in a racist gang.pro-
vided revealing information about
his character.
Thomas also dissented in May
when the court on a 6-3 vote
upheld the conviction of a black
county zoning official in Georgia
who had been targeted for investi-
gation by the FBI. Over a 30-
month period, an undercover agent
posing as a developer made 33
approaches to the $16,000-a-year
official seeking zoning changes.
Although the official- John H.
Evans, did nothing to help the man
he believed was a developer, he did
accept an $8,000 campaign contri-
bution from him. Evans was
promptly charged with extortion
under federal law. Thomas said
that the ruling virtually invites
prosecutorial abuse and even dis-
crimination against black officials.
In June, he questioned the wis-
dom of a court ruling forbidding
defendants to take race into ac-
count in dismissing potential jurors,
arguing that blacks and other mi-
norities will be hurt most. When
the court ordered Mississippi and
other Southern states to do more to
integrate their state universities,
Thomas added a note urging pres-
ervation of the historically black
colleges.
"It would be ironic, to say the
least." he wrote, "if the institutions
that sustained blacks during segre-
gation were themselves destroyed
in an effort to combat its vestiges."
His supporters point to decisions
such as these to argue that Thomas
will bring a unique perspective as
the only justice to grow up poor
and black.
"I think the critics who say that
he will not remember where he
came from will be proven wrong,"
said Tom Jipping, a legal analyst
with the Free Congress Founda-
tion.
During the summer recess,
Thomas will not be teaching or
traveling abroad like his col-
leagues. Instead. he will busy him-
self writing letters and moving into
a new home farther outside the city
of Washington. The farther, the
better, he told several friends.
"He told me he wished the court
met in Omaha. not Washington,"
Bolick said.
In the weeks after his nationally
televised confrontation with Okla-
homa law professor Anita Faye
Hill after she had accused him of
sexual harassment, Thomas re-
ceived nearly 10,000 letters of sup-
port, his friends say. And he in-
tends to try to answer them all.
"He is very conscious of the
value of the friends who stood by
him. And he feels an enormous
debt to mainstream America." saic
Bolick. "And he will try to repay
that debt."
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Justice Thomas, the Freshman
Te Supreme Court's term began in rancor last
fall affer the monumental fight to confirm Clarence
ThoniaA and it ended last week in his failed attempt,
along with three other justices, to force radical
changps in law. During this first year on the Court,
Justice.Thomas spoke loudly but not often wisely.
Those who hoped that he would find himself once
confirmed more often saw him lose himself in
ideology. In this first year, Justice Thomas has
failed the test of judiciousness.'
Thit harsh judgment derives from his per-
forinaiice in a long list of cases on different issues.
In some ways, despite the Anita Hill ordeal and the
narrov 52-to-48 Senate vote to seat him, Clarence
Thom~s has yet to join the Court.
Injudiciousness surfaced early in a case involv-
ing prispners' rights. Fully seven justices thought
those rights were violated when guards shackled an
inmate, split his lip, loosened his teeth and broke his
dental plate. Is it reasonable to call that a violation
of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel punish-
ments?*No, said Justice Thomas. To think that is to
turn th Bill of Rights into "a National Code of
Prison Regulation."
Is. t reasonable to spring the defendant in
another case because he had beendenied a speedy
trial?'drely not That "will transform the courts of
the la4d into boards of law enforcement supervi-
sion." Is it just to require the release of a prisoner
acquitted by reason of insanity after he has recov-
ered his reason? "The due process clause does not
requirefthe states to conform to the policy prefer-
ence oflederal judges."
Inanother case, a 6-to-3 majority gave defense
lawyers'the right to ask prospective jurors whether
they would automatically vote for the death penalty
upon finding someone guilty of murder. Justice
Thomas and Chief-Justice William Rehnquist joined
justice' Antonin Scalia's dissent, charging, "The
Court strikes a further blow against the People in
its campaign against the death penalty."
New justices are as free as any others to be
cranky,. stubborn, loud or vigorous. That's not
what's troublesome looking back over Justice
Thomas's record. The problem is that his argu-
ments read more like boilerplate attacks on politi-
cal opponents than lawyerly debates with col-
leagues on the same bench.
. In a quarrel over the scope of the Federal
extortion law, he accused his colleagues not merely
of rejecting better interpretations but of making up
their own version of the law.
Justice Thomas was the single dissenter when
,-the Chief Justice held for the rest of the Court that
Delaware prosecutors improperly used an inflam-
matory but irrelevant factor, a murderer's mem-
bership in a racist prison gang, as evidence favor-
ing execution. In a leap of logic, Justice Thomas
argued that the jury could conclude, based merely
on that membership, that the murderer "had en-
gaged in some sort of forbidden activities while in
prison."And then in the session's closing days came two
dramatic decisions, on school prayer and abortion.
Three Republican appointees, Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter, held
the constitutional line against government med-
dling with religion. In the abortion case, they stood
against government interference with a woman's
basic liberty.
At his hearing, the nominee said he had never
uttered an opinion about Roe v. Wade to anyone. It's
hard to grasp how anyone could go so quickly from
such agnosticism to joining a dissent that bitterly
condemns that precedent and demands that it be
overruled.
History tells of many justices who were ap-
pointed out of political expediency, some of whom
grew out of politics and into judiciousness. Clarence
Thomas has not yet followed that pattern of growth.
Thomas Confirms Fears of Liberal Critics
By PAUL M. BAnarrr
Staff Reporter of Tau WALL STREE.T JOURNAL
WASHINGTON - Clarence Thomas's
first year on the court confirmed the worst
fears of his liberal critics.
He is a confident, aggressive revision-
ist, willing to make radical legal changes
in such areas as property taxation, crimi-
nal prosecution and prisoners' rights. In
Monday's abortion ruling, he joined his
close allies, Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist and Justice Antonin Scalia, along
with Byron White, in an opinion that would
have overturned Roe vs. Wade.
Many justices shift their views after a
few years on the bench, making any
conclusions about
Justice Thomas ten-
tative. But he pro- W








cal of new justices.
Justice
Thomas's desire to
remake law with Clarence Thomas
which he disagrees
has at times put him-at odds with most of
the rest of the Republican majority, espe-
cially Justices Sandra O'Connor and An-
thony Kennedy. Instead, he has signed on
with Justice Scalla's continuing - and
largely unsuccessful - effort to simplify
and narroX the court's interpretation of
the Constitutiop'and to curb the authority
of the judiciary . Justices Thomas and
Scalia voted for'the same results 87% of the
time - one of the closest alliances on
the court.
Filling the seat of Thurgood Marshall,
the court's first black justice, Mr. Thomas,
thet second, occasionally added a distinc-
tive voice on racial issues. He wrote a
separate opinion in the court's decision
requiring Mississippi to do more to deseg-
regate its public colleges, arguing that the
state shouldn't shut its cash-starved histor-
ically black schools. Stressing that too
much forced integration could destroy in-
stitutions that have launched many blacks
into the middle class, he quoted W.E.B. Du
Bois: "We must rally to the defense of our
schools."
He filed a lone dissent to an 8-1 ruling
that set aside a convicted murderer's
death sentence because the prosecutor
introduced evidence of his membership in
a racist prison gang. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist wrote the majority opinion that said
the prosecutor's reference to the gang
affiliation violated the defendant's consti-
tutional rights because it indicated only his
"abstract beliefs." Perhaps they seem
abstract to some, Justice Thomas re-
sponded, but prison gangs aren't book
clubs or debating societies, and member-
ship in the Aryan Brotherhood was con-
crete evidence of the defendant's charac-
ter, which was at issue in the sentencing
proceeding.
In another dissent, Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, objected to the
court's ruling that the use of excessive.
force to discipline prison inmates violates
the Constitution, even if guards don't
inflict serious injury. Beating shackled
prisoners is wrong, Justice Thomas wrote,
but prison has always been a tough place;
punishment can't be deemed "cruel and
unusual" unless there is substantial harm
done.
This conclusion damped the optimism
of people who had gained some hope from
Justice Thomas's confirmation-hearing
.comments on prisoners. He had told the
Senate Judiciary Committee that as an
appeals court judge, he had been moved by
watching chained black prisoners led into
the local courthouse, thinking: "There but
for the grace of God go ." But oace he
donned his justice's robes, he saw his first
obligation as urging federal courts to stop
second-guessing state law enforcers.
In another case, Justice Thomas voted
with conservative majorities to curb the
protection afforded minorities by a section
of the Voting Rights Act. The ruling
enabled historically segregated states and
localities to shift power among office hold-
ers without having to seek federal ap-
proval. In a different case, he voted with
the majority to curb opportunities for
asylum available to refugees from war-
torn nations.
Even when he joined the majority - as
he did most of the time - Justice Thomas
periodically displayed Justice Scalia's pen-
chant for writing separately to tweak the
author of the main opinion. The Scalia-
Thomas duo tried to push the court to
admit to contradictions in Its past deci-
sions, and to overturn rulings they didn't
like. They usually failed.
J UDGINGTHO0l AS
Clarence Thomas disgusted civil rights activists with
an obstreperous first year in which he let the world
know just how conservative he could be
By THOMAS SANCTON
Thomas' Supreme Court
chambers sits a framed signTHE DESK IN CIARENCEthat reads: "There's no limit to
what you can do or where you
can go if you don't mind who
gets the credit." There is some
irony in that. From the moment Thomas
was nominated last July through his dra-
matic confirmation hearings, critics at-
tributed his meteoric rise to affirmative
action, tokenism or the narrow political
calculations of George Bush. But now that
the term is finished, Thomas alone can
claim credit for one of the more obstreper-
ous first-year performances on the Su-
preme Court in recent memory.
Though he told friends after his confir-
mation that he wanted to be out of the
spotlight for a while, Thomas' first-term
rulings were pugnacious, blunt and, for a
new Justice, relatively numerous. He
wrote nine opinions for the majority, four
concurrences and eight dissents. "Thom-
as hit the ground running," says Universi-
ty of Michigan law professor Yale Kam-
isar. "He's in there mixing it up."
That may have been his way of demon-
strating that he was undaunted by Anita
Hill's sexual-harassmerit charges and the
Senate's lukewarm 52-48 confirmation
vote-one of the thinnest margins in court
history. As in the abortion ruling last week,
he has linked up with the court's hard-line
conservatives, Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia.
These three have often combined with By-
ron White and three more moderate con-
servatives, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day
O'Connor and David Souter, thus giving
the court a conservative majority in most
important cases last term.
No sooner had Thomas arrived than he
gravitated to Scalia. The pair not only vot-
30
ed alike in 56 out of 90 decisions, but
Thomas can write in language that brings
to mind Scalia's occasional let's-you-and-
me-scrap tone. "Jurors do not leave their
knowledge of the world behind when they
enter a courtroom," Thomas scolded the
other Justices in one dissent. "And they
do not need to have the obvious spelled out
in painstaking detail."
If Thomas is taking cues from Scalia, it
is not during long t6te-A-t8tes; associates
say the two rarely talk. But they clearly
share a judicial philosophy. Both take a
narrow view of the Constitution. Rights
not spelled out explicitly in the text, such
as the right to abortion, are not recog-
nized, and both men want to cut back the
role of the federal judiciary, leaving more
authority to the President, Congress and
the state legislatures. Perhaps most signif-
icant, they don't approach precedent on
tiptoe. Thomas and Scalia are happy to
challenge-with dynamite-the decisions
of earlier, more liberal courts.
Which is why Thomas causes such
pain to women's groups, liberals and
above all black leaders. In a remarkable
snub, Thurgood Marshall, the civil rights
pioneer whom Thomas replaced on the
court, did not attend Thomas' swearing-in
ceremony last November. Later in the fall,
Thomas quietly sought out Marshall in his
chambers, where he took notes for two
hours while Marshall held forth. Not long
after, Thomas got some unsolicited-and
angry-advice from another prominent
black jurist, A. Leon Higginbotham Jr.,
chief judge emeritus of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. In a No-
vember letter to Thomas that he published
two months later in the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review. Higginbotham wrote
that the young Justice displayed "a stunt-
ed knowledge of history and an unformedjudicial philosophy." He proceeded to give
Thomas a lengthy lecture on the civil
rights struggle that had helped land him
on the high bench.
That did not stop Thomas from outrag-
ing the black leadership in one civil rights
case, Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
sion, in which he joined a 6-to-3 majority in
allowing two Alabama counties to strip
powers from black officials after their
election. Then came Hudson v. Mcfillian,
a case that involved a shackled and hand-
cuffed black convict who was beaten by
two Louisiana prison .guards in a punch-
out that loosened teeth, cracked a dental
plate and left his face bruised and swollen.
The court majority concluded that this
was cruel and unusual punishment forbid-
den by the Eighth Amendment. But not
Thomas' Eighth Amendment: In a dissent
joined only by Scalia, he wrote that while
the guards' behavior was deplorable, the
majority ruling was "yet another manifes-
tation of the pervasive view that the Feder-
al Constitution must address all ills in our
society ... The Eighth Amendment is not
a National Code of Prison Regulation."
"I cannot, to save my life, understand
that vote," sayS N.A.A.C.P. executive director
Benjamin Hooks. "I don't think Thomas is
dumb; I think he is wrong." Such criticism
may explain why in some of his writing
Thomas has appeared anxious to signal
that he is mindful of black struggles. In a
major integration case, U.S. v. Fordice, the
court ruled 8 to 1 two weeks ago that be-
cause of continuing evidence of racial seg-
regation in its state university system, Mis-
sissippi must continue efforts to attract
more blacks to its mostly white campuses
and more white students to its three tradi-
tionally black colleges. But though it would
ordinarily offend his notion of color-blind
laws, Thomas wrote a separate concur-
rence to stress the importance of finding
some way to preserve the black-student
majorities at historically black campuses-
a significant goal for some blacks. "It would
be ironic, to say the least," Thomas wrote,
"if the institutions that sustained blacks
during segregation were themselves de-
stroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges."
In another case, Georgia v. McCollum,
the court examined the constitutionality
of excluding potential jurors on the basis
of race. Though the practice was outlawed
for prosecutors in 1986, defense attorneys
continued to exercise this means of elimi-
nating jurors who might be biased against
their clients, whether black or white. The
court voted 7 to 2 to ban these so-called pe-
remptory challenges on racial grounds.
Citing a 1991 precedent, Thomas voted
with the majority. But in an opinion that
read more like a dissent, he wrote: "I am
certain that black criminal defendants
will rue the day that this court ventured
down this road that inexorably will lead to
the elimination of peremptory strikes ...
Today's decision, while protecting jurors,
leaves defendants with less means of pro-
tecting themselves."
TIME. J L:LY 1:1. 19192
The flip side of Thomas' courtroom ac-
r tivism is his almost cloistered personal
z life. Friends say the Anita Hill episode left
him "shattered" and "guarded," leading
him to shun public appearances. He is now
instinctively so averse to the press, they
say, that he's no longer much of a newspa-
per reader. "An experience like that
leaves scars," says a friend. "Clarence and
his wife have both had to go through a
healing process."
Religion has been an important part of
the process. Thomas, a onetime Catholic
seminarian, and his wife Virginia regular-
ly attend Sunday services at Truro Episco-
pal Church in Fairfax, Va. Unlike the Sca-
lias, and O'Connor and her husband, they
are absent from the Washington social
scene. Since he joined the court, Thomas
has attended only two public events, a Ho-
ratio Alger Awards dinner and a state din-
ner at the White House. In May he can-
celed an appearance at New Jersey's Seton
Hall law school after he was warned of a
possible demonstration against him.
Remembering her own embarrassment
when she was booed during an appear-
ance at New York University, O'Connor
called Thomas to offer support.
Thomas doesn't have much time any-
more for personal pleasures like reading
Louis L'Amour novels and tooling around
in his jet-black Corvette. His life revolves
almost entirely around workdays at the
court that can run from 5 a.m. to 7 p.m. He
is usually in bed by 8. On a court where the
Justices communicate largely by memos,
he is forging friendships with White and
Rehnquist. His most frequent personal
contact is with his clerks, reputed to be
among the court's most conservative.
Most Justices say they need at least
five years to settle fully into their role.
Many have found their positions shifting
during that transitional period: Nixon ap-
pointee Harry Blackmun, for example,
drifted to the liberal end of the court,
while Byron White, a Kennedy appointee,
moved the other way. Don't look for any
such lurch from Thomas. "My impression
is that Thomas arrived on the court know-
ing where he belonged," says University of
Virginia law professor A.E. Dick Howard.
Indeed, conservatives can barely con-
ceal their glee over Thomas' perfor-
mance. "The court no longer sees itself as
the moral conscience of the nation bent
on improving on the state of mankind,"
says Bruce Fein, a conservative legal
scholar, approvingly. On the wall of
Thomas' chambers is a Harriett Erlich
drawing titled Freedom that shows three
black children with outstretched arms.
Thomas might ponder its message; his
own liberation from the poverty of Pin
Point, Ga., and his rise to the court would
have been unthinkable without the body
of liberal jurisprudence he now casts into
doubt. -Reported by Julie Johnson/Washington
and Andrea SachslNew York
I %IE. .1IN 3. 1! 3131
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Divided Justice: A Commentary on the
Nomination and Confirmation of
Justice Thomas
Michael J. Gerhardt*
"The fault . .. is not in our stars. [blut in ourselves[.]"
William Shakespeare'
Introduction
For roughly two hundred years, politics has influenced dramati-
cally the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court justices.
Presidents routinely have selected nominees to the Court based on
political considerations,2 and senatorial advice and consent remains
the only political check in the process of selecting Supreme Court
justices.5 Even so, the racial and sexual politics underlying much-
but not all-of the controversy over the appointment of Clarence
Thomas as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court
shocked most observers,' prompting widespread condemnation of
Associate Professor of Law. Lecturer in Government. The College of William
and Mary. B.A. 1978, Yale University; M.Sc. 1979, London School of Economics; J.D.
1982. University of Chicago. I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky. Dave Douglas, Tracey
Maclin, Paul Marcus. Nancy-Ann Min, Glenn Reynolds. Steve Wermeil, and Ron Wright
for their generous comments on earlier drafts; and to Tim Hui and Eric Hurt for their
excellent research assistance.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEAREJULIUS CAESAR act 1. sc. 2.11. 140-41 (Arthur Humphries
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1984).
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text; c/ infra note 25 and accompanying text.
S. See infra notes 25, 27-3 1 and accompanyin text.
4. See, e.g.. Leslie Phillips., arching in Protest; Try to Crash Senate. USA TooAY. Oct.
9, 1991, at SA.
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the Thomas confirmation hearings and proposals to change the sys-
tem for nominating and confirming Supreme Court justices.'
This Essay argues that the existing process for the nomination
and confirmation of Supreme Court justices is sound, but that it
failed with respect to justice Thomas because many of the deci-
sionmakers did not strive to ensure the appointment of a justice
with the appropriate professional credentials, integrity, judicial tem-
perament and philosophy, and grounding in constitutional law.
Political choices and differentes rather than procedural defects ex-
plain any missteps injustice Thomas' nomination and confirmation.
The outcome turned in large part on deep-seated divisions among
the American people and their leaders over racial equality, the rele-
vance of race and sexually related conduct to the evaluation of
Supreme Court nominees, and the applicable burden of persuasion
in the Senate's confirmation proceedings. These divisions crippled
the confirmation hearings on justice Thomas, paralyzing much fruit-
ful discussion in the Senate on his qualifications to be an associate
justice, and culminating in the most closely divided vote ever in
favor of the confirmation of a Supreme Court justice.6
Part I identifies the common elements of those moments when the
nomination and confirmation process has worked most effectively.
At its best, the process has enabled the President and the Senate to
push each other to consider seriously the nominee's professional ac-
complishments, judicial temperament and philosophy, intellectual
integrity, and ability to bring ideological balance or diversity to the
Court. At its worst, the process has failed to prevent the President,
the Senate, or both, from caring primarily about the immediate
political gains of an appointment, and thus from being indifferent or
even consciously opposed to considering any of the factors truly rel-
evant to selecting competent jurists.
Part II criticizes President Bush, justice Thomas, and many sena-
tors for their performances in the nomination and confirmation of
justice Thomas, and particularly for allowing justice Thomas' race
and background to turn the focus of the process away from the fac-
tors that appropriately identify those meriting a seat on the
5. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, Bush Launches Strike at Congress: President Calls Lawmakers
Privileged Class of Rulers' WASH. POST, Oct. 25. 1991, at Al; David Lauter & Ronald J.
Ostrow. Vays Sought to Improve Confirmation Proceedings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17. 1991, at Al;
A thony Lewis. Lessons of Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at A17; Robert F. Nagel.
.\o Show Show: Refonn the Hearings, New REpuauc, Oct. 7, 1991, at 20; David E. Rosen-
baum. The Thomas Confirmation: Selection Process Under Attack onAll Sides. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
17. 1991. at A22; see also Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Advice Serousl: An Immodest Proposal
for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. RIV. 1577 (1992) ("If we are to give
effect to the advice provision, then, we must create a system that grants the Senate an
institutional role in the selection of nominees, but one that does not bind the President's
hands.").
6. The Senate confirmed Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court by a 52-48 vote.
137 CONG. Rec. S14.704-05 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991). The only other favorable confir-
mation vote that comes as close as the Senate's 26-23 vote in 1857 to confirm Nathan
Clifford. President Polk's Attorney General and an ardent defender of slavery. See LAu-
RENCE H. TasoE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CuoICE or SUPREME
CoURTJUSTICEs SHAPES OUR HISTORY 88 (1985).
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Supreme Court. This Part condemns (1) the President's purely par-
tisan decision to nominate Justice Thomas because of the latter's
race and ideology, (2) justice Thomas' reliance on his handlers'
"Pin Point Strategy"7 rather than his professional record in the
hearings, and (3) the Senate's general falure to seize on the appro-
priate issues-competency and credibility-for evaluating justice
Thomas.
Part III suggests that, although no proposal for modifying the
nomination and confirmation process can protect the nation from
errors in human judgment, some minpr changes can prevent di-
vided government from obstructing the appointment of qualified
persons, and make it easier for the participants to focus on some-
thing more noble than the petty political concerns of the moment.
This Part proposes that the public and the Senate should pressure
the President to take more seriously his own public rhetoric about
nominating qualified people for the Court in spite of any ideological
baggage they may carry. This Part further proposes that the Senate
should (1) focus primarily on the nominee's full public record, (2)
follow the lead of senators such as Albert Gore and Paul Simon, who
suggested putting the burden of persuasion on the President, his
nominee, or both, (3) steadfastly oppose any nominee whose ideol-
ogy the Senate opposes or whose level of professional experience it
finds wanting, and (4) schedule hearings shortly after the President
selects his nominee in order to prevent the nominee from being in-
doctrinated by his handlers.
. The Lessons of History: A Brief Overview of the Nomination and
Confirmation Process
To provide some perspective on the battle over Justice Clarence
Thomas' appointment to the Supreme Court, it is useful to consider
what generally distinguishes successes from failures in the nomina-
tion and confirmation process. The obvious starting point for such
analysis is the Appointments Clause, which provides that the Presi-
dent "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point . .. judges of the supreme Court."" This Clause reflects the
framers' intent that the politically accountable branches of the fed-
eral government-the President and the Senate-each perform seri-
ous roles in determining the composition of the third branch.
7. Richard L. Berke. The Thomas Hearings: In Thomas' Hearing Room. Spirits of Hear-
ings Past. N.Y. Taus, Sept. 11. 1991. at A25 (describing justice Thomas' handlers' "Pin
Point Strategy," which required justice Thomas to remind the senators on the judiciary
Committee whenever possible about his difficult childhood and upbringing in Pin Point.
Georgia, in order to keep them from focusing the hearings on his professional record).
8. U.S. CoNST. art. II, I 2.
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Although the President and the Senate invariably consider the polit-
ical ramifications of their decisions regarding appointments,. the
history of the nomination and confirmation process shows signifi-
cant moments in which the President and the Senate have pushed
each other to look past the immediate-often petty-political gains
of a Supreme Court appointment for the sake of promoting certain
political ideals, particularly with respect to the improvement, bal-
ance, and quality of the third branch.
At its best, the process has enabled the President and the Senate
to cooperate in making considered judgments on the Supreme
Court nominee's professional experience, judicial temperament and
philosophy, intellectual integrity, and capacity to provide ideologi-
cal diversity or balance on the Supreme Court.' 0 Although these
9. See infra note 26 and accompanying text; see abo Calvin R. Massey, Getting There:A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments, 19 HAsTINGs CoNsT. L.Q, 1I(1990) (analyzing the history of Supreme Court appointments in tenns of "failed nomi-
nations," "controversial but successful nominations," "instances in which the President
nominated the Senate's choice," and "instances in which the President has let the Court(or an individual justice) dictate the choice").
10. No consensus exists in favor of these factors. Some people might even vehe-
mently oppose them, especially those who believe appointing justces who share a spe-
cific ideology is in the Court's. Constitution's. and nation's best interests. I stand bythese factors. however, because I believe they do not give an undue advantage to any
reasonable view of constitutional interpretation and because they comport with what I
regard as the essential judicial function, which is to mediate between competing consti-tutional visions. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 COSINEL . RV. 1358.1390-92 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLIT-
^CAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1989)) (hereinafter Gerhardt, Interpreting Bark]; Michael J.Gerhardt, The Rol- of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory. 60 GEo. WAsH. L.REv. 68. 140-47 (1991) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Rote of Precedent]. Many who favor ap-pointing only justices who share a particular ideology may do so because they believethat there is a single correct answer to every interpretive question about the Constitu-tion, and that their particular ideology is the inexorable guide to those answers or re-
sults. Although I believe that some seminal cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S. 483 (1954), can be defended in terms ofa variety of respectable judicial ideolo-gies, I suspect most Americans share the view that the Court is at its best when it (1)
coicedes that cases must bc judged on their facts and that no single theory of constitu.tional interpretation can explain all of constitutional law, and (2) fosters an open dia.logue on constitutional issues. See generally HARRY H. WELLINGTON. IsrERPRETING THECONSTITUION 158 (1990) ("For what the Court decides is both derived from public
values and in turn shapes public values. It is this interaction-this complex and robustdialogue-that ultimately makes final the meaning of our fundamental law."): Richard A.Posner, Bark and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365. 1371 (1990) ("(Tihe Court's survival
and flourishing are indeed more likely to depend on the political accountability of its
results than on its adherence to an esoteric philosophy of tnterpretation.").
For examples of other scholars' criteria for evaluattng nominees. see TRIBE. supra note6. at 94. 96. 106-07 (suggesting that, beyond determining a nomince's basic competencyto sit on the Court, senators should determine whether the nominee's "vision of whatthe Constitution means" comes within the bounds of the "American vision' (em hasis
omitted) and whether the nominee's appointment "would upset the Court's equili rium
or exacerbate what [they regard) as an already excessive conservative or liberal bias");Charles L. Black. Jr.. A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nomines, 79 YALEL.J. 657. 657 (1970) (maintaining that a senator should vote against confirmation if he
or she "firmly believes, on reasonable grounds, that the nominee's views on the largeissues of the day will make it harmful to the country for him (or her] to sit and vote onIhe Court"); Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?. 101 HARv. L.REV. 1202, 1207 (1988) (proposing that senators should feel free to vote against aSupreme Court nominee based on "statesmanship, prudence, common sense, and poli.tics"); William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, aid Duties of the Senate inl the Sipenme CourtAppointment Process, 28 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 633. 681 (1987) (arguing that a senator
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factors may not be perfectly neutral, they generally have played to
the advantage of both political parties over the years and have fos-
tered the appointment of distinguished Supreme Court justices with
varied backgrounds and respectable constitutional visions.
For the sake of brevity, I offer only a few examples in which presi-
dents, senators, or both, have based their respective nomination and
confirmation decisions on some or all of the above factors. Perhaps
the most famous example is Republican President Hoover's nomi-
nation of Benjamin Cardozo, who at the time of his appointment
was the revered chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals.I
Although Justice Cardozo was a Demo'crat, and would have been the
third New Yorker and the second Jew on the Supreme Court, the
Senate, numerous distinguished academics, and labor leaders de-
manded that President Hoover nominate justice Cardozo because
they believed the times warranted the kind of intellectual distinction
and balance he could bring to the Court.' 2
Similarly, President Eisenhower-a Republican-nominated as
associate justice the highly regarded NewJersey Supreme CourtJus-
tice William Brennan-a Democrat-to show the President's willing-
ness to add political diversity to the Court.s Two of President
Eisenhower's other appointments to the Supreme Court, Justices
John Harlan and Potter Stewart, although both solid Republicans,
were overwhelmingly confirmed by the Democrat-controlled Sen-
ate-despite some staunch opposition from southern segregation-
ists-because each had demonstrated first-rate legal minds,
intellectual integrity, and even judicial temperaments. Justice
Harlan had practiced law for over twenty-five years and served
briefly as a judge on the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 4
Justice Stewart had received widespread praise for his judicial re-
straint, acumen, and independence during his four years as a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.I' Simi-
larly, although ideology, heritage, or friendship obviously mattered
in the nominations of Justices Louis Brandeis,O Harlan Fiske
should vote against confirmation of any nominee "whose fundamental judicial or polit-
ical values differ from those of the senator"); Gary J. Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A
Proposed Approach to Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 CoNsT. COMMENTARY
283, 289 (1990) (suggesting that each senator should consider a nominee's positions
with regard to "Itlhe outcome of cases of major national significance[, plublic confi-
dence in the Supreme Court(. and tihe fairness and efficiency of the Supreme Court's
decisionmaking process").
I1. Set HENaYJ. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTs: A POLITCAL HISTORY OF Ar-
POINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 204-07 (3d ed. 1992); Massey. supra note 9. at II-
12.
12. ABRAHAM, supra note II, at 204-07; Massey, supra note 9. at 11-12.
IS. ABRAHAM. supra note 11, at 265-67; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 52.
14. See ABRAHAM, Jupra note II, at 262-65.
15. Id. at 271-75.
16. Id. at 180-84; see abo ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN's LIFE 466
[VOL. 60:969 1992)972 973
Stone,' 7 Felix Frankfurter,' Abe Fortas,' 9 and Thurgood Mar-
shall,20 they each had, at the time of their respective appointments,
virt'ally unparalled professional accomplishments.2'
Among the more recent appointments, justices John Paul Ste-
vens, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter were highly regarded
lawyers and judges at the time of their nominations. Justice Stevens
graduated first in his college and law school classes, and was a na-
tionally renowned antitrust lawyer and independent judge for five
years on the United Stales Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit.22 Justice Kennedy served with distinction as a federal court of
appeals judge for over twelve years;23 and Justice Souter had re-
ceived widespread praise as a state attorney general, trial court
judge, and supreme court justice in New Hampshire.2' Justices Ste-
vens', Kennedy's, and Souter's public records merited and received
(1946) (discussing President Wilson's esteem for justice Brandeis on a personal level);
MLvIN I. UROFSKY, A MIND OF ONE PUct: BRANDEIS AND AMERICAN REFORM 119-25
(1971) (discussing President Wilson's respect for and frequent reliance on the advice of
justice Brandeis prior to his nomination).
17. See ALPitus T. MASON. HARLAN Fiast STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 18 1-85 (1956)
("[Presidenti Coolidge's decision to appoint Stone was prompted by ... his record(,] ...
independencel.] . . . his political services, . . . and personal friendship.").
I. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 220-25; Tas, supra note 6. at 84-85.
19. See ABRAHAM. supra note I I, at 288-90; see also LAuRA KALMAN, ARE FORTAS: A
BIOGRAPHY 241-48 (1990) (discussing President Johnson's friendship with and respect
for Justice Fortas prior to his nomination).
20. See ABRAHAM, supra note it. at 292-94; see also infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
21. Justice Brandeis graduated first in his Harvard Law School class and practiced
law for over forty years in Boston. During this time, he devoted himself to numerous
public causes including, but not limited to. his arbitration of labor disputes in New
York's garment industry, and arguments before the Court in support of the constitution-
ality of state maximum hour and minimum wage statutes. See URoFsRy, supra note 16;
MAsON, supra note 16. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone practiced law for twenty-five years with
a Wall Street law firm. He then served, in succession, as a professor at and Dean of the
Columbia Law School, Attorney General of the United States, associate justice of the
Supreme Court, and finally chief justice. See MASON. supra note 17. at 77-181. Prior to
his appointment to the Supreme Court. justice Frankfurter was a distinguished proes-
sor of constitutional, administrative, and labor law at Harvard Law School; helpe found
The New Republic; and served in a variety of public positions and as an informal advisor to
President Roosevelt in formulating the New Deal. See ABRAHAM. supra note 11. at 220-
25; TsIBt. supra note 6. at 84-85. Justice Fortas was editor of the Yale Law journal.
served as an advisor to various Democratic politicians, founded the prestigious Wash-
ington, D.C. law firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter, defended many victims of Mc-
Carthyism, and litigated several major civil rights cases, including Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See ABRAHAM. supra note I1, at 288-90; KALMAN. Supra
note 19. After graduating at the top of his class from Howard Law School, justice Mar-
shall served for over two decades as General Counsel to the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. During this time he won several landmark civil rights
cases in the Supreme Court. including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); was appointed by President Kennedy to sit on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit; and was appointed United States Solicitor General by Pres-
tdent Johnson. Justice Marshall won twenty-nine of the thirty-two cases he argued
before the Supreme Court. Se ABRAHAM. JUpra note II. at 292-94; see also infra note 137
and accompanying text.
22. See ABRAHAM, Supra note i1, at 327-31; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 108.
23. See ABRAHAM, supra note II, at 359.
24. See. e.g.. Paul R. Baier, The Court and lis Critics. A.B.A. J.. Feb. 1992. at 60-61
(refuting Bruce Fein's criticism of the professional abilities of recent Court appoint-
ments including justices Kennedy and Souter); Richard L. Berke. Senate Confins Souter.
90 to 9, As Supreme Court's 105th justice. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1990. at Al (referring to
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strong bipartisan support in the Senate, which was controlled by the
Democrats at the time each was nominated.
There also have been times when the Senate has focused as much
on the net impact of adding the candidate to the Court as on the
opinions of the nominee himself. In this century, the Senate re-
jected President Hoover's nomination of the concededly competent
Judge John Parker of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit because it did not want to add another vote to the
Court's conservative, antilabor majority.* More recently, in one of
the most widely publicized nomination hearings in American his-
tory, the Senate rejected Robert Bork.'despite his distinguished pro-
fessional background, because it found that many of his views on
constitutional issues threatened well-settled American constitutional
jurisprudence and because it feared he would tip the Court's ideo-
logical balance too far to the right.28
At other times, though, presidents and senators have made petty
political judgments during the Supreme Court appointment pro-
cess. 27 Indeed, the first Senate rejected for the position of chiefjus-
tice President Washington's nomination of Associate justice John
Rutledge-a delegate to the constitutional convention-based on its
disagreement with Justice Rutledge's views on the United States'
treaty with Great Britain.2* In this century, the Senate confirmed
Justice Brandeis in 1916, but only after four months of Senate de-
bate marred by antisemitism and accusations that Justice Brandeis
was radical, anti-establishment, and anti-big-business.
20 In 1967,
Judicia Chairman Biden's statement regarding "the strong bi-partisan support" forjustice outer).
25. The Senate focused onjudge Parker's adherence to a Supreme Court precedent
upholding contracts that condttioned employment on not joining a labor union. See
ABRAuAM. supra note II, at 42-43. 200; Tase. supra note 6. at 34. 90-91; Massey. supra
note 9. at 6.
26. See Massey, supra note 9, at 6-7; Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, supra note 10, at
1386-90.
27. Some of those nominated to the Supreme Court for political and even ideolopi-
cal reasons also had diverse and distinguished professional experience. and became in-
tcllectual leaders or coalition builders for the betterment of constitutional doctrine on
the Court. Perhaps the most prominent example is President Eisenhower's nomination
of Earl Warren to Chief Justice to reward the latter's support at the 1952 Republican
Convention. See BERNARD ScuwAaRz, SuPnR CIEF, at 2 (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE.
EARL WARREN: A Pusuc Lars 138-40 (1982). Other examples of such appointments
include justices Hugo Black, ses GERALD T. DuNNE, HuGo BLAcK AND THE JUDICIAL
REvoLUTo 43-48 (1977), Robert Jackson, ses EUGENE C. GERHART. AMERICA'S Anvo-
cATE: ROBERT H. JAcKSoN 229-32 (1958). and Lewis Powell. see ABRAHAM supra note I1.
311.18. For a discussion of these and other politically motivated appointments to the
Court, see, for example, ABRAHAM, supra note 11; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 50-76.
28. For a discussion of the reasons for the Senate's rejections of Justice Rutledge
and other nominees throughout the nineteenth century and the first part of the twenti-
eth century. see ABRAHAM. supra note it, at 71-207; TIsE, supra note 6, at 77-92; Mas-
sey. upra note 9, at 5.
29. See ABRAHAM, supra note II, at 180-184; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 91.
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the Senate confirmed justice Marshall despite strong objections on
philosophical and overtly racist grounds.s0 In 1973, President Rich-
ard Nixon, frustrated over the Senate's rejection of the distin-
guished Fourth Circuit Judge Clement Haynesworth based on
claims of ethical impropriety and insensitivity to racism,
3
' nomi-
nated the lackluster judge Harold Carswell of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.32 The Senate wasted little
time in rejecting Judge Carswell for not being sufficiently
competent. 3
In the final analysis, the Appointments Clause of the Constitution
challenges the President and the Senate to put petty political con-
cerns aside to make deliberate and respectable judgments as to
whether particular appointments are in the nation's, the Court's,
and the Constitution's best long-term interests. The history of the
nomination and confirmation process suggests that sometimes the
responsible political actors meet this challenge, and sometimes they
do not. Part II suggests that the nomination and confirmation of
justice Clarence Thomas ranks more toward the merely political
rather than the nobler end of the spectrum of the Supreme Court
confirmation process.
II. A Case Study: The Ups and Downs of the Thomas Nomination
and Confirmation
This Part examines the respective political judgments of President
Bush, the Senate, and Justice Thomas himself, as major participants
in the nomination and confirmation of Clarence Thomas. It main-
tains that, for the most part, they each failed in their respective roles
to ensure the appointment of a Supreme Court justice with the ap-
propriate professional credentials, intellectual integrity, judicial
temperament and philosophy, and ability to maintain intellectual
distinction or balance on the Court.
A. The Thomas Nomination: President Bush's Racial Politics Meet the
Supreme Court
When President Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to fill the va-
cancy on the Court created by justice Marshall's resignation, no one
took seriously the President's characterization ofjustice Thomas as
"the best person" in the country to serve on the Court. 4 Justice
Thomas had limited professional distinction, with his most signifi-
cant legal experiences having been a controversial tenure as chair-
man of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and barely
more than one year of experience as a federal court of appeals
30. See ABRAHAM. supra note I1, at 292-95.
Si. See TRIBE. supra note 6. at 82. 88-89.
32. See id; Massey. supra note 9. at 7.
33. See TRIBE, Jupra note 6. at 82, 88-89; Massey. supra note 9. at 7-8.
34. John E. Yang & Sharon LaFraniere, Bush PicAs Thomas for Supreme Court, WAsH.
POST, July 2, 1991, at AI.
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judge. At forty-three. Justice Thomas was a controversial conserva-
tive who happened to be a judge rather than a distinguished judge-
such as Anthony Kennedy or David Souter-who also happened to
be a conservative.
Justice Thomas' race and ideology accounted for his nomination.
In nominating Justice Thomas, the President dared the Senate to
reject an African-American who combined an "up-by-the-boot-
straps" life storyss with Judge Robert Bork's flare for alienating lib-
eral interest groups and assailing popular or well-established,
rights-granting Supreme Court opinions. Justice Thomas' nomina-
tion was a bold political move calculated to make it more difficult for
many of the same civil rights organizations and southern blacks,
who opposed Judge Bork's nomination, to oppose justice
Thomas.3 In addition, Justice Thomas' nomination was designed
in part to remove political heat from the President's opposition to
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,3 7 which continued even in the midst of
the Thomas confirmation hearings.38 The Thomas nomination re-
flected President Bush's general political approach to civil rights:
The President hoped to mollify many whites dissatisfied with affirm-
ative action through his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 199 1,s
but he also hoped to attract more blacks to the Republican party
through his appointment of Justice Thomas. Thus, it was justice
Thomas' race and ideology, and not his professional credentials,
that made him uniquely qualified to merit President Bush's nomina-
tion to the Court.
40
In selecting Justice Thomas, President Bush returned to a prac-
tice-nominating extreme ideologues for the Supreme Court-that
many hoped had ended with the Senate's rejection of Judge Bork.
At the same time, President Bush was following President Reagan's
lead by relying on a small cadre of advisors to facilitate the selection
35. Linda Greenhouse, Who'sJudge Thomas? For Now, It Depends on Who You Are. N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1991. 14. at 4.
36. See Erwin Chcmerinsky, October Tragedy, 65 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1497 (1992).
37. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 became law on November 21. 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166. 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1 1981 (1991)).
38. See. e.g.. Adam Clymer. White House Rejects New Compromise on Rights. N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1991, at A16.
39. The President opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because he believed it
would lead to the implementation of racial quotas in hiring. See Adam Clymer, Senate
Democrats Back a Compromise on Civil Rights Big N.Y. Tsurs, Oct. 26. 1991. at Al.
40. Cf Reginald Alleyne. ThinA of the Outcry If This Nominee Were White, L.A. TimEs,
Sept. 10. 1991, at B7 (suggesting that "a white nominee with a record like Thomas'
would have a very difficult time winning Senate confirmation" and that a rejection of
judge Thomas would have left the Coun "without a black member, because President
Bush's nomination of another black would destroy his already ludicrous attempt to por-
tray the nomination of Thomas as one having nothing to do with race. Also, Thomas
may actually be the only prominently placed black in the United States whose views on
legal issues of race would be acceptable to the Bush Administration").
977[voL. 60:969 1992]976
of lederal judges with conservative views far to the right of the
judges that Republican Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford had
tended to appoint.' t For the most part, Reagan and Bush judges
are disposed to agree on a strong libertarian distrust of federal
power, as well as on confining the scope of-particularly federal-
statutes to their literal language, opposing federal court interfer-
ence with state legislation on the basis of unenumerated fundamen-
tal rights, allowing more religion in public life, giving little
deference to precedents that do not conform to their ideologies, de-
ferring to the executive'in separation of powers disputes, support-
ing the death penalty, rejecting or discounting claims of
constitutional violations in criminal convictions, and sometimes rec-
ognizing economic liberties enforceable against federal and state
governments.42
To understand how important ideology rather than experience or
competency is to the President's choice of federal judges, particu-
larly in the lower courts, one need look no further than the Presi-
dent's choice to replace justice Thomas on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, John Roberts.' 3 Rather
than choose from among numerous conservative and moderate
Republicans with substantially more legal or judicial experience,"
the President nominated Roberts, a thirty-seven-year-old white male
with modest legal experience, consisting of a prestigious law school
record, judicial clerkships, a few years in a big firm practice, a short
stint as Deputy Solicitor General, and, perhaps most notably, "im-
portant relationships with influential Bush administration officials,
especially among the corps of youthful GOP lawyers who are wield-
ing increasing influence in the federal government."4 5 Even though
41. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picing the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10. 1990. at Al; Amy Singer. A Federalist in the White House, Am. LAW.. Oct. 1991, at 87.
42. See Guido Calabresi. What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TimEs.July 28. 1991. J 4,
at 15 (denouncing the current majority's "aggressive, willful, statist" behavior); Earl
Maliz. The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Contsiutionaljurisprudence, 24 GA.
L. REV. 629 (1990) (describing the strands of conservatism reflected in contemporary
constitutional theory and decisionmaking); <f Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimina-
tion and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L.
Rev. 80. 83. 151 (1991) thereinafter Calabresi. What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores]
(describing the Reagan and Bush appointees as having "an activist outlook" and as
"generally supporting state power and eroding libertarian values"). The nomination of
judges and justices with such ideologies contrasts sharply with President Jimmy Carter's
system for merit selection of federal judges. See Charles R. Babcock, Picking Federal
Judges: Meril System vs. Park Bench, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7, 1978, at A4 (describing President
Carter's plan to establish a merit selection system for selecting federal judges, including
the establishment of special judicial selection commissions appointed by the President);
Stuart A. Taylor. Jr.. Carter judge Selections Praised, but Critics Discern Partisanship N.Y.
TIMes. Oct. 3, 1980, at Al (describing President Carter's merit selection system as par-
tially succeeding in removing partisanship in the nomination of federal judges).
43. See Daniel Klaidman. Bush Chooses Deputy SG for D.C. Circuit, LLcAL TiMEs, Dec.
16. 1991, a 1.
44. Id. (indicating Bush passed over "better-known and more seasoned contenders,
including Judge Michael Boudin of the [United States] District Court for the District of
Columbia and Stuart Gerson, assistant attorney general for the justice Department's
Civil Division").
45. Id at 17; see also Saundra Torry, D.C. Lawyer M1lay Be Named to Fill Thomas' Seat,
WAsn. POST, Dec. 21, 1991. at A5.
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Roberts will be younger than a substantial majority of lawyers prac-
ticing before him, his appointment serves the goal of packing the
judiciary with ideologues, preferably young, who have had little ex-
perience to inform their judgment.4 6 Justice Thomas also fits this
mold, being younger than many of the distinguished lawyers ap-
pearing before him and expecting to serve far longer on the Court
than he spent in training to get there.
The tragic effect of President Bush's apparent attitude about judi-
cial nominations is that this is the longest period in American his-
tory in which one political party has without interruption made
appointments to the Supreme Court.' 7 President Bush and his
small cadre of advisors has helped to solidify the most ideologically
unbalanced Court-as well as the most hostile to civil rights-since
the Fuller Court, which decided Plessy v. Ferguson48 in 189 6 .* The
degree to which Justice Thomas fulfills White House plans to over-
haul the federal courts becomes even clearer in the next subpart,
which examines justice Thomas' performance during his confirma-
tion hearings.
B. Clarence Thomas: The Divided Justice
Essentially, justice Thomas' confirmation hearings consisted of
two phases, the first of which focused on his views on constitutional
issues (Phase 1) and the second of which dealt with Professor Anita
Hill's charges of sexual harassment (Phase II). Before, during, and
after the confirmation proceedings, more than one image ofJustice
Thomas appeared in the public eye. It remains to be seen which of
these personas will emerge as an associate justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
Prior to his nomination to the Court, Clarence Thomas appeared
to be a man at war with himself and his heritage. While he admitted
to having benefited from affirmative action programs at Yale Law
46. Yet another exam ple is the recent appointment ofJudgeJ. Michael Luttig, age:
thirty-seven, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Saundra
Torry. Some judges Decide a Lifetim on the Federal Bench Is Too Long, WASH. PosT, Jan. 20.
1992. at FS. Shortly after being confirmed by the Senate. Judge Luttig received wide-
spread criticism for continuing to work as an advisor to justice Thomas in the later's
confirmation hearings in spite of the Code ofjudicial Conduct for United States judges.
which "discourages judges from engaging in 'political activity' and from any conduct
that a ears to compromise their independence or impartiality." Robb London, A Ques-
tion hics for a NewJudge, N.Y. Ta Iss. Oct. 18. 1991. at B16.
4 . See ABRAHAM, supra note I1, at app. D.
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49. See Calabresi. What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores, supra note 42, at 83. 151; A.
Leon Higginbotham. Jr.. An Open ultter to justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal judicial
Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005. 1027 (1992) (urging justice Thomas not to aid the
Court in its continuing "retreat from protecting the rights of the poor, women, the dis-
advantaged, minorities, and the powerless") (footnote omitted).
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School,50 he characterized such programs as "offensive."51 In addi-
tion, despite often claiming that he had not sought civil rights-re-
lated jobs because he believed others saw them as the only legal
work appropriate for African-Americans, he eventually turned down
an opportunity to work in the White House on energy and environ-
mental issues and instead agreed to serve as Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights in the Department of Education, and later as Chairman
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 2 Re-
grettably, none of these positions, even combined with his experi-
ence for little more than a year as a federal appellate judge, required
Thomas to spend much meaningful time doing the kind of work ex-
pected of Supreme Court justices, including critiquing and crafting
legal decisions and arguments.
During the hearings, Justice Thomas consciously cast himself as
someone other than the often strident and controversial govern-
ment figure he had been in the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Following the Pin Point strategy, 5s Justice Thomas used every op-
portunity in the hearings to remind the senators about his impover-
ished youth, his grandfather's heroic nurturing, and the love and
care he received from the nuns at the Catholic schools he had at-
tended, rather than his professional accomplishments. 5 Justice
Thomas tried to have it both ways; claiming that most of his profes-
sional record was not relevant to his judicial performance but that
he was otherwise uniquely qualified to become an associate justice.
The same man, who dared the senators to base their confirmation
decisions on the merits of his appointment rather than his race, con-
stantly avoided claiming that his professional record reflected any-
thing pertinent to the consideration of his nomination. Justice
Thomas implied that he would be an "empty vessel" who would de-
cide cases strictly as the law dictated, but who would still somehow
be influenced in a positive way by his unique upbringing.5s
50. RuthMarcus. Thomas Afirms Right to NIvar, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1991, at A1;
cf Higginbotham, supra note 49, at 1018 ("I submt that even your distinguished under-
graduate college. Holy Cross, and Vale University were influenced by the milicu createdy [Brown v. Board of Education. 547 U.S. 483 (1954).) and thus became more sensitive
to the need to create programs for the recruitment of competent minority students. In
short, isn't it possible that you might not have gone to Holy Cross if the NAACP and
other civil rights organizations, Martin Luther King and the Supreme Court, had not
recast the racial mores of America? And if you had not gone to Holy Cross, and instead
had gone to some underfunded state college for Negroes in Georgia, would you have ...
met the alumni who have played such a prominent role in maximizing your professional
options?").
51. Neil A. Lewis, Thomai'Journey on Path of Slf-Help, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1991, atA12.
52. See David A. Kaplan, Supreme Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16. 1991. at 18, 30.
53. See supra note 7.
54. See. eg., The Thomas Hearings: Excerpt from Senate Session on the Thomas Nomination.
N.Y. TIMES. Sept. I, 1991. at A22.
55. Richard L. Berke, Thomas Vote Delayed Until Tuesday, N.Y. TIMs, Oct. 2, 1991. at
A20 (quoting Senator Paul Wellstone); Tom Wicker, A Court of Mediocrity, N.Y. Tiaus,Oct. 6. 1991. 14. at 17 (quoting same).
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Given the Pin Point strategy5 e in Phase I, justice Thomas ap-
peared to be either lying or woefully uninformed. It stretched cre-
dulity for Justice Thomas to claim that he never seriously discussed
Roe v. Wade57 with anyone during or after law school,a even though
Roe was one of the most important constitutional law cases decided
by the Court in the past twenty-five years and he had criticized it
more than once in his public statements and writings."59 Justice
Thomas further stretched credulity when he claimed that he signed,
but never read, at least one government report deriding Roe, that he
never read a criticism of Roe that he had publicly praised, and that
he had no personal opinion regarding Roe despite his public con-
demnations of the controversial case.6o Even if it were possible that
justice Thomas had not read these documents before being nomi-
nated, it is astonishing that he did not read them in preparation for
the hearings when he must or should have known he would be ques-
tioned about them.
In addition, it stretched credulity for Justice Thomas to protest
repeatedly in Phase I of the proceedings that his controversial
speeches and articles-often critiquing liberal policies and Court
rulings-had not expressed any personal opinions he held or would
hold as a justice with respect to judicial decisionmaking. For exam-
ple. he testified that he did not "see a role for the use of natural law
in constitutional adjudication" and that his "interest in exploring
natural law . . . was purely in the context of political theory." 6 1 Yet
his writings consistently reflect a belief that natural law is a legiti-
mate basis for judicial decisionmaking.2 For example, in a 1989 law
review article, then-EEOC Chairman Thomas wrote that:
without recourse to higher law, we abandon our best defense of
judicial review-a judiciary active in defending the Constitution,
but judicious in its restraint and moderation. Rather than being a
justification of the worst type ofjudicial activism, higher law is the
only alternative to the willfulness of both run-amok majorities and
run-amok judges.es
56. See supra note 7.
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. See Neil A. Lewis, At the Bar: The Press Is Caught in a Afisrepresentation of Clarence
Thomas' Words, or is It?, N.Y. TiMaS, Dec. 20, 1991, at B9 (summarizing and evaluating
Justice Thomas' testimony regarding Roe).
59. Se, e.g., Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Phileges or immunities
Clas of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv.j.L. & Pus. PoL'v 63, 63 n.2 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Thomas, Higher Law Background); ClarenccITomas, Why Black Conservatives Should
Look to Conservative Policies, Speech to Heritage Foundation (une 18, 1987) [herein.
after Thomas, Why Black Conservatives).
60. See Lewis, supra note 58, Chemerinsky, supra note 36.
61. Confusion Rules over Natural Law: Rivals Find Ammunition in Theory. BOSToN GLOBE.
Sept. 12, 1991, at 16.
62. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. Thomas, Higher Law Background, supra note 59, at 63-64.
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Yet another problematic-and perhaps deceptive-piece of testi-
mony was justice Thomas' statement regarding the Court's 5-4 de-
cision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,64 which upheld FCC
broadcast license issuing policies favoring racial and ethic minori-
ties. When asked whether he agreed with Metro Broadcasting, Justice
Thomas testified, "I have had no basis at a judge to disagree with
it."@ Yet, within days, the Legal Times broke a story suggesting jus-
tice Thomas was trying to protect his nomination by withholding
from publication an opinion he had just written in which he ques-
tioned the reach of Metro Broadcasting and struck down the FCC's
policy preference for women in broadcast licensing." Justice
Thomas denied that he was withholding the opinion for political
reasons,67 but he proceeded to release the opinion as reported
months after his confirmation.68
Similarly, in yet another apparent contradiction, Justice Thomas
testified that he accepted a marital right of privacy but held no per-
sonal opinion about privacy cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,"9
even though he had described the holding as a judicial "inven-
tion."70 If Justice Thomas were to be taken at his word, the ques-
tion becomes how well suited for the Supreme Court is someone
who did not hesitate to take public positions on controversial issues
about which he never has read or studied seriously, showed ques-
tionable judgment regarding his preparation to defend his record in
the only public forum in which he could be held accountable, and
exhibited virtually no intellectual curiosity about the most dominant
subject area-constitutional law-with which he would be dealing
on the Court.
During Phase II of the hearings,7 the image of justice Thomas
that emerged was no more appealing than the one that had ap-
peared in Phase 1. His characterization of Phase 11 of the hearing as
64. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
65. Stuart Taylor, Jr.. Bere the Judicial Overide, N.Y. TiMss. Oct. 3. 1991. at A25.
66. See Neil A. Lewis, Appeals Court Ruling by Thomas Limits FCC. Affirmative Action,
N.Y. Times. Feb. 20, 1992, at At.
67. Id.
68. On February 19, 1992. Justice Thomas. by special designation, returned to the
appellate court to release his opinion (joined by Jude James Buckley. over a strongdissent by ChiefJudge Abner Mikva) in Lamprecht v. F C No. 88-1395, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1997 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 1992). striking down the FCC's policy giving preferen-
tial treatment to women in awarding broadcast licenses. In explaining that t e policy
was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection of the law to white men, justice
Thomas rejected Metro Broadcasting's expressed deference to con ressional fact-fnding
in support of its laws on the ground that "the Government had ailed to show that its
sex- reference policy is substantially related to achieving diversity on the airwaves." Id.
69. ForJustice Thomas' testimony on Griswold. see, for example, Linda P. Campbell,
Thomas Supports a Right to Privaq; Reply Surprises Democrats; judge Won t Duscuss Abortion.
Cuca. Tais.. Sept. It. 1991, at Al.
70. Clarence Thomas. Cit'I R'idhs as a PriscIt Versus Civil Rights an ilinterest, in As-
7ES1SNG THE REAGAN YARs 598 avid Bts. e. 1988).
7 1. See text preceding jupra note 50.
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"a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks" 72 was shockingly hypocriti-
cal for at least two reasons. First, Justice Thomas and his sponsor,
Senator John Danforth, had asked for the Phase II hearings.
73 Sec-
ond, Justice Thomas spent much of his professional life criticizing
other African-Americans for blaming the ills that befell them on ra-
cism rather than their own shortcomings.74 He even denounced his
sister by invoking the stereotype of a "welfare queen,"75 although
he had her sit behind him during his confirmation testimony.
If the nominee that appeared at the hearings was not the real
Clarence Thomas, but rather a caricature. molded by his handlers,
then one can only wonder who is the real Clarence Thomas and
whether he is qualified to sit on the Court. Was it the real Clarence
Thomas who, in a 1987 speech, praised Lewis Lehrman's pro-life
oriented critique of Roe v. Wade as "a splendid example" of the ap-
plication of natural law to judicial decisionmaking;76 or was it the
real Clarence Thomas who testified in 1987 that he only "skimmed"
the Lehrman article?77 Was it the real Clarence Thomas who testi-
fied before the Senate Judiciary Committee that he was qualified to
sit on the Supreme Court because he had the compassion to ponder
"but for the grace of God[,] there go I" whenever he saw a busload
of prisoners coming to the District of Columbia Courthouse?78 Or
was it the real Clarence Thomas who, in one of his first dissents,
sharply criticized the seven member majority for applying the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment to con-
finement conditions in general and to the gratuitous beating of a
black inmate?79 Was it the real Clarence Thomas who testified
72. The Thomas Nomination: Exceps from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas NominationN.Y. Tims, Oct. 12. 199 1. at A 12.
73. See Chemerinsky, supra note 36.
74. See. e.g.. Derrick Z.Jackson. Hardly a Lynch Victim. BoTON GLoas. Oct. 16, 1991.
at 15. In the aftermath of Thomas' confirmation, these charges prompted an open letter
from judge A. Leon Hligginbotham, Jr.. who was somewhat skeptical of Justice Thomas
and other black conservatives. "Other than their own self-advancement. I am at a loss to
understand what iis that the so-called black conservatives are so anxious co conserve.-
Higginbotham, supra note 49. at 1018.
75. Charles R. Lawrence Ill. Perspectives on the Thomas Controversy. L.A. Times. Oct.
15, 1991. at B7; see also Murray Kempton. What About the Children. Senators?, NEWSDAY.
Sept. 18, 1991, at 13 (referring to justice Thomas. then-EEOC chairman, as havin
"trashicdi his nephews as welfare addicts"); Neil A. Lewis. Thomas*Journey on Path of Set
Help, N.Y. TIMas.July 7, 1991. at A12 (quotingjusice Thomas. then EEOC Chairman,
as sayi is sister "gets mad when the mailman is late with the check").
76. Tomnas. Why Black Conservatives. scipra note 59, at 8.
77. Ruth Marcus, Thomas Refuas to State View on Abortion issue: Nominee Steadfast amid
Senators' Questionu. WASH. POST. Sept. 12. 1991, at Al. A4.
78. Excrt from Snates Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIusS, Sept. 13.
1991. at AlS
79. Joined only by justice Scalia. justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment did not protect prisoners from beatings by
puards unless the prisoners suffered serious injuries. Justice Thomas scolded the major-
ity, including ChiefJustice Rehnquist, for adhering to precedents which "cut the Eighth
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under oath, that he had no judicial ideology hostile to liberal judicial
decisionmaking-regardless of any public statements to the con-
trary-but who has voted differently from Justice Scalia, the Court's
most strident conservative ideologue, only twice thus far.80 First, as
the sole dissenter in Dawson v. Delaware, justice Thomas caustically
attacked Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion ruling that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit, in the capital sentenc-
ing phase of a murder trial, the introduction of evidence of a de-
fendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood which began after
the defendant had become a prisoner for the crime for which he was
being sentenced.8 The second divergence occurred "when [Jus-
tice] Scalia issued a three sentence concurrence in a minor case in-
volving federal [civil] procedture." 82
Ultimately, the irony of Justice Thomas' career may be that, de-
spite his lifelong protestations to the contrary, he may be
remembered primarily for his work in civil rights. Indeed, he has
done little, if any, memorable work in any other area. Justice
Thomas has reached a point at which it would be futile to protest
further against being associated closely with the one area of the law
that he claimed he sought to avoid.83 The question now facing him
is: In rising above his impoverished background, how much of it did
justice Thomas leave behind? We can only wonder in what ways he
will use his race, his impoverished background, the lessons his
grandfather taught him, and the discrimination he often has faced-
Amendment loose from its historical moorings" by applying it to both punishment and
confinement conditions. See Hudson v. McMillian. 60 U.S.L.W. 4151, 4155. 4157 (U.S.
Feb. 25. 1992) (Thomas.J.. dissenting), see also David Margolick, At the Bar: From a Lonely
Pn on Cell, an Inmate Wis an Important Victo-ryfor Civil Liberties. N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1992,
at B8 (describing how a prison guard, after using racially abusive language, beat Hudson
for washing his laundry in his cell toilet). In another of his first votes, Justice Thomasjoined ChiefJustice Rehnquist andjustice Scalia in dissenting from the Court's decision
to override justice Scalia's ruling as a Circuit justice to reverse an order staying an exe-
cution. See Collins v. May, 112 S. Ct. 576 (1 91).
80. See L. Gordon Crovitz. jutice Thomasts] Opinion: No Wonder They Wanted to Stop
Him, WALL ST.J..Jan. 29. 1992. at AIS (indicating "Justice Thomas has voted with jus.
tice Scalia more than any otherJustice" and suggesting that "Justice Thomnas already has
done more than solidify the intellectual conservative wing of the Court. It also seems
likely that his lifelong career on the Supreme Court will be a constant reminder to his
critics of why they went to such lengths to try to block his nomination"): Ruth Marcus,
Early Retursu Show justice Thomas as Advertised: Conservative, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1992, at
A6; see also Linda Greenhouse, judicious Activism: justice Thomas Hits the Ground Running,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, 14, at I (criticizing Justice Thomas for his "willingness to
discard precedents in which the Court departed from the search for the original under-
standing," for chiding the majority in Hudson "for endorsing 'the pervasive view that the
Federal Constitution must address all ills of our society.' and for using a tone in his
opinions "reminiscent of the speeches in which [he] used to criticize the Court when he
served as one of the Reagan Administration's chief emissaries to conservatives inter.
ested in reshaping the Federal judiciary. At his confirmation hearing, he said he had
made the speeches as a 'part-time political theorist.' but that when he became a Federal
judge [he) had 'shed the baggage of ideology' ").
81. Dawson v. Delaware, 60 U.S.L.W. 4197, 4201 (U.S. Mar. 9. 1992) (Thomas.J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that majority's "Idlenying that Ithe defendant's] gang member-
ship told the jury anything about his activities, tendencies, and traits-his 'character'-
ignores reality").
82. Marcus. supra note 80.
83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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all of which he presented as the only basis on which the Senate
should confirm him 8 4-to become an effective spokesperson on the
Supreme Court in dealing with the civil rights issues that surely will
come his way. In short, willjustice Thomas tell the same stories on
the Court that he told in his confirmation hearings, and will a more
formidable, coherent, uplifting and lasting vision of constitutional
law ever emerge from the beneficiary of the Pin Point Strategy?
C. The Senate: "You Take the High Road, and I'll Take the Low Road"
To appreciate the effectiveness of the Pin Point strategy
85 it is
Important to analyze separately the performance of the Democratic
and Republican senators in each phase of the confirmaton hear-
ings.88 Despite beginning somewhat cautiously in Phase I with their
criticism, the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee-with
the exception of Senator DeConcini-cventually took Justice
Thomas to task for his evasive testimony, surprisingly weak grasp of
constitutional law, and dubious credentials. For example, Senator
Metzenbaum opposed Justice Thomas based on the latter's contro-
versial record as Chairman of the EEOC, unbelievable testimony
before the Judiciary Committee, and inadequate "legal credentials"
to serve on the Court;8 7 Senator Leahy opposed justice Thomas be-
cause the nominee lacked "the experience and qualifications that a
Supreme Court Justice ought to have";88 Senator Kohl opposed Jus-
tice Thomas for his "selective recall," "lack of legal curiosity," and
"limited legal knowledge";8 and Senator Heflin voted against Jus-
tice Thomas' confirmation because Justice Thomas lacked credibil-
ity and compeency.na Nevertheless, Justice Thomas' evasive
answers and expressions 'of ignorance*' had little negative impact
on the Senate's portended vote at the conclusion of Phase I.92
In addiionJustice Thomas' performance in Phase I often seemed
to hinder the senators from pursuing a more elevated discussion
with him regarding constitutional law and his intellectual fitness to
84. See supra notes 53-54d accompanying text.
85. See supra note 7.
86. Professor Chemerinsky notes that the Pin Point Strategy worked particularly
well with a number of the southern Democrats, who approved ofjustice Thomas' vews
on affirmative action and were keenly awaret of their support came fro Al
can-Americans. who tended to support Thomas. See Chemeinnky, supra note 36.
87. See The Thomas Nomination: Excerpts from Remarks by iembers of Senate judioal Panel
on Thomas, N.Y. Taur.s. Sept. 28. 1991, I 1. at 8.
88. Id
89. See id.
90. See Richard L. Berke. Two Democrats on Senate Panel Say They Will Oppose Thomas.
N.Y. Timas, Sept. 27, 1991, at Al.
91. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
92. See.g. Neil A. Lewis. The Thomas tHrings. Thomas to tein Court Seat. Seato
Predict. N.Y. T IMEs. Sept. 14. 1991. I 1. at .
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serve on the Court, often deflecting or obstructing more intensive
interrogation. First, in response to questioning from Senator
Leahy, justice Thomas stated he did not debate Roe v. Wade as a law
student because he was married and working at the time, and "did
not spend a lot of time around the law school doing what all the
other students enjoyed so much, and that is debating all the current
cases."93 Yet Newsweek reported that, as a student, justice Thomas
usually "spent the entire day at (law] school, not going home until
after midnight." Justice Thomas again evaded an attempt to en-
gage him in a discussion of constitutional law when he later testified,
in the midst of questioning from Senator Leahy, that he did not be-
lieve there were any cases holding that fetuses are not persons enti-
tled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.95 The
obvious answer was Roe, which held that fetuses are not "persons"
for constitutional purposes.96 Afraid of appearing to badger the
witness, senators did not use Justice Thomas' ignorance about the
elementary holding of a case, which even he acknowledged as being
one of the most important constitutional law cases decided in this
century," to stress that Justice Thomas lacked the intellectual dis-
tinction or fitness to serve on the Court.98
Second, justice Thomas' testimony that he thought the Supreme
Court upheld a private employer's policy barring pregnant women
from working on jobs that might harm their fetuses was equally
damning. 99 In fact, the Court struck down just such a policy as vio-
lating federal employment discrimination laws (Title VII) in Interna-
tional Union, U.A. W. v. Johnson Controls. oo Johnson Controls was one of
the most important Title VII decisions last term and was within jus-
tice Thomas' supposed area of specialization; yet his misstatement
of its holding appeared to become lost in the midst of his many eva-
sive and incredible statements under oath.
Third, in response to the controversial question of what criterion
justice Thomas would use for determining whether to overrule a
constitutional precedent, he approved the standard announced in
justice Thurgood Marshall's final dissent,' 0 which suggested the
Court should have "strong reasons" for overruling a prior deci-
sion.' 0 2 Justice Thomas testified further that the Court's standard
93. Marcus, supra note 77. at A4.
94. David A. Kaplan et al.. Supreme Mystery. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16. 1991, at 18, 26.
95. See Neil A. Lewis. Thomas Undergoes Tough Questioning on Past Remarks. N.Y. TiMEs.
Sept. 12. 1991. at Al. A21.
96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
97. See Anna Quindlen. Trying to Fill In Clarence Thomas' Newly Blank Slate, Ciii. Tais.,
Sept. 17 1991, at 19 (quotingjustice Thomas as testifying. "I cannot think of any cases
that has held that fetuses are not persons for Constitutional purposesl").
98. q Neil A. Lewis. High Court Nomines Testimony Continues to Frustrate Democrats,
N.Y. TIMEs. Sept. 13, 1991. at Al.
09. See Neil A. Lewis. Thomas Ends Testimony but Senators Crumble over Elusive Vews.
N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 17. 1991, at All.
100. III S. C1. 1196 (1991).
101. Payne v. Tennessee, IlI S. Ci. 2597. 2619 (1991) (Marshall.J., dissenting).
102. Lewis, supra note 99.
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for overruling precedents "should be as uniform as possible" 03 and
that he believed "the cases in the individual rights area deserve the
greatest protection." 0
Yet no senator probed the accuracy, sincerity, or implications of
Justice Thomas' answers. For instance, he slightly misstated justice
Marshall's view on stare decisis, which would have required that the
Court overrule precedents only if those decisions were decided
wrongly and would lead to other serious problems if followed.
05
Nor did any senator ask Justice Thomas to explain what he would
accept as "strong reasons" for overrulingprecedent. In addition, it
would have been possible to assess Justice Thomas' position on pre-
cedent by asking Justice Thomas to cite and distinguish between
cases he felt should be overruled and those he felt should not.
Fourth, when Justice Thomas testified that the only opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut 1on with which he agreed was justice Harlan's
concurrence, the same stance taken by Justices Kennedy and Sou-
ter,'0 7 no one pressed Justice Thomas on why he preferred Justice
Harlan's concurrence over Justice White's concurrence or Justice
Douglas' majority opinion.e08 Given the general admiration many
senators and scholars have for Justice Harlan's jurisprudence in
general, and his Griswold concurrence in particular, Justice Thomas'
professed agreement with the latter was such welcome news to the
Democratic senators onthe Judiciary Committee that it seems to
have misled them into thinking justice Thomas may have more in
common with Justice Harlan than is the case.
103. Marcus, supra note 77, at A4.
104. Id It did not take justice Thomas long, however, to renege on this statement.
Within his first four months on the Supreme Coursjustice Thomas called for the recon-
sideration and overruling of the Court's well established precedents on the Confronta-
tion Clause and the Eighth Amendment. See supra note 79; White v. Illinois. 112 S. Ct.
736, 744. 746 (1992) somas, J.. concurring tn part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the Court should have reexamined the Court's Confrontation Clause
precedents because "[tlhe standards that the Court has developed to implement its as-
sumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of hearsay evidence have no
basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment" and that he "wrlolte separately only to sug-
est that our Confrontation Clause urisprudence has evolved in a manner that ts per-
aps inconsistent with the text and istory of the clause itself").
105. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 26
2 1-2 2 . See generally Gerhardt. Role of Precedent. supra note
10. at 120-21.
106. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107. See Campbell, supra note 69. Justice Thomas' endorsement of Grswold "was al-
most identical to statements given a year ago by David Souter." Id
108. The honest answer would probably have been that justice Harlan did not live
long enough to sit on the Court during Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and that
justice Douglas' concurrence and justice White's dissent in Roe were not positions with
which justice Thomas wanted to associate himself. Other issues many senators failed to
probe during the hearing included justice Thomas' tenure as EEOC chairman, we
Chemerinsky, supra note 36. and justice Thomas' endorsement of justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537. 552 (1896) (Harlan.J., dissenting). which has
racist elements.
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Phase I presented the Democrats with numerous other problems.
Justice Thomas repeatedly asked the Committee, in effect, to con-
firm him on the basis of his character and achievements while claim-
ing that his professional record said nothing about how he would
perform as a justice. 09 IffJustice Thomas was to have been taken at
his word, then it is not clear on what basis the administration wanted
him as a Supreme Court justice or 'could have claimed him as the
"best person" for the job.' 1o IfJustice Thomas' professional record
were indicative of how he would perform on the Supreme Court,
then the Committee should not have hesitated to reach conclusions
about his record, with or without justice Thomas' assistance.
In addition, the Democrats in Phase I did not fully address Sena-
tor Hatch's charge that, particularly with respect to abortion, they
were holding Justice Thomas to a far tougher standard than the one
to which they had held Justice Souter.I' I The Democrats could have
clarified their strategy and justice Thomas' own dubious perform-
ance in the hearings by arguing that Justice Thomas merited differ-
ent treatment because, unlike justice Souter, Justice Thomas had
publicly criticized Roe and, therefore, his testimony distancing him-
self from that criticism merited close scrutiny. In addition, Justice
Thomas' testimony was far more evasive than justice Souter's,
which displayed a vastly greater degree of familiarity with the nu-
ances of constitutional law and judicial decisionmaking.' 12 More-
over, unlike Justice Souterjustice Thomas relied on his character as
the primary basis for confirmation. Thus, the Democrats had li-
cense to probe his character, intellectual abilities, and integrity, par-
ticularly about an issue as important as abortion.
Neither the Democrats nor Republicans fully addressed the state-
mients from various witnesses that the hardships Justice Thomas
overcame in his youth could not forecast his performance as a
judge.'' 3 More than one witness' testimony suggested that justice
Thomas' background did not necessarily make him a better person
or judge, or reflect anything probative about his current attitudes
toward various segments of society, judicial authority, or federal-
ism;114 yet this testimony went unaddressed.
109. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
110. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
11l. See Neil A. Lewis, High Court Nominees Testimony Continues to Fnustrate Democrats,
N.Y. TIMEs. Sept. 13. 1991, at Al.
112. See, e.g.. Baier, supra note 24.
113. See Excerpts from Hearing on Thomas' Nomination. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at
A16.
114. Set, e.g.. ad. (testimony of Professor Patricia King of the Georgetown University
Law Center). Professor King testified, "I don't think judge Thomas' background is any
more a Predictor of his future service on any bench than mine has been for my career las
a law profesor]. . .. Somehow, judge Thomas seems not to remember those he must
have encountered along the way who were lost to the darkness simply because there was
no help for then." Id Harvard Professor Chris Edley. Jr.. another prominent African-
American legal scholar, also testified that character alone does not necessarily make
someone a good justice. Id.
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In Phase II, Justice Thomas' charges of racism'lS cowed the Dem-
ocrats into not pressing him on several matters relevant to the illu-
mination of his character and Professor Hill's credibility. None of
the Democrats responded to justice Thomas' charge that Professor
Hill's allegations were the product of a racist conspiracy. 1 6 The
senators neglected to answer justice Thomas' charge that Phase II
was racist by reminding him that the investigation undertaken in
Phase II was pursuant to a request made by Justice Thomas and
Senator Danforth." 7 Nor did anyone press justice Thomas to iden-
tify the racists responsible for the probe-which he had requested-
or to prove the existence of the racist conspiracy against him, in-
cluding how it could have started ten years earlier when Professor
Anita Hill first told a friend about being sexually harassed by
Thomas.' n1
Moreover, the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Biden, may
not have clarified sufficiently the most difficult question in Phase II.
Senator Biden conducted Phase II as if the burden of proof were on
justice Thomas' accusers. If the only issue in Phase II were the
truth of Professor Hill's allegations, then this position was abso-
lutely correct: Justice Thomas was entitled to a presumption of in-
nocence regarding any specific allegations of misbehavior in the
office. Otherwise, any, nomination could be thwarted by anyone
coming forward with false accusations. But if the issue in Phase II
was Justice Thomas' fitness to serve on the Court, then the burden
of proof remained on justice Thomas. particularly because his char-
acter was already put into question by much of his earlier evasive
and incredible testimony."" In other words, the debate over the
truth of Professor Hill's allegations should not have clouded the is-
sue whether Justice Thomas had established generally the kind of
character and professional fitness to merit confirmation to the
Court. 20
115. See supra text accompanying note 72.
116. See, e.g., Steve Daley & Mitchell Locin. Day of Reckoning for Thomas: Democrats from
South May Hold Key, Cus. Ttas., Oct. 15, 1991. at AI (refemng to justice Thomas' re-
mark that he was a "victim" of a racist conspiracy).
117. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
118. See The Thomas Nomination: Statements to Senators from Witnesses for Anita Hill, N.Y.
TIusS, Oct. 14. 1991, at Al.
119. See supra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
120. In addition, Senator Biden may have given in too easily to the Administration's
requests to allow justice Thomas to testify durng prime time and to forego personalqusin about his conduct outside of the office. SeHelen Dewar. Democrats Cniticud for
Strategy on Thomas: Aproach in Hearings Called Too Cautious. WASH. POST, Oct. 20. 199 1, at
All1. Senator Biden a acquiescence in these requestsl allowed the Committee only a ar.r
tial view ofJustice Thomas' character, yet his c aracter was the only real basis on wich
Justice Thomas was allowing the Senate to evaluate him. See supra notes 53-55 and ac-
companying text. Regrettably, questioning was either discouraged, or simply not al-
lowed, with respect to (1) the dissolution of Justice Thomas' first marriage. which
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For their part, the Republicans in Phase I-with the exceptions of
Senators Grassley and Brown-appeared to be apologists forJustice
Thomas, overlooking his many foibles in the hopes of attracting
more African-Americans to their party and of his being the kind of
ideologue they would like to see on the Court. They generally failed
to question the Bush administration's faith in the nominee's qualifi-
cations and ideology and avoided pressing him on any substantive
matters or on his lack of judicial experience.
During Phase II, Senators Hatch, Simpson, and Specter seemed
to twist facts, mischaracterize Professor Hill's testimony, give
credence-without proof-to the most outlandish theories on why
she was lying before the Committee, and assume without serious
inquiry that justice Thomas had an exemplary character and was
credible. None of the three senators allowed the facts to get in the
way of their mission to discredit Professor Hill. Senator Simpson
referred cryptically to information "coming in over the transom";' 2 '
Senator Specter triumphantly declared that Professor Hill "commit-
ted perjury" even though there was no credible evidence to support
the claim (and he later recanted);' 22 and Senator Hatch sanctimo-
niously suggested that anyone who acts the way Professor Hill de-
scribed justice Thomas as acting could not be a "normal person,"
but rather a "psychopathic sex fiend or a pervert"-in contrast to
justice Thomas' presumably always-professional conduct. 23 Sena-
tor Hatch even suggested that Hill must have lifted parts of her tes-
timony from the horror novel, The Exorcis, 124 and an opinion from
the Tenth Circuit, in which Professor Hill lives.' 25
The Democrats and Republicans together must share the blame
for not taking seriously Professor Hill's-and other women's-
claims of sexual harassment by justice Thomas. Once the Federal
seemed painfully relevant to his state of mind at the time of the alleged harassment, (2)
Justice Thomas' behavior outside the office, and (3) whether Professor Hill's allegations
could have been prompted by her personal dislike for. or philosophical disagreements
with. Justice Thomas. .
121. Against Clarence Thomas: Even 'Don I Know' Calls for a No' Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15. 1991. at A24.
122. Id
123. Walter V. Robinson, Thomas Says He'll Fight to the End- Supporters Rip into Sex Alk-
gatons, BosToN GLoa, Oct. 13. 1991, at 1. This line of questioning may have had its
desired effect in that it put the burden on the senators who disbelieved justice Thomas
to show that he had a pattern or practice of engaging in the type of behavior alleged by
Professor Hill. Although making this showing would have been relevant-but not dis-
positive-in a 1991 lawsuit brought againstjustice Thomas for sexual harassment, it was
irrelevant to a simple claim that iis behavior was tasteless, degrading to women, and
unprofessional, if not illegal. As the administration's top official responsible for re-
dressing sexual harassment claims. Justice Thomas should have been held to a higher
standard of performance in the office than just whether his conduct was legal. More-
over, this kind of questioning by Senator Hatch was just one dramatic example of why
each side should have designated a special counsel to ask their respective questions.
The problem was that the senators apparently were not familiar with changes in sexual
harassment law or inadequately idenufied the relevant factors for determining the credi.
bility of the witnesses in Phase 11.
124. Michael Hedges. Hatch Finds Curious Precedents for Hill's Allegations, WasH. TIMES.
Oct. 13, 1991. at Al 8.
125. See id. (referring to Carter v. Scdgwick County. 705 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan.
1988)).
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report indicated that it was a swear-
ing match between justice Thomas and Professor Hill as to whether
he sexually harassed her, no one in a position of authority on the
Committee seemed to want to go forward, even to hold closed hear-
ings. In fact, many senators, including Senator Hatch, did not even
read the FBI report when it first came out.'26 Closed hearings
would have fulfilled the Senate's duty to take the charges seriously
and to assess the only thing Justice Thomas ever willingly put into
issue during the hearings-his character. At the very least, the FBI
could have been asked to extend its investigation to probe into Pro-
fessor Hill's motivations for lying, JusticE Thomas' general conduct
in the office, and other allegations of sexual harassment directed at
justice Thomas.
Moreover, most of the senators did not separate legal claims of
sexual harassment from mere allegations of improper sexual con-
duct. The Republicans asking questions in Phase II tried to suggest
either that Professor Hill must have been lying because she did not
seek legal redress at the time Justice Thomas allegedly sexually
harassed her, or that her claims did not rise to the level of being
legally cognizable. The Senate failed to recognize that our general
sensitivity and understanding of sexual harassment is far different
today than it was in the early 1980s, and that Professor Hill did not
have available at the time of the alleged harassment the same kind
or range of legal remedies a woman would have now.' 27 Nor did
any of the senators on the Committee focus on the impropriety of
Justice Thomas' conduct as opposed to its illegality, a particularly
apt focus given thatJustice Thomas relied solely on his character for
confirmation. In addition, in the event that any of the senators be-
lieved Professor Hill's allegations, not one of them pointed out that
justice Thomas' outright denials under oath constituted perjury.
Ill. Politics and the Court in the 1990s: Back to the Future
If the system for nominating and confirming Supreme Court jus-
tices does not require constitutional amendment, the question re-
mains how the President, the Senate, and the public can ensure the
elevation of political discourse on, and the criteria for, evaluating
Supreme Courtjustices. The answer turns largely on making minor
adjustments to the nomination and confirmation proceedings to
126. See Timothy M. Phelps & Gaylord Shaw. The 2nd Woman: Neow Witness Agairut
Thomas Was Fired from EEOC, NEwsoAY. Oct. 11, 1991, at 5.
127. For example, at the time of'the alleged harassment, Professor Hill would not
have had any claim under Title VII. However, assuming arguendo there would have
been no statute of limitations problem, she could have conceivably brought a Title VII
action againstjustice Thomas at the time of the hearings for back pay and reinstatement.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986).
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make it easier for the public to participate more fully in the process,
and for the President and the Senate to undertake nobler and more
accountable judgments regarding the selection of Supreme Court
justices. These changes may be particularly effective mi aiding the
divided state of our government to allow its institutions to function
optimally in the nomination and confirmation process.
One solution is for members of the public to become more in-
volved in the nominatiod and confirmation process. If the public
and its representatives in the Senate do not share the President's
views on the criteria to be used in evaluating and choosing federal
judges in general and Supreme Court justices in particular, then the
public and the Senate should demand that the President prove his
appointments are in the best interests of the American people, the
Court, and the Constitution, and hold him politically accountable
when they are not.
The Senate, and particularly the Judiciary Committee, could also
do more to influence the selection of federal judges. First, the Judi-
ciary Committee could follow the example established by President
Hoover's selection ofJustice Cardozo and refuse to confirm anyone
unless the person is of the Committee's own choosing.1
2 8 Of
course, the effectiveness of this proposal depends on the Senate's
ability to stand its ground in the face of presidential opposition.
Second, the Senate and, in particular, the Judiciary Committee
should not refrain from explicitly endorsing nominees on the basis
of their credibility, judicial temperament and philosophy, and pro-
fessional experience. In other words, the Senate should reach some
consensus on the credentials it would like for judicial nominees to
possess, and then adhere to that consensus in spite of presidential
opposition. For example, the majority on the Judiciary Committee
could announce at the outset of confirmation proceedings that they
will not vote for any nominees who give evasive answers to ques-
tions about their public records, fail to affirm expressly certain fun-
damental liberties or freedoms that members of the Committee
would like to see endorsed, or fail to demonstrate a level of profes-
sional accomplishment that the members of the Committee want to
see in a federal judge including a Supreme Court justice. If the
President were to nominate to the bench ideologues with little
meaningful experience in the law and the craftsmanship of judging,
then the Senate could exercise its political judgment to demand a
nominee with more substantial and meaningful professional
experience.
Third, the Committee could spend less time interrogating the
nominee and more time examining the nominee's public record and
questioning people who are familiar with that record. For example,
the Committee could make clear at the outset of its proceedings that
it will place more importance on how a cross-section of the legal
community perceives the nominee's qualifications to become a
128. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court justice than on the nominee's testimony. In addi-
tion, in questioning people who know the nominee, the Committee
could be more aggressive in uncovering stances on constitutional
issues that the nominee may have communicated privately.ia9
Fourth, the Senate should reach some consensus on the burden of
persuasion in confirmation proceedings. In this regard, the Senate
could follow the lead of Senators Gore and Simon, both of whom
argued that the burden of persuasion in a confirmation battle
should rest with the nominee.1 s0 In the final debate on the Thomas
nomination on the floor of the Senate, they both took the position
that the burden of persuasion was on the President, the nominee, or
both, to show that justice Thomas merited a seat on the Court. For
example, Senator Simon pointed out that "the benefit of the doubt"
regarding a Supreme Court nominee should be resolved in favor of
"the people of this country" and the Constitution.Is' Both senators
maintained in effect that the Senate's ultimate fidelity should have
been to the future generations of Americans who would have to live
under Justice Thomas' rulings. In short, their position was that be-
cause justice Thomas was asking the Committee to give him life ten-
ure with which to become a final interpreter of the Constitution, the
Senate should not have entrusted the Constitution to him unless it
was fully comfortable with doing so.
Finally, the Judiciary Committee should reconsider its scheduling
of confirmation hearings. The Committee delays hearings to allow
for investigation of the nominee, but the delay enables the adminis-
tration to fully coach or indoctrinate a nominee in the law. Any de-
lay actually threatens judicial independence because it increases the
degree to which the administration can influence the judicial philos-
ophy of a nominee. In addition, the nominee may feel inclined to
favor the administration based on his ideological indoctrination and
the assistance he receives-particularly during heated hearings-to
achieve confirmation.
Instead, the Committee could schedule hearings shortly after the
President announces his choice for the Court and focus the hearings
primarily on the public record of the nominee. If the Committee
were to choose to hear from the nominee, its more rapid scheduling
129. For example, the Commintee could cross-examine a nominee as to whether he
spoke to anyone about his prospective nomination or testimony and. if so. to whom did
he speak, when did the conversation(s) take place. what was said, and why did the con-
Ve3alion Occur.
130. See Senate Debate on the Nomination ofJu4ge Thomas. Federal News Service. Oct. 15.
1991. available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (remarks of Senator Simon) Ihereinalter Simon's
Remarks). Senate Debate on the Nomination of judge Thomas. Federal News Service. Oct. 8.
1991. available in LEXIS. Nexis Library (remarks of Senator Gore).
13 1. See Simon a Remarks, supra note 130.
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could force the nominee to rely more on his own resources. In addi-
tion. the Committee could limit the nominee's testimony to specific
responses to particular attacks on his record or specific arguments
regarding why he should be confirmed. Or the Senate might even
consider returning to its pre-1925 practice of simply evaluating
nominees on the basis of their public records rather than their testi-
mony before the Committee.i32 The earlier practice never pre-
cluded substantial give-and-take between the President and theSenate whenever they each felt inclined to become involved seri-
ously in nomination and confirmation decisions.13s
Conclusion
In the twenty-four years between Justice Marshall's and JusticeThomas' confirmation hearings, this nation traveled from being di-
vided over fear, hatred, and hope in having a distinguished African-American on the Supreme Court to feeling guilty, confused, and an-gry about the place of race, racism, and sexism in the nomination
anc, confirmation of Supreme Court justices. IfJustice Frankfurter's
observation was correct that constitutional law is "applied politics,
using the word in its noblest sense,"s'3 then it is hard to find the
nobility in the aftermath ofJustice Thomas' nomination and confir-
mation. Indeed, Justice Thomas' performance thus far as an associ-
ate justice exposes his evasive, and oftentimes seriously misleading,testimony in his confirmation hearings and the Senate's negligencein allowing him to get away with such testimony.'"s
Nevertheless, we can still recapture some nobility with two re-
membrances. First, we should recall those moments in the history
of the nomination and confirmation process when the President andthe Senate pushed each other to consider seriously the best interestsof the nation, the Court, and the Constitution in selecting and evalu-
ating Supreme Court nominees. Moreover, the framers envisionedthe Senate as the body best suited to deliberate carefully on thegreat political issues of the day,'s of which Justice Thomas' confir-
mation was clearly one.
132. Indeed, the practice of allowing nominees to testify before a committee did notbecome firmly entrenched until about 1955. and only since 1959-with the hearings onJustice Potter Stewart's nomination--did it become customary for the Senate to inquirein any detail about a nominee's views on cases or legal philosophy. See ABRAlsAM. supranote 11. at 251-95.33. If the Committee were to adopt this proposal-something I admit is highly un-ikely-:it would then be tncumbent upon the Senate to stop nom dees from paying pri-vate "courtesy calls" on each senator. Otherwise, the nomtnees could easily underminethe rationale behind the proposal by making private assurances to various senators. if.however. the Committee barred nontinees fromt testifying in contftrmation hearings butthe Senate permitted private "courtesy calls" with each senator, then the Committeeshould ensure that any information about the nomince's judicial ideology which wasshared privately with any senator is aired publicly.
134. Alexander M. Bickel, Applied Politics and the Science of Law: Writings of the lanardPenod. in FELIx FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 164, 166 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).135. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.136. Ser PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL., IMPEACIoENT IN AMcnIcA. 1635-1805, at996 (v984)o
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Second, we could all do well to remember the example JusticeMarshall set throughout a lifetime dedicated to racial justice. No
lawyer or judge ever spoke more eloquently, powerfully, forth-
rightly, or tirelessly for the powerless, disenfranchised, and dispos-sessed among us. Justice Marshall remains the only Supreme Courtjustice who devoted most of his professional life to helping the un-
derprivileged, who had the courage to criticize relentlessly from thebench and elsewhere the public and private sectors for their failuresin achieving racial equality, and who-like Justice Thomas-had suf-fered the sting of racism throughout his life. Justice Marshall's life
reminds us that Justice Thomas is not the first person to be able totell the kinds of stories he told to the Judiciary Committee. JusticeMarshall's career, ranging from a brilliant and courageous public-interest lawyer for over two decades, to a federal court of appealsjudge, to United States Solicitor General, reminds us of the level ofprofessional distinction we can demand from and get in our
Supreme Court justices.ts7
However, Justice Marshall had no monopoly on principle, andjustice Thomas has every right in the world to chart his own judicialcourse. Justice Marshall emphasized that the federal courts exist in
large part to protect individual liberties from being infringed by thegovernment, at all levels, or by private conduct that is encouragedor fostered by hostile or callously indifferent states.1s8 He persist-
ently admonished that we, as a nation, have a long way to travelbefore we can end racial discrimination and injustice, and that theCourt has an indispensable role to perform in helping us reach thatelusive destination.13* In contrast to justice Marshall, JusticeThomas rejects "the pervasive view that the Federal Constitution
must address all ills in our society.**t4o Justice Thomas seems totake the position that a function of the federal courts, at least as
important as the one advanced by justice Marshall, is to protectfrom federal or private interference the structural and policymakingautonomy of the states regarding a wide range of importantinterests.
Yet, Justice Thomas has not shown how his constitutional vision,including his apparently deep-seated distrust of the federal govern-ment and courts and trust in state governments, will leave the field
137. For discussion ofJustice Marshall's career and jurisprucence, see A Tribute toJustice Thurg'd Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23-76 (1991i) (including cmmentaries byWilliam). Brennan.Jr., Robert L. Carter, William T. ColemanJr. wen s LHiggnbotham, Jr., and Martha Minow).
138. See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to jutice Thurgood Aarhall 105 HAnv. L.REY. 23-32 (1991).139. Id.
140. Hudson v. McMillian, 60 U.S.L.W. 4151. 4155, 4158 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1992)(ihomas, J., dissenting).
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of civil rights better off than he found it. Nor has he shown how his
vision will be more effective than Justice Marshall's competing ap-
proach to heal racial divisions and injustice. In addition, Justice
Thomas has not demonstrated why, particularly with respect to the
maintenance of the conditions characterizing Justice Thomas' and
many other Americans' childhoods, the states deserve the kind of
widespread deference he apparently wants to give them. Conse-
quently, we should not forget that although a divided justice of the
sort Justice Thomas appears content to perpetuate is better than no
justice at all, it is still not the kind ofjustice or as much justice as we
need.
[voL. 60:969996
IN THE SUPRENE COURT
What Difference Can a
Justice or Two Make?
The following is a condensed excerpt
from Chapter Two of the forthcoming
book, God Save This Honorable Court, by
Laurence H. Tribe, to be published by
Random House in September 1985.
By Laurence H. Tribe
IN a speech delivered on the eve of the
1984 election, Justice Rehnquist ob-
served that presidents have little success
in "packing" the Supreme Court with
like-minded men and women, in large
part because new justices "invariably
come 'one at a time' and each new ap-
pointee goes alone to take his place ...
no cohorts with him." Once there, the
appointee is supposedly absorbed by the
institution, with the result that the new
justice is more likely to be changed by the
Court than to effect any significant chang-
es himself. In fact, almost two-thirds of
all the Court's members have taken their
seats within one year of another new
justice, creating an entering class of sorts.
Justice Rehnquist himself was nominated
on the same day as Justice Lewis Powell,
and the two were confirmed by the Sen-
ate only four days apart.
But there remains the fundamental as-
sertion behind the "one at a time" idea:
each individual justice, or even a pair of
new members, is said to be swallowed up
by the institution of the Court, and is
therefore not in a position to reshape its
course. Alternatively, as Justice Rehn-
quist also suggested in the same speech,
the Court's "centrifugal forces" can be
perceived as so powerful that the justices
may be expected to grow completely in-
dependent of one another, each becom-
ing an island unreachable by any "hierar-
chical order" or "institutional unity."
The argument is that, because the justices
are appointed for life and answer only to
their own consciences, they are less con-
cerned with being "team players" and
more concerned with securing their indi-
vidual places in history.
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In different ways, these seemingly con-
tradictory images serve to make the same
point by denying the idea that one or two
justices can make a major difference at
the Court. But, to the extent they share a
grain of truth, both observations leave
the door open to many ways in which just
one or two justices can make a difference,
and a crucial one.
The 5-4 Court
Even those who accept the idea of
"centrifugal forces" on the Court would
have to acknowledge the difference that
one justice can make when the Court is
closely divided and renders a 5-4 deci-
sion, and about one-fifth of the Court's
cases in the decade from 1974 to 1984
were decided on a 5-4 basis. Yet this is a
Court not known for ideological divisions
or intramural rivalries as sharp and deep
as some previous Courts have experi-
enced. If it seems surprising or unsettling
that so large a fraction of the constitu-
tional choices being made in the 1970s
and 1980s turn on the narrowest of mar-
gins, there is some comfort in learning
that the phenomenon is hardly a new
one.
Some of the Court's early decisions to
grant states broad power to modify their
own contracts (the 1837 Charles River
Bridge case) or to impose restraints on
state ability to issue bills of credit (Craig
v. Missouri, decided in 1830) were re-
solved by margins of one justice. The
great Civil War cases testing the bound-
aries of presidential and national power
(The Prize Cases and the Test Oath Cases)
were all decided by Courts split 5-4. The
famous Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873,
which were the first major attempts to
interpret the 14th Amendment, turned
on the vote of a single justice.
Nearer to the turn of the century and in
the early 1900s, the Court's string of
conservative economic rulings were often
handed down in 5-4 decisions. For exam-
ple, the 1895 decision to hold the income
tax unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. and the 1905 decision
to strike down a New York maxi
hours law for laborers in Lochner v.
York were decided by the narrowe
margins. When the Court then struc
at the New Deal in 1935 and 192
invalidated the Railroad Retiremeni
and a New York minimum wage law
single vote margin. When the fat
1937 "switch in time that saved the r
occurred, the Court, by 5-4 votes,
tained a Washington minimum wage
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish and
National Labor Relations Act in N.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
The landmark criminal defense ru
of the early 1960s-requiring the e
sion by state courts of illegally obta
evidence in Mapp v. Ohio, extendin
Fifth Amendment privilege against <
pelled self-incrimination to state proc
ings in Malloy v. Hogan, and guaral
ing that suspects are to be informe
their rights when subjected to "custs
interrogation" and to be assisted byo
sel during such questioning in Miram
Arizona and Escobedo v. Illinois-
depended on the vote of one jus
And, by 5-4 votes, the Court has a
recently cut back on many of these"
protections.
The 5-4 decisions run the gants
issues and show no sign of disappem
In 1978 the Court addressed the sat
of affirmative action in its 5-4 ded
upholding some programs but barril
use of numerical "quotas" to aid miss
students in University of Califofl3
Bakke. In 1984 alone, the Court rui
the narrowest of margins in favor of
constitutionality of city-sponsored as
ty scenes in Lynch v. Donnelly, the le
ty of home videotape recording in 4
Corp. of America v. Universal City S
os,. and the president's power to:
travel to Cuba in Regan v. Wald.
Key 5-4 decisions are thus more th
century old, and will be with us as loW
the Court is. They serve as reli
that one justice can, and does, In
difference in the choice among Poo
constitutional futures. The Court a
on a delicate balance between two
io of justices split on some issue, with
or more others positioned between
c rival camps. In such a case, the
tion of one justice to the Court can
, to create a "critical mass" of jus-
tthat tips the Court firmly to one side,
,tually bringing others along as well.
4 Court as delicately balanced as that
he 1980s is capable of being thrown
,lrey to one side of the ideological
&ide by an appointment that upsets still
anow margins on key questions.
Wecasting the past
Over the course of a long judicial ca-
Xet, one justice's voting pattern might
jier strikingly from that of another.
Oy if we know who might have been
appointed in a justice's place can we say
schb confidence how decisively a given
appointment affected ultimate results.
But how do we forecast the past? After
A, there is usually no way to know which
prson would have been nominated for a
saton the Court if the person ultimately
ulected had been passed over. Yet in
m where the Senate has rejected one
mainee and confirmed instead a subse-
qunt choice, we do have tangible evi-
dane of just how great a difference onejtice can make.
No case demonstrates that difference
mre dramatically than the substitution
d Owen Roberts for nominee John Par-
tr. Parker, a 45-year-old federal judge
hom North Carolina with a reputation
fo antilabor, conservative decisions, was
ejected by a narrow 41-39 Senate confir-
mation vote in 1930. In his place, Presi-
dent Hoover nominated the more moder-
ate 55-year-old Pennsylvanian, Owen
Roberts. Roberts became the justice who
switched his vote on minimum wage laws
in 1937, abandoning the Court's conser-
ttive "Four Horsemen" on the validity
of state economic regulation and joining
bur other justices to begin upholding key
ernents of the New Deal.
Roberts's switch was critical in side-
8acking President Franklin Roosevelt's
Controversial "Court-packing" bill, an at-
tanpt to add six new justices to the Court
and ensure its support of the Roosevelt
Program. Had Parker been on the Court,
'ould he have switched as Roberts did?If not, would the Court-packing bill have
Passed? If it had, what then?
To take another,. more recent case,
there is the Senate's 1970 rejection of1mer segregationist G. Harrold Cars-Well and the subsequent approval ofn nominee Harry Blackmun to theCott- Justice Blackmun has been quite
bral on racial issues coming before the
Rehnquist: "Staked out the right."
Court and has been a key figure in the
Court's development of pro-choice prin-
ciples in the abortion area. Would Cars-
well have played a parallel role? We are
entitled to doubt it.
Catalysts on the Court
Beyond the potentially pivotal role of
the justice's own vote, a justice's persua-
sive powers may often make a difference
by rallying colleagues. The difference in
these cases may go well beyond simply
changing a result or a margin of victory; a
"catalytic" justice may even be able to
change the Court's very chemistry, alter-
ing its understanding of the basis of its
decisions, and therefore changing the de-
velopment of the constitutional law the
Court announces. Such a justice can also
play a key role in the separation of the
hundred-odd cases the Court chooses to
hear annually from the many thousands it
turns away.
For example, in the Court's internal
discussion of Grosjean v. American Press
Co. Inc.-a 1936 case involving a Louisi-
ana law that selectively taxed newspapers
which opposed Governor Huey Long-it
was unanimously agreed that the law
would be struck down, but there was
dispute over what the basis of the deci-
sion would be. Justice Sutherland carried
the day for the more conservative justices
on the Court, and won an agreement that
the decision would rest on the state's
discrimination against certain commer-
cial enterprises under the 14th Amend-
ment's equal protection clause. But Jus-
tice Cardozo drafted an alternate opinion
resting the decision on a far more novel
ground: application of the First Amend-
ment to prohibit state-instead of simply
federal-laws hindering freedom of the
press. Cardozo's opinion proved so pow-
erful that Justice Sutherland adopted it in
place of his original draft of the Court's
official ruling. The landmark holding in
that case, especially coming from the pen
of a justice-George Sutherland-
known for his conservative opinions, was
a major advance in the law of the First
Amendment. In 1931 only five justices
had been wflling to apply the First
Amendment to state laws; a unanimous
Court did so in 1936 as a result of Cardo-
zo's intervention.
Justice Brennan played a similar cata-
lytic role in many of the difficult and
often path-breaking cases decided by the
Warren Court. He organized his brethren
and articulated the Court's broader vi-
sion of the Constitution in Baker v. Carr,
when the Court held that it could rule on
the validity of a state legislature's appor-
tionment, and in the 1964 case of New
York Times v. Sullivan, which limited the
ability of public officials to bring libel
actions against the press. Catalytic justic-
es, another established tradition on the
Court, prove that one justice can often
make much more than one vote's differ-
ence. One person's persuasive judicial
skills are often the key to taking the
Court to new frontiers of constitutional
law.
Staking out the ground
One justice can also make the differ-
ence in the important, if difficult to docu-
ment, role of broadening the range of
acceptable views on the Court-or rede-
fining the "center" by staking out the
ground at one end of the ideological
spectrum. Justice William 0. Douglas's
persistent liberal rulings in many criminal
defense and civil liberties cases widened
the scope of options seriously considered
by the Court, and may have allowed
more liberal views to seem distinctly
"moderate." In the other direction, the
addition of Justice Rehnquist's conserva-
tive ideology to the Court has "staked out
the right" for a more moderate majority,
and allowed Chief Justice Warren Burger
to lead the Court toward-if not to-the
Rehnquist perspective.
Like the "rabbit" technique often used
by track teams-the tactic in which one
competitor keeps up the pace by running
far in front of the field, knowing that he
cannot win but simply hoping to aid a
comrade in gaining victory-a justice
who trailblazes-an ideological outlook on
the Court normally will not carry the day.
But his legacy can influence an entire era.
The chief justices-only 15 have
served in our entire history-present the
most obvious examples of the "one jus-
tice who can make a difference." Al-
though often in dissent, and sometimes
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lagging behind instead of leading the
Court, one chief may make all the differ-
ence in the constitutional world. No ex-
ample better proves this point than Chief
Justice John Marshall. The legendary
chief justice personally wrote the opinion
of the Court in 519 of the 1,215 cases
decided during his tenure on the Court.
Of the decisions that involved interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, Marshall penned
the Court's judgment in more than half.
Marshall was able to keep his Federalist
majority together for dozens of key deci-
sions, absorbing appointments by
Democratic-Republican Presidents Jef-
ferson, Madison and Monroe. His intel-
lectual grip on his fellow justices was so
firm that Marshall dissented from a con-
stitutional ruling only once: in every
other major case decided in his 34 years
at the helm of the Supreme Court, Mar-
shall got his way.
The 20th century
In the 20th century the changing of the
chiefs has translated into an important
difference in the Court's direction. For
example, most observers believed that
Chief Justice Fred Vinson was ambiva-
lent about the constitutionality of school
segregation, and uncertain about what
position he would take after hearing ar-
guments in a series of cases in 1953.
Instead of deciding the cases, the Court
ordered their reargument the following
year. In the interim Vinson died and new
Chief Justice Earl Warren took his place.
The new chief not only wrote the Court's
precedent-shattering decision in Brown
v. Board of Education, signaling the end
of segregated public schools in this coun-
try, but also worked with his associate
justices to develop an opinion which
could be announced unanimously. That
the Court spoke with a single, authorita-
tive voice in Brown added immeasurably
to the ruling's credibility in the face of
widespread and bitter resistance.
The Court's first female justice
Justice Potter Stewart can neither be
credited nor blamed for the quite differ-
ent votes cast by his successor, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, in the wake of his
1981 resignation from the Court at the
judicially youthful age of 66. But the
consequences of this single change on the
Court demonstrate anew how a one-
justice switch can thift the direction of
the entire Court.
On some issues;. of course, there is no
reason to believe that Justice O'Connor's
votes differ from those that Justice Stew-
art would have cast. Taken as a whole,
however, there are sharp differences be-
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tween what she has done-and what he
was likely to do. In her first three years as
a justice, Sandra Day O'Connor voted
with the Court's most conservative
member-Justice William Rehnquist-
almost nine times out of 10, or 87 percent
of the time. During the decade Justice
Stewart shared on the Court with Justice
Rehnquist, the two voted together in only
two-thirds of the cases, or 66 percent of
the time. Given how often the Court's
divisions are close ones, the potentially
different vote in one-fifth of its decisions
would have produced a number of impor-
tant changes.
Although Justice Stewart voted with
the 7-2 majority that struck down most
abortion restrictions in 1973, Justice 0'
Connor voted with the two 1973 dissent-
ers in one key abortion ruling a decade
later, and joined three justices in dissent-
ing from an even closer abortion vote in
another 1983 case. Her votes on abortion
issues contributed to no new anti-choice
majority on the Court as of 1985, but the
same cannot be said of another aspect of
the right to privacy: security from "un-
reasonable searches and seizures."
In 1984, for example, in Segura v.
United States, Justice O'Connor support-
ed a 5-4 majority opinion that Justice
Stewart almost certainly would have op-
posed. The case involved a warrantless
19-hour police seizure of Andres Segura's
apartment. Acting on a tip, federal
agents concluded early one evening that
they had probable cause to search Se-
gura's apartment. But the agents were
told by the U.S. Attorney's office to
"secure the premises" while awaiting the
issuance of a warrant the next morning,
because it was too late to find a tnagis-
trate who might issue a warrant that day.
At midnight, the agents hauled away
Segura and four friends and began
lengthy vigil in the apartment. M iorni
had broken-but the agents, warrantle:
as ever, were still rummaging throug
Segura's belongings. It was not until tb
evening, fully 18 hours into their occup.
tion of the residence, that the agents eve
went before a magistrate. When ask:
why they had waited so long, their od-
excuse was that they preferred to file '
typed warrant application, and a goc
secretary was hard to find.
The Supreme Court's opinion ac
knowledged the illegality of the agent
entry but nonetheless allowed the use '
the evidence. Labeled "astonishing" b
the four dissenting justices, the resi
would undoubtedly have been differezt;:
Potter Stewart, rather than Sandra Day
O'Connor, had cast the deciding vote.
For it was Justice Stewart who, during tl
.1960s, had written the Court's most fal
reaching opinions extending constituto&
al protection against just such warrant!in
searches. Nor is Segura an exception'
case: several times in 1983 and 1984, a 54
Court found in the Constitution's ban 6
unreasonable searches and seizures
obstacle to invasions that the CouL
when Justice Stewart was a membs
would predictably have invalidated in d
name of privacy.
At the same time, Justice Stewaril
more ambivalent record on questions a
sex discrimination indicates that Just
O'Connor's presence might have be
indispensable to the "liberal" outcomed
the Court's 1981 decision in Musisyi.
University for Women v. Hogan. Tbers?
Justice O'Connor's vote was neededltd
create the 5-4 majority which rejected A
unfairly discriminatory the exclusion-i
males from a Mississippi nursing 5
Defying the desire of Court-watche -
stuff justices once and for all into pigeo"
holes of "right" or "left," this story too"
fairly typical: when one justice is repLfl-
with another, the impact on the Coor
likely to be progressive on sorne
conservative on others.
That complexity makes all the W
crucial a sensitive inquiry into the .
range of views each justice will brinA
the Court-unless, of course, coc '.
believes that substantive views caso
how be excluded from a justices-'*
That, as we shall see in the next chaPa
is a dangerous fantasy.
Laurence H. Tribe is the Ty
sor of Constitutional Law at
Law School. A review of his bo
Save this Honorable Court, apP.
page 82 of this issue.
The Bush imprint on the judiciary:
carrying on a tradition
The judges appointed by President Bush so far bear many similarities to the Reagan
judicial appointees. By 1993, about two-thirds of the federal judiciary will have been
selected by these two presidents.
by Sheldon Goldman
On March 25, 1969, just abouttwo months after the start of
the Nixon presidency, White
House aide Tom Charles
Huston wrote a memorandum for the
President in which he arguedz
Through hisjudicial appointments, a Pres-
ident has the opportunity to influence the
course of national affairs for a quarter of a
century after he leaves office.... [I]t is
necessary to remember that the decision as
to who will make the decisions affects what
decisions will be made.... (T]he President
[can] establish precise guidelines as to the
"A. type of man (sic] he wishes to appoint-his
professional competence, his political dis-
position, his understanding of the judicial
function-and establish a White House
review procedure to assure that each pros-
pective nominee recommended by the At-
torney General meets the guidelines..Jie
(the President] may insist that someevi-
dence exists as to the attitude of the prospec-
tive judge toward the role of the court. He
may insisetupon a man who has a passion
for judicial restraint.... The criteria he can
establish are as varied as the views held in
different political, social, and legal circles
today. But if he establishes his criteria and
establishes his machinery for insuriu gthat
the criteria are met, 'the appoititnknts he
makes will be his, in fact, as in theory.'
I would like to thank -the-Research'C5incil and
DeanSamuel FContiof theGraduatehoolofLde
University of Massachusetts at Amherit f6r a Fac-
ulty Fellowship Award which enabled me'to con-
duct this research. I am also grateful to Senator
Joseph Biden's staff at the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee for their great help and cooperauon and to
Assistant to the Attorney General Murray G. Dic k-
man and Deputy White House Counsel Lee Lix--
man for their gracious assistance. All errors of fact I
and interpretation are mine alone.
1. Emphasis is in the original. So is the blatunl
DAVID VALDEZ/THE WHITE HOUSE sexism. The original copy of the memorandum.
with written comments by President Nixon. Wa'
withdrawn from the president's papers at NixoN
direction. However. I found a copy of the menmo
randum in White House Central Files. FC 50. h41o
years as president, George Bush appointed 67 federal judges. 1. Folder WHCF ExFG50 The Judicial Brunc
(1969-19701. Nixon Presidential Materials Pt(1
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The President read. the memo and on
the cover sheet handwrote:
"To Kliendienst [Deputy Attorney
General]: RN agrees-Have this analy-
sis in mind in making judicial nom-
inations." 2
If the Nixon administration had the
desire to attempt a systematic philoso-
phical screening process for prospective
appointments to the lower federal courts,
it was left to the Reagan administration
to implement what Huston and Nixon
envisioned.3 The Bush administration,
by continuing the screening process, has
institutionalized it and in this sense can
be seen as carrying on a tradition. In
terms of the demographic portrait of
Bush appointees, we shall see shortly the
extent to which the administration has
maintained tradition.
This article examines the first two
years of appointments by President
George Bush of lifetime judgeships to
courts of general jurisdiction. The pat-
tern established is of special significance
in light of the Federal Judgeships Act of
1990 which created 85 new federal judge-
ships, which along with current and
future vacancies will enable the Bush
administration to leave its imprint on
the judiciary.
Judicial selection overview
George Bush was elected to the presid-
ency on November 8, 1988, by an elec-
toral college landslide and by a comfor-
table but not overwhelming popular
vote majority. At the same time the
nation elected a Republican president
for the fifth of the last six presidential
elections, it also elected a Democratic
Party controlled House and Senate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee dur-
ing the first two years of Bush's presid-
2. lam grateful to Professor John Anthony Mal-
tese of the University of Georgia for providing me a
copy of the cover sheet with Nixon's handwritten
directive and for alerting me to the existence of the
Huston memo. Also see. Maltese, The selling of
Clement Haynsworth: politics and the confirma-
tion of Supreme Court justices, 72 JUDICATURE 338
at 343 n. 29 (1989).
3. See Goldman, Reagan's judicial appoint-
ments at mid-term: shaping the bench in his own
image. 66 JUDICATURE 334 (1983); Reaganizing the
judiciary: the first term appointments, 68 JuDIcA-
TURE 313 (1985); Reagan's second term judicial
appointments:the battleat midway, 70JUDICATURE
324 (1987); and Reagan's judicial legacy: complet-
ing the puzzle and summing up, 72JUDICATURE 318
(1989). Also see Murphy, Reagan's Judicial Stra-
tegy. in Berman, (ed.). LOOKING BACK ON THE REA-
GAN PRESIDENCY 207 (Baltimore: The Johns Hop-
kins University Press. 1990).
enc' (coinciding -with the 10!st Congress)
remained (and remains) under the leader-
shipof Democratic Senator Joseph Biden.
The potential for partisan confrontation
over judgeships was present but generally
did not occur as Democrats and the Bush
administration exercised restraint.
In total, President Bush appointed 48
district court and 18 appeals court judges
and one Supreme Court justice, for a
total of 9.2 per cent of the permanent
Article III judgeships on courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction.' When the 101st Con-
gress ended, only two district court nom-
inees and one appeals court nominee
had not been acted upon. This contrasts
with the last two years of the Reagan
presidency in which three district court
and two appeals court nominations were
withdrawn and nine district court and
six appeals court nominees were not
acted upon (some as a result of the
Democrats' decision to wait until after
the presidential election and some be-
cause the nominees were controversial).
Dick Thornburgh, who had been ap-
pointed attorney general in August of
1988 during the last six months of Rea-
gan's presidency, was retained by Bush.
Thomburgh was not as controversial as
his predecessor, Edwin Meese III, and
gave the impressionof wanting tochange
the image of the Justice Department
from a confrontational to a more quietly
professional one.
The move away from controversy is
reflected, in part, by the decision not to
renominate four of the nine Reagan dis-
trict court and three of the six Reagan
appeals court nominees whose nomina-
tions were not acted upon by the end of
the 100th Congress.5 It is also reflected in
part by Thomburgh's decision to end the
Office of Legal Policy, which had been
4. The 9.2 per cent figure is based on the total
number of permanent lifetime judgeships exclud-
ing the newly created judgeships in the Federal
Judgeships Act of 1990. Not included in this study
are appointees to such specialized courts as the
Court of International Trade, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the local courts
of the District of Columbia. Article III courts of
general jurisdiction considera wide rangeofconsti-
tutional and statutory law issues and are therefore
more politically important than the specialized
courts. These courts also hold special interest for
students of the judiciary and of the presidency.
5. Not all the Reagan nominees not resubmitted
by Bush were controversial.
6. The commitne added to its rules: "Political
or ideological philosophy are not considered.7 See
Lavelle. ... And the Role of the ABA. NATIONAL
LAw JOURNAL. August 6. 1990. at 43.
the center of judicial selection activity II
tLe Justice Department, and to create a
new office in the Justice Department, the
Office of Policy Development, to handle
non-judicial legal policy matters.
Thornburgh planned to bring in
Robert B. Fiske, Jr., a prominent estab-
lishment lawyer and conservative Repub-
lican, to be deputy attorney general and
to transfer judicial selection activity to
the depuey's office as had typically been
done before the Reagan administration.
However, right-wing Republicans ob-
jected to Fiske because he had been
chairman of the ABA Standing Commit-
tee on Federal Judiciary. To right-wing
conservative groups the ABA committee,
or some members of it, improperly used
political or ideological criteria to assess
the professional qualifications of nomi-
nees. Most grating were the four minor-
ity votes on the 15-member ABA com-
mittee finding Robert Bork not qualified
for a seat on the Supreme Court.
Perhaps to defuse the opposition to
Fiske as well as to recognize the impor-
tance of right-wing political support for
the administration and the merits of the
complaint against theABA, Thornburgh
asked the ABA to disavow taking into
consideration the political or ideologi-
cal views of judicial nominees when
undertaking the ABA rating process.
The ABA, however, maintained the posi-
tion that it did not consider such views of
prospective nominees as part of the rat-
ing process unless those views had a
bearing on professional qualifications
such as judicial temperament, compe-
tence, and integrity. That response was
unsatisfactory to the attorney general
who declared that the administration
would no longer consult with the ABA
committee unless it reversed itself on this
issue. Finally, the attorney general and
the ABA committee came to an agree-
ment that included an explicit disavo-
wal by the ABA committee of any con-
sideration of a nominee's political or
ideological views in the rating process.6
Members of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee were dissatisfied with the ABA's
role in judicial selection, !he commit-
tee's rating system, and the committee's
secretive processes. On June 2,.1989, the
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hear-
ing on the ABA committee's role, at
which time the president of the ABA tes-
tified that in deference to the concerns of
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the Senate J udiciary Committee and the
attorney general the ABA would elimi-
nate the "Exceptionally Well Qualified"
rating, leaving only the "Well Quali-
fied," "Qualified," and "Not Qualified"
ratings.' Starting in early summer, the
Bush Justice Department, for the first
time since Bush took office, provided the
ABA with the names of intended nomi-
nees for rating purposes.
Even after the disagreement with the
ABA was resolved, some key conserva-
tive senators continued to oppose Fiske.
Although it appeared that were Fiske to
have been formally nominated he would
likely have been confirmed, the White
House delayed submitting the nomina-
tion apparently to avoid a fight with
some conservative Republican senators.8
Finally, on July 6, 1989, after it was clear
that the White House was reluctant to
support Fiske, he asked that his name be
withdrawn from consideration. By this
time, judicial selection activity had been
moved directly to the attorney general's
office and Thornburgh's longtime aide
Murray G. Dickman, assistant to the
attorney general, was given responsibil-
ity for coordinating judicial selection in
the Justice Department.
After the withdrawal of Fiske, the
attorney general decided that judicial
selection should remain centered in his
office.9 However, as a by-product of the
restructuringof judicial selection within
the Justice Department, the dispute with
the ABA, and the attempt to appoint
Fiske, only two nominations to the ap-
peals courts and three to the district
courts were sent to the Senate during the
first six months of 1989 (and all the
nominees had previously been nomi-
nated by Reagan). In the entire year of
1989 only a total of 22 district and
appeals court nominations were sent to
the Senate, while in 1990 there were
more than twice that number.
Another highlight of judicial selec-
tion activity during the first two years of
the Bush administration was, of course,
the selection of David H. Souter to
replace retiring Justice William J. Bren-
nan, Jr. Filling the vacancy was a poten-
tial minefield because of the abortion
issue, but the administration avoided a
contentious confrontation battle by
choosing a low-profile, non-doctrinaire,
conservative judge with no public posi-
tion on abortion rights. After a tour-de-
force p'i I otnuince betftore thcienati e jMli-
ciary Committee, Souter was confirmed
on October 2, 1990, by a vote of 90 to 9.
Another general point of note con-
cerning the selection process is the in-
creasing activity of interest groups in the
selection process. The Alliance for Jus-
tice along with People for the American
Way, both civil liberties orientedgroups,
began issuing annual reports on lower
courtoominations and distributing them
to the media. Other liberal as well as
conservative groups paid close attention
to who was nominated. These groups
communicated their views to the Justice
Department and to senators, particularly
thoseon the Senate Judiciary Committee.
President Bush's most prominent
appointee, Justice David H. Souter.
KEN HEINEN/AP LASERPHOTO
At the start of the Bush administration
there were a number of questions about
how judicial selection would proceed
and what would be the Bush imprint on
the judiciary.o After two years of the
Bush administration the answers to those
questions are taking shape. We will next
examine in greater detail the judicial
selection process under Bush. This will
7. For an account of the unpublished June 2
hearing.see Biskupic. Justice Department andABA
Settle Their Differences. 47 CONcRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY WEEKLY REPORT 1327 (June 3. 1989). At the
hearing, the attorney general reported on the agree-
ment with the ABA. The hearing was held at the
urgingoffive Republican senators who were mem-
bers of the Senate judiciary Committee. For an
account of senatorial views leading up to the hear-
ings, see Biskupic, ABA's Role Under Scrutiny, 47
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 896
(April 22. 1989).
8. See Wines. Thornburgh Abandons Choice
for Top Justce Post. NEW YORK TIsS. JUly 7.
bc followed by Ihc prolessional, demlo-
graphic. and attribute profiles of the
Bush appointees compared to those of
previous Republican Presidents Reagan,
Ford, and Nixon and Democratic Presi-
dents Carter and Johnson. The final
portions of this article will consider
whether there is already a Bush imprint
on the judiciary as well as speculate on
future judicial selection developments
during the next avo years and what the
likely shape of the judiciary will be after
theadministration has filled the85 newlv
created judgeships along with current
and expected vacancies.
Principal data sources for Tables I and
2 included the questionnaires completed
by the judicial nominees and submitted
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, tran-
scripts of confirmation hearings, per-
sonal interviews, certain biographical
directories," and answers by nominees
to queries from this author. Occasion-
ally, newspaper stories from theappoin-
tee's home state contained relevant data.
The data appearing in the tables are for
those confirmed by the 101st Congress to
lifetime appointments on courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction.
Selection under Bush
Two majorjudicial selection innovations
of the Reagan administration-the sys-
tematic screening process emphasizing
judicial philosophy and including exten-
sive personal interviews of the major
candidates, and the creation of the Presi-
dent's Committee on Federal Judicial
Selection-were continued by the Bush
administration. The interviewing of pro-
spective nominees is done essentially
within the Justice Department. The lead-
ing candidates for appeals court and dis-
trict courtjudgeships are invited to Wash-
ington at their own expense (federal law
prohibits reimbursement) and are inter-
viewed by various Justice Department
1989. a( A-1, A-11.
9. Interview with Murray G. Dickman. assistant
to the attorney general. January 7.1991. Note that it
was reported that in an effort to make Fiske accep-
table to tonservative senators. Thornburgh said
that Fiske would not handle judicial selection. NEW
YORK TIMtES. supra n. 8.
10. See, for example, the questions raised in
Goldman, Reagan's judicial legacy supra nt. 3. ai
330.
i1. The various directories include The Amer-
can Bench (5th edition), Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory, and Who's Who (national and regional
cdtitions).
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officials, including the deputy attorney
general and the solicitor general. The
interviews are for the purpose of allow-
ing Justice officials to gain a firsthand
understanding of the candidate's judicial
philosophy as well as his/her intellectual
ability. Candidates are not asked, just as
they were not asked during the Reagan
administration, how they would decide
particular cases or whether they favor
overturning such Supreme Court prece-
dents as Roe u Wade.12
As part of the screening process, Jus-
tice officials analyze a candidate's judi-
cial record if the candidate has one.
Analysis of the judicial record is also
undertaken in the White House Coun-
sel's office. Assistant White House Coun-
sel Lee Liberman, in particular, analyzes
judicial opinions and focuses on how
candidates think about legal problems
and arrive at judicial solutions.
The President's Committee on Federal
Judicial Selection meets weekly at the
White House, usually for two to three
hours. The agenda is distributed in ad-
vance and the committee is chaired by
White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray.
The meetings themselves are run infor-
mally. Membership on the committee is
somewhat different than during the Rea-
gan administration. The Assistant Attor-
ney General for Policy Development, the
successor to the Office of Legal Policy,
no longer handles judicial selection and,
therefore, is not a member of the com-
mittee. Murray Dickman, assistant to the
attorney general who coordinates judi-
cial selection in the Justice Department,
is, as one would expect, a member of the
committee. So is Assistant White House
Counsel Lee Liberman, who focuses on
judicial nominations and whose office
processes the nominations for the presi-
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
IS. Interview with Lee Liberman, Deputy White
House Counsel, January 9, 1991. President Bush, in
a November 30, 1990, letter to Senate Minority
Leader Bob Dole asked for the help of Republican
senators in finding qualified women and minority
district court candidates that also met the other
criteria. See Biskupic. Bush Boosts Bench Strength
of Conservative judges. 49 CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY WEEKLY REPORT 171 (January 19. 1991).
14. For an assessment of the selection commis-
sions during the years of Carters presidency, see
Berkson and Carbon, TilE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS.
PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (Chicago: American
Judicature Society, 1980) and Neff, TIE UNITED
STATES DISTRicrJUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS:
THEIR MEMBERS. PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES
(Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1981).






Like the committee during the Rea-
gan administration, the committee dur-
ing the Bush administration also con-
sists of the attorney general, the deputy
attorney general, the assistant to the
president for personnel, and the assist-
ant to the president for legislative affairs.
The White House Chief of Staff, just as
during the Reagan administration, is a
member of the committee and also just
as during the Reagan administration is
usually too preoccupied with other mat-
ters and attends meetings infrequently.
For district court appointments, the
Justice Department asks Republican sen-
ators to submit three names for Depart-
ment consideration. There has been some
resistance on the part of some senators,
but the administration is not sympa-
thetic to senators who submit one name
and insist that person be named. How-
ever, the Justice Department will con-
sider one candidate at a time provided
that if the person proposed is not satis-
factory to Justice, the senator will sub-
mit another name until a suitable candi-
date is found.
Bush has told those in the administra-
tion handling judicial nominations to
keep in mind four points: (1) that he
wants to name highly qualified persons
who are philosophically conservative;
(2) that he is looking for persons sensi-
tive to the separation of powers under
the Constitution; (3) that recruitment of
judges should be opened up to provide
greater access for qualified people than
achieved under old-boy networks; and
(4) that recruitmen. should be expanded
to search out appropriately qualified
women and minorities. 3 Although
points 3 and 4 are similar to recruitment
objectives of the Carter administration,
the Bush administration did not em-
brace the selection commission method
favored by Carter that, in fact, did objec-
tively open up access to thejudiciary."4 It
is difficult t( determine just how suc-
cessful the Bush administration has been
in opening the process beyond what
appears to be the willingness of Justice
officials to consider highly qualified
persons without strong party connec-
tions. As for the Bush record of women
and minority appointments, Tables I
and 2, as discussed shortly, reveal the
extent of their success.
Another feature of the Bush selection
process is what appears to be an even
more subtle shift to the White House in
terms of the process of determining who
is to be nominated. During the Carter
administration, the White House coun-
sel's office tried to promote affirmative
action candidacies, but was at a disad-
vantage as the Justice Department main-
tained effective control of the nomina-
tion process. The Reagan administration
effectuated a formal White House role
with the establishmentof the President's
Committee on Federal Judicial Selec-
tion that met regularly at the White
House and which produced shared con-
trol of the nomination process. Now the
Bush administration has not only con-
tinued the committee and maintained
shared control, but appears to have ex-
panded the role of the White House
counsel's office in the nomination pro-
cess. It is perhaps significant to note that
outgoing Assistant Attorney General for
Legal Policy Stephen J. Markman not
only briefed Assistant to the Attorney
General Murray Dickman as to the selec-
tion process, he also briefed Assistant
White House Counsel Lee Liberman.
White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray
ordinarily consults with and briefs the
president on judicial nomination mat-'
ters. When the president has Thoughts
concerning judicial selection, the chain
of communication is typically from the
president to the White House counsel to
the attorney general. This, of course, does
not suggest any strain in relationship
between the Justice Department and the
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White House. Indeed, all the evidence
suggests a close day-to-day working rela-
tionship between the attorney general's
office and the White House counsel's
office. The evidence also suggests that
there is a consensus between the Bush
Justice Department and the White House
in evaluating candidacies and applying
the criteria set by the president. But the
stage may be set for some future adminis-
tration employing the same institutional
arrangement to assert the supremacy of
the Office of the White House Counsel
over the Justice Department in deciding
whom to nominate. If in some future
administration the White House is more
concerned with patronage considera-
tions than professional merit and the
reverse is true for the Justice Department,
the end result could have a considerable
impact on the judiciary.
After the initial strain in relations
with the ABA Committee was resolved,
the Justice Department resumed submit-
ting names of likely nominees to the
committee. One name, and not several,
is given for each vacancy. Thus far, no
one with a majority rating of Not Quali-
fied has been nominated. However, seven
nominees received a split majority Qua-
lified/minority Not Qualified rating.
No doubt, this was as unwelcome for the
Bush administration as similar split rat-
ings were for the Reagan administra-
tion, despite the ABA's assurance that a
majority Qualified rating means that the
individual receiving it is fully qualified
for judicial office. The ABA Committee
continues its policy of not explaining
individual ratings and not revealing the
raw vote totals. Its meetings continue to
be closed to the public, a practice upheld
by the Supreme Court in 1989 in Public
Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice.1 5 Indeed,
the Court's decision on June 21, 1989,
ended the uncertainty concerning the
committee's operations that threatened
to remove it from the selection process.
District court appointments
In Table I we find selected backgrounds
and attributes of the 48 Bush appointees
to the federal district courts confirmed
by the 101st Congress in 1989 and 1990 as
compared to the federal district court
appointees of Bush's five predecessors.
Occupation. The figures for occupa-
tion at time of appointment suggest that
the proportion of appointees recruited
Table 1 How Bush's appointees to the district courts compare to the appointees of Reagan,





























Bush Reagan Carter Ford









































from the largest law firms was approxi-
mately the same as that of the Reagan
appointees, which in turn was higher
than that of previous administrations.
This is particularly true for the propor-
tion recruited from the superfirms (100 or
more partners/associates). Overall, how-
ever, the proportion of Bush appointees
drawn from private practice was lower
than that for the Reagan administration.
Close to half of the Bush appointees
were recruited directly from the judi-
ciary, and this was the highest propor-
tion of all six administrations. These
figures lend support to the suggestion
that the administration was more con-
cerned with recruiting highly qualified,
philosophically compatible persons

























































































































tinized) than with recruiting those whose
most prominent qualifications were their
political activism.
Unlike the Reagan administration that
drew in excess of 10 per cent of its ap-
pointees from the U.S. attorney's office,
the Bush administration proportion was
about 6 per cent. Of the six administra-
tions, the only one with a lower propor-
tion was the Carter administration. Like
the Reagan administration, however, the
proportion of law professors appointed
to the district courts was lower than that
of the Carter, Nixon, and Johnson ad-
ministrations. Because Republican sena-
tors play an important role in judicial
selection and also because the number of
15. 109 S.Ct. 2558 (1989).
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Bush appointees is relatively low, these
findings should be kept in perspective.
Experience. Half the Bush appointees
had previous judicial experience with
all but one of them a sitting judge at the
time of appointment. In terms of judi-
cial experience, only the Carter appoin-
tees exceeded Bush's. As for prosecutor-
ial experience, the Bush proportion was
lower than that for the Reagan appoin-
tees and the lowest of all six administra-
tions. Similarly, the proportion of Bush
16. See Smith. Former U.S. magistratesasdistrict
judges: the possibilities and consequences of pro-
motion within the federaL judiciary. 73 JUDICATURE
268(1990).
Reagan Carter Ford Nixon
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appointees with neither judi
prosecutorial experience was
lowest of all six administration
Starting with the Carter adn
tion, there was a tendency for the
tees to have more judicial than
torial experience. Previously, it
other way around. A judicial re
course, can be evaluated to deterr
judge's philosophical orientatio
cial temperament, and dispo
tendencies. We know that the
concerns of the Bush adminis
Additionally, by promoting stat
or federal magistrates or ban
judges to the federal district be





























'Two Johnson appointees (1.6%) did not attend law school.
There was one Reagan district court appointee self-classified as non-denominational.
"*These figures are for appointees confirmed by the 96th Congress. Professor Elliot Slotnick of Ohio Slat
generously provided the not worth figures for all but six Carter district court appointees for whom no data were
Education. If sociocconotuic dilferctt-
Johnson ces between the Republican and Demo-
N cratic parties are reflected iii the back-N
grounds of judicial appointees, they are4
98.4% likely to show up in the type of educa-
120 tion of the appointees. The findings in
1.6%
2 Table 1 for undergraduate education do
93.4% seem to hint at such differences. Only a
114 minority of the appointees of Demo-
4_1 cratic presidents Johnson and Garter5
2.5% had a private undergraduate school ex-
3 3 perience, whereas the majority of the
appointees of Republicans Nixon, Ford,
48.4% Reagan, and Bush received a private
59 school education.
49.2% When law school education is exam-
60
2.5% med, the proportion of Bush appointees
3 with a prestigious Ivy League law school
94.3% education is about the same as that of the
115 Reagan appointees, and the proportions
5.7%
7 of both sets of appointees were lower
_ than that of the Garter, Ford, Nixon, and
49.2% Johnson appointees. Including such
60 prestigious non-Ivy League law schools
58.2% as Berkeley, Duke, Georgetown, North-
7 western, Stanford, Texas, and Virginia
31.1%
38 raises the proportion of Bush appointees
10.7% with a prestige legal education to about
13
42 per cent.
NA Affirmative action, The record of the
NA Bush administration of selecting quali4
NA fied women to the district courts is better
proportionately than the Reagan admin-
NA istration's record. Indeed, it surpasses all
12 previous administrations with the excep-
51.4 tion of Carter's. The record of black-
American appointments, however,
e University matches the low proportion of ap-
ravailable.avial. pointments by Reagan, which was the
worst record since Eisenhower. The pro-
portion of Hispanic-American appoint-
:ial nor ments is also low and is less than half the
also the Reagan proportion. No Asian-Ameri-
S. cans received appointments for the first
inistra- time since the Nixon administration.
appoin- ABA Ratings. As recounted earlier, the
)rosecu- Bush administration's dispute with the
was the ABA Committee on Federal judiciary
cord, of was resolved, in part, by the committee's
nine the agreement to eliminate the Exception-
n, judi- ally Well Qualified rating. Now the high-
sitional est rating is Well Qualified. Table I
se were merges the Exceptionally Welt Qualified
tration. and the Well Qualified ratings for the
e judges Reagan, Carter, Ford, Nixon, and John-
kruptcy son appointees soas toenablea compari-
nch, the son to the Bush appointees. When th
.erjudi- comparison is made, it appears that th
The appointees' political and legal credentials
.Many Bish appoihtees, confirmed dur- ABA rating. -- -
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(Colorado) coordinator and Mesa
y? irmai geeBsh or
brnburi &4
.betlegislativeassistant.In 1982, Pres-
entReagan nanied Thomas as:Chair-
Buash :Ip uniIrsc. havv alw 1liclws .\lt.
ratings ol all six a(iIIIIIismatiol. Itw
ABA ratings are taken as lair reprnsci;i-
tionsol legal ability, the Bush appolics
as a group have the largest proportion of
appointees with the highest ABA ratings
since the Kennedy administration. 7
Despite the unprecedented proportion
of those with the highest ABA ratings, 30
per cent of those with the Qualified rat-
ing received a split gualified/Not Qual-
ified rating which reant that an unspev-
ified number of members of the ABA
committee, although not in the major-
ity, perhaps even only one member. rated
the appointee to be Not Qualified. This
was a higher proportion than that of the
Reagan second-term appointees (about
25 per cent). This lack of consensus
within the committee may suggest that
some less-than-first-class lawyers are
coming to the bench. Without a major-
ity and minority. report justifying the
basis for each rating, it is difficult to
know precisely why some appointees
met with a less than unanimous seal of
committee approval. However, it should
be stressed that the official committee
position is that any appointee receiving
a Qualified rating is considered to be
fully qualified forjudicial office whether
or not the committee is unanimous. i8
Other considerations. As expected,
President Bush appointed an overwhelm-
ing proportion of Republicans to the dis-
trict courts, a proportion about the same
as that of Reagan's. Table I also presents
figures for party activism which show
over 62 per cent of the Bush appointees
with a history of party activism. This is
an even higher proportion than that of
the Reagan administration and propor-
tionally is the highest of all six adminis-
trations. These figures, however, seem to
undermine the observation made earlier
that the Bush administration may be
placing less emphasis on party activity
than previous administrations. The ex-
planation for this contradiction lies
simply in the fact that an appointee was
classified as beinga party activist if at any
time (including college and law school
years) the appointee was politically ac-
17. For the ABA ratings of the Eisenhower and
Kennedy appointees, see Grossman. LAWYERS AND
JUDGEs 198 (New York: Wiley, 1965).
18. In general. see Slotnick. The ABA Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary: A contemporary
assessment. 66 JUDICATURE 348. 385 (1983).
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the range of political activity). Thus the
high proportion for the Bush appointees
does not signal that party activism was an
unusually important criterion in the se-
lection process.
The religious origins or religious affi-
liations of the appointees is shown in
Table 1.t9 Before the Reagan administra-
tion, Democratic administrations ap-
pointed larger proportions of Catholics
than Republican administrations, re-
flecting the large proportion of Cathol-
ics affiliated with the Democratic party
and represented in the pool from which
the judiciary is drawn. But Catholic pol-
itical allegiances shifted significantly
towards the Republican party particu-
larly in the 1980s. Indeed, the proportion
of Catholics appointed by Reagan ex-
ceeded Carter'sand about equaled John-
son's. The proportion of Catholics ap-
pointed by Bush, however, appears to
have declined somewhat although it is
higher than Nixon's and Ford's. The
proportion of Jewish appointees by Bush
was the highest of all six administra-
tions, but the relatively small numbers
involved requires us to treat this finding
as no more than highly tentative. It
appears that religion is not a factor in
the selection process.
Table I also presents the net worth of
the Bush, Reagan, and Carter appoin-
tees. In 1989, the previous analysis.of
judicial appointments contained theob-
servation that: "Without a more compet-
itive pay scale, we can expect an increase
in the number of wealthy individuals
who becomejudges as some non-weal thy
highly qualified lawyers will not be able
to afford a pay cut to go on the bench. '20
That expectation was borne out as the
proportion of millionaires appointed by
Bush reached one-third, an increase over
the proportion for the Reagan appoin-
tees, which, in turn, had been a dramatic
increase over the Carter proportion of
millionaires. However, effective January
1, 1991, judicial salaries increased by
28.6 per cent (which includes a one-time
25 per cent salary increase and 3.6 per
cent costof living adjustment). Although
































































the level recommended by the Commis-
sion on Executive, Legislative and Judi-
cial Salaries in 1988, they come close.21 It
will be of interest to see two years from
now whether proportionately more peo-
ple of more modest means are becoming
judges now that the salaries are some-
19. This has now become a difficult attribute to
determine if it is not mentioned in the question-
naires or standard biographical sources. See the
discussion in Goldman. Reagans second term
judicial appointments, supra n. 3, at 330. Many
Bush appointees were willing to respond to my
queries concerning religious affiliation or origin.
but a few indicated they considered such a query
offensive and irrelevant.
20. Reagan's judicial legacy, supra n. 3. at 323.
21. The new salaries that became effective Janu-
ary I. 1991 were: for federal district judges-
5125.100; for federak ircuit court judges-$132.700;
for associate justices of the Supreme Court-
$153,600; and for the Chief Justice of the United
States-5160.600. The original recommendations















































































































































If the Bush administration is seeking
to recruit younger judges, much like it
appeared during Reagan's second term,22
that is not necessarily reflected in the
finding reported in Table 1. The average
age at time of nomination of the Bush
judicial Salaries were that the salaries of federal
district judges be raised to $135,000, federal circuit
court judges to $140,000. associate justices on the
SupremeCourt to$ 165,000, and the Chief Justice of
the United States to $175.000. President Reagan
accepted these recommendations that were sup-
posed to become effective on February 8, 1989, but
they were tied to unpopular congressional pay
increases and the entire package was disapproved
by both houses of Congress. The resolution of dis-
approval was signed by President Bush preventing
the increases from going into effect. Eventually
Congress enacted the Ethics Reform Act of 1989
which authorized (he judicial pay increases that
became effective at the start of 1991. . -
22. Reagan's judicial legacy, supra n. 3. at 323-
324. 326-327.









































Total number of appointees
















































































































*There was one Johnson appointee for whom no ABA rating was requested.
-Net worth was unavailable for one appointee.
*"Net worth only for Carter appointees confirmed by the 96th Congress with the exce
worth was unavailable.
appointees was higher than that for the
Nixon, Ford, and Reagan appointees.
During the Reagan administration the
proportion of those appointed under the
age of 40was about 7 per cent for the first
term and about 12 percent for the second
term. The proportion for the Bush ap-
pointees was about 8 per cent. For the
Reagan appointees the proportion under
the age of 45 was 26 per cent in the first
term and 37 per cent in the second term.
For the Bush appointees the proportion
was about 31 per cent.
Appeals court appointments
Table 2 reveals the findings regarding
the Bush admin
to the courts of
low number of*
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luc(5 (a Itt I It o Vt of If I III [v Up;(Ic t I I' fti it
Ford Nixon Johnson Bush itn(I Reagan appoititescattl Iroi
% % / large law irms. It is possil that the
N N N
Reagan administratiotn exhausted the
100.0% 100.0% 975% supply of prominent conservative law
12 405 3912 45 23% professors and that no obvious academic
- - 2 5%
- 1 I-right light was there to be chosen by
100.0% 97.8% 95.0% Bush tn the geographicareas in which
12 44 38 there were appeals court vacancies. It is
- - 50% also possible that ?e lack of appointing
- - 2
-law professors was rorr a matterof find-
- 2.2% - Ing the right academic for the right
- 2.2% -
I vacancy. If the latter reflects the teality,
58.3% 73.3% 75.0%' we can expect law professors to be se-
7 33 30 lected; but it is uncertain whether Bush
33.3% 26.7% 20.0% will match the relatively high propor-
4 12 8
8.3% - 2.5% Lions of law professors appointed by
1 - 1 Reagan and Carter.
8.3% 6.7% 95.0% Theproportionof Bush appoinLed ap-
I 3 3891 % 933% 380 peals judges with neither previous judi-91.7% 93.3% 5.0%
11 42 2 cial nor prosecutorial experience was
- - similar to that for the Reagan and Carter
- administrations. For these administra-
58.3 600% 5.5% tions, lack of such experience apparently58.3% 60.0% 57.5
7 27 23 posed no serious obstacles to appoint-
58.3% 75.6% 60.0% ment.
7 34 24 Educaton and affirmative action. Like
33.3% 15.6% 25.0% the Reagan and Carter appointees, the
4 7 10
8.3% 8.9% 15.0% large majority of Bush appointees were
1 4 6 educated as undergraduates and law
NA NA NA school students in non-public schools.
NA NA NA The Bush appointees had the lowest
proportion of all six administrations of
NA NA NA those educated at a publicly supported
NA NA NA law school. The proportion of Bush
12 45 40 appointees with an Ivy League law
52.1 53.8 52.2 school education was higher than that of
the Reagan appointees. However, when
prestige non-Ivy League law schools
ption of five appointees for whom net such as those mentioned in the discus-
sion of district court appointees are
included, the proportion of both the
istration's 18 appointees Bush and Reagan appointees is approx-
appeals. The relatively imately the same-about 45 per cent.
Bush appointees as well The Bush record of appointment of
ber of Ford appointees women is proportionately the second
ercentage differences be best in our history, exceeding that of the
ly. Reagan administration. Because the total
nd experience. When ex- number of Bush appeals court appoin-
2, we note that the pro- tees is low, itcannotbesaid with certainty
peals court appointees that this reflects either a trend or an
rom the sitting judiciary appointment priority. However,-taken in
ame as that of the Rea- conjunction with the larger proportion
d Johnson administra- (than achieved by the Reagan adminis-
reas about one in four tration) of women district court appoin-
tees came from private tees, it is plausible to argue that this pro-
d one in eight from law portion can be seen as demonstrating a
ne in three Bush appoin- Bush administration cotmitment to the
111 IIIIlfll ta] (4111:1111( wd lllwil.
(Il ()t( Afritcan-Almeric an '11d onIe(
Hispan n-Americal iceived appoint-
mieis b\ the Bush adm1inisnraiion. No
Asian-Aierican received an appoint-
ment. Gieater efforts by the administra-
tion will be needed to bring to fruition the
president's stated desire to open the door
of opportunity to qualified minorities.
ABA ratings. About three out of four
Bush appointees received the highest
ABA ratings compared to the Reagan
record of three out of five. Only one Bush
appointee received a split Qualified/Not
Qualified rating, but that split rating
went for the first time to a sitting federal
district judge. Because the ABA commit-
tee does not offer reasons for its ratings
there is no basis for knowing what
moved the minority of the committee to
a rating of Not Qualified. Before the
Bush administration, the ABA ratings of
U.S. district judges nominated for eleva-
tion were typically Well Qualified or Ex-
ceptionally Well Qualified. It is possible
WrC i behind ihw elcv;on )I IIllis judg .
It isalso posSiblethat )o1iti(alidlogi
(<al (onsidera tions miotivitud ihe iiinoi -
ity Not Qualified rating. Alternativelyv.
this appointee may in fact be onlI nar-
ginally qualified. Nevertheless. on bal-
ance, if the ABA ratings are considercd a
measure of professional qualill. none of
the previous five administiations rx-
ceeded the Bush record in appointing
highly qualified people. In general. then.
the Bush appointees can be considered to
be among the best qualified judges to
assume the appellate bench.
Other considerations. Like the Rea-
gan administration before it. the Bush
administration failed to name even one
Democrat to the appeals cours. Before
the Reagan administration, it was the
Kennedy administration that provided
an instance of a president failing to find
even one member of the opposition
party worthy of a position on an appeals
court. Also like the Reagan appointees,
.b1 it It hIll 41 fit(.( . C II s 1H.id
NCin( bau kgiouid ol patnty .11 i ism (SIc
lle appoilntces political and legai Iv-
ientials. page 300). Only the Caiit
a)pointees had a higher proportion of
appointecs with a background of prior
partisan activism.
The relativelv small number of Bush
appointees means that comparisons of
proportions of the Bush appointees to
those of prcvious.admiiiistrations must
not place too much emphasis on sone-
what small percentage differences. Ne
ertheless. it appears froi Tnlable 2 that the
Bush administration exceeded the Rea-
gan administration in the proportion of
Catholics appointed to the appeals
courts. a proportion that appears to be
the highest of all six administrations.
Once again, this may be a manifestation
of the changing composition of the
Republican party, and also it may be
iiidicativeof the total eradication of reli-
gious discrimination of the most subtle
kind in judicial recruitment.
'IlT nt wor of thc Bu1sh appoiruices
is PIresented in Thble 2 and reveals Ithur
just as with Bush's district court appoin-
tees about one out of three appeals court
appointees were millionaires. There was
a lower proportion of Reagan appoin-
tees who were millionaires and a much
lower proportion for the Carter appoin-
tees. The reasons offered in the discus-
sion of the Bush district court appoin-
tees are applicable here. It will be of
interest to see whether the new salary
scaleof the federal judiciary will broaden
the socio-economic backgrounds of the
appointees. Of course, the Republican
23 About 16 per cent of Reagan's first term
appeals court appointees were under the age of 45.
In 1985-1986 that proportion jumped to over one-
third (34.4 per cent), but in the last two years of
Reagan's presidency declined to 13.3 per cent. In
contrast. for the first two years of the Bush adminis-
tration the proportion of appeals court appointees
under theage of 45 was 22.2 per cent. In general, see
Goldman. The Age of Judges: Reagan's Second
Term Appeals Court Appointees Compared to the
Appointeesof Presidents Since 1891.73 A.B.A.J. 94(1987).
pa y IVten 1(0 raI t li I  artgc I p ()o Ins
of the Ip)1)r-i om( orai1 0 e lonit0 ;1han dots
the Democratic party, thus tile relaiion-
ship between salary scale and net worth
may not be able to be tested until there is
a Democratic administration inl the
White House appointing federal judges.
In contrast to the findings concerning
average age at time of nomination for
Bush's district court judges, the findings
for the Bush appeals court appointees
show them to have the youngest average
age of all six administrations. The aver-
age age was 1.5 years younger than that
for the Reagan appointees, almost 3.5
years younger than the Carter appoin-
tees, and over 5 years younger than the
Nixon appointees.23 Administrations. of
course, have more leeway over appeals
court appointments than district court
appointments, and these findings for
age may indeed reflect a deliberate at-
tempt on the part of the administration
to select younger rather than older peo-
ple so as to extend the Bush legacy.
The Bush imprint?
Ilas there been a Bush impi t on t'
jtidiciarv? The answer. of cotrse. is how
can there not be. More to the point. how-
ever, is the nature of that imprint. It is
obvious that the full portrait of the Bush
judiciary can only be drawn when the
Bush administration has appointed its
final judge. But tLle sketch we can see
(and have seen) has lines extending back
to the Reagan and also to previous
administrations.
There was no more important deci-
sion that George Bush made with im-
port for judicial selection than was his
decision to retain Dick Thornburgh as
attorney general. Thornburgh had be-
gun service as attorney general in August
of 1988 following Edwin Meese's resig-
nation after being cleared of alleged
criminal wrongdoings. Thornburgh,
thus, was first a Reagan appointee. For
the Bush administration, continuity with
Reagan was seen as politically impor-
nii ermont Bar
Parkefliaid '
ional credentials goimgb L
s hool career wh
anaging editor of the re
1. "From 1969-191 :.'4
-esadeputy state attorre -eneraIrt V
ihnder James Jeff6ids tIe ft
nator). Subsequently, ih b m6 ecarxi
ly regarded attorney mpvarit
pin Burlington-
But the administration was dismayed
uthtuhould Ubliban
pation , sipubli-
d staed he woul o that state's
bl-that were to be I- dfunctional
d tthe Senate o&' L6 bl iuiscfAtio-to say
'Nh .21 i -s that-the
o f fellow Res--n ill not willingly
plican srds wound up i nCipower to
putting ahod on ly two nomina en"ia Parker not
ti ssboth frbinmtvwhich had two e i
mocratic senatr-TheSenate Repub odii U bddt have buidged.
lican Confereicetok:Jeffords' side in ;!'Idbn Goldman
I -~*-05
tant in order to cement Reagan's follow-
ing to the Republican party. But when
Thornburgh first became attorney gen-
eral, he faced a Justice Department that
had its public image tarnished and one
in which internal strains had taken their
toll. Insofar as judicial selection was
concerned, the administration had
clashed frequently with the Democratic-
controlled Senate Judiciary Committee,
perhaps because the Reagan Justice De-
partment had not fully grasped the pol-
itical import of the Democrats assuming
control of the Senate in 1987 for the first
time during Reagan's presidency. Thorn-
burgh, apparently, appreciated the new
political reality and his task of rebuild-
ing the Justice Department and its pub-
lic image. It is significant that Thorn-
burgh moved judicial selection to his
office, thus assuring his continual over-
sight in this ongoing and sensitive task.
During the first two years of Bush's pre-
sidency, Thornburgh, with only few ex-
ceptions, avoided controversial nomina-
tions (see "Controversial Nominations,"
page 304). Yet the profile of the Bush
appointees, as we have seen, bears many
similarities to the Reagan appointees.
Equally significant forjudicial recruit-
ment was George Bush's decision to con-
tinue the Reagan-initiated President's
Committee on Federal Judicial Selec-
tion and to entrust its chairmanship to
his close friend, White House Counsel
C. Boyden Gray. Bush's insistence on
naming those who shared a conservative
judicial philosophy assured not only a
continuation of the Reagan-initiated
screening process, including extensive
interviewing, but placed a parallel
screening process (without the personal
interviewing) at the White House level.
There has been some evidence sug-
gesting that there has been a decisional
impact of the Reagan appointees that
has moved the federal courts and federal
law decidedly to the right of the philo-
sophical spectrum. 24 It is too soon to be
able to gauge the decisio'nal impact of
the Bush appointees, but it is likely to be
similar. It is not insignificant to note
that of the 10 Bush appointments of sit-
tingjudges to the courts of appeals, nine
were elevations of federal district court
judges, all of whom had been Reagan
district court appointees.
The Bush imprint, thus far, seems to
include a commitment to recruit quali-
fied women. But, in terms of results thus
far, it is difficult to say the same for
blacks and other ethnic minorities.
The next two years
Despite the relatively low numbers of
appointees thus far, therearesome trends
that appear to have emerged. When the
Bush administration fills the 74 new fed-
eral district and 11 new federal appeals
court positions created by the Federal
Judgeships Act of 1990, along with other
vacancies, 25 the shape of the Bush judi-
ciary will be considerably clearer. Never-
theless, we can safely predict that the
overwhelming proportion of appointees
will continue to be middle-aged, well-to-
do white male Republicans. It is also
likely that at least 10 per cent of the
appointments will be women. We can
also expect that the emphasis on judicial
experience will continue since a judicial
track record provides the best evidence of
a judge's judicial philosophy. There will
likely be efforts to recruit black-Ameri-
cans and other minorities, but it is
uncertain whether the Bush administra-
tion will improve upon the Reagan
administration's poor record.
If there is a Supreme Court vacancy
during 1991 or 1992, national attention,
of course, will be centered on judicial
selection. If the Souter appointment is a
guide to how the administration will
managejudicial selection for the highest
court, we can expect a deliberate attempt
to avoid controversy. This would be a
particularly wise strategy to follow as
the chances for presidential defeat of a
Supreme Court nomination increase the
closer the nomination is to a presidential
election year.26 If Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall decides to retire from the Court, the
administration will surely replace him
with an African-American (to do other-
wise would suggest that there is no
African-American in the entire United
States qualified to sit on the Supreme
Court, a position that at the least would
be awkward to take for a president run-
ning for reelection). Clarence Thomas,
although only 42 years old, has been
mentioned by Court watchers as a possi-
bility,21 but it is uncertain how contro-
versial his nomination would be (much
would likely depend upon his record on
the D.C. Circuit). Another possibility
whose name has been mentioned is 53-
year-old Judge Amalya Kearse, a highly
regarded Second Circuit jurist who has
served on that court since 1979.28
Even without another Supreme Court
appointment, by 1993 George Bush will
likely have named over 200 lower federal
court judges, itself a major accomplish-
ment. Added to the over 325 Reagan
appointees remaining on the bench,
about two-thirds of the judiciary will
have been appointed by Reagan and
Bush alone. By 1993, Democrats will
account for only about 25 per cent of the
federal bench,'an imbalance exceeded
only after the 20 years of appointments
by Roosevelt and Truman. Just as the
Roosevelt and Truman appointees car-
ried through the constitutionalization of
the New Deal, which meant institution-
alizing judicial restraint in matters of
governmental economic policymaking,
so too the Reagan and Bush appointees
will be likely to constitutionalize the
Reagan-Bush social* agenda, which
means institutionalizing judicial re-
straint in matters of governmental civil
liberties and civil rights policymaking.
Rights and liberties may be subjected to
majority rule in each state and in the
nation to an extent not seen in almost 60
years. Whether this bodes well or ill for
the nation will be a subject for continu-
ing and vigorous debate. O
24. See the discussion of the studies in Goldman.,
Reagan's second term judicial appointments, supra
n. 3. at 335-338. Also see Tomasi and Velma, A11 the
President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 87
COLUM. L REv. 766 (1987); H. Schwartz, PACKING
THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (New York: Charles.
Scribner's Sons. 1988); B. Schwartz. THE NEW.
RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE
LEGAL CLOCK (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1990); Smith, Polarization and change in the
federal courts: en banc decisions in the U.S. courts
of appeals. 74 JUDICATURE 133 (1990); Alumbaugh
and Rowland. The links between platform-based
appointment criteria and trial judges' abortion
judgments, 74 JUDICATURE 153 (1990).
25. At the beginning of the 102nd Congress the
total number of vacancies, including the newly
created positions, was 124 (18 to the courts of
appeals and 106 to the district courts).
26. See Cameron. Cover, and Segal, Senate Vot-
ing on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitu-
tionatModel, 84 AM. Po. Scs. REv. 525 (1990) and
Segal and Spaeth, If a Supreme Court vacancy
occurs, will the Senate confirm a Reagan nominee?.
69 JUDICATURE 186 (1986).
27. Seefor example, Lewis. Panel Backs Appeals
Court Nominee, NEW YORK TIMES, February 23.
1990, at A-16.
28. Of course there are many other African-
Americans qualified to sit on the Supreme Court.
SHELDON GOLDMAN is a professor of polit-
ical science at the University of Massachu-
setts, Amherst.
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Seeking High Ground on the High Court
In the '92 campaign, the candidates' constitutional values
and their notions of the kind ofpeople who should sit
on the Supreme Court could help define the election.
BY TERENCE MORAN
In presidential elections, the Supreme
Court is like sudden weather, breaking
into campaigns with an unexpected but
natural power. From





crucial role in setting
the agendas, mobilizing the activists, and
intensifying the debates of the campaign
season.
This year, the nation's troubled econ-
omy dominates political discourse. But
when voters go to choose the next presi-
dent, the broad constitutional values and
ideals of George Bush and Bill Clinton-
and their notions of the kind of people who
should sit on the Court-will, subtly but
certainly, help to define their candidacies
to the country.
Each side will seek to do that defining
on its own turf. The battle over the Court
in the campaign thus turns on charged
symbols and loaded words. on Clarence
Thomas and school prayer. on privacy and
pornography. Whether it's through the
rhetoric in their speeches or the images in
their advertising, the goal for the candi-
dates when it comes to these issues is to
tap into voters' often conflicting ideas
about justice in America.
Both camps, while planning to put the
vast majority of their energies into ad-
dressing the economic concerns and civic
alienation of the electorate, are ready for a
fight over the Court.
"The Court is a significant issue in this
campaign. especially for voters who are
concerned about specific problems in
society, whether it's crime, government
regulation, or abortion," says James Cic-
coni, a senior issues adviser to President
Bush's campaign and a partner in the D.C.
office of Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld.
"'ITose are voters we have traditionally
done well with, and we plan to make our
case on those issues in the course of this
campaign," adds Cicconi.
For Gov. Clinton of Arkansas and his
troops, the GOP legal litany sounds tired
and ineffective. The Democrats, they
claim, have the high-court high ground in
1992.
"The Republicans have manipulated
these hot-button social issues ever since
the riots of the 1960s in a way that divides
the country, divides the Democratic base,
and decreases turnout in elections,"
charges former Gov. James Blanchard of
Michigan, a staunch Clinton supporter and
adviser to the Democratic candidate's
campaign.
"But there's been an awakening on
what the Court has really been doing-
withdrawing rights and opportunities,"
adds Blanchard, who is also a partner in
Bush campaign adviser James
Cicconi Court will be an issue.
D.C.'s Verner. Liipfert. Bernhard.
McPherson and Hand.
Blanchard's perception of a great
awakening about the direction constitu-
tional law has taken over the past 10 years
may be wishful thinking, but polls show a
trend that ought to give him some hope-
and unsettle his GOP opponents. There's
been a slight but pronounced shift in how
voters view the Court: the justices' num-
bers are down.
For example. the Gallup Organization
has asked Americans since 1973 about
their confidence in various institutions,
including Congress. the Court. news-
papers, and -Big Business." When the
question was last posed, in October 1991.
the level of confidence in the Court was
near an all-time low, matched only by the
responses in 1978. Last fall, the number of
people declaring themselves in the Gallup
Poll to be very confident in the justices
had plunged.17 points since the last pres-
idential campaign in 1988. (See ac-
companying box.)
In bad economic times. people lose
confidence in many things. But the
Court's loss of support among the citi-
zenry exceeds that of other institutions;
business. labor. organized religion. and
newspapers all barely slipped in Ameri-
cans' estimation over the past four years.
Part of the reason for the changing view
of the Court is ideological: the justices are
increasingly seen as too conservative. This
is a far cry for Republicans from the head%
days of the late 1960s and 1970s. when a
strong majority of Americans wanted to
see the Court slow down or reverse its
liberal crusade in the law.
For decades, GOP presidential candi-
dates have gone to town on that distaste
for liberal jurisprudence. But the Re-
publican hegemony over the issue of the
Court in national politics may be coming
to an end-and there are plenty of activists
working to see that'day arrive.
"Democratic candidates have tried to
make an issue of the Court before. but it
never clicked," says Arthur Kropp, pres-
ident of People for the American Way. a
liberal advocacy group. "But times have
changed."
Kropp says that his group, which has
been in the thick of many battles over the
Court. is planning an ambitious media
strategy to raise awareness among voters
of the justices' power and of the conse-
quences for the Court in the election.
People for the American Way's cam-
paign, to be unveiled in September. will
consist in part of a stark imperative super-
imposed over pictures of Bush and Clin-
ton: "Before you choose, think about how
they'll choose." Kropp and many other
liberal activists are betting that the pros-
pect of yet another conservative adminis-
tration picking justices and judges will
spur voters to action this fall, although he
denies any coordination with the Clinton
campaign.
"The public doesn't want radical
change on these volatile issues," Kropp
says, noting that, should President Bush
be re-elected, Republican presidents will
have chosen upward of 90 percent of all
federal judges. "A lot of organizations
like ours will try to make this an is-
sue-but we aren't acting as Bill Clinton's
surrogates."
Lightning Rod
Still. the Clinton camp is counting
heavily on the energy and enthusiasm of
activists for whom the Court is a crucial
factor in voting. And with its emphasis on
"choice," People for the American Way's
slogan deliberately invokes the traditional
lightning rod of constitutional law in pres-
idential politics-abortion.
Now that the Court is just one vote shy
of a majority that would junk Roe v.
Wade, the ruling that guarantees the right
to choose abortion, a passionate deter-
mination has taken hold in the abortion.
rights movement. As has happened often
in American history. the Court's rulings
have galvanized political opposition to its
vision of liberty and power.
"When the Supreme Court brought the
COURT POUTICS FROM PAGE 10
abortion issue clearly into the political
arena, activists. particularly in the Demo-
cratic Party. became more united and
more determined." says Deborah Dotson.
a researcher at the Center for Women and
American Politics at Rutgers University.
Clinton has already reached out to these
reinvigorated partisans-but in a way that
could come back to haunt him. By explic-
idy promising to appoint only justices who
will uphold Roe. the Democratic candidate
has opened himself to charges that he is
looking to extract political promises from
potential Court appointees and that he is
employing a litmus test on the issue that is
just as rigid-and more brazen-as the
one allegedly used by President Ronald
Reagan. Republicans are ready to pounce.
"It is absolutely, morally wrong, con-
trary to our historical traditions, and truly
repugnant." blasts COcconi. the Bush is-,
sues adviser. "There's a big difference
between looking for justices who sub-
scribe to a philosophy and asking them to
commit in advance to rule in a certain way
on a specific case."
President Bush's campaign staffers also
note that Clinton's pro-choice enthusiasm
seems to be a recent development. As
Arkansas governor. Clinton signed into
law a bill that required girls to notify their
parents or get a judge's permission if they
wanted an abortion, and he backed the
state's ban on funding for poor women's
abortions.
"His stance now is completely at odds
with his own past positions, and that raises
the issue of consistency, of fidelity to his
own prior commianents," Cicconi says.
But Clinton's camp dismisses such
charges as desperate talk from a desperate
campaign. They are confident that the
grass-roots uprising over the abortion is-
sue this year will work to their advantage,
not only with liberal Democrats but also
with pro-choice independents who sup-
ported Ross Perot's candidacy and with
Republicans who are trying to get their
party to change its rigid anti-abortion
stance.
"Bill Clinton is not afraid to say that he
will appoint justices who will uphold
decisions that say that racial prejudice is
wrong and decisions that say that crinmi-
nalizing women is wrong," declares Paul
Begala, a Clinton campaign strategist.
"There are fundamental rights in this
country, and Bill Clinton supports them."
Divisive Duo
The question of just who Clinton might
name to the Court--and the issue of who
Bush already has-will bring to the fore-
front of the campaign two of the most
divisive figures in American politics:
Clarence Thomas and Mario Cuomo.
Thomas, whose confirmation batle last
year riveted the nation and inflamed public
Opinion, occupies a unique place in the
countri's political imagination. No sitting
Supreme Court justice since William
Douglas has become so prominent a polit-
ical target; no public figure in recent
memory stirs such deep passions.
"He's the best thing that ever happened
to us." says Jane Danowitz, president of
the Women's Campaign Fund. a liberal
political action committee. "He's put our
issues very much on the front burner."
Clinton. like virtually every other
Democrat this year, has campaigned spe-
cifically on the issue of Thomas' ap-
pointment to the Court. But heading into
the fall campaign, the Democratic candi-
date must be careful in crafting an anti-
Thomas message; the justice has plenty of
fans.
Although it has always been difficult for
Democratic activists to stomach, most
Americans believed Thomas in his show-
down with Anita Hill and most supported
his confirmation. While Thomas' base has
eroded somewhat (see accompanying
box). even a plurality of rank-and-file
Democrats-47 percent-still thinks the
Senate was right in sending him to the
high court.
Please tell me how much
confidence you, yourself,
have in the Supreme
Court, (Percentage of
people answering 'a great
deal" or "quite a lot.")
56%
39%
President Bush's staffers are confident
that targeted media can take advantage of
this support, and they say they will not be
bashful in playing the Thomas card.
"Cleary, Clarence Thomas is a hero to
a significant chunk of this country's vot-
ers." says a top Bush campaign official
who asks not to be named. "Those are
people we will be reaching out to."
Clinton's campaign, meanwhile, be-
lieves that the volatile emotions sparked
by Thomas' nomination fight will work
best for Democrats if the issue is cast in
less personal terms.
"We won't run against him personally,
partly because you can't unscramble the
eggs-he's already on the Court," says
Begala. "But of all the outrages in that
process, the worst and the one that res-
onates with people was the first and big-
gest lie-that Clarence Thomas was the
most qualified person in the country for
that position.
"It says a lot about how George Bush
makes his appointments." adds Begala.
If Thomas reflects Bush's values when
it comes to the Court, then Gov. Mario
Cuomo of New York will stand for Clin-
in general. do you think
the U.S. Supreme Court is
too liberal or too
conservative in its
decisions?




ton's concept of who might make a good
justice. Since he announced on MTV June
16 that Cuomo was on his list of Supreme
Court candidates, Clinton has sparked
speculation of a high-stakes deal like the
one President Dwight Eisenhower cut with
Earl Warren to win the then California
govemor's support.
"Is this the ultimate political gift for an
endorsement?" asks Karen Johnson, po-
litical director of the National Federation
of Republican Women. "We'll probably
lose New York now. because they'll all
want to get rid of him."
Johnson's acid tone is characteristic of
many voters' reaction to the New York
governor. While he is a hero to liberal
Democrats. Cuomo repels a significant
number of moderates and independents
whom Clinton needs to win, especially in
the South. President Bush's staffers can
hardly wait to introduce "Bubba" to the
notion of a Justice Cuomo.
'A whole lot of people where we look
for votes and where Bill Clinton is looking
for votes find Cuomo not only unaccept-
able but very scary." says James Lake.
deputy campaign chairman of the Bush
New York Gov. Mario Cuomo (left)-on Bill Clinton's short list for the
Court-and Justice Clarence Thomas energize activists in both parties.
effort. "I think it was a serious mistake for
Clinton to do that."
Even Clinton, when readying for a
potential challenge from Cuomo in the
Democratic primaries last December, was
careful to distinguish himself from
Cuomo's brand of Democratic politics.
Calling him "a powerful spokeman for the
Northeastern liberal wing of the party."
Clinton told a New Hampshire audience
that he was different because he "could
balance budgets."
Now, however, the Clinton campaign is
taking a different tack.
"His point about Cuomo was that not
only is he a scholar of the law, but that he
understands the impact of the law on peo-
ple's lives," says Begala. "That en-
gagement with real people and their lives
is the central distinction between Bush and
Clinton."
The Republican bid to use Cuomo as a
wedge issue highlights how the Supreme
Court has worked to the GOP's advantage
in presidential campaigns for over 20
years. By focusing on abiding American
values that Democrats have seemed at
times to disparage and that the Court has
seemed at times to threaten-religion,
morality. the desire to live in safe neigh-
borhoods-Republicans have lined up
much of Middle America on their side in
election after election.
Raising those issues is always an emo-
tional and sometimes a dirty endeavor. As
President Bush proved in his 1988 cam-
paign. he is ready and able to do what he
must in order to draw these fundamental
distinctions between his ideals and those
he says his opponent holds. Attorney
General William Barr. according to one
Bush campaign official, will play a major
role in that effort.
But this year. with the economy stuck in
low gear and a conservative Court poised
to change constitutional parameters that
most Americans grew up with, the old
Republican war horses may not do. Dem-
ocrats sense a shift in the way voters see
their party's constitutional values.
"People are talking about the Court a
lot mote, candidates are raising it more.
and when they do. there's more applause
for our positions," says Blanchard. the
former Michigan governor, who spends
half his time in his home state. "I think
the message is getting out that we as a
society need to be vigilant about our
rights. that we can't let ourselves get
sandbagged again on these issues. There's
too much at stake." O
What the Polls Say About the Court
Should the Senate have confirmed Clarence Thomas?
Yes I No
(June 1992)(Oct. 1991)Scs a n.
glie eng rton post
AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER
Election- YearJUST BEFORE the Supreme Court adjourned
in June, Chairman Joseph Biden of the Senate
Judiciary Committee announced that if a
retirement were announced on the court at
the end of the term, he would oppose any action
to confirm a replacement. It is unusual to send
such a signal, but the senator's position is not
surprising. A lifetime appointment to the Su-
preme Court is so important, particularly at a
time when the court is often closely divided on
questions of great national interest, that it is
understandable Senate Democrats would want to
postpone any action until after the presidential
election.
Sen. Biden's declaration did not apply to nomi-
nees for other federal courts, however. Pre-
sumably, these would conti-ne to be comdered
at least until the political campaign begins in
earnest after Labor Day. But the senator did say
that the committee would act first on nomina-
tions of women and minorities and would get to
white males only if time allowed. As a result,
though some nominations have gone to the floor
in the past six weeks, 63 are still pending in the
committee-on average for 102 days. This is a
substantial number of nominees to be stranded as
the session draws to a close.
No doubt there are political reasons for the
slowdown. But both parties have been playing the
game. After the Clarence Thomas hearings, the
Confirmations
administration decided to withhold fromu the Sen-
ate all FBI reports on nominees. The Judiciary
Committee refused, to proceed without these
reports from October 1991 until Febiruar 1992,
and by the time-the policy was changed, dozens of
nominationy had been added to the backlog.
The adniinistration has also been slow i ll
vacancies. There are still 46 slots open-on
average for- 'nore than. a year; many are -njurisdictions where judges are badly needed. In
addition, because of administration pressure to
get a Senate vote on .thercontroversiaL nomiaw.
tion of Alabama's Edward-Carnes, Republicans.
have actually blocked avote on eight of theirown'
nominations-most of them the very womend-
minorities Sen. Biden would confirm. 'Dat issue
was resolved only last Friday whed the Carnes
vote was set for September and the way cleared
for a vote on the others:
It is regrettable that s many vacanciei emain
unfilled, btt we see no real villains. Addrding to
the Judiciary Committee, 6IFjuMs will have been
bonfirmed by the time Congress adjourns this
year--the highest total for a presidential ele*ioL
year in which different parties controlled the White
House and the Senate. Unfortunately, that is of
little consolation to sitting judges awaiting col-
leagues to share the workload and to individuals,
most of them eminently qualified, whose nomina-
tions will expire when Congress goes home.
Gov. Clinton's Litmus Test
OR MORE than a decade, critics have
accused Presidents Reagan and Bush of
applying a litmus test with regard to abor-
tion in the selection of Supreme Court nominees.
Both presidents stoutly deny that any prospec-
tive nominee has been asked to state in advance
his or her views on Roe v. Wade, and every
nominee has confirmed that assurance. More-
over, each nominee declined to state a position
on the landmark abortion ruling when asked to do
so at Senate confirmation hearings, refusing,
quite correctly, to announce in advance how he
or she would rule on a matter that would surely
come before the court.
Now Gov. Bill Clinton has said that he will
apply an abortion litmus test (the term is one he
accepts) in nominating Supreme Court justices.
On more than one occasion since the court
decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey last week,
he has repeated this pledge. Most recently, in an
interview with Bill Moyers, he conceded that
though he is uncomfortable with the concept of a
litmus test, his appointments to the Supreme
Court "will be strong supporters of Roe v. Wade."
This statement needs clarification.
Most voters understand that when they choose
a president, that person will in turn choose
Supreme Court justices who share his values and,
to a certain extent, his political philosophy. No
one is surprised when Republican presidents
appoint justices thought to be more conservative
than the jurists chosen by Democrats. But this is
a far cry from demanding that a nominee pledge
in advance to rule a certain way on a constitution-
al question that is still unsettled. It is clear after
last week that Presidents Reagan and Bush
exacted no such promises from Justices O'Con-
nor, Kennedy and Souter, who formed the key
bloc upholding Roe v. Wade.
As a lawyer, Gov. Clinton should be even more
sensitive to the importance of an independent judi-
ciary than his predecessors. He should follow this
pattern if he is elected. It would be fine to choose a
Supreme Court nominee who has an extensive
public record in support of upholding the landmark
case. If that is what the governor means when he
promises a litmus test, that's unobjectionable. But it
would be terribly wrong to demand assurances with
respect to cases that will come before the court in
the future. No president should ask for such a
pledge, and any prospective justice who would give
it is not worthy of the appointment.
Clinton Says He Won't Appoint Anti-Abortion Justice,
From a Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON-Seeking to
gain political ground from the con-
tinuing controversy over abortion,
presumptive Democratic nominee
Bill Clinton warned Tuesday that
the Supreme Court is "just onejustice away from repealing the
right to choose" and pledged to
appoint only jurists who support
abortion rights to the high court.
"I remember clearly what it was
like" in the days before the 1973
Roe vs. Wade decision legalized
abortion nationwide, Clinton said.
He reminded supporters at a
Washington rally of "the disasters
in dark alleys, the uncertainty, the
fear, the hiding."
"As President, I'll not make you
worry about the one justice," he
said-alluding to the court's razor
thin 5-4 decision Monday not to
overrule Roe.
Earlier in the day, during an
appearance on NBC's "Today"
show, Clinton said that although he
does not like litmus tests, he would
use one for his high court nomi-
nees.
"I think that a judge ought to be
able to answer a question in a
Senate hearing, 'Do you or do you
not support the right to privacy,
including the right to choose?"' he
said. President Bush's nominees
have refused to answer that ques-
tion.
Moreover, Clinton added, whom-
ever he chooses as his running
mate would have to support abor-.
tion rights.
At least one person who haso
been under consideration for thet
job, Pennsylvania Sen. Harrie4
Wofford, has supported restric-
tions, including his state's law that,
the high court ruled on Monday.
Some Clinton aides have told re-
porters recently they believ&
Wofford's chances of being select-
ed for the job have dwindled be-
cause of the abortion issue.
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The 1992 Campaign "This idea of balance on the courts is a sudden liberal invention." SUNATOR ORIN c. MATCH
Selection of Conservative Judges Guards Part of Bush's Legacy
ByNEILA.LEWIS
WASHINGTON. June 30 - If President
Bush falls to w-n reeection this November.
his successor will no doubt move swiftly to
undo many of his policies. But one aspect of
Mr. Bushsa legacy will not yield to quick
Change, and that Is the sharply conservatve
makeup of the nation's Federal courts.
Building on the record of Ronald Reagan
before him. Mr. Bush has put into place a
-Federal judiciary with its own distinct con-
servate plilosophy that could dominate Ube
courts for decades.
During his Presidency, Mr. Reagan a.
pointed about 325 lawyers to the Supreme
Court the appellate courts und the district
corets. So far. Mr. Bush has appointed 150
tore, so that tinw 00 perents of the natan's
sitting Federal judges were selected by these
two men. Anad Mr. Bush is expected to fil 30
more shots before Election Day.
In picking judges, the President has been
faithful to Mr. Reaganss approach of select'
ing conservatives. Mr. Buts choices are
generally whm, wealthy, male and perhaps
most sulking of all, relatively yoeg. Since
they are appIIed for life, some of thesejudges could sit on the heads through 10 or
more PresidentIal terms.
Tree to Their Tenets
Their impact is already tnmtistakable, a
strong rebuke to anyre who sti believes
that judges are simply neutral umpitrs in
some grand legal game.
True to thie key tenets of the conservabtie
judicial agenda, these judges tend to con.
struse las as earrowly s possible and uau-
ally favor aw enforcemet officials over
rimiIal defendants. They also typically do'
r to Congress i deciding closecomstttutn-
I asues.
But judgegicking Is not an exact scence,
as demonstrated by the rting Monday on the
moat amaited case of the year - the So'
pretme Court decision that upheld a moman's
right to an aborton mhile alwhloig states to
impose restrictions. No other tasue has been
so central to the judicial appolment pro
cess as abortie. Monday'a decision demns.
strated yet again that sece judges take the
bends they do not always perform us the
Presidents iws appointed them expected.
Two appolntees of President Reagan and
one of President Bush's formed the core of
the bloc that, to the comsternation of many
conservatives, upheld the essence of Roe v.
Wade. the 1973 ruling that found a constku.
tional right u aortiain
- But eon wil that, the tendency of Be-
gain-Bush appointees to vote in cerain defi-
nite patterns throughiaut the cot system
has prored to he reliable. lrdeed. several
political scientits are now able to pdtce
. computertzed stdlies demonstrating the dif.
ferences between the rilings of these ap
poites and these of judges appeted in
earlier years - especially tlte 17 judges
namned by President Jimmy Carter.
Simply plug in the decisaons, these studied
say. and ReaganwBuh judges ae shown to
be markedly different even from these who
were put on the bench by Richard M. Nixon
and Gerald R. Ford. both also Republicans
A 190 study financed by the National
Science Foundation And the Brookings eatl.
Insion and published in Judicature Magazine
shows that Reagan appotiees supported soc
strictions on abortion aboat 77 percent of the
time, a tendency that would presumbly applyto Bush appointees. who were fot included In
the study. The study said that from 1981 to
1987. Carterappointed judges supported ro.
strictions in about 12 percent of the cases:
judges appointed by Mr. Nizon had a score of
21 percen.
Other studites show similar disparities in
sucs areas as atitrust and criminal law.
Conservatliess Crusade
Such results are the ensdgame of a remark.
ableeffort by Mr. Reagan. and now Mr. Bush,
to remnake the nation' atrss - a crusade
driven by many conserative lamyers aod
officials who have worked to tube advantage
of Republican Control of the White House.
Senator Joseph 0. olden Jr- the Delaware
Democrat who is chairman of the Judiciary
Committee. complined that conservatives
were trying to achevet policy changes
throagis the judicial process that they could
one aee through the poitical process.
Under the Contt~itution. the Senate sares
responsibility with the While House forpatting judges on the bernch. But Mr. Bdert's
committee and the Democratictcantrolled
The Bush Record -
Srashoetiirat fese
Senate have largely acquiesced in the Rea. instal
gan-Bush effort by confirming mess of their
tn e. Several Democrats have ex.
plamed that they are reluctast to oppose n.
candldates solely on Ideological grnads.
But Mr. Oiden served motice in a recent tAt,.
apeeds that he wouild try to change that
attitude anM sid he would relect say nomt.
ne whon philosophy does om represent a
bilace between a conservative Administra.
tion and a snore moderate Senat.
Senator Orrn G. Hatch, a Utah Republican
and Judiciary Comm1tie member, taid vot'
ors generally applaud the change i the dl.
recton of the judiciary. In his view. com. A'
plaiss that Mr. Bush is turning the counts to
the right simply reflect liberal constermation.
"Thi idea of balance on the courts Is a
sudden itleral inentio, Mr. Hatch sld in
an interview. "I didn't hear anything about
halaes in all the years of the Warren Court,
when we had Justices like William Douglas,
Earl Warren and William Bennast It all




Underlyig all this lies a tntalizing ques-
tin: Has President Oash selected all these
coservative judges because he is personally
committed to Un in of shifting the courts
nghlwrd in a wholesale manner?
Or. as his detractors and eense sup.posses argue.does he simply see the namig
of conservative judges as a relatively cos.
free way us please the Republican Party'a
conservative ing?
C. Boyden Gray, the White House counsel
who is in Charse Or the screening and salec.
tin process for jodges, argues that the Pres. - at I n" come to expect." The judgepicbers In both the Reagan snddeat does hold a tleptIlo Indeent wile Mr. Bush abouls always Bash Adnistrations he pain parttcplhlr
phy of judtg, believed s a cmed" i Other Are - attenim tusshe Ideologes of the lars they
'He has a well-developed sense of the til hispaiciesm andtUesrtw selected for the Circutt Courts. Reagan.ssb
Consthitato and such things as the sepaersa* s
(lan ofttutm and Gray midege a t er. meal, no examples, har angere the rght omesnoe makeup the majority Mr. or
view. In his view the, Mr. Bush is comsit. g - he has been flthful t the dea of the 13 apeals Cont; the ire Presidentsledw tshing l then r. Bud ateis comsorni. shifting the Fateda Conurs tte rMgt, hare appoited about 70 percent of the as-ted to shifting the courts to a more conserva tie community c ene n appeiatjudges.
tire pilsoiphty.
"He m knowledgeable about ly pleased.' Mr. hek "od The pelector. my ot orce ay litmusIbt ep- The President. whens a ked Mnass interview tent on a Snrt issue. s Adminitration 01fi.Sand sbatance f judicial no i at mlor de Cted al y. Ot hat rs out to be almost
Mr Gray added. "And the approach the record In judicial appoinments: "We he bes tie pit, lite ther am other ways
President has taken ojud s.tion. g aty judges. I think I'd tantihatoas a nsy.in his fint term would motinue n a second ,iglfiat -i1's vry bard to get nad to so uppel.Whie mnver c opponents may em late mour os by thu Admasttration unless
Different lrerspoeines khIndw whati Mr. Bush's nfitd m s you pas the political smelt ent.o ala one
the aas at s reindent has -e f rAdmmnantbonofficiaL'"It'sm
rae Ith ht Republican rght a..xve subtle."
pIpl - hclssding goone, proen d flsomer "tdon't owle h eespllduysnotedonand As an exatople. UN former official lain.Oth Adminstration officials - e a tlin the r ha smg, leave bee UNo te dges ca dles ar m usaly asked direct lise
sharply differet riew, and smetl policy,' leut dot's aety whet Itns athet their e aw oo Rn th. Wade
A tarimr Adtnhiistriation ofticial who '" " happened," Seator Blden "i. And outh Supreme Cout eosems. Mr.
directly involred wih judicial oomatin Mr. Boick aid UN White Hosie knos Buss ba been lly CBreoul to asoai
Mrusts's d tro particpate ofc s N The is Pree w n sU direct edquryn this a te. Out a. recause
Regam Policy mO judicial ents, Ater 9 Mondays rulng Mr. Bush Ihalsready
selclm 00 jtudicial fastnees and seemed all, coneoatinow hare come s Wespect tihue Contng tadter Increasg psresaar fromhappy to deeat he Nmatter to misers. Te the Preminju will make odi selectis: s abartas opents "  prhavise that he wil
fst'soer official, who insisted on anonymity. troo liking On the Other had ae thiatsg i that ftre nomin to UN Supreme
ecBulled e Istance ushmhtds Mr. Bus was mare liberal lodges would he a waste of Cour ve to ."erus Is Rse.
keenly aware of UNe politics of a specif is Political Capital hecose Ise who support The situatis is often different for lower
tottobsatlo. InvolvingimsMeilf hew t0 001 that Approacb are almttae t the delts o amews.
thm IMibu thr'oughl UN Sesate. But the Mr. Bush on ~ grouns, "Sneetme you're epected to just tie
forme, official aaset Mr. Btush showed Ie cdare1 yourself, slate your clew. no sen
hitorsst In UN mamalsea phtilosaphy. .thita. te f brmer official wi n. these
011K BUCh Udirector of UN Institute for, Method casTe selees knw what Is o pected of
JustIce,. a Washlngtas-based mosamilu them and ie tdodere theIr oewr. wagroup doat fsilows Judicial nominatIonscia Attentono deteN people cose for appeals
called that when Mr. Bosh was flrst elected, mou"t aoaes ar already lt known. el-
UNe right wing was quite worried that e ir ourts the crt postoir by this I n uttinless
Atd me Consa e Nselectiho acmsm oers- o their.pais in she Federal.
ieo judges lot Socsety an orgnculdasis based on lam
Thas was N greatest prority of moen While muds of UN public's 10050 as sool campses designed to promote cs.AT whoru followed George Bosh's eias on she Supreme Court. Republia judge' - lal Ideology aa mollastoprovide
M Mr. a fista. A a result, early In pickers hare pal Special attemim to the opponities toCltivate political sil.
the term. a host Of Influential conserels eartlant 13 Federal circuit mort of leves As an example. Mr. Oush. recently mam,.
carried on a climpaigo to impressi apes the UNe level just below. sat-ed John Roberts for a rataney on sheWhite Noose hut UN Preside ould he The district ohae gnns'ily ondtin' Cor0AppealforiheDistcto1Catambia.
watched closely and hseel ta emeMO d aIs. sd thes judges ar mos closely bound Mr. Roberta is 37 year. old and bus a sterling
A tting Federal Judge apotnted In UN by precedent. Oat appellate judges, thele conserative resume He helped pick judges
Rearash or had a similar vlew. "t'n a theoretically also botnd byprecedent. har in UN Reagan While wohme And is curretly
rery tal y mreial he gives to he right, mor freedom towasesrate am stretch UN UN Deputy Solicitor Contend chanted with
Ingers " om d the oudge. himelf a tos boundaries of theism. Andsince UN Corm seeg thai cases arged beore she Supreme
Itere "Bush Is m lawyer, and In ry glad Supreme Court has decided to pehyew ever Cour coniorm totte Adnstrsbrs polill.
n delegae thi sduff to hs legal beagles, and fewer Cases rack rear the circuit coforts' - agenda.
they se wIt that he goes the conses-atires opinios often become the ae of UN land. Mr. ecsht through is selectors, has also
ra4e a pint of choosng young lawyers like
this to fill the courts. Since thesepeoptle hold
lifetime t re, the IdeologicallvdrIrn
judke-pickers are able so ftsure that their
Philsophy will outast the vicissitudes of the
elecaoral process for several decades.
Youth or Experience?
A study by Sheldon Goldman of the Unver.
Otty of Massachusetts of judal nonesO-
goig back to president Lyndon S. Juhnso
found that Mr. Bush'a nominces wOre the
yougest. of all, Senator Biden complained
that many of these judges lack the seasonsg.
the lte esperience. to be wise judges
"I think it's better to hare people who have
lived a little bit. who hare some maturty and
vston," he sad. "But these People under.
stand very well that age is an important
factor to remaking the courts.
The relative youth of Mr. Bush's selectons
may be one of the reasons his nominees have
reerived increasingly pourer ratings by the
American Bar Association. The association
evaluates h oitnss of nominees for Federal
judgeships. and expertence ts usually consid-
ered an importnts lactor.
In no case has a majority of the bar
group s evaluaing panel found a Bush noms-
nee to be unqualified. But in lS percent of the






has roo always been dramatic. but .t ss un
mtstakabl. In October. for example. the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. tn New
Orleans. overturned a ban On all products
containig asbestos, a known carcinogen.
The count sid the ban might be too costly to
corporatons
BOt the dsange is seen most clearly in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Colmbia
Circuit. viewed by many to be second in
influence only to the Supreme Court.
While much of that Ctrcust'S work involves
workaday appeals from .she Federal regula.
tory agesctes. a significant share of its cases
hold a clear philosophical component. And in
those cases. the differences between the sev.
en Bush-Reagan appointees and the four
onamed by President Carter are stark.
The District of Columbia Circuit oftens
cleaves along ideological lines. In 198. the
Republican-appousted judges ruled that
Washtngton officaias did nm have to comply
with an order to limtt the population in a local
prison. The Denocraic-appointed judges
dissented, arguing that such overcrowding
was unconstitutlaL
Not Meey PhIlosophical
The court abe divided angrily In 199 orr
as tsse that typscally divides coservatives
and liberals: we is entitled to have a hear
Jn0 before a Federal court. The Republican-
appointed majosty prevaled. ruliag against
a group of Hispanic immigrants who wanted
to appeal their denials of amnesty.
In the best known recent cases before that
cowart. the judges divided along political lines
agan in throwing out the convictions of
Litut. CaL Oliver L North and Adm. John M.
Potndexter. former White House officials
tried for their roles in Ue tarsartra affast
Judge Laurence H. Silberman writing for
a majority, said prosecutors In Ue North
case may hare Improperly relied on estaro-
ny Cokmnel North gave under a grant of
immunity when he testified before Congress.
Adrriral Poindester's Conviction was thrown
out (or the same reason.
Arld the nmy isnot always pllosophical.
Durig a private confesrece t disctss an
affirmative action case. Judge Silberman. a
Reagan appoIntee. grew so angry that he
threatened Judge Abner J. Mikva. a former
Deesocrate Congressman and appomtee of
President Cartner.
As Judge Silberman explained It later.
during a heated argument he soid to Judge
Mlkik,: "It you were 10 years younger, Id be
semfted to punch you in the nose." Since
Judge Mikv did not Immediately become 10
years younger. Judge Silberman said, It wa..
Wt really a threat
Jude Silbermon has bere on the short tilt
of plssible nomtslees for the last three So
premose Court racantes
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The Supreme Court and the grass roots:
whom does the Court represent best?
Evidence from nation wide polls during the Wa 7rren, Bw ge; and Rehnquist Courts suggests that the
modern Supreme Court's rulings have represented the attitudes of major demographic and social
groups at similar rates. This evenhanded pattern of representation conributes to the Court's
reputation as a neutral arbiter
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W hether the U.S. Su-preme Court representssome groups betterthan others has long
been a question of interest to judicial
scholars, journalists, and litigants.
Typically, the Court's representation
of social or demographic groups has
been measured in one of two ways.
First, researchers may examine the jus-
tices' rulings, dicta, or voting patterns
for evidence of sympathy toward
group claims. Second, some research-
ers have computed which interest
group litigants have the best win-loss
records before the Court, and whether
interest group litigants fare better, or
worse, over time.'
Analyzing the Court's voting pat-
terns.and doctrines or counting inter-
est group litigants' successes and fail-
ures, however, does not directly
indicate how well the Court's rulings
represent grass-roots group attitudes.
A recent example may help demon-
strate the differences among Court
doctrine, interest group claims, and
1. For recent examples of this approach. see
Epstein and Hadley. On the Treatment ofPolitical Par-
ties in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1900-1986, 72 J. or PoL.
413 (1990): Wheeler. et. al.. Do the "FHaves" Come Out
Ahead?.21 Law Sc Soc'Y Ray. 403 (1987); and George
and Epstein. Women's rights Litigation in the 1980s:
morrofthesame? 74JuDIC.ATURE 314 (1991).
2. Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa
Clara County. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). at 626-640.
3. See. e.g.. Supreme Court, 6-3, Extends Preferences
In Employment for Women and Minorities, NEw Yoasu
TE.MEs. March 26, 1987, at 1. The NOW Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, the Lawyers' Commit-
tee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Equal Op-
portunity Advisory Council. among others.
submitted amici briefs in support of the Court
majoriEV's position.
4.."The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that
employers may sometimes favor women and mem-
bers of minorities over better qualified men and
whites in hiring and promoting to achieve better
balance in their work forces. Do you approve or
disapprove of this decision?" (Gallup. April 10-13.
1987 and June 24-26, 1988).
At least 17 instances appeared among these 110
cases where inconsistencies could be identified
between grass-roots group attitudes and the legal
positions of organized interest groups or public
officials that might be thought to represent these
grass-roots group attitudes.
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency of
Santa Clara (1987), a divided Court
held, 6-3, that employers could take
sex and race into account in promo-
tion decisions and give an advantage
to women or racial minorities in pro-
motions to "traditionally segregated
job categories."' The Johnson ruling
was widely cited as a victory for women
and minority employees; several
women's and civil rights interest
groups had submitted amicus curiae
briefs in support of the Court's even-
tual ruling.' A nationwide Gallup Poll,
however, reported that while a 57 per-
cent to 35 percent majority of non-
whites favored the ruling, a 59 percent
to 32 percent majority of women op-
posed it. Many other such examples
can be found of apparent conflicts be-
tween interest group amicus positions,
oral argument, or Court dicta versus
grass-roots group poll attitudes.
4
As Johnson illustrates, an alternative
approach to answering the question-
whom does the Supreme Court repre-
groups. These 17 instances included religious. la-
bor, women. black, state attorney generals. and
U.S. solicitor general positions. A complete list of
these apparent inconsistencies between grass-
roots attitudes and interest group or public offi-
cial positions is available, upon request. from the
author.
5. Random sampling polling replaced quota sam-
pling methods by the 1930s. The poll items here are
not a random sample of all Supreme Court cases,
and inferential statistics reported herein should be
interpreted cautiously. However. reweighting cases
for sampling biases over time or between types of
cases did not significantdy affect the results reported
below: see results in Table l.A listing ofcases may be
found in Marshall, PusUC OPINION AND THE SUPRE1E
Cour 194201 (Boston: Unwin Hyman. 1989). and
Public opinion and the Rehnquist Court. 74 JLDicATURE
232 (1991). The poll items here overwhelmingly re-
lied on dichotomous. forced-choice responses (e.g..
"agree" versus "disagree-): only four poll items
used a filter question. If rulings were omitted for
poll items where only a poll plurality existed. the
conclusions reported below would not change.
6. During the 1991/92 term, for example. Jus-
tices Souter, Stevens, Blackmun. O'Connor. and
White supervised circuits from which they had
geographically come to the Court.
sent best?-is to rely on actual attitudes
of social or demographic groups, as
measured by scientific, nationwide
public opinion polls. Here, a "grass-
roots" demographic or social group
does not refer to dues-paying members
of organized interest groups. Instead, it
refers to the reported attitudes of poll
samples of specific demographic
groups, such as men, women, Catho-
lics, Protestants, upper-, middle-, or
lower-income groups, and so forth.
Pollsters frequently write poll items
to tap issues in Supreme Court dis-
putes. Major nationwide polls also rou-
tinely report, or at least archive, poll
results not only nationwide, but also
for major demographic groups. As a
result, it is often possible to determine
which groups' attitudes a Supreme
Court ruling actually represents-ac-
cording to available public opinion
poll results.'
Representing groups' claims
In a legal or electoral sense, the Su-
preme Court does not clearly "repre-
sent" social or demographic groups at
all. The justices sit for life terms (with
good behavior), without any popular
election. Few Supreme Court seats are
any longer informally "reserved" for a
member of a religious, regional, so-
cial, or demographic group. The
"black" seat of Justices Thurgood
Marshall and Clarence Thomas and
the "woman's" seat occupied by Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor, now re-
main the clearest concessions to group
representation. Several justices cur-
rently supervise federal circuits.from
which they geographically hailed,6 al-
though the practice of geographically
balancing appointments according to
circuits apparently died out well be-
fore the Warren Court.
Although most Supreme Court jus-
tices may not legally, informally, or
23
electorally "represent" specific social
or demographic groups, the Court
may nonetheless agree with some
groups' attitudes more frequently
than it agrees with others. For ex-
ample, in the Johnson ruling the Su-
preme Court agreed with (thus, repre-
sented) a majority of nonwhites, but
disagreed with a majority of 21 other
group attitudes reported in a Gallup
Poll. In this sense, the Supreme Court
"represents" a group when the
Court's ruling agrees with a majority
(or at least a plurality) of a group's re-
ported attitudes as measured in a sci-
entific, nationwide poll. The Supreme
Court fails to represent a group if it
disagrees with a majority (or plurality)
of a group's attitudes.
Four widely cited theories exist in
the judicial literature, each suggesting
that the Supreme Court will represent
the attitudes of some demographic or
socioeconomic groups better than
others. These theories are reviewed
briefly below, then tested with avail-
able poll data.
As the available poll data since the
early 1950s indicates, none of the four
theories of Supreme Court representa-
tion is completely correct. In part,
each errs because modern American
public opinion only occasionally has
been deeply polarized. In part, each
theory also errs because even where
group attitudes have been polarized,
the modern Supreme Court has been
relatively evenhanded in its rulings.
Four theories
The first and perhaps oldest theory
suggests the Supreme Court will best
represent numerically large, economi-
cally and politically dominant majori-
ties. Robert Dahl's much-debated 1957
essay popularized the argument that
the Supreme Court is essentially a
majoritarian institution, which best
represents prevailing political majori-
ties.7 Except during brief political re-
alignment periods, Supreme Court
rulings will typically represent the
views of national and legislative ma-
jorities. Deaths, retirements, and new
appointments ensure that the Su-
preme Court is seldom long out-of-
line with a public opinion majority.
To be sure, majoritarian theories of
judicial representation seldom exam-
ine actual poll results. largely because
scientific public opinion polls were
not available until the 1930s, and poll
items tapping Court rulings were sel-
dom written until the 1950s.1 Ma-
joritarian theories of Supreme Court
representation, however, might pre-
dict that the Supreme Court would
best represent groups that comprise
numerical majorities and that have
also been socially, economically, and
politically dominant-for example,
Protestants, whites, men, middle-aged
or older Americans, and middle- or
upper-income Americans.
By contrast, a second theory holds
that the Court is-or at least should
be-especially responsive to small, un-
popular, or politically impotent mi-
norities who have little other effective
access to the political arena. Several
accounts have criticized the majori-
tarian theory and have argued that
both the Warren and Burger Courts
were often sympathetic to minority
claims on civil rights, civil liberties,
and political dissent.o This coun-
termajoritarian theory of representa-
tion also has been argued frequently
as a normative theory on behalf of
blacks and other racial minorities,
women, small religious sects, prison-
ers, gays and lesbians, children of un-
wed parents, aliens, and the poor."
Testing this second theory poses sev-
eral methodological problems. Many
minority groups-for example, the
7. Dahl, Decisionmaking In a Democracy: The Su-
preme Court as National Politymaker, 6 J. OF Pus. L.
279 (1957). For criticisms of Dahl's essay, see
infra, nn. 10 and 14.
8. For exceptions, see Barnum, The Supreme
Court and Public Opinion:judicial Decision Making in
the post-Nu Deal Period, 47 J. or POL 652 (1985);
Marshall, supra n. 5; and Casper, THE POuTICS OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES (New York: Harper and Row,
1972).
9. The majoritarian theory may also frequently
be found in normative arguments that the Court
should defer to political majorities to prevent
noncompliance or defiance of Court rulings; see,
e.g., Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPRENM Coca'r IN AsRI-
cAN GovERNTIEar (New York: Oxford Universitv
Press, 1979); and Kurland, PouirIcs, THE CONSTITU-
TION, AND THE WARREN COURT (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1970). Other authors argue that
the Court should defer to popular majorities to
heighten the people's sense of political responsi-
bility; see, e.g., Thayer. The Origin and Scope of the
A merican Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HAnv. L.
REv. 129 (1893); and Bickel, THE LEAsr DANotRous
BRAc: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR or PoLIcs
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). Others
argue that deference to popular majorities will
avoid sanctions against the Court itself; see
Choper, JUDICIAl. RE11EW AND THE NATIONAL POLITI-
CAL PRocEss 139-162 (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1980).
In fact, rnen do not actually comprise a major-
Anish or Jehovah's Witnesses-are so
few in number that nationwide poll
samples of 1,000 or 1,500 cannot reli-
ably measure group members' atti-
tudes. In other instances pollsters do
not separately identify minorities-for
example, homosexuals or noncitizens.
Modern polling techniques usually
undercount some minorities-such as
the poor, transients, prisoners, or non-
English speakers. Even for relatively
numerous minority groups-such as
blacks, Hispanics, or Jews-measure-
ment errors may be relatively high.1 2
Further, only a handful of Supreme
Court rulings each term addresses is-
sues of special interest to unpopular or
numerically small minorities, and
some of these disputes are not of suffi-




polls routinely identify several differ-
ent minority groups' attitudes on poll
items. The countermajoritarian the-
ory might predict that the Supreme
Court would best represent the atti-
tudes of racial minorities (blacks), reli-
gious minorities (Catholics), politi-
cally impotent groups (the young, or
low income, or less-well-educated
Americans), or women-at least on is-
sues of key interest to these groups.
These groups are typically under-
represented in top public or private
leadership positions," and all (except
ity of adult Americans, but they have typically so
dominated public and private offices that they are
usually considered as a dominant majority.
10. See, e.g., Abraham, FREEDOM AND THE COURT:
CivIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Cox,
supra n. 9; Choper, supra n. 9, and The Burger
Court: Misperceptions RegardingJudicial Restraint and
Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 S111ACUSE L REv.
767 (1979); Cortner, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
SEcoND BILL or RicHTS (Madison, Wis: University
of Wisconsin Press. 1981); Casper, The Supreme
Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sc.
REv. 50 (1976): and Shapiro, The Supreme Court
from Warren to Burger, in King, ed., THE NEw AMERI-
CAN PourTICAL SwanM (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute, 1979).
11. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRsT: A THEORY or
JUDIcAr. REVIw (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1980); and Richards, SexualAutonomY
and the Constitutional Right to Privar. 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 122 (1979); Choper, supra n. 9, at 79-122.
12. Bradburn and Sudman. POLLS AND SURVE1S
111, 132 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1988); and
Thornberry and Massey, Trends in U.S. Telephone
Coverage Across Time and Subgroups, in Groves. et.
al, eds., TELEPHONE SURVEY METHODOLOGY 27-36
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988).
13. Ornstein, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS,
1984-85 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute, 1984).
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women) comprise clear numerical mi-
norities in American society.
A third theory also predicts that the
Supreme Court will best represent the
attitudes of numerically small
groups-but in this case, politically
and economically advantaged elites.
Supreme Court justices, like other
policy makers, may respond to the best
organized, best financed, most often
elected, and most articulate interests
in American society." High-status
elites may also be more successful in
elective politics, and the norm ofjudi-
cial deference may lead the Court to
uphold elite-inspired laws and policies
enacted elsewhere. In addition, Su-
preme Court justices themselves typi-
cally come from relatively advantaged
backgrounds and enjoy high levels of
education and high incomes. As a re-
sult, the justices may sense and share
elite values. 3 Elite theories predict
that the Supreme Court will best rep-
resent upper-income and well-edu-
cated Americans.
The fourth and final theory argues
that the justices best reflect attitudes
of their own political party identifiers.
A considerable literature documents
that federal judges, including Su-
preme Courtjustices, sometimes differ
significantly in their voting patterns
according to their political party ties."
This literature does not tie the judges'
voting patterns directly into grass-
roots Republican and Democrat iden-
tifiers' attitudes. Yet one might hy-
pothesize that the justices would
best represent their own party identifi-
ers' preferences. As a result, when the
14. Devine. THE ATTENTIvE PUBLIC: POLYARCHIAL
DEMOCLACY (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1970); and
Domhoff. Who RtLES A.MaRcA? (Englewood Cliffs.
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
15. Spaeth. SUPREME COURT POLIcY MAKING 109-
118 (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979);
AbrahamJusrtcts A.o PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL His-
TORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (New
York: Oxford. 1985); Friedman and Israel, THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
1789-1969 (New York: Chelsea. 1969): and
Schmidhauser. THE SUPREME COURT (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).
16. Elite theories have more often been applied
historically to earlier Court periods. especially
the late 1800s and early 1900s, and to individual
justice's biographies see. e.g., Abraham. supra n.
7 at 291-293. See also Schmidhauser. The Judges of
the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 MIDWEST J.
OF POL. SCI. 1 (1959).
17. The literature on the impact of political
parties on judicial behavior is extensive: see, e.g.,
Goldman. Voting Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. PoL. Sc. REv. 491
(1975); and Tate. Personal Attribute Models of the
Voting Behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices. 75
Court has a majority of Republicanjus-
tices, the Court will best represent Re-
publican identifiers' preferences.
Conversely, when the Court has a ma-
jority of Democratic justices, the Court
will best represent Democratic identi-
fiers' preferences.
Data and methodology
Each of these four theories of repre-
sentation yields different predictions
about which group attitudes the Su-
preme Court will best represent. At
present there is no research that indi-
cates which theory is most accurate.
These theories, however, can be tested
by using breakdowns from available
nationwide public opinion polls. Ma-
jor polling organizations such as
Gallup, Harris, the Times-Mirror,
CBS/New York Times, or the Los Angeles
Times polls frequently include poll
items to measure attitudes toward
pending, or recently announced, Su-
preme Court rulings, at least on
prominent controversies. During the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
Courts (1953-54 through 1990-91
terms) some 110 major nationwide
poll items could be matched closely
with the substantive issues raised in a
Supreme Court ruling.
Nationwide polls do not simply re-
port the poll results for the entire na-
tionwide sample. Pollsters also rou-
tinely report (or at least archive)
results broken down by standard de-
mographic categories. As a result, for
poll items that address these 110 Su-
preme Court rulings, it is also possible
to examine the attitudes of 22 social or
A.m. PoL. Sc. REv. 355 (1981).
18. For a listing of the issues and poll matches.
see supra n. 5.
19. The Gallup Poll routinely reports nation-
wide results broken down by major social and de-
mographic groups. Breakdowns by groups for the
Harris Poll may be obtained from the University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. NC, and for other
network and newspaper polls, from the Roper
Center. University of Connecticut. Storrs, Ct. The
.05-level error margins were applied to nation-
wide poll results to classify rulings as consistent.
inconsistent. or unclear. When applied to smaller
numerical groups, such as blacks or Catholics, this
may lead to .1-level error margins.
20. "In 1984 a law was passed requiring all
states to raise their legal drinking age to 21 or
face reductions in Federal highway funds. At
present. nine states and the District of Columbia
permit legal drinking under age 21. Would you
favor or oppose having the Federal government
start withholding funds from these states if they
fail to raise their drinking age to 21 by October
first?" (Gallup, June 9-16. 1987).
21. Supra n. 4.
demographic groups: by sex (male, fe-
male); education (college, high
school, less than high school); region
(East, Midwest, South, West); income
(high, medium, low); religion (Protes-
tant, Catholic); age (under 30, 30 to
64, 65 and older); race (black, white);
and party identification (Republican,
Democrat, Independent).' 9
When a poll item could be closely
matched, in substance, with a Su-
preme Court ruling, that ruling was
classified as either "consistent," "in-
consistent," or "unclear"-both for
nationwide public opinion and also
for each of the 22 social and demo-
graphic groups described above. This
procedure permits an empirical test of
how often the modern Court has
agreed with major American social
groups, and which groups' grass-roots
attitudes the Court best represents.
Three simple examples rmay help
clarify this classification. A Supreme
Court ruling was classified as "consis-
tent" if it agreed with a public opinion
majority or plurality, either nationwide
or for a reported group. In South Dakota
u Dole (1987), for example, a 64 percent
to 23 percent nationwide poll majority
favored withholding federal highway
funds from states that did not raise their
drinking age to 21-a view consistent
with the Supreme Court's ruling. Fur-
ther, majorities of all 22 groups agreed
with the Supreme Court's ruling, with
majorities in favor ranging from 55 per-
cent (among Independents) to 72 per-
cent (among Republicans).'
By contrast, a 63 percent to 29 per-
cent nationwide poll majority dis-
agreed with the "inconsistent" Johnson
v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County (1987) ruling to allow the pro-
motion of women or minorities over
men or whites to achieve better bal-
ance in the workforce. Majorities of all
22 groups disapproved of the Court's
ruling-with the sole exception of
blacks, among whom a 56 percent to
34 percent majority approved of the
Court ruling.2'
Public opinion was divided more
closely on a few "unclear" decisions
where the polls were divided closely
within the .05-level margin of error, or
where contradictory poll results ap-
peared. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp. (1981), for example, 45 per-
25
cent-favored and 43 percent opposed a
state law prohibiting tandem trailers on
interstate highways. Because the close
poll margin fell within the 95 percent
confidence level margin of error, the
Kassel ruling was classified as "unclear."
In this instance the Kassel ruling was clas-
sified as consistent with 4 groups, incon-
sistent with 11 groups, and unclear for
the remaining 7 groups.2
Results
Table I reports the percentage of War-
ren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court rul-
ings that were consistent with nation-
wide polls, and also the percentage of
these rulings that were consistent with
attitudes of the 22 social and demo-
graphic groups reported here. Tables 1
through 5 exclude the few instances of
"unclear" poll-to-ruling matches, where
poll results were evenly divided or where
contradictory poll results appeared.
Overall, 53 percent of the 110 deci-
sions were classified as consistent with
nationwide polls, another 37 percent
were inconsistent, and 10 percent
were unclear. If the unclear decisions
are excluded, as in Table 1, then 59
percent of the remaining rulings were
consistent with nationwide public
opinion polls, and the remaining 41
percent were inconsistent.
Of greater interest here are the re-
sults for each of the 22 social or demo-
graphic groups. Table 1 reports the
percentage of consistent decisions in
two ways. The first column reports the
overall results; the second column re-
ports results for a reweighted sample
to correct for sampling biases over
time and across caseload.'
Results in Table 1 indicate that the
modern Supreme Court has repre-
sented all 22 groups' attitudes about
equally often. For each of the 22,
about three-fifths of the Court's rul-
ings were consistent with group atti-
tudes. The range between the best-
and least-well-represented group was
only about 11 percent (for the un-
weighted sample) to 13 percent (for
the reweighted sample).
Given the relatively small number of
Court rulings that could be matched
with identifiable polls, these results
should be interpreted cautiously.
Table 1 results, however, indicate that
there is no strong evidence that the
Table 1 Percentage of Supreme Court




















































































Note: Table 1 excludes instances of evenly divided or contra-
dictory poll results. None a1 the results in Tables t through 5
are statistically significant except as noted: *(.05 level).
"(.01 level). To obtain the percentage of inconsistent deci-
sions. subtract the percent Consistent from 100 percent.
modern Court has significantly better
represented some groups than others
during this period. Overall, the results
in Table 1 offer little support for any
of the first three theories of Supreme
Court representation reviewed above.
Table 2 breaks down the results for
party affiliation for two time periods-
first, for Court terms when there was a
majority of Republican justices on the
Court, and second, for Court terms
when there was a majority of Demo-
cratic justices on the Court. 4 Table 2
offers little support for the theory of
partisan representation, since the
Court's representation of party identi-
fiers did not significantly differ de-
pending on the partisan makeup of
22. -Would you favor or oppose a law in this state
that would prohibit tandem truck rigs-that is. large
urucks with two trailers attached--on major inter-
state highways?" (Gallup, April 29-May 2. 1983).
23. Cases were reweighted to the figures re-
ported in O'Brien, STORM Crwrta 205 (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1986). The 110 rulings were also
tested to see if different levels of representation
occurred, depending on whether the poll items
were taken before, versus after the ruling was an-
nounced. However. pre- versus post-ruling differ-
ences results were not significant at the .05 level.
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Table 2 Representation of grass-roots
Republicans and Democrats, by
partisan makeup of the Supreme
Court
Partisan Percent of rulings
majority on consistent with:
the Court Grass-roots Grass-roots
were: Republicans Democrats
Majority Republican 63 66
Majority Democrat 49 58
Note: Percentages indicate the majority of Court rulings that
agreed with the indicated group s attitudes during each time
period. For neither time period were the reported diterences
statistically significant at the .1-level.
the Court itself. Grass-roots Democrats
were marginally better represented by
the Court than were grass-roots Re-
publicans, regardless of whether there
were a majority of Democratic or Re-
publican justices on the Court, but the
differences were not large.
Why has the modern Supreme
Court represented all 22 groups' atti-
tudes nearly equally often? A large
part of the answer lies in the structure
of modern American public opinion.
As the examples in Table 3 indicate,
only rarely do majorities of compari-
son groups (e.g., blacks versus whites)
hold opposing views on Supreme
Court controversies. 23 In the extreme
instance, majorities (or pluralities) of
blacks disagreed with majorities (or
pluralities) of whites in 17 percent of
the 110 rulings examined here. Yet in
the remaining 83 percent of these 110
rulings, majorities (or pluralities) of
both blacks and whites held similar at-
titudes, and the Supreme Court's rul-
ings simultaneously represented both
groups' attitudes equally well.
As Table 3 further indicates, most
groups disagreed with their compari-
son group less often than did blacks
and whites. Majorities (or pluralities)
of men and women disagreed very
rarely-in only 8 (7 percent) of the
110 rulings examined here. Majorities
(or pluralities) of Democrats and Re-
publicans disagreed in only 6 (5 per-
cent) of the 110 rulings. In short, the
typical Supreme Court case has not
24. Terms during which there were five (or more)
Democrat justices include 1953/54-1956/57 and
1962/63-1974/75. Terms for which there ivere five
(or more) Republican justices include 1975/76-
1990/91. The 1957/58-1961/62 terms were ex-
cluded from this analysis since the justices were
evenly divided between the two parties, with one
self-described Independent justice (Frankfurter).
25. For evidence that these patterns occur fre-
quently, see Erikson. et al.. AMERcAN PUBLIc OIN-
ION 169-207 (New York: MacMillan, 1988).
Table 3 Percentage of Supreme Court decisions in which comparison groups disagree
and Supreme Court representation In these decisions
% of decisions in Supreme Court decision favors
Groups compared which groups disagree (group) where groups disagree
Whites versus blacks 17% Whites (47%): blacks (53%)
East versus South 14' East (77%); South (23%)
College versus less than high school 14 College (62%). less than high school (38%)
Young versus old 14* Young (77%). old (23%)
High versus low income 13 High (67%). tow income (33%)
Protestant versus Catholic 8 Protestant (43%). Catholic (57%)
Male versus temale 7- Mate (6%). Female (14%)
Republican versus Oemocrat 5 Republican (20%). Democrat (80%)
Republican versus Independent 6 Republican (33%. Independent (67%)
Democrat versus independent 4 Independent (50%). Democtat (50%)
Nate: None of the comparison groups omitted from Table 3 produced statistically significant differences.
been one in which group attitudes
were sharply polarized.
Further, in most Supreme Court de-
cisions, public opinion is also relatively
one-sided. In two-thirds (67 percent)
of the 110 rulings examined here, the
overall margin between poll item re-
sponses was greater than 20 percent. 6
In few instances-only 16 (15 per-
cent) of the 110 rulings-was nation-
wide public opinion closely divided,
with a poll margin between responses
of less than 10 percent. 7 Where na-
tionwide public opinion is very one-
sided-as is so frequently the case for
Supreme Court controversies-few in-
stances of conflicting majorities be-
tween comparison groups will occur.
The modern Supreme Court's rela-
tively even-handed pattern of repre-
sentation may also result, in part, from
characteristics of the Court itself-
particularly the shifting nature of
majority coalitions and lack of clear
ideological direction that has charac-
terized the modern Supreme Court
during much of this time period." Ad
hoc doctrinal decisions, shifting ma-
jorities, and the lack of an overreach-
ing philosophy during much of the
Burger and early Rehnquist Courts,
coupled with a large number of non-
unanimous, closely divided votes, may
contribute to the Court's pattern of
representing different social and de-
mographic groups at roughly simi-
26. Examples of one-sided poll results include
South Dakota v. Dole (1987) and Johnson v.
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County
(1987), at supra n. 4. 20. and 21.
27. An example of a more narrowly-divided poll
result includes Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. (1981). supra n. 22.
28. See, e.g.. Shapiro, supra n. 10: Blasi. THE
BURGER Cocar: THE COUNTERREVOLXTIoN THAT
WASN'T 217 (New Haven: Yale University Press.
1983); and O'Brien. supra n. 23. at 262-275.
29. For the argument that representation is best
measured by situations in which conflict occurs, see
Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAVIORAL SdC. 201
lar rates.
Table 3 also reports which group at-
titudes the Supreme Court repre-
sented for those rulings in which com-
parison groups (e.g., blacks versus
whites) disagreed. These results may
offer a good test of Court representa-
tion because they consider only the in-
stances where there was actually a dis-
agreement in group attitudes. Here,
the Court's ruling would represent
one group, but not the comparison
group." In these instances, the major-
itarian theory would predict that the
Court's ruling would represent the
more numerous and influential
group, but the countermajoritarian
theory would predict that the Court's
ruling would represent the smaller or
politically impotent group.
Polarized group attitudes most of-
ten occurred on racial, sex and gen-
der, and crime and punishment issues.
Other issues, such as economic issues,
seldom led to polarized group atti-
tudes. For example, blacks and whites
disagreed on 19 rulings-among
them, 7 racial issues, 6 crime and pun-
ishment issues, and 3 sex and gender-
related issues. Easterners and Souther-
ners disagreed on 15 rulings-among
them, 8 racial issues, 1 crime and pun-
ishment issue, and 3 sex and gender-
related issues. Young and old Ameri-
cans disagreed on 15 rulings-among
them, 4 racial issues, 5 crime and pun-
(1957). and A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY 63-
67 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1956).
30. In Table 4, the "partisan" category in-
cludes issues where differences between Republi-
cans and Democrats were most often found since
the early 1950s. These include racial, foreign
policy, business and labor, social welfare, and
lifestyle issues. SeeSorauf and Beck. PARTY PoLTaCS
IN AM.vERICA 141-158 (Glenview, IL: Scott.
Foresman. 1988): and Citelson. Conway. and
Fiegert. AMERICAN PoUTIcIL PARTIES: ST.%stUny AND
CHANCE 138-144 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1984).
Table 4 Supreme Court representation of




Issue and number group attitudes
of decisions In these cases:
Racial (19) Whites (63%); blacks (69%
Religious (5) Protestants (40%); Catholics
(40%)
Privacy. gender (19) Men (53%); Women (44%)
Business. economic (18) High Income (61%): medium
(47%): low (SO%)
Free speech, dissent (11) College-educated (56%): high
sctool (40%): less than high
school (40%)
Partyrelated (SS) Republicans (61 %):
Hemocts (61%);
independents (60%)
ishment issues, and 3 sex and gender-
related issues.
In most instances, the Court re-
mained relatively evenhanded in its
decision making. In rulings where ma-
jorities (or pluralities) of blacks and
whites disagreed, the Supreme Court's
rulings agreed with black attitudes in
9 of 17 instances, but agreed with
white attitudes in 8 of 17 instances. In
only three instances did the modern
Court significantly more often prefer
one group to its comparison group.
The Court more often represented
Eastern (versus Southern) attitudes,
younger (versus older) attitudes, and
male (versus female) attitudes. These
mixed and seldom significant results
provide little support for any of the
four theories of representation re-
viewed earlier.
Table 4 reexamines the data differ-
ently, by reporting only a subset of de-
cisions involving specific issues of spe-
cial importance to comparison
groups. For example, 19 of the 110
rulings involve racial issues. In 17 (89
percent) of these 19 rulings the Court
agreed with black majorities (or plu-
ralities), while in 12 (63 percent) of
these 19 rulings the Court agreed with
white majorities (or pluralities).
These results again provide little sup-
port for any of the theories of represen-
tation reviewed earlier. The modern
Court has sometimes more often
(blacks), but sometimes less often
(women, low income groups) repre-
sented attitudes of less influential
groups. On other instances (as for grass-
roots Republicans or Democrats) there
was no clear pattern.0 Overall, the evi-
dence as to which groups the Court best
27




















































































represents is mixed and inconclusive;
none of the results reported in Table 4
reach statistical significance.
Finally, Table 5 examines the mod-
ern Court's pattern of representation
of group attitudes by two frequently
arising issues: fundamental freedoms
and economic decisions. Fundamen-
tal freedoms rulings include all dis-
putes over Bill of Rights or Fourteenth
Amendment claims, while economic
rulings involve employment, taxation,
or business regulation disputes.
The differences reported in Table 5
are slight and do not achieve statistical
significance. Again they provide little
consistent support for any of the four
theories. Upper-status group elites
(high education, high income) are
marginally better represented, espe-
cially on economic issues, and males
are marginally better represented
than females. But some low-status or
politically impotent groups (the
young, blacks) are also marginally bet-
ter represented than their comparison
groups. Overall, these slight and statis-
tically insignificant results provide
little consistent support for any of the
four theories of representation.
Table 5 also examines the Court's rep-


























Two time periods are reported. The first
comprises the Warren Court and early
Burger Court from the 1953-54 term
through the 1975-76 term-until with
Justice Stevens's appointment, the five
Nixon-Ford appointees formed a Court
majority. The second period spans the
remaining Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, from the 1976-77 through the
1988-89 terms. Again, the evidence fails
to support any of the theories. In nei-
ther the earlier nor the later periods did
the Court statistically significantly better
represent a group than its comparison
group. Even the over-time decline in
support for black attitudes does not
achieve statistical significance.
Discussion
The modern Supreme Court has been
relatively evenhanded in representing
different social and demographic
group attitudes. Since the early 1950s
the Court has not significantly better
represented dominant majorities, nor
unpopular and politically impotent
minorities, nor elite groups from
which most of the justices themselves
come, nor grass-roots Republican or
Democratic Party identifiers. Very
little support appeared for any of four
theories of representation frequently



























found in the judicial literature.
Why has the modern Supreme
Court represented different group at-
titudes and values in such an even-
handed manner? Two explanations
stand out. First, in most Supreme
Court controversies, group attitudes
are not sharply polarized. As a result,
few rulings require the Court to "ref-
eree" disputes that pit demographic
or social groups against one another.
Even when group attitudes do dif-
fer, the modern Court has been rela-
tively evenhanded in deciding be-
tween group attitudes. This may result
largely from a second reason. The
closely balanced ideological coalitions
on the modern Court, coupled with
ad hoc and shifting doctrinal values
during much of this time period, may
help create a pattern in which, over
time, the Court's rulings have not con-
sistently represented some group's at-
titudes at the expense of others.
This pattern of evenhanded repre-
sentation of group attitudes over time
may also help explain why the modern
Court has enjoyed relatively favorable
approval ratings, compared with Con-
gress or the executive branch. Over
the last one-third century the Court
has "satisfied" American public opin-
ion majorities or pluralities in about
three-fifths of its rulings where a clear
poll majority actually existed. Further,
the Court's rulings have represented
most social, economic, and demo-
graphic groups at very similar rates.
A Court that satisfies most groups in
most rulings and that also satisfies dif-
ferent and sometimes competing
groups at roughly similar rates may well
come to enjoy an image of a neutral ar-
bitrator, above the routine political
fray. In this sense the modern Court's
evenhanded representation of group
attitudes may in part contribute to one
element of "mythic" beliefs-that the
Court is a fair, neutral, and even-
handed arbiter of social conflict.s' C
31. Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: An Em-
pirical Investigation, 8 LAw & Soc'v RE. 385 (1974):
Bass, The Constitution as ymbo, 8 A.4. Po.. Q. 237
(1980); and Frank. LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(New York: Brentano, 1930).
THOMAS R. MARSHALL is a professor in the
Department of Political Science at the Univer-








some. fragmented and surprising-
ly image-consciats, the U.S. Su-
preme Court is moving iis
conservative act ahead willi cau-
lion, even icstitation. under the
sharp eye of public and political
Despite fears of many liberals.
the court denonstrated in the
IcFmI lust cnded that a cotnsaiva-
live revolution led by its Reagan-
Bush appointees may have to
await another appointment or
two.
In a divided society torn by
many compilex issues, (lie lile
justices found solidarity ant un-
usually elusive matter. Front the
give-and-take of argument and
vote, there emerged a moderate
center, still conservative in lone
but reluctant to move the court
to the extremes of legal decision-
making.
"The mushy moiddle." as Paul
Kamenar. cxecutive legal director
of the WashingLon Legal Founda-
tion, put it, dominated the
court's 1991-92 term. While it
prevented a conservative jugger-
naut from developing, its cist-
encc may not be enough to guide
the court with intellectual force
and legal clarity because mushy
middles are just that: They ofBcn
collapse, depending on the issue,
personalitics and arcumstances.
In this key election year. thejusties seemed concerned about
their image and about threaten-
ing some of the more liberal
precedents of the past. "The
court is trying to be politically
correct," said David O'Brien.
who teaches government at the
University of Virginia.
But, if this wats its purpose, it
neither conservatives nor
,. especially O the volatile
issue of abortion rights. which
die court upheld last week by aone-vole margin. The court only3
:.crmed to serve notice to the
politieians that its soul was op
for grabs in an election year.
After the recent retirements aliberal Justices William Brennar
and Thurgood Marshall, maniu
liberals believed that the cor
would strike out in an aggressive
ly conservative direction. killin
Roe vs. Wade, which establishes
abortion rights nationwide, an
, dismantling many of the civil lib
ertics protections erected ove
*hl last generation.But it turned Out to he a con
servative court still reluctant Is
retool prior decisions. cspeciall
in hiph-profile cases involvin
abortion, separation of churc
and state and free speech.
The leaders of the "mushWiddle" were an unlikely trio
instlices whose credentials o
lower courts had impressed Pr
sidenits Reagan and Bush: Sandi
Day O'Connor, Anthony Kenn
dy and David Souter. 1cs thr
taaled up with the two veteraCrate justices. Harry Blad
and John P'aul Stevens.
great disappointment of tho
.were looking lor more dr
changes.
I terally rrayed on the rig
fi Chief Justice Willia
JA4iist and Justices Anton
Scalia and Clarence fionas. ihe
newoner. Justice litron White
continued as a swing vole.
"It seems pretty clear that Ib-
cral concerns about a solid. clhc-
sive conservative bloc . . . were
not borne out." said Kamcnar of
the Washington Legal Founda-
tion, a pro-busincss and generally
conservative group. "I think its
very hard now to predici how
they will cone down oii an
issue."
Largely because of tie aluertion
issue, the count iils itscil deeply
cimcshed ins a tslitical nOt fromt
which it will hav a hard timec
escaping. Futurc nomiinalions
will likely tum isn even more
partisan circuscs, with Congicsg s
trying to draw out nonincLes for
their opinions in uiliotion.
As Blacknun. Wie wmic tihe
Roc vs. Wade dlcisusn in 197),
said in Monday's abortion deci-
sion:
"I am $3 years old. I cannot
remain tin this cout forever, and
when I do step down. tle conifir-
mation process for my successor
may well focus oin the issue b-
fore us today."
ie said lie regratled that his
successor could well overturn
Roc.
Larry Marshall. a law professor
at Northwestern Unwersity and a
former clerk to Justicc Stevens.
said Blackmun "dcariv had the
1992 presidential elcclion in
mind" in making this statement,
giving candidates cause to raise
the court's imakeup as a caim-
paign issue.
The mioderate bloc had also
beet in action a few days earlier
whentthe court outlawed by a 5-4
vote officially sanctioned praycrs
at public school gratluations. The
case had been scen -as a potential
vehicle for dumping a stringent
three-part test dcvisqed by the
court in 1971 to delernune if
government actions unconstitu.
tionally favor religion.
Instead of confronting tie ten,
the court reached hack to de-
cisions of the 196(s and extei.Idcd its luan ion classroomm tsr-aye
to graduation invications alld
f' Ienedictiotis. lii additioni. tile
acourti turned ditwil several alin-
fpeals ;isistg trot such liractiixs
I as placing religious .,voilaols siti
-mnuntitipal. seali, prclferring It
avoid tire new ciluicli-state issues
Ithey rmissed.
J In the area ..r r-7 .1... use
-decisions seemed even mrnet con-
rvoluted. contradictory and frac-
tured. Settling a I 7-year-old
l awsuit over tie Ictivitics of live
1) international Society fio Krislstss
y Cotiaciousitea at a1 irporl SCt-
g ittitals. the court tieidedil the
h ease last mnthtl with shiftingvotes.
y O'Cnior atid Kcntiedy joined
sf thre Ssu-justii- iiiajonliV tteadcd by
n Rehinquist uphoilding the bain On'
SolicitationsiiikisetriiaS
ra 11oweverit. tire two abail~icti tie
c- chief just ice asid sided wills
xe htlackiullii Stevens so'd Souter in
in strikitng doiwn thre las ott leflet
k- diistribution on tie sa1i1ic preiti
to ises.
s M*le fragmet-utait was also cv-
at- ieis whtite court isinalishated
a hate-crime ordinane. prohibit-jt igcssluttings Nali swastika
ni displays aldl thrLsa~ntiae
sin conduct.
Top court may face backlash





ming a woman's right to an
abortion, the U.S. Supreme
Court on Monday used a unique
argument that asserts the court's
own legitimacy as a force forjustice and law. free of political
interference.
It used this argument to reject
political pressures for overturn-
0 House panel OKS bill to
make abortion easier. Page 5.
ing Roe vs. Wade, the 1973 de-
cision that established abortion
rights nationwide.
But in trying to avoid politics.
the court may Find itself stuck
right in the middle of it.
The three justices who were
the architects of Monday's 5-4
decision relied on the time-hon-
ored doctrine of respecting legal
precedent and added that the
court's legitimacy as an institu-
tion would be undermined if it
changed course on such a
divisive political issue.
Some legal experts.
unimpressed with this line of
reasoning, suggest that the court
may be putting itself into a posi-
tion where it could lose public
respect because it resists chang-
ing an opinion it thinks is
See Court, pg. 2
Court
Continued from page I
wrong.
Some legal scholars even believe
the court's decision could under-
mine the very legitimacy it hopes to
maintain, and turn future nomina-
tions to the court into a no-holds-
barred political war solely over
abortion rights.
"It is hard to imagine that ap-
pointments and confirmation to the
Supreme Court can be made on
any other ground than a Roe vs.
Wade litmus test," said Michael
McConnell, a law professor at the
University of Chicago who favors
doing away with Roe. "That de-
stroys the court as a legal institu-
tion."
Michael Shapiro, a professor of
the University of Southern Califomia
Law Center, said the legitimacy ar-
gument will make it difficult for the
court to overturn rulings on highly
divisive issues. He noted that Justice
Antonin Scalia, in his dissent, com-
plained that using that line of
reasoning, justices would never con-
sider overruling a prior decision until
the public uproar has ceased.
Indeed, Scalia said the justices
were acting as if they were "political
campaign managers" in trying to en-
gage in the "hopeless task of predict-
ing public perception" instead of
asking whether Roe was decided cor-
rectly.
In their written opinion, the threejustices-Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony Kennedy and David
Souter-openly spoke of the public's
perception of the court as an institu-
tion that doesn't compromise under
social and political pressures.
And in Roe. they said. pressure for
such compromise was strong. "So to
overrule under fire in the absence of
the most compelling reason to re-
examine a watershed decision would
subvert the court's legitimacy beyond
any serious question." they said in
the opinion, which none of them
took credit for writing.
In a scathing putdown, Scalia
commented: "The imperial judiciary.
lives."
Mark Tushnct. who teaches at the
Georgetown Law Center and clerked
for now-retired Justice Thurgood
Marshall, said the legitimacy ar-
gument was made for the benefit of
those who might think the three jus-
tices were responding to political
pressure.
"I think it was particularly impor-
tant to Justice Souter, who appears
to have been the author of this por-
tion of' the opinion," Tushnet said.
"He wanted to explain to people
who thought he was a Reanite
conservative why he felt justified in
doing what he did."
Tushnet said this argument is the
weakest part of the opinion, adding
that Scalia's criticism was on target.
The three justices attempted to re-
inforce their legitimacy argument by
insisting that Roe is consistent with
a body of law that arose with the
recognition of the right of marital
privacy in 1965 and continued until
1990 with its right-to-die decision.
They explained that a whole gen-
cration of women have structured
their lives on the understanding that
if contraception fails. they could cor-








The Supreme Court deci-
sion on abortion may have
lifted one of the most serious
threats to President Bush's
re-election, vastly complicat-
ing his opponents' hopes to
galvanize voters with the is-
sue this fall.
By affirming the constitu-
tional right to abortion while
permitting states to restrict
it, the Supreme Court came
down neatly on the side of
public opinion.
That creates a daunting
task for Bill Clinton and Ross
Perot, who both support
abortion rights, unlike Bush.
They must try to do what
Democratic presidential can-
didates have failed to do for
a decade: Persuade voters to
cast their votes based on hy-
pothetical threats posed by a
hypothetical nominee the
next president may or may
not get to make to the court.
"It clearly removes abor-
tion from being a divisive is-
sue in the presidential cam-
paign," said Linda DiVall, a
Republican pollster.
Added Susan Estrich, who
managed Michael Dukakis'
1988 Democratic presiden-
tial bid: "George Bush may
have dodged a bullet today."
Still, the next several days
will be critical in gauging
how much success Bush's op-
ponents and abortion rights
advocates have in painting
the ambiguous decision as an
assault on the landmark Roe
vs. Wade precedent.
Unless they succeed in
convincing voters that the
ruling is what Democratic
pollster Peter Hart called a
"real and present danger to
abortion," it will be hard to
excite more than the most
committed abortion rights
advocates.
To that end. Clinton imme-
diately noted that four jus-
tices "came out forthrightly"
against abortion rights.
"The constitutional right to
hose is hanging by a thread
we are only one justice
By Danny Johnston, AP
ON ATTACK: Bill Clinton, in Little Rock Monday, slammed
the ruling, saying, 'We are only one justice away from return-
ing to the painful past.' President Bush praised the ruling.
Ross Perot came down on both sides of the issue.
As a citizen, I re-
spect and obey the










away from returning to the
painful past before Roe vs.
Wade," he said.
The next president could
fill as many as five seats on
the nine-member court.
But as Dukakis and Walter
Mondale can testify, that ar-
gument is so complex to vot-
ers that Mary Matalin, Bush's
political director, likened it
to "a three-cushion shot" in
pool. And polls repeatedly
show most voters don't con-
sider abortion a top issue in a
presidential race.
Also, the fact remains that
one of Bush's appointees, Da-
vid Souter, did not support
overturning Roe vs. Wade.
What's more, the court is
arguably more in step with
public thinking than Bush.
Clinton or Perot: Polls show
most voters support abortion
rights, but also support the
kind of restrictions imposed
by Pennsylvania.
As governor of Arkansas.
Clinton himself signed legis-
lation requiring minors to no-
tify parents, in most cases, in













order to get an abortion.
"Clinton and Perot would
be hard-pressed to argue
there should be no restric-
tions on abortion," said GOP
consultant Roger Stone.
It also remains unclear if
Perot will try to make much
of an issue of this. He has
said he supports a woman's
right to choose, but unlike
Clinton, hasn't said if he
would require prospective
Supreme Court justices to do
the same.
Perot's two-sentence reac-
tion to the decision shed no
new light on his positions:
"As a citizen I respect and
obey the laws of the country
as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court."
Bush, by contrast, praised
the court for upholding
Pennsylvania's "reasonable
restrictions on abortion ...
The Pennsylvania law sup-
ports family values in what is
perhaps the most difficult
question a family can con-
front."
'Both Sides Gird for Fight
Court Decision Sparks Election Threats
By Maralee Schwartz
and Dan Balz
The Supreme Court ruling in
the Pennsylvania abortion case
spared President Bush the po-
litical consequences that a de-
cision overturning Roo v. Wade
would have triggered, but abor-
tion-rights advocates vowed
yesterday to put the issue on
the president's desk before the
November election.
Democratic congressional
leaders said yesterday they
would quickly pass the Freedom
of Choice Act, which legalizes
abortion, and force Bush to risk
a politically damaging veto.
At the same time, abortion
opponents pledged to redouble
efforts to resist dilution of the
antiabortion language in the
Republican platform and to
pressure Bush on future Su-
preme Court appointments.
In political terms, the court,
which affirmed many of the re-
strictions Pennsylvania placed
on abortion, produced less than
the bombshell of three years
ago, when its Webster v. Repro-
ductive Services decision thrust
abortion back into the center of
American politics. But with the
White House on the line in the
fall, both sides mobilized to use
yesterday's decision to drama-
tize the significance of the elec-
tion's outcome.
"What is obvious is that both
sides are trying to claim more
than the court wanted to claim
and both are jockeying for ad-
vantage in the fall," said Glenn:
Bolger, a Republican pollster..
The only immediate impact of
yesterday's decision will be felt
in Pennsylvania. In the Wash-
ington area and elsewhere, wo-
men will continue to have large-
ly unrestricted access to abor-
tions. But the ruling is likely -to
spark efforts to enact restric-
tive legislation in the states. In
Maryland, the decision could
heighten debate over a Nov.*3
referendum to write abortion
rights into state law. [Details on
Page A9.1. -
Yesterday's decision in Casey
v. Planned Parenthood pro-
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TOWN MEETING
THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT
Reflections on the Recent Past and the Future
Section: The Past Term in Perspective
THE ABORTION DECISION--
A REFLECTION OF THE SOUL OF THE COURT
Press Commentary
Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the Court.
any state to deprive persons of "life,
liberty, or property. without due pro.
cess of law." Though this guaranteesNORTHEAST HARBOR, Maine fairprocess in the application of laws,
fterithe many Justices have treated theA fe teSupreme Court dei-si.i Planned Par- clause as if it guaranteed laws withenthood v. Casey, substance that strikes them as fair.Sarah Weddington Chief Justice Roger Taney began
and I discussed the the misuse of due process in Dred
outcome on televi- Scott to invent a substantive right to
sion with Barbara Walters. Ms. Wal- own slaves, and the Court has never
ters seemed .a bit nonplussed that looked back. Taney found his power
both of us were unhappy. in the word "property." Roe and Ca-
. Since the Court had both re* -sy claim authority from the "lib-
affirmed Roe v. Wade's basic holding erty" mentioned in the clause. Nei-
that abortion is a women's constitu- ther word has any substantive mean-
tional right and upheld most of Penn- Ing other than what the Court Chooses
sylvania's regulations of the exercise to give IL The power assumed Proved
of that right. one of us. she thought, too seductive to be abandoned for a
should have been smiling. satisfaction so ard as sticking to the
. Instead, Ms. Weddington, the law- principles of the Constitution..
yer for "Jane Roe," announced a The joint opinion of the new three-
terrible defeat for women, which she Justice coalition expressly reects
predicted would be a powerful issue any such limit to judicial power: "It
in the Presidential campaign. I Is tempting, as a means of curbinggrieved for the Constitution, whose
continuing deformation is unlikely to
swing a single vote in November.
Public discussion of the decision
almost completely ignores the Consti-
tution and focuses Instead on abor-
tion. Hence, the three who controlled p
the outcome - Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and lb r a iv im
David H. Souter - are called by the
media "centrists" and "moderates."'
They may. be that on the political
Opectrum, but on a constitutional the discretion of Federal judges. to
rum their joint opinion is more suppose that liberty encompasses noproperly termed "icai" more than those rights already guar-
The inescapable fact Is that the teed to theConstitution contains not one word press provisions" of the' Bill of
that can be tortured into the slightest Rights. "But of course this Court has
relevance to abortion, one way or m never accepted that view.". t
other. That tc a subject left. like most This is the usual defense of the
subjects, to democratic processes Courta habit of rewriting the Constitu.
and the moral choice of the public tim. and it is no more than an asser-
Until 1973, the Court was content to lion that the Court has trespassed
let the people and their elected repre- upon the rights of democratic major-
sentaives govern, but with Roe it ities for so long that it has established
usurped their democratic preroga- an easement. a permanent right Of
tives. "Usurped" Is not too strong a way, across those rights. One suspect
word. for the Court offered no legal with Jhaice Antonin Scula that the
reasoning for taking the abortion n- temptation was not very strong: "The
sue from the people by mating abor- Court's temptation i in a quite oppo-
tion a constitutional right. To this day site and more natural direction -
it has offered none.. - towards systematically eliminating
Along with Justices ,Harry A. checks upon its own power: and it
Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, succumbs."
Justices. O'Connor, Kennedy and So- Justices O'Connor. Kennedy and
ter assert that the right to abortion Sourter suggest thac one or MOre of
arises from the due procsclause of them might not have decided Roe the
the 14th Amendment. which forbids same way as an ttiical mapter but are
moved to reaffirm it by "principles of
Robert H. -Bork a Supreme Court- institutional integrity" and adherence
nominee in 1987. is a legol scholar at to precedent. Such adherence has nev-
the Americsn Enterprise Institute. er been important in constitutional
cases, since only the Court can correct
Its past constitutional mistakes, and
seems out of place here since the joint
opinion itself overrules all or almost
all of the criteria Roe put in place.
"Institutional integrity" turns out
to mean the Court must not overturn
a wrong decision if there has been
angry opposition to it. Nothing is said
of the possible perception that the
Court reaffirms such a decision be-
cause there has been angry support
for it There being political forces on
both sides, principles of institutional
Integrity would seem to counsel de-
ciding the case on the merits.
But somehow reaffirming Roe is
presented as the principled, even he-
roic. course. Justice Blackmun's
opinion goes so far as to call the joint
opinion an "act of personal courage."
That is hard to fathom. The joint
opinion is intensely popular with just
about everybody Justices care about:
The New York Times. The Washing.
.ton Post. the three network news pro-
grams, law school faculties and at
least 90 percent of the people Justices
may meet at Washington dinner par-
ties. That fact surely did not motivate
the decision, but it does dispel any
notion that the opinion took courage.
Where does this leave the Court.
and us? The Court has entered a new
era with the rise to effective control
by what The Washington Post saw fit
to call, one hopes ironically, a "cen-
ter-right coalition."
The group's approach is shown not
only by Casey but by decisions such
as Lee v. Weisman, which destroyed
the tradition of nonsectarian prayers
at. high school graduations in the
name of preventing the "establish-
ment of religion." Justice Kennedy's
majority decision, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, among others,
found Government doercion in the
fact that a teen-ager might feel peer
pressure to stand with her class-
mates while the prayer was said.
."Wtstice Scalia's dissent used histo-
ry to show that the minimal
presence of religion in a public
ceremony could not conceivably
have been intended to be uncon-
stitutional. That contrast is like-
ly to continue and, for the time being,
an ahistorical and free-handed liberal-ism of the sort Casey and Weisman
display will dominate.
No bloc votes as a unit all of the
time. Moreover, Justice Byron R.
White can be found now with the
Blackmun-Stevens wing. now with the
Scalia-Clarence Thomas wing. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist sides
more often with Justices Scalia and
Thomas but not uniformly. The likeli-
hood, therefore, is a fragmented, shift-
ing and - judging from the acrimony
By Robert H. Bork of the opinions - unhappy Court.
But on constitutional life style
sues. it will be a Court given more
liberal activism than to adherence
the principles of the Constitution
originally understood. That mea
the Court will inevitably continue
be the center of a political strugi
for control of the law.
Some conservatives have sugge:
ed that Casey removes yet anoth
reason to vote for George Bush, b
President Bush did appoint Claren
Thomas. and Mr. Bush's rivals wou
appoint no one remotely similt
Journalists, who are heavily pr
abortion, have reproved Presiden
Bush and Reagan for supposedly L
ing a litmus test for nominations b
have seemed completely silent as B
Clinton has promised to appoint on
Justices who agree with Harry Blac
mun about Roe. Should he be electe
we will get a liberal activist well
the left of the present coalition i
every try. That would mean moi
Roes, more Welsmans, more Casey
Sarah Weddington is right. Radic
feminists will try to make a car
paign issue of the fact that Cas
upheld some regulation of abortio
they want abortion on derand. Mo
Americans do not, which means, if I
steps up to it. George Bush can tut
the issue, and ultimately the Supren
Court. his way.
Revealing View of Court
The Ruling's Words Are About Abortion,
But They Offer a Portrait of 3 Key Justices
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 30 - The Su-
preme Court's decision on Monday re-
affirming Roe v. Wade was as much
about the Court as about abortion.
It was not only that three of the five
Justices appointed by
News Presidents Ronald Rea-
. gan and George BushAnalysis turned out to have the con-
trolling votes -:.that . pre-
served the constitutional right to abor-
tion. Beyond that, the three - Sandra
Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy
and David H. Souter - approached
their. task and wrote their joint opinion
as if they held the future of the Court in
their hands. .
. The core of. the majority's 60-page
opinion was a 16-page section on the
reasons why adhering to Roe v. Wade
as. precedent was necessary, even for
Justices who might. well not have
signed the original opinion in 1973 and
who still had some doubts about it.
Legitimacy of Court
This section, signed by all three but
principally .'wriiten by Justice Souter,
-conveyed a remarkable sense of per-
'sonal passion and urgency. Without a.
footnote, And with a minimum of legal
jargon,- the opinion included. phrases
like."The promise of constancy, once
given, binds its maker" and "Like the
character of an individual, the legiti-
macy of the Court must be earned over
time.".
The..message of the opinion was
equally' straightforward: the pressure
to overturn-Roe v. Wade has brought
the Court to a moment of great institu-
itional danger. The Court's claim tc
legitimacy, always fragile in a demo
cratic society that has bestowed on life
tenured judges the extraordinary pow
er to thwart.. the majority's will, i.
nonetheless the only currency the
Court really has.
The opinion said that. to overrule,
"under fire," a decision that has not
been shown to be wrong would be seen
as "a surrender to political pressure,"
exacting a "terrible price" by danger-
ously depleting the Court's currency
with a public that would come to see
judging as no different from. politics
and judges as no dif(erent fromooliti-
clans. -
Stakes for Nation
"If the Court's legitimacy should be
undermined," the opinion said,."then
so would the country be in. its very
ability to see itself through its constitu-
tional ideals." The opinion added:
"The Court's concern with legitimacy
is not for the sake of the Court but for
the sake of the nation to which it is
responsible."
These words, some of .which Justice
Souter read from the bench Monday
before a spellbound courtroom dudi-
ence, echoed a statement he made at
his confirmation hearing in September
Continued on Page A12. Column 4.
- ords on Abortion but Picture of (Jo urt
1990. He told the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee then that he. had not reached a
conclusion about the validity of Roe v.
Wade. But he addressed the role of
precedent in general, calling it "a bed-
rock necessity if we are going to have
in our judicial system anything that
can be called the rule of law.'!
Equally striking, the- majority's
words Monday echo the warnings thatjudicial. conservatives regularly deliv-
ered, during the years that liberals
dominated the Court, about the need
for "judicial restraint" and the risk to n
the Court from spending limited re-'
serves of legitimacy and public accept-
ance............' 
--'w
Illuminating as it did the three Jus-
tices' approach to their work, Mon-
day's decision may have been even.
more revealing than that. It is possible-
to read the opinion, particularly the
section on precedent, as a roadmap for
explaining the moderate turn that was
the most striking feature of the entire
Supreme Court term.
There is no* doubt that in decisions
ranging from school prayer to habeas
corpus to property rights to federal-
ism, the Court adopted a more modu-
lated approach than had seemed likely
from the way the Justices had invited
argument. or framed the "issues only
months earlier. The question.was why.
'Anger Toward White House
-The opinion Monday may be the-an-
swer. Among the emotions on display
in the joint opinion of Justices O'Con-
nor, Kennedy and Souter was anger,
particularly at the White House under
Presidents Bush and Reagan alike, for
repeatedly bringing the abortion issue
to.the Cout.and preventing the raw
wounds from the judicial abortion wars
from ver beginning to heal.
1 "TtUnited States, as it has done in.fiv cter cases in the last decade, Justices John Paul Stevens and Harry
again asks us to overrule Roe," the A. Blackmun, the author of Roe V.
opinion said pointedlylin its opening Wade, offering a tightly reasoned
paragraph. framework for a constitutional right to
It is possible that the Administra- abortion. It had a somewhat different
tion's aggressive advocacy, in the than Roe v. Wade but in some
school prayer and habeas corpus cases
and the abortion case, caused these the precedent itself.
three Justices in the middle to draw In contrast to the emphasis in R
back and question whether the course Wade on the medical and social histo
on which they had embarked was lead- of abortion, this opinion placed the
ing to a destination they wanted. question of women's ability to controltheir reproductive lives in the context
focu than Roe Ro. Wad bu in som
The three Justices' approach to the
abortion isstie is perhaps an example.
Judging from the structure of the opin-
ion, they took the Administration's in-
vitation at face value and re-examined
Roe v. Wade. They started from a
position of substantial doubt about the
precedent's validity; indeed, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy had committed
themselves in previous ppinions to the
position that Roe v. Wade was deeply
flawed not only as law but as science
and probably morality as well.
Yet by the end of the exercise, they
Jhad produced an opinion - with a
o moer n trne. o equality.
"This opinion makes sense and puts
tMe right to.abortion on a firmer juris-
prudential foundation than ever be'
fore," said Prof. Laurence H. Tribe, a
liberal legal scholar from the Harvard
Law School.
It was as if the three Justices, forced
to go back to first principles, had in the
end persuaded themselves, in this as in
the other cases in which they controlled
the outcome this term.
In addition to- the Justices' response
to outside pressures on the Court, they
may also be responding to forces with-
in it. Biting dissents in Monclv's case
Continued F~rom Page Al fronm Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist and Justice Antonin Scalia, also
signed by Justice Byron R.'White and
Clarence Thomas, highlighted the in
ternal tensions, if not outright personal
animosity, 'that more and more ap-
pears to be a fact of life within the
Court.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Sou-
ter have rarely, if ever, taken a similar
tone in their own opinions. The hard-
edged, take-no-prisoners stance by the,
Justices on the Court's far right, in-
cluding Justice Thomas as well as the
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, may
have the effect 'of driving the other
three toward the center.
It is also possible that the three find
the center a-more hospitable placewith
Justices .William J. Brennan -Jr.i and
Thurgood- Marshall:both retired from
the Court. The retired Justices were
often as dogmatic in their liberal views
as the Justices on the right are in
theirs.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who
served with .both,- men, may have
moved further to the right in those
years as they felt continually pushed to
define themselves in opposition to the
liberals. With the liberal lions gone,
these two may be free to gravitate
toward their more natural home in the
center.
Still another factor may help explain
the Court's surprising evolution as it
has explained other turns in the Court's
history:' the independence of a-lifc -
tenured judiciary. The decision Mo
day can be read on one levei as
declaration of judicial independence.
In this context, a section that Justice
Kennedy read from the bench takes on
a special resonance. Referring to the
right to "liberty" protected by the 14th
Amendment, Justice Kennedy said:
"At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own coricept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life." It is at least
possible that Justice Kennedy was talk-
ing, consciously. or not, of his own lib-
erty not only as a citizen but as a judge.
COLUMN LEFT




a The court has set a precedent
of due process for citizens,
without sexual distinction.
T he Supreme Court's long-awaited deci-sion on abortion restrictions deserved
and got a lot of commentary. What was
missed at first about the controversial
outcome is that, in addition to reaffirming a
core abortion right for women, the decision
is a major change in the meaning and
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. This
change will have a profound positive
impact in a world of other issues, ranging
from gay rights to school funding.
In the Pennsylvania case, Planned Par-
4nthood vs. Casey, the critical centrist
justices-Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
M. Kennedy and David H. Souter-said
explicitly that there are things that the
government cannot do to its citizens sim-
ply because they are citizens, even though
the prohibitions are not explicitly set forth
in the Bill of Rights. The court can call a
halt to government when it excludes
people from "the social and economic life of
the nation." I call this new doctrine
"citizens' due process."
Feminists have been arguing for years-
and the abortion cases made the issue
unavoidable- that American citizens have
rights beyond the specifics of the Constitu-
tion and that abortion rested not just on
women's privacy but on a fair shot at
American life. The three centrist justices,
and even Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who
wrote the majority opinion in Roe vs. Wade
two decades ago as a privacy matter, have
now acknowledged that claim. This is an
important change in constitutional politics
and law. Exchanging privacy for citizen-
ship means that women are no longer
asking to be left to do a shameful private
act; they are asking for allowance to be a
part of the American public. The pro-
choice placards that, even today, tell the
state to "Get your hands off my body,"
should now read: "Women are American
citizens, too."
is 63; a lot depends on the politics of
Supreme Court appointments in the next
few years. But if the Senate Judiciary
Committee does its job and future appoint-
ees must tell us how they stand on citizens'
due process, not only will abortion rights
be largely preserved, but many other
cutting-edge constitutional issues will be
affected. The new test for constitutionality
will be whether the government's action
impairs the ability "to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the
nation," as the court wrote in Casey.
A few years ago, the Supreme Court
ruled in another 5-4 decision that the
Constitution doesn't protect gay men and
'The new test for
constitutionality will be . . .
the ability "to participate
equally in the economic and
social life of the nation." '
women from state criminal sodomy laws.
In that case, the state hadn't actually been
throwing gay people in jail, so that issue is
technically still open. Under the new
citizens' due process, gay adults could
argue that, between consenting adults, a
fulfilling personal sexuality is part of their
right to a social life equal to that enjoyed
by heterosexual citizens.
It is hard to imagine the court that
decided the Pennsylvania case ruling that,
without compelling other factors, gay citi-
zens must choose between their sexuality
and prison. The majority in Planned Par-
enthood vs. Casey also rejects the historical
analysis that the majority used against the
gay claim, which held that the Constitution
Jidn't protect homosexual sex because it
never had done so. In striking down the
spousal notification requirement in the
abortion law, the justices said quite clearly
that they were doing so because the
common-law doctrine that a married
woman is a creature of her husband for
legal purposes is a thing of the past.
Another example involves school fund-
ing. A decade ago, constitutional analysis
went badly astray when the court ruled
that the Constitution didn't stop the states
from creating school districts of wildly
unequal funding capacities. Many, but not
all, states have disagreed, requiring vari-
ous steps toward equal school funding
under state constitutions. A concept of
equal citizenship in the federal Constitu-
tion should forbid the states from engaging
in grossly unequal school funding, a system
that produces people uneducated to min-
imal political citizenship and often unable
to participate in any economic life, because
they can't hold any job at all.
As the justices said last Monday, protect-
ing women's reproductive rights was the
case of a generation, comparable in its
impact on society to the decision to deseg-
regate the schools. But even the abortion
issue is not as important as the constitu-
tional change it has produced.
' Flawed Rulin
BY BRUCE FEIN .Last Monday's 5-4 ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey left the controversial 1973 Roe v.
Wade abortion decree undisturbed. But all
Americans, regardless of tlieir views on
abortion, should be concerned about many
aspects of the decision. The reasons ad-
vanced in a governing plurality opinion for
reaching the result are menacing to the
rule of law and frightening to free ex-
pression and enlightened jurisprudence.
Furthermore, a concurring opinion by
Justice Harry Blackmun calling the Senate
to arms to block confirmation of a succes-
sor who would overrule Roe threatens the
institutional impartiality and independence
of the Supreme Court.
In their jointly authored plurality opin-
ion, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, An-
thony Kennedy, and David Souter pro-
claimed an amorphous constitutional right
of privacy that can only be destined for
idiosyncratic application. The trio ex-
plained in these terms why the liberty
protected by the 14th Amendment en-
dowed mothers with a virtually absolute
abortion right: "At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State."
In fashioning that constitutional for-
mulation of protected liberty, the plurality
relied on penumbras and emanations of the
Bill of Rights, including the uncharted
vistas of the Ninth Amendment. They tac-
itly interpreted the latter as establishing
unenumerated constitutional rights that the
justices can discover with an exceptional
acuity of vision or imagination.
Bruce Fein of Great Falls, Va., was
general counsel to the Federal Communi-
cations Commission from 1983 to 1984
and associate deputy attorney general
from 1981 to 1982. He is now a partner
in Blaustein & Fein, specializing in ad-
vising foreign governments in drafting
constitutions.
gJeopardizes th
The plurality also insisted that to over-
rule Roe would be "to mandate our own
moral code." But that insistence is pat-
ently false. Such an overruling would
make the Supreme Court and Constitution
neither pro-choice nor pro-life; abortion
policies would be determined by state laws
and state constitutions.
In any event, the plurality's open-ended
definition of protected liberty will later
require the justices to invoke their moral
code in interpreting the Constitution. For







concept of existence" or "personhood"
requires public nude dancing, polygamy,
homosexual marriage, or the experimental
or regular use of hallucinogens in the
home. Under the interpretive standard of
the plurality, how can claims that these
liberties qualify for constitutional protec-
tion be decided without imposing the idi-
osyncratic moral codes of the justices?
Wrongs Unrighted
The plurality opinion is most trouble-
some because of the virtually insur-
mountable barrier it erects to overruling
wrongly decided precedents. These are not
so rare as some suppose. The Supreme
Court has overruled approximately 300
cases in its history. It has traditionally fol-
lowed Justice Louis Brandeis' teaching
that trial and error is every bit as in-
dispensable to enlightened jurisprudence
as to enlightened physics. There should be
no statute of limitations for constitutional
truths.
e Rule ofLaw
The "separate but equal" racist doc-
trine of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) was
overruled by the 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education school desegregation decree,
and a score of precedents tumbled to ac-
commodate the economic and social-
welfare regulations of the New Deal. A
ruling upholding a 1940 compulsory flag-
salute statute was overruled within three
years, and an 1869 legal-tender decision
enjoyed even a shorter life span.
Moreover, the reasons the plurality re-
lied on for leaving Roe undisturbed were
flawed. It was said that the decision had
not proved "unworkable" in application.
But its ambiguous right-to-privacy stand-
ard has left lower courts at sea in deter-
mining whether all consensual social or
sexual intimacies enjoy constitutional
protection.
The plurality decision said that "for two
decades of economic and social develop-
ments, people have organized intimate re-
lationships and made choices that define
their views of themselves and their places
in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception
should fail. The ability of women to par-
ticipate equally in the economic and social
life of the Nation has been facilitated by
their ability to control their reproductive
lives. "
Of course, many social institutions and
customs had been constructed in reliance
on racial segregation without preventing
the Supreme Court from overruling
Plessy. Furthermore, the New Deal Court
packed by President Franklin Roosevelt
destroyed the reliance interests of millions
in overruling scores of cases that es-
tablished a constitutional right to freedom
of contract. And would it have made sense
for the Court to decline overruling Dred
Scott v. Sandford (1857) because slave
owners had relied upon the right created
by the case in purchasing slaves to carry
into the territories of the United States?
Overruling Roe, moreover, would not
signal the end of the ready availability of
abortion. More than a dozen state courts
have protected abortion rights under state
constitutions, and a majority of state leg-
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islatures, including those in California and
New York, would surely legislate statu-
tory clones of Roe. The constitutional
right of interstate travel would guarantee
any mother in a pro-life state access to an
abortion in a pro-choice state.
The plurality said no decisions sub-
sequent to Roe had weakened its doctrinal
footings. But Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
directly assaulted the privacy foundation







Writing for a majority in Bowers, in-
cluding Justice O'Connor, Justice Byron
White explained: "The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegiti-
macy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cog-
nizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution." White also declared
that majority sentiments of morality were
sufficient to sustain laws frowning on
homosexuality.
The plurality parried by declaring: "one
could classify Roe as sui generis. If the
case is so viewed, then there clearly has
been no erosion of its central determina-
tion." In other words, since Roe has not
been overruled, its doctrinal under-
pinnings have not been weakened! The
absurdity of that line of reasoning needs
no elaboration.
The plurality also said that precedents
should not be re-examined if an overruling
would create an appearance that the high
court had "surrenderled] to political
pressure . . . so to overrule under fire in
the absence of the most compelling reason
tve-xainme a watershed decision would
subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any
serious question."
Thus, the vociferous critics of the Roe
ruling are to be punished by the plurality
for exercising their First Amendment
rights. The constitutional error of Roe
must be preserved to forestall an appear-
ance of judicial surrender. Under that
theory, Plessy should have remained the
law of the land if blacks had assailed the
wrongness of the precedent by endless
picketing around the Supreme Court. And
the Lochner era of contract rights should
have remained intact because it had been
stridently assailed by President Roosevelt,




The plurality opinion degenerates into
comic opera. After slavishly praising stare
decisis, the plurality blithely announces
the overruling of parts of two precedents:
Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists (1986), and
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health Inc. (1983). At this point, it seems
difficult to escape the conclusion that the
plurality's ostensible objections to over-
ruling Roe were disguises for their in-
tellectual timidity and cowardice. But as
President Harry Truman properly lectured,
if you can't stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen.
Although there were several strong
candidates, the most deplorable utterances
in Casey came from Justice Blackmun, the
author of Roe, in a concurring opinion. He
painted Roe as the symbol of light and its
opponents as the symbol of darkness. He
fretted over his lack of immortality that
might save the light and undisguisedly
urged the Senate to reject the confirmation
of a successor who might usher in dark-
ness by voting against Roe: "I am 83 years
old. I cannot remain on this Court forever,
and when I do step down, the confirmation
process for my successor well may focus
on (abortion). That, I regret, may be ex-
actly where the choice between the two
worlds [between light and darkness will
be made."
Is it poisible to imagine anything more
lethal~to an impartial and independent
judiciary than incumbent justices cajoling
the Senate in the confirmation of new jus-
tices and urging a case-specific litmus
test? Presidential candidate Bill Clinton
has already followed Blackmun's lead by
avowing that no person would be consid-
ered by him for the high court who has not





Last Monday's 5-4 ruing by
the U.S. Supreme Court on the
Roe vs. Wade abortion decree
should worry all Americans -
whether supporters or oppo-
nents of abortion rights.
In Planned Parenthood vs.
Casey, the governing plurality
opinion of Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy
and David Souter proclaimed a
formidable and frightening












ry, guided By Bruce Fein,
by Justice a lawyer and
Louis Bran- columnist for
deis' wisdom Legal Times
that trial and and The Wash-
error are ev- ington Times.
ery bit as in-
dispensable to enlightened law
as to enlightened physics.
For example, in 1869 the
high court threatened the sol-
vency of the United States by
making legal-tender laws,
which permitted the repay-
ment of debt by paper money,
unconstitutional. Less than one
year later, the high court re-
versed itself and overturned
the misconceived precedent
In 1940, the court upheld a
public flag salute for public-
school children. Three years
later, the court tossed out the
precedent
A score of precedents tum-
bled to accommodate the eco-,
nomic and social regulation of'
the New Deal.
And the "separate but
equal" racist doctrine of Plessy
vs. Ferguson (1896) was over-
ruled by the 1954 Brown school
desegregation decree.
The plurality insisted that it
w*ouldaneverse-examine a pre-
cedent if an overruling wouldi
create the appearance that the
high court had "surrenderfed]
to political pressure."
In other words, the vocier-
ous and multitudinous critics of
the Roe ruling are to be Pun-
ished for exercising their First
Amendment rights. The consti-
tutional error of Roe must be
preserved to forestall an ap
pearance of judicial surrender.
Under that theory, Plessy
should have remained the law
of the land if blacks had as
sailed the wrongness of the
precedent by endless picketing
around the Supreme Court.
Can law become enlightened
if criticism of the status quo is
greeted with massive judicia
resistance?
Admittedly, in areas of law
that do not bitterly divide the
nation, a definitive and un
changeable ruling may out
weigh the need for truth.
But in areas of law that pro
voke the minds and hearts of
millions, there should be ng
statute of limitations on const
tutional truths.
Indeed, the plurality id
Planned Parenthood over
ruled two precedents that pro
hibited states from ensuring
consent to an abortion be fully
informed.
The opinion is at war with it
self. And an opinion so dividec
cannot last.
'Betrayal or Courage':
3 Justices Are Judged
a Decision: O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter take the
middle ground, and some heat, in break from the right
By ROBERT L JACKSON
TIMES STAFF WRITER
W ASHINGTON -SupremeCourt Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor. Anthony M. Kennedy
and David H. Souter were reviled
Monday by Randy Terry, chairman
of the Operation Rescue anti-abor-
tion group, for their cowardice and
betrayal, but fellow Justice Harry
A. Blackmun lauded them for "an
act of personal courage and consti-
tutional principle."
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
had rejected pleas by the Bush
Administration and other anti-
abortion advocates to overturn the
1973 Roe vs. Wade decision when
they ruled in Monday's decision on
a Pennsylvania abortion case. In-
stead the three laid down a middle-
ground approach to the bitterly
divisive issue that preserves the
right to abortion but permits the
states to regulate it.
O'Connor and Kennedy are ap-
pointees of former President Ron-
ald Reagan. who was as vociferous
in his opposition to abortion as has
been President Bush. who named
Souter to the court.A nd While the conservativephilosophy of the three was
clear in Monday's decision on a
Pennsylvania law setting precon-
ditions for abortion, the majority
opinion they helped write sur-
prised some by its independent
conclusions and its repeated affir-
mations of what it described as the
basic principles of the 1973 deci-
sion.
Terry, whose group has at-
tempted to block entrances to
abortion clinics, was especially an-
gered by what he saw as a defec-
tion of the three justices. "Kenne-
dy. Souter and O'Connor should be
'astamed of their cowardice and
their betrayal of the children and
of justice." he exclaimed after the
vote.
But Blackmun, who authored the
1973 Roe decision, was effusive in
his praise: "Make no mistake. thejoint opinion of Justices O'Connor.
Kennedy and Souter is an act of
personal courage and constitution-
al principle." he wrote in his con-
curring opinion.
Monday's ruling offered new in-
sight into the thinking of the threejustices who have emerged as the
decisive swing votes on one of the
most contentious issues to come.
before the court in modern times.
Though a Reagan appointee,
O'Connor in her 11 years on the
court had never suggested that she
favored an outright overturning of
the landmark decision. Neither had
she said that Roe should be af-
firmed.
So she broke new ground per-
sonally Monday in declaring, along
with Justices Kennedy. Souter,
Blackmun and John Paul Stevens,
that the 19-year-old decision is "a
rule of law and a component of
liberty we cannot renounce."
'"The woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy before viability is
the most central principle of Roe
vs. Wade," declared O'Connor.
At the same time, O'Connor's
conclusion that some state restric-
tions on abortions are permissible
so long as they do not constitute an
"undue burden" on a woman's
right to terminate a pregnancy is
consistent with her past positions.
In 1989. when she voted with the
majority in a Missouri case to open
the way for states to limit access to
abortion, she said that she did not
accept the assertion contained in
the majority opinion that the ruling
would "modify and narrow" the
Roe decision. And O'Connor made
clear at the time that she was not
ready to jettison Roe.
Kennedy's vote perhaps was
more surprising because he had
voted without qualification to sup-
port other conservatives on the
court in voting to restrict abortion
rights before the Pennsylvania de-
cision. A Reagan appointee like
O'Connor, Kennedy always had
been counted on by the anti-abor-
tion camp.
In the Missouri case three years
ago. Kennedy joined in the majority
opinion written by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, which said
that the court's decision "would
modify and narrow Roe" by per-
mitting some state regulation of,
abortion during the second trimes-
ter of pregnancy for the purpose of
"protecting potential human life."
That opinion sidestepped the
larger issue of whether Roe should
be overturned.
F or Souter, a former NewHampshire state Supreme
Court justice appointed to the fed -
eral high court by Bush. Monday's
opinion marked his first vote on the
abortion issue. During his Senate
confirmation hearings two years
ago. Souter steadfastly refused to
say whether he believed the nght
to privacy guaranteed a right to
abortion.
It was the third time this month
that the three justices had staked
out a cautious. moderately conser-
vative position to rebuff the Bush
Administration on major issues.
The three vote with the majority
in a 6-3 decasion rejecting an
Administration plea that federal
judges be sharply restricted in
re-examining the convictions or
sentences of state prisoners. and
they prevailed in a 5-4 decision last








The first clear sign Monday
that Roe vs. Wade would not
be overturned came in the Su-
preme Court cafeteria.
Justice Harry Blackmun -
author of Roe - was having
7- 4 breakfast with his law clerks
as he often does. He seemed
bubbly and chipper - not the
mood to expect if he was
about to witness the demise of
AP his cherished doctrine legaliz-
BLACKMUN: Justice, 83, ing abortion.
can't stay on 'forever' Sure enough, an hour later,
the justices convened to make
the dramatic announcement
that the court was reaffirming Roe vs. Wade by a 5-4 vote,
even as it was upholding most provisions of the restrictive
Pennsylvania abortion law before it.
In his written opinion, Blackmun rejoiced that "just when
so many expected the darkness to fall" on Roe. "the flame
has grown bright."
By day's end. however, many concluded that Blackmun
was engaging in wishful thinking and that the right to an
abortion is in more jeopardy than ever.
And abortion rights advocates were chilled by Black-
mun's almost plaintive warning that the court was just one
justice short of reversing Roe: "I am 83 years old, Black-
mun wrote. "I cannot remain on this court forever, and
when I do step down, the confirmation process for my suc-
cessor well may focus on the issue before us today."
In political terms. Blackmun's observation may catapult
the court into the fall presidential campaign, as voters
choose among the three men who want to he in a position to
v Please see COVER STORY next page >
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Umnetaissceessor-arany one of
several justices who could depart in
the nextour years.
"Only the next election can pre-
serve" abortion rights, said Demo-
cratic candidate Bill Clinton.
Clinton and Ross Perot favor abor-
tion rights, while George Bush op-
poses them. Now, more than ever,
whoever is elected will be under
pressure from both sides of the abor-
tion debate to make sure the abor-
tion views of the next Supreme Court
nominee are well known.
"Because of the decision today,
nothing is more important to the pro-
life movement than re-electing
George Bush," said Tom Glessner of
the Christian Action CounciL
By at least tacitly endorsing Roe,
the court also took some wind out of
the sails of abortion rights advocates,
who had hoped a clear loss would
provide fodder for the fall campaign
and put pressure on Congress, where
they seek passage of a Freedom of
Choice Act.
But advocates and legal experts
from all sides read the court opinion
and drew entirely contrary conclu-
sions about what was said and
meant With equal conviction, ana-
lysts variously called the ruling a de-
feat or a victory for abortion rights.
Key reason for the outbreak of
contradictory interpretations: While
many focus on the results of a case
- who won and who lost - the court
and many others see much more sig-
niaicance in how the court reaches
its decisions. By what method or le-
gal process did the justices reach the
bottom line?
Monday's ruling muddied both
bottom line and legal framework.
The court upheld most of Pennsyl-
vania's abortion restrictions, but
struck down one provision that clear-
ly bothered Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor from the outset: the re-
quirement that women seeking abor-
tions notify their husbands.
How could that be justified when
unmarried women had no such obli-
gation? O'Connor asked during oral
arguments in April.
To reach its conclusion the court
had to decide how it would analyze
state restrictions on abortion.
O'Connor and Justices Anthony
Kennedy and David Souter opted for
the Roe v. Wade framework in an
opinion paying homage to Roe, wom-
en's privacy and the importance of
adhering to precedent Joining them
were Blackmun and John Paul Ste-
vens, longtime supporters of Roe.
Harvard law professor Laurence
Tribe, who supports abortion rights,
said the language of this alliance
alone is significant - and positive.
"You're going to be getting lots of
people on the pro-choice side giving
you spin that this is terrible news,"
said Tribe. But, he added, while not
wanting to sound overly optimistic,
"I do not regard it as terrible news."
Said Tribe: "This decision is far
more persuasive in explaining why
women should have this right than
Roe was. And the fact that it was
written by three Reagan-Bush ap
pointees underscores how it reflects
not a marginal view of extremists or
an ideologically committed group of
people, but a central tradition of
American democracy."
James Bopp Jr. of the National
Right'to ife Committee, also focuses
on the Roe endorsement "It's a ma-jor del... 2kder fLis ai=ng, aeret
no outlawing of abortion at all, and
for so many that's the big one. We
lost 95% today."
The Roe section of the ruling alone
seems to guarantee at least one con-
sequence: States that forbid or crimi-
nalize abortion outright will not get
the court's support because that
would effectively snuff out a right
the court endorses.
But others focus on another conse-
quence of the decision: States are
now far more free to restrict abor-
tions than they were before.
Despite "the court's division and
all its writings, we have some clar-
ity," said Solicitor General Kenneth
Starr. "The court has said that the
abortion decision can be regulated.
That is the view of seven justices."
Just what form those regulations
will take is unclear. Most agree that
states can safely mimic Pennsylva-
nia with rules requiring parental
consent, waiting periods and some
record keeping requirements.
"It's frightening to think what else
states could invent after today," said
Marcia Greenberger of the National
Women's Law Center. She thinks
states are now empowered to use ev-
ery form of persuasion imaginable to
talk a woman out of abortion.
Abortion rights opponents view
that prospect positively: "Today, a
Pennsylvania woman's right to know
is guaranteed - her right to know
about the risks of abortion, the devel-
opment of her unborn baby and the
alternatives available to her," said
Beverly LaHaye, president of Con-
cerned Women for America.
Other restrictions that seem to be
fair game: strict requirements on
doctors' procedures and medical fa-
cilities, as well as waiting periods.
The next question, perhaps the
most important one, is this: By what
standard will the next wave of abor-
tion restrictions be measured?
O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy
adopted O'Connor's "undue burden"
test, which means that each new re-
striction will be assessed to deter-
mine whether it places a "substantial
obstacle" or "undue burden" in the
path of a woman's exercise of her
abortion rights.
Before the case was decided, both
sides attacked that standard - first
suggested by O'Connor several years
ago - as impractical and vague.
When she first floated the idea, no
other justice would consider it.
But now it becomes the prevailing
standard, even though O'Connor ac-
knowledges that in applying it "some
disagreement is inevitable."
Glessner thinks that's an under-
statement: "It's an unworkable stan-
dard, very subjective. Who knows
what an undue burden is? It's just a
gut check of how the justices feel on
a given day."
In the end, if a large number of re-
strictions pass the "undue burden"
test, then abortion rights advocates
say the promise of Roe will be effec-
tively negated.
"The effect of a multitude of re-
strictions for poor, young or margin-
alized women could be the same as a
ban," said Frances Kissling of Catho-
lics for a Free Choice.
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his angry
dissent, said. "We should get out of
this area. where we have no right to
be, and we do neither ourselves nor
!he country any good by remaining."
One thing the court's historic deci-
sion guarantees is the justices are not
likely soon to "get out" of the abor-
tion area. The court's angry debate
will resume again - especially if a
new member joins the select group.
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er voters are increasingly militant on the
pro-choice side. Though Molinari's father,
who held her House seat for 10 years, was
pro-life, like a few other Republicans, she
plans to vote for the Freedom of Choice
Act, which would restore by legislative
means the full intent of Roe v. Wade. It will
not become law this year because its pro-
ponents cannot get the two-thirds major-
ity needed to override Bush's veto. But the
fight over it will keep abortion in the
headlines.
Early in the campaign. Clinton did not
plan to stress abortion or other emotional
issues such as school prayer. He wanted to
avoid the appearance of catering to "spe-
cial interests." including feminists. But
now Clinton must scrape for every faction,
large or small. As the only one of the three
candidates favoring the pending bill and
promising to appoint pro-choice judges to
the Supreme Court, Clinton hopes to stand
apart from his rivals.
Perot is more cautious. Though he
contends that "it's the woman's choice,"
his disparagement of those who breed
"like rabbits" mollifies some traditional-
ists for whom abortion equals moral de-
cay. But his opposition to government in-
terference in women's lives appeases
some moderate pro-choice partisans. In a
debate that polarizes opinion into ex-
tremes. Perot. the political apprentice, is
bidding for the serene middle ground
where most voters are found. That is an-
other reason Bush wishes Perot-and the





abortion rights. Why did
he change his mind?
By RICHARD LACAYO
W HODUNIT IS ONE OF WASHINGTON'Sfavorite games. in which the objectis to figure out who were the majorplayers behind important policy
decisions in the White House or Congress.
Though the game gets harder when the
decisions come from the tight-lipped pre-
cincts of the Supreme Court, it was being
played in earnest last week in an attempt
to figure out one of the court's most unex-
pected rulings in years. Someone cobbled
together a Roe-friendly majoritv that in-
cluded three conservatives-Anthony
Kennedy. Sandra Day O'Connor and David
Souter-but who was it?
in several earlier decisions the trio had
emerged asa center-right coalition willing
to throw its support to the court's two em-
battled liberals, Harry Blackmun and John
Paul Stevenst. 'fiey' produced majorities in
lavor of'sustaininug the han on scho)l pray-
Rehnquist, Souter* Who cobbled together
'tteedoe-friendyaajority at the court?
er and strengthening the power of federal
courts to review the convictions or sen-
tences of state prisoners. These rulings
made conservatives question their as-
sumption that. 12 years of Reagan-Bush
appointments had produced a right-wing
lockon the court. But in order to join the5-
to-4 majority that reaffirmed abortion
rights last week, Kennedy had to step
away from his own earlier opposition to
Roe v. Wade. which he signaled just three
years ago when he put his name to a with-
ering attack on Roe written by Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist and joined by An-
tonin Scalia, the court's right-wing
philosopher-bulldog. At an end-of-term
party last week, the court clerks gently
ribbed Kennedy for legal flip-flops by per-
forming the theme song from the old TV
series Flipper.
Who got to Kennedy? Conservatives
point darkly in the direction of those
clerks, the young lawyers selected by the
Justices each term to assist in researching
and writing the court's opinions. Kennedy
and Souter both have clerks who were
once students and proteg6s of Laurence
Tribe, the Harvard law professor who is
public enemy No. 1 to legal conservatives.
Peter Rubin. a Souter clerk, helped re-
search Tribe's strongly pro-choice 1990
book, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes.
Michael C. Dorf, who clerked for Kennedy,
is co-author with Tribe of a new book, On
Reading the Constitution.
The clerk-did-it theory works this way:
Rehnquist believed that Kennedy would
join him. Scalia, Clarence Thomas and By-
ron White to produce a majority decision
repudiating Roe. But while Rehnquist was
writing what he thought would be a major-
ity opinion along those lines, Kennedy was
persuaded to switch by his clerk Dorf. per-
haps with the collusion of Souter's clerk
Rubin.
Another theory: Kennedy sees himself
as a candidate to be the next Chief Justice
and is staking out a position as more mod-
erate than Scalia. the conservatives' favor-
ite. Kennedy used to be tagged as Scalia's
faithful but less brilliant follower (a posi-
tion Clarence Thomas currently enjoys).
Now he has moved to the head of the
court's "wimp bloc," complains Gary
Bauer, domestic-policy adviser in the Rea-
gan White House. The shift in Kennedy's
position, he says. "reflects schizophrenia
or cravenness.
A third, less Machiavellian theory
might hold the key. Kennedy may indeed
have disparaged Roe three years ago, be-
fore Clarence Thomas replaced Thurgood
Marshall. But faced with the possibility
that Roe might really be overturned-and
the social tumult that would ensue-
he instinctively pulled back from the
brink. -Reported by Julie JohnsonlWashington
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Charles Krauthammer
Good Policy,
This week's Supreme Court abortio
decision makes for enlightened social poli
cy. That is the good news. The bad new
is that it makes for appalling constitutiona
law.
If the Supreme Court were, as a majori
ty of justices thinks it is, a Nationa
Commission on Everything, we should b
overjoyed that it has promulgated an abor
tion policy that is not only sensibly moder
ate but that captures what national con
sensus exists on the issue. Unfortunately
Suprimei Court is not a national com
nission.t Itis the nation's ultiniate'consti
tutional aithority.'And the damage it does
tothe Constitution in its zeal to legislate
cofrect abtion policy is profound.
First, the good news. The court upheld
the right 'to abortion, but the controlling
opinion written by Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter held also that the' state's
interest in the potential life of the fetus
allows it to regulate with an eye to discour-
aging abortion-s6 long as the discourage-
ment does not amount to prevention.
You must permit but you may discour-
age, says the court. And so does a great
majority of the American people. Except
for the abortion-on-demanders, for whom
*abortion'has the moral valence of an
ageadectomy, mst Americans feel un-
eb about ab K g of the mis-
erydiven death, that imy women will
mffer if it is ba'ed6 they are loath to
return to the days of prohibition. Knowing
-also that an abortion, unlike an appendec-
tomy, is morally problematic, they are
equally loath to encourage it as just anoth-
er form of birth control.
That is why the overwhelming majority
of Americans, men and women, favors mod-
est; dcouraging-restrictions. A 1992 Gal-
lup poll showed. that 86 percent favor
requiring 'doctors to inform patients about
alternatives to abortion; 73 percent favor
sloiinotimatia 73. percent favor a
24-hour waiting period 70 percent favor
consentrequrments for minors.
( t for spousal notification, wanen fa-
varall these restrictions in numbers great-
er orequal to those ofmen.)
What eaistitutes modest discourage-
iadt The. awart says that antiabortion
regulations must not pose an "undue-bur-
den! for the woraw trying to obtain an
abortiou. Meaning? The court seems to
want to say. Anything that tries merely to
persuade the woman to change her mind is
constitutionaL The court upheld, for exam-
pie, Pennsylrania's 24-hour waiting period
andmandatory. information (about abortion
altrntves) requirement as not unduly
brdeoqone.:They do not prevent a woman
fran getting an abortion. They try only to
bend her thinking against it.
As a general guide to social policy (the
details of which each community could
decided for itself), this is a reasonable
standard. But as a constitutional principle,
the "undue burden" test is a disaster. It a
wholly rootless constitutional invention. It is
Terrible LawI a useless judicial guide, indeed an invitation
- to capriciousness It will subject the minut-
5 est regulation of abortion to the personal
I preferences of individual judges.
It is, in sumn, a crazy way to make
- abortion policy. This is, after all, a de-
l macracy. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter may have divined a national consen-
sus on the issue and contrived a constitu-
* tional principle-undue burden-to fit the
* current consensus. But that is not the way
we ought to be arriving at either constitu-
* tional principles or democratic choices.
The Constitution is silent on abortion. So
I should the cut be. The Ame-rican people
are extremely vocal on abortion, but are
commanded by a usurping judiciary to be
I silent.' In this decision, the court "calls the
contending sides of a national controversy
* to end their national division by accepting a
icommon mandate rooted in the Constitu-
tion"'-i.e., by accepting what the court
tells them to accept. The results of this
perversion of democracy are clear.
First, by short-circuiting the democratic
process the court prolongs and inflames the
abortion debate. In 1973, at a time when
state after state, reflecting changes in na-
tional mores, was liberalizing abortion laws,
the imperial court aborted the process and
decreed a liberal regime everywhere. That
created a vast antiabortion protest move-
ment (from which grew the New Right)
and, in time, its pro-abortion mirror image.
The result can be seen on the nightly
news: marches, protests, the occasional
ni-iroL. Why this endless, relentless extra-
parliamentary action? Because the people
have been deprived by the judiciary of the
opportunity to have the'fight and settle the
issue where democracies normally have
their fights and settle their issuesin the
elected legislatures, Without egislative re-
course, people naturally take to the street.
A second casualty of Roe is the judiciary
itself. More than any other issue in the past
20 years, abortion has led to the radical
politicization of the process for choosing
Supremne Court justices. Politicization, in
turn, has jeopardized the court's authority
as the nonpartisan arbiter of constitutional
dispues In this very ase, for example,
Justice Blacrnun concludes his cocurig
opinon with a disgraceful invitation to the
Senate to choose his successor on a Roe v'.
Wade litmus test, a test that has poisoned
the confirmation process for a decade.
The country and the court would be far
better off had the court never gotten into
the abortion busiess in the first place. And
yet; if we are destined to live with Roe,
better the new Roe, imperial but moderate,
than the old Roe, which was nothing more
than imperial.
Yet again, one still wishes that the right
policy had not been wrongly arrived at. Had
the court's latest, reasonable abortion poli-
cy been decreed not on high by the court
but at the ballot by the people, we would be
far along the road to resolving the nation's
most divisive moral issue.
Undue Burden'Is it any wonder that the issue sets
perfectly nice people to bashing
each other over the head in the
streets? Read the dissent of Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia on the
abortion case. It is savage, just as the
debate is.
The justice is a gifted writer, and as
an exercise in invective his opinion is
bracing reading. The tone, like the
argument, is bitter and passionate. He
rips into the plurality decision, which
upholds certain restrictions, as enacted
in Pennsylvania, but also, to Scalia's
fury, upholds the right of-abortion and
declines to overrule Roe a Wdde. :
"Roe," he fumes accurately, -"fanned
into life an issue that has inflamed our
national politics in general and has
obscured with its smoke the selection 6f
Justices to this Court in particular ever
since."
He derides the plurality's contention
that "constancy" is essentiaL
Overturning Rob which Scalia and three
of his brethren wish to do, would
weaken the bonds between the peOe
and their government, Justice David H.
Souter wrote.
"The Imperial Judiciary lives," snarls
Scalia. "It is instructive to compare this
Nietzschean vision of us unelected.
life-tenured judges-leading a Volk who
will be 'tested by following' and whose
'very belief in themselves' is mystically
bound up in their 'understanding' of a
Court that 'speak[s] before all others
for their constitutional ideals'-with the
somewhat more modest role envisioned
for these lawyers by the Founders."
"The only principle the Court
'adheres' to, it seems to me, is the
principle that the Court must be seen as
standing by Roe. That is not a principle
of law (which is what I thought the
Court was talking about) but a principle
of Realpolitik-and a wrong one at
that."
At one point he refers to the "czarist
arrogance" of the plurality's reasoning.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun is just as
personal although not quite as strong.
on the other side.
It is appropriate in a way that the
discussion be intemperate. This is a
powerful issue, a question of life and
death. It is only the hand-wringers who
stand in the middle and bleat about
"compromise' who are out of step.
There is no compromise. Either the life
in the womb is extinguished or it is not,
there is no halfway. It is like asking
aLlitionists to be reasonable. To
opponents, abortion is murder. The
"pro-choicers" make it sound like a
1 ilRtY cam
on Public Mind
God-given right. Yet the compromisers
cluck about "extremists" on both sides;
there can be no others.
Congress has rushed into the breach
with the Freedom of Choice Act, which
will supposedly shield Roe from any
further depradations by the court. Its
opponents say it will codify Roe, which
permits abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy, after which, the
Court said in its 1989 Webster v
Reproductive Heal Sev*icer decision,
states may impose conditions.
Abortion-rights activists, although
privately relieved that Roe survved,
complained because, as Rep. Patricia
Schroeder (D-Colo.) put it, the imposition
of regulations somehow suggests that
women are incapable of inature judgment
in claiming their "fundamntal
constitutional right" to abortion
At a packed House Judiciary
Committee hearing on the abortion bill
Tuesday, Rep. Howard Coble (R-N.C.)
begged to differ. "The Constitution
neither guarantees nor forbids what Roe
provides."
The only way we are going to
remove the "undue burden that the
issue places on our tempers and
consciences is to remove government
from the scene.
Those who-eel that the woman who
must bear the child and bring it up is
the only person needed to make a
judgment about carrying it to term
should organize a foundation, and offer
help out ofprivate funds to any woman
who needs money to get an abortion.
They will not have to endure what they
see as the'outrage of seeing women
deprived of their rights.
On the other hand, the antiabortion
activists who have become increasingly
violent in preventing women from
entering abortion clinics should also
start raising money to finance their
conviction that every child has the right
to be born. They may have to build
orphanages for all the unwanted babies
they insist should be born. They may
have to setup social service agencies to
provide for counseling for adoption.
It would be enormously expensive,
but it would be worth it to them to
prevent wiat they regard as a holocaust
and spare ihem the outrage of having
their tax dollars used to finance surgery
they regard as murder.
fIn Sunday's column about die Ross
Perot rally in Annapdis I misidentifid
theformer spokerwoman for the Naval
Aca temy. She is Carol Fddmann. Sorry
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trolled the outcome of this case. i
pattern that has emerged in severs
other important decisions this term
They voted to strike down thi
Pennsylvania laws requiremen
that married women notify thai
husbands of their plans to underg
abortion, but upheld other prov
sions, including requirements that
w n be informed about the
risks and alternatives to abortion
a then wait 24 hours before
undergoing the procedure. In pre
vious cases, overruled by yester-
day's decision, the court had
strck down such restrictions as
violating the fundamental abortion
tight
The long-awaited ruling-
amouanting to five separate opin.
lons toaling 157 pages-came as
the justices released their final
opinins of the term. Neither side
in the fierce abortion fight that
has divided the country for nearly
2Gyears was happy with the out-
come, which is certain to keep the
battle alive in state legislatures
and courts as the adversaries
wrestle over what restrictions are
fnow allowed.
Abortion-rights activists, who
had declared abortion a lout cause
at the high court and turned their
attention to the November elet-
tioes and federal legislation, said
they were deeply disappointed.
They said the court, for the first
time in its history, weakened pro-
tecnon ar a right it once fee&ie
fundamental, and that the burden
would fall more heavily on young,
poor and mninority women and
those in rural areas.
National Abortion Rights Acion
League President Kate Michelman
called the courts action devastat.
ing for women' and said it moved
them '"ane step closer to the back
alleys.'
Some abortion apponents, who
thought that they were all but s-
sured of a repudiation of Rar with
the addition of Thomas to the high
Count, were equally unhappy. Wan-
da Peaos, president of the National
Right to Life Committee, called the
ruling 'a loss for rnoro children
and a victory for pro-abortion
forces-
Mot Supreme Court opinions
are written by a single justice and
insed by others, In this case.
Ptaoa.d Parareaad d Soeuthnar-
emw Pinessysenaes a Caasy. was
written by three jstices, the first
time sice the court reinstated the
death penalty in 1976 that the court
has issued such a 'oint opin.ian'
Each member of the pharality took
the extraordinary step yesterday of
reading a portion of the opinion
from the bench.
'The womans right to terminate
her pregnancy before viability is the
most central principle of Roe v.
Wade:" they said. 'it is a rule of
and a component of lberty we can-
ot renounce.
They adopted the new 'nandue
tarden' test that for the moment
controls how the court will assem
abortion laws in upcoming cases* An
undue borden. they said, is one that
'has the purpose or eflect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of
agoman seeking an abortion of a
novbleiern~s."
'Connor had previously pro-
posed such a test. Souter had never
before spoken on the subject. Ken-
nedy's vote was the most surpris-
ing. because he voted in 1989 with
Rehnquist. White and Scalia in Web.
arl a ReProductinr Heurth Service,
advocating a far lower standard of
.reiew-the one the dissenters
urged yesterday.
Blackmiam, in a separate concur-
ring opinion, praised the joint opin
ion as "an act of personal courage
and Constitutional principle.'
He recalled his ominous warning
three years ago in Webster that the
court was poised to cast into dark-
ness the hopes and visions' of mil-
lions of American women who be-
lieved that they enjoyed the right to
abortion.
'All that remained between the
promise of Roe and the darkness of
the plurality was a single, flickering
flame: Blackmun wrote. 'But now.
jost when so many expected the
darkness to fall. the flame has
gr own brighL*
Nonetheless. Blackmun added, -I
fear for the darkess as four jus-
tices anxiously await the single vote
neceMaty to extinguish the light.-
The three justices in the plurality
said they might not have voted con-
stitutional protection for abortion
had they been on the court in 1973.
noting that 'some of us as individ-
uals find abortion offensive to our
most basic principles of morality."
But they said their obligation was
to interpret the Constitution. -not
to mandate our own moral code.'
The question for them. they wrote.
was not 'the soundness of Roe's
resolution of the issue. but the pre-
cedential force that must be ac.
corded to its bolding.'
The constitutional protection iv-
en to abortion in Ro, they said, was
in line with previous naliings estab-
lishing a constitutional right of pri-
vacy and striking down laws re-
stricting the use of birth control.
The woman who carries her child
to term, they said. 1is subject to
anxieties, to physical constraints. to
pain that only she mast bear..
Her suffering is too intimate and
personal for the state to insist,
without more, upon its own vision
of the woman's role. however dorm-
inant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our cul-
ture."
The principle of stare decrid-
that the court should not lightly dis-
card its precedents-tipped the bal-
ance in favor of retaining Roe, they
said.
The significance of the 1973 case
was such that the court would pay a
'terrible price' for overuling it, the
plurality said. The three justices
compared Roe to the landmark
1954 school desegregation case.
Bron i Bonad of Education. Hav-
ing told the nation what the Con-
stitution requires. they wrote, the
court could not back down without
exposing itself to charges that it
had surrendered to political pres-
sure.
'So to overrule under lire in the
absence of the most compelling rea-
son to reexamine a watershed de-
ABORTION AND THE COURT
a Rea . Wad. 1971 Constitutional right of nrvacy includes rigt of wo-
man to choosA abortion: therefore. Texas law makng abortion a Crime o
unconslitutional.
Sats up trimester framework for testing legality of aboion restrctonrs
Ciing first trimester, aboition deisioni anorely up to manse and her
physician dinig second trimester. state may hopse regulations reason-
ably rilated to matemal health. during third trimester. state ap fbitd an
aborions emept ose, needed to Asee life of worman.
S000 v. Boton. 1971 Decided same day as Ro. invalidates Cergia law
raluirig Oat ax abortion be perormed in hospitats and orat women must
snise approval of the physicians and a hospital corenitte.
a Preeraed Parestaoed of Cantral Afeofut V. Danferth 197M Strikes
down Missouri law requiring rarried woman to ntaisn onsent of her huls-
band before obtaining abartion requiring doctors peeformiwg pstibtp
abortins to use the method most likely to preser= e fet Ie and reqiing
unmarried mwi woman to obtain onsent of oe parent, with n provision
for Judicial bypass.
6 Make v. Rom Beal v. Do 1977. Upholds at. prohibiom on use of
Public funds for abortions Oat are net 'medicap necessary. even if state
proides fanding tor childbirth.
A Da et . Bahk 1971 Invaidates Massachusetts law requiring sino
to obtain ensent of both parents before abortion,
As ##Aar&t K~ MOAic , 198a UPholds littr amnerdirwor" denying federal -
lsiaanesent tor aberoarn wode Medicaid eae when necessary to sane,
matemal Ife or ild pregnancy caused by rape or incest
6 City of Akon v. Abort Center for Reproeducest Healt 1983. Strbks
down ordiraces requirig that all abortien after first trimester be per-formed in fisservice hospitals tat physicians recte to an women seeing
abortiom certain information about fetal developmen and risks and atter-
natires to abortian and imposing a 24-hour waiing period.
o Plaistd Parenthooed Assoiatoi of Kansas City K. Ascor. 1981
Missouri law reqinrig lUnemsanipated mnOes to obtain parental or judicial
consent foe abortion is constitutional because it provides alternative to par-
ante onsent. Court also upholds requirement of pathologrcal exauination
of abortion tissue ard presene of second physician at late-tern abortions.
* Thrrbah . Anerini C.aeg. of bose.racans and synacologis.t
1985 Reaffirming oe, Court strikes down Persyvania law detailing -in,
tor0ed Constwar presouns, inpoing reporting requirements on physicians,
and requeigri physician to tae care to preserve fetal life in tate-temn abor-
tion,
a Webistr . Reproductef Heatr Servfcee 1989. UphIs Mdissou tawbarrng use of public lacilities or pAblit employees to perform abortions andspaiiwtylscians to test ftr lue viabdity if woman is bF eir t :
than 20-weels pregnant.
a MOoSdO K. Athneoat, 199a Law requiring notification of both parents
of minor saeeing abortion. witon o jdicial bypass. is strick down. Altera.Out -70quur tsug r9t-ere notc bt including procedure for 1wdiial soaer-s phed
8 Obie P. Akron Certer aRproducte HeatIW 1990 Law requring
rainr to notifp one parent or obtain udical waer is upheld over argumant
that judicial procedure is too burdiemonre.
* Rust . Siniarsa. 199L Court upholds federal regulations prohibitingflalrally funded fanily planing throis from inoring pregnant patients
td abortion ma laegal option or otherwise discussing abortion.
a Jae 29 1991 The Supreme Court gave tnes sweepig new power to
reMict abortiors as itupteld em prowsions of a Pennsylrana law making
abortion nre difficult to Obtain. But the murt said states maey not outlaw
as abortions.
was 'a rational attempt oy mer a-c
to improve truthful commtwiration
between spouses and encourage
collaborative decisionmakig, anthereby fosters marital integrity.'"He also said the provision 'mak
it more likely that the husband wU
participate in deciding the fate of
his unborn child. a possibility that
might otherwise have been denied
him.'
Scalia agreed with all that but
said he had to "respond to a few of
the most outrageous arguments in
today's opinion, which it is beyond
human nature to leave unan-
swered.' Mucking the opening lines
of the plurality opinion-tLiberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt'-Scalia retorted. 'Reason
finds no refuge in this jurisprudence
Of confusion."
C s w ould subvert the court's
legitimacy beyond any serious ques-
tion.' the opinion said.
The plurality then said it was get-
ting rid of the trimester framework
the court had adopted in Ror and
replacing it with the undue burden
test. Under the trimester frame-
work. the right to abortion was
nearly absolute during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy; the state
could impose reasonable restric-
tions to protect maternal health
during the second trmester; and
could outlaw abortion entirely after
fetal viability except to save the life
or health of the pregnant woman
(something that remains true after
yesterday's ruling.)
The plurality said the trimester
framework 'undervalues the state's
interest in the potential life within
the woman.' which it said exists and
in 'substantial throughout pregnan-
cy.
Applying the undue burden test.
the plurality said that the spousal
notice constituted such a burden
because it did not 'merely make
abortion a little more difficult or
expensive to obtain' but in practice
allowed some husbands to exercise
a veto over their wives decisions.
'We must not blind ourselves to
the fact that the significant number
of women who fear for their safety
and the safety of their children are
likely to be deterred from procuring
an abortion as surely As if the Com-
mnowealth (of Pennsylraniaj had
allowed abortion in all cases.* they
said.
'Women do not lose their consti-
tutioaly protected liberty when
they marry.' the plurality said.
The Constitution protects all in-
dividuals, male or female. married
or unmarried, from the abuse of
governmental power, even where
that power is employed for the sup-
posed benefit of a member of the
individuars family.'
But the court said other provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania law-the
24-hour waiting period, informed
consent requirements, parental
consent. and reporting require*
:nents-do not constitute an undue
burden.
They said it was troubling' that
the 24-hour waiting period may in
practice impose higher costs and
longer delays because of the dis-
tances many women must travel to
abortion clinics. but that the delay
was not an undue burden.
Justice John Paid Stevens. in a
separate opinion, said that even un-
der an undue burden test. the 24-
hour delay and counsdinig provi-
sions should fail.
Blacamun attactted ume dssent-
ers' view that abortion is not enti-
tled to any special constitutional
protection. 'In the Chief justice's
world, a woman considering wheth-
er to terminate a pregnancy is en-
titled to no more protection than
adulterers, murderers, and so.
called 'sexual deviates,' he said.
'Given the Chief Justice's exclusive
reliance on tradition, people asing
contraception are the aext likely
candidate for his list of outcasts."
The four dissenting justices-in
opinions by both Rehnquist and
Scalia-called outright for Roe to
be overruled. something that Rehn-
quist and White had shied away
from doing in Wsrr.
'We believe that Roe was wrong-
ly decided and that it can and should
be overruled,' Rehnquist aid.
He called the undue burden test
an "unjustified constitutional com-
promise. one which leaves the court
in a position to scrutinize all types
of abortion regulations despite the
fact that it lacks the power to do so
under the constitution."
Rehnquist agreed with the abor-
lion-rights advocates who said that
the withdrawal of fundamental pro-
tection for the abortion right was a
marked defeat for their side. He
said the plurality *retains the outer
shell of Roe v. Wade but beats a
wholesale retreat from that case.-
In the name of not overruling
previously decided cases. Rehnquist
said, the plurality left Rot standing
as a sort of judicial Potemkin Vil-
lage. which may be pointed out to
passers-by as a monument to the
importance of adhering to prece.
dent.'
Rehnquist said he would uphold
all the provisions of the Pennsylva.
nia law, including the husband .no-
tice requirement. He said that rule
Concept of marital privacy crucial to abortion ruling
Original premise'
of Roe wouldn't hold
By Lyle Denniston
Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - In 157 pages,
the Supreme Court's decision defin-
Inga new. limited right of abortion is
never explained simply. But there is
one idea that apparently made all
the difference - an idea based as
much on modern sociology as on
law.
That notion, basically, is that pri-
vacy is vital to the institution of mar-
riage in America today, for the part-
ners, and for the marriage. And that
idea led to the view that abortion
rights - if they are to exist at all -
must rest very much upon marital
- privacy, and less upon an open-end-
ed individual right of privacy.
In the new ruling. marital privacy
was crucial, because it is especially
attractive to two justices whose votes
were were necessary to the outcome:
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy. a
married man, and David H. Souter, a
bachelor.
News analysis
If it had not been for the high level
of sensitivity Justice Kennedy and
Justice Souter have about the need
to protect marriage and the family
from government intrusion, there
would have been no majority of five.
Without that, they very likely would
not have voted with Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor to keep Roe vs. Wade
partly intact.
Through the years. Justice
O'Connor has been in favor of some
abortion right, though less than Roe
vs. Wade had established. She thut
has long seemed available to vote tc
retain a version of an individua
woman's right to end a pregnancy.
She and Justices Kennedy anc
Souter. once they had made the com
mitment in recent weeks not to over
rule Roe, as the Bush administratior
had asked, formed the core of a po.
tential majority for the decision tha'
finally emerged.
They picked up at least some sup
port - enough to make the voting
outcome 5-4 - from the court's onlt
See ANALYSIS, 12A, Col. z
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remaining liberal justices. Harry A.
Blackmun lthe author of Roe) and
John Paul Stevens.
It is a fair assumption that if Jus-
tices Blackmun or Stevens had tried
to draft a majority opinion reaffirm-
ing Roe primarily on its original
premise - the right of individual
privacy - Mr. Kennedy and Mr.
Souter would have shied away. Jus-
tice O'Connor might not have.
Individual autonomy. in general.
as a basis for constitutional conclu-
sions, is a concept that makes -mod.
erate conservatives" like Justice
Kennedy and Justice Souter quite
uncomfortable. They seem to fear
where it would lead. making a con-
stitutional matter out of a whole
range of choices about individual au-
tonomv.
Without either of those two jus-
tices. there could have been no ma-
jority to salvage any part of Roe vs.
Wade. Four otherjustices. more con-
servative than they, were voting to
overturn Roe outright. and those
four were unyielding in that commit-
ment to the final vote. The loss of
any other justice to the cause of
maintaining some right to abortion
could have scuttled Roe altogether.
The concept of privacy within
marriageg s xplains much of the
underlying theory of the majority
opinion written jointly by Justices
Kennedy. O'Connor and Souter. and
to explain at least some of the more
important parts of the ruling on par-
Ucular restictions in the Pennsylva-
nia anti-abortion laws.
But that does not mean that the
resulting decision protects only abor-
tion rights for married women. The
Constitution itself. with its guarantee
of legal equality. could not be the
source of a right for women only if
they were married.
But that is the strongest premise
for much of the ruling because it is
tied directly to the unfolding in mod-
em times of the entire concept of a
constitutional right of privacy.
The decision that emerged Mon-
day represented a distinct shift from
Roe vs. Wade. on the overall privacy
question. The majority reaffirmed
generations of Supreme Court prece-
dent establishing an expanding right
of privacy - the bulk of those deci-
sions keyed to maintaining privacy
in marriage.
Those decisions protect every-
thing from mixed-race marriages, to
the use of birth control among mar-
ried couples. to the choice of how to
educate one's children.
Roe vs. Wade is an outgrowth of
those background decisions on mai-
tal privacy, but it went much further
than those ever had gone to devise a
right of privacy based on individual
autonomy - the woman's right to
control her own physical destiny.
When Mr. Souter's nomination
was before the Senate Judiciary
Committee two years ago, and he
was pressed repeatedly for his views
on abortion and on the right of priva-
cy, he did not hesitate to say he fa-
vored 'marital privacy.- But that is
as far as he would go, on privacy
rights in general, or on abortion as a
privacy right in particular.
He had never had a chance. until
Monday. to cast a vote on an abor-
tion case. to give his views on priva-
cv the most stern test that a judge
can face.
Mr. Kennedy. too. has left no
doubt of his quite strong commit-
ment to marital privacy. Almost from
the time he joined the court four
years ago. he has made it clear re-
peatedly that he was worried that if
Roe vs. Wade were overruled, past
precedents on marital privacy might
have to go. too.
Three years ago. for example.
when a Bush administration lawyer
was urging the court to overrule Roe
in an earlier case. Justice Kennedy
pressed him to say whether such a
decision would mean the court also
would be undercutting a 1965 'right
of privacy' precedent. Griswold vs.
Connecticut.
The Griswold decision, declaring
that a married couple had a constitu-
tional right to privacy that includes
the use of birth control without gov-
ernment Interference. was one of the
more significant rulings relied upon
by the Supreme Court in declaring a
right to abortion in Roe in 1973.
Although the decisicr in that
1989 case found Mr. KennLdy voting
to relax the Roe decision, he would
not vote with Justice Antonin Scalia
then to overturn Roe outright. This
time. with Roe's fate directly on the
line. Justice Kennedy switched rath-
er markedly, and voted to uphold
Roe in a considerably stronger form
than he had advocated earlier.
His switch, perhaps. was the
most noteworthy aspect of Monday's
ruling. But almost equally significant
was Justice Souter's willingness. on
his first such test. to go along with a
ruling strongly related to the notions
that he, too. holds about marital pmi-
vacy.
The image they hold of the mod-
em marriage, with the wife a fully
competent decision-maker about
matters intimate to her, was at the
core of the ruling striking down a
clause that required married women
to tell their husbands before getting
an abortion.
'Women do not lose their consti-
tutionally protected liberty when
they mary." the main opinion de-
clared. -A state may not give to a
man the kind of dominion over his
wife that parents exercise over theIr
children.
In a real way, the Bush adminis-
tration may well have helped bring
about the demise of the tell-the-hus-
band- clause because of the almost
startlingly bold assetilon it had made
to the court about government power
to regulate private discussions w:th-
in marriage.
The government brief had argued
a notion verv likely viewed as ex-
treme by all five of the justices in
Monday's majority. "A state.- the
brief contended. :may legitimatel
elect to ensure truthful marital com-
munication concerning a crucial is-
sue such as abortion . .. .
That assertion must have pro-
voked some discussion behind the
scenes at the court. since It showed
up - In nearly that form - in the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist. The spousal
notice requirement.: he wrote. 'is a
rational attempt by the state to im-
prove truthful communication be-
tween spouses and encourage collab-
orative decisionmaking . . . -
The part of the new decision that
upheld a Pennsylvania restriction re-
quiring teen-agers to get one parent's
consent for an abortion also reflects
the view of Justices Kennedy.
O'Connor and Souter that this would
encourage - not discourage - pri-
vate family discussions of the abor-
tion option.
They also favored a 24-hour wait-
ing period for teen-agers who want
an abortion.
Rngeaslbeither iaMe;
Both Vow to Continue Fight
*a4081f 1Iopong
camps turn their attention
to the upcoming elections
and the future makeup of
the Supreme Court.
iy SARA FRI'Z
TIMES SI AFF WatTER
W ASHINGTON-As far ascombatants on both sides of
the alortion debate are concerned.
Monday's long-awaited Supreme
Cour tecisin settled nothing.
In f..t. because the court neither
outlawed abortion nor granted an
absolute right to obtain one with-
out s'me government-imposed
regulation, the ruling appeared to
be having the opposite effect esca.
lating the already bitter battle
between those who favor and those
who oppose abortion right
That bitterness is expected to
pervade the presidential election
and contests for Congress and state
legislatures acrossihe country, and
Is even expected 'to spill into the
streets. Foes and supporters of
abortion rights sought to turn the
ruling to their political advan-
tap-both citing, with different
emphasis, the fact that the land-
mark abortion rights ruling had
survived by a single vote.
Bill Clinton, the presumptive
Democratic presidential nomnee.
reiterated his support for the right
to abortion and vowed to make it a
major issue in his campaign. At a
press conference in Littit Rock.
Ark.. he warned that Roe vs. Wade
"Is hanging by a thread" and noted
that the next President will be in a
pivotal position to shape future
court rulings because only one
more justice is needed to overturn
the 1913 case.
'You have four judges plainly
committed to repeal Roe vs. Wade,
three others nibbling around the
edges and a brave Justice (Harry
A.1 Blackmun saying he doesn't
know how much longer he can
hang on." Clinton saik.-'"his is one
of the things this presidential elec-
tion is about. and I hope the
American people will say in clear,
unambiguous terms we do not
want to go back" to the days when
abortion wa illegal.
Blackmun, author of Roe vs.
Wade. is 83.
President Bush took the opposite
tack. lie congratulated the court
for upholding the bulk of the
Pennsylvania law, noting that it
"supports family values in what is
perhaps the most difficult question
a family can confront" Bush reit-
erated his opposition to abortion
"in all cases except rape or incet
or where the life of the mother is at
stake."
Ros: Perot, who is expected torn for the White House as an
Independent, did not comment di-
rectly on the ruling but said "Per-
sonally. my poition has been and
rmains that, basically, this diffl.
cult dcaison should be a woman's
rhoet."
The rhetoric escalated even
though the court reaffirmed the
basic tenets of Roe va. Wade.
Abortion rights advocates por.
Kathryn Kolbert, who represent-
ed Planned Parenthood. speaks
to reposters about court ruling.
trayed the decision to allow re-
strictions as a dramatic legal re-
treat that raised the specter of a
return to Illegal, back-alley abor-
tions. By crying foul. they hoped to
retain the political momentum
necessary to elect candidates who
support abortion rights in Novem-
ber.
"Roe vs. Wade to dead-they
finally put the final knife in it."
declared Rep. Patricia Schrmeder
(D-Colo.), a leading abortion
rightsproponent.
Kate Michelman. preadent of
the National Abortion Rights Ac-
tion Langue INARAL), said the
principal objective of abortion
rights groups would be to defeat
Bush and to elect "a pro-choice
President" and "a veto-proof Con-
gres.
Anti-abortion leaders, who had
hoped that a court domiated by
conservatives might completely
overturn Roe, complained that
they were betrayed.
"You will see a lot of unrest in
the streets, a lot of incredible anger
from people who want to restore
moral sanity and protection to
bables," warned Randall Terry
head of Operation Rescue. which
regularly stages siL-ins outside
abortion clinics.
DarIa St. Martin, associate direc-
tor of the National Right to Life
Committee. said the chief goal of
the antI-abortion camp would be to
reelect Bush and thus enable him
to appoint at least one more justice
who would help reverse the court's
narrow 5-4 majority in favor of
permitting abortion in the United
States.Trhe courtla reaffirmation of Roe
Could drain se of the politi-
cal oeal from the efforts of abortion
rights groups, who have tried
withotit success over the last dee-
ade to use the Issue to elect liberal
presidential canidlates. As they
did in 1984 and IS88-and as
Blackmun did In his opinion-they
will warn voters that the court la
jusl "one justice away" from over.
turning Roe.
Patricia Ireland. president of the
National Organization for Women.
acknowledged that abortion rights
forces were pleased that the court
had not overturned the right to
have an abortion but were react.
Ing negatively to gain political
advantage. "All of this in a way is
political posturtng for the elec-
Uona"shesaid .
Supporters d abortion dghts had
agreed upon this strategy long
before the courts desn was
made known, Mihelman acknowl-
edged that her groaa would have
adopted the same political reponge
If the Cnrt had overtuned Roe.
To* battle will now move to
state legislatiures and to Congress.
which will consider the so-called
Freedoma of Choice Act this week.
The bil. which is designed to write
Roe into law, is expected to pass
Bish ba vowed to veto ItL
State legislatures ar expected to
fight over regulations to restrict
*Cem to abordhona, Fture court
came are expected to buge on
whether these laws ae amstent
with Mondays ruling.
Both sides 'have been amassing
large sums of political acnton com-
mittee money that they intend to
tue to help elect like-minded can-
didates. NARAL recently launched
a drive to raise $5 millon in three
months: the National Right to lte
Committee pians to invest 5I1
million In the upcong elections
And in the presidetlal race.
political analysts say. Bush could
gain an advantage because he is
the only candidate who apposes
abortion rights. Clinton and Perot
could divide the votesof those who
support the right to abortion. gte-
Ing the President a boost even
though polls Indicate that his-post-
tion Is not shared by the majority of
Americans
In a sense. the decision came as
welcome news to ush because, if
the court had overturned Roe. It
Could have unleashed a political
backlash that thei Preidents cam.
paign strategists feared would
bring more supporters of abortion
rights to the poll.
But. aithough It did not overturn
Roe Itself, the decision is bound Is
Increase tension In the GOP over
the bitterly divisive tme. Republi-
cans who support abortion rights
are promising a floor fight at the
GOP National Convention In Au-
guo to aertans the maotinm
plank in the party** platform.
In the Democrat-controlled Con-gram, the Hone Juliciary Com-
mittee arheduled a meeting today
to vote on the Fieedon of Choice
Act. A smilar measure is expected
to be approved Wednesday by the
Senate lAbor and Human Re-
sources Committee. Final congres-
alonal action to not expected until
late July or early August because
Congress Intends to reess for In-
dependence Day and the Demo-
cratic National Convention.
Because the bill is supported by
many Republicans. such as Sen.
John Seymour of Californle, as well
as by liberal Democrats. such as
Sen. Alan Craneton of California.
supporters predict that Congress
will pas It. On Monday. Seymour
and Cranston condemned the court
decision and called for enactment
ofthebill.
The legislation is the product of
many months of coordinated plan.
ning by liberal Democrats In Con-
grems. led by Schroeder. Rep. Don
Edwards (D-San Jose) and a few
others. The measure was designed
to build on the increasing political
strength that abortion rights advo-
cates have demonstrated in Con.
gres since 198.
"Only a few years ago, the easy
vote In Washington on abortion
was to vote with lanti-abortion
Rep.1 Henry J. Hyde (R-II."
noted Rep. A AuCoin (D-Ore.).
"That is no longer the case. Today,
the easy vote la to vote pro-choice,
and that is an amazing transforma-
tion"
But most congressional leaders
acknowledged that they do not
have ufilcient votes to overturn
Bush's threatened vetoof the enea-
sure.
Its* asff witt sa m Faae U1,
Deaglas ll, Wilam Eats., David
laM.t, headsi IL ar- neleb se Pad
litsmm abaste to a" asery.
Also Headed to the High Court . . .
Three move cam heading tomard Whe supreme Court will directly
ask the jutice to decide If abortion is a amasitiional right. Utah,
Loddsna anid Gum a hove Ronga to boa abortion. None of the low
arrtingenfjorendas legal dialtenes work throgfh the federa courts.
a Onem: Considered the most restrictive anti-abortion Statute. the
law would make it a felony to perform arty abortion ecept to
preserve a woman's life or prevent grave danger to health as
certified by two independent doctors. The law was overturned in
April by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeal., which said the
Supreme Court had not overruled the 1913 Roe vs. Wade ruling that
legalized abortion,
a ltedam: The law would ban abortion ecept o save the mother'a
life arin promply reported caes of rape or inceat it cills for prison
sentences of up to 10 years and fines of up to $10.000 for doctors
who perform illegal abortions. A federal judge declared the law
unconstitutional in August. and the U.S.5th Circuit Court of Appeals
heard arguments in February.
* Utah: The law would ban abortion except in caseof rope or Incest.
grave danger to the mother's physical health or if the fetus had
grave defects. In cases of rape or iceat. the abortion would have to
be done no mor1 than 20 weeks into the pregnancy. A federal judge
said he would delay ruling an a constitutional challenge to this law
until after theSupreme Court ruding on the Penrsylvamia statute.
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he 1991-92 Supreme
Court term was supposed to
mark the triumph of the
right. It didn't. With
remarkable opinions on
abortion, religion, and
federalism, the center staked
out its own ground. A special
pullout supplement,
beginning on Page S19,
,explores the promise and
pitfalls of the center's new path. In analyzing the most
important decisions of the term, 10 constitutional scholars
-. reveal some other supreme
surprises: the advocacy of
executive power at the expense
of public-interest groups,,the
4:courts, and even Congress; the
conservative wings emergence
as stalwart defender of free speech; the abandonment of sound







The Most Important Decisions
Ten constitutional scholars select a single case fom vbe last term that speaks
volumes about the alignment of the Court, the development of legal doctrine,
or the evolution ofjurisprudential theory.
The Center Springs
To Life in Reaffirming
Roe v. Wade's Essence
Court-packing, it turns out, is harder
than it looks. After 12 years in
power and the chance to fill five
Supreme Court vacancies, the Reagan and
Bush administrations still have been un-
able to bring down Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S.
113 (1973)-the central symbol of what
they call liberal judicial activism.
By a vote of 5-4. the Court in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey. 60 U.S.L.W. 4795 (June 29,
1992). ringingly reaffirmed the "essential
holding" of Roe v. Wade-namely, that
abortion may not be prohibited prior to
fetal viability. By the same vote, the Court
struck down a Pennsylvania law requiring
a married woman to tell her husband that
she is seeking an abortion, thus making
clear that some abortion obstacles short of
criminal prohibitions will continue to be
found unconstitutional.
But by a vote of 7-2, the Court upheld
several other Pennsylvania laws designed
to discourage abor-
'ion by making itPlanned Parenthood more byma-ingum-moetime-consum-
ing or expensive.of Southeastern Pennsylvania Suchs ave ng
. Cbeen the principal
legislative tactic of
I an anti-abortion
movement frustrated in its inability to
achieve the outright overrule of Roe.
The Court until this term had invali-
dated nearly all such hoops and hurdles-
at least when imposed on affluent adult
women, rather than on teen-agers or the
poor. But in Casey, it reversed course.
upholding informed-consent and reporting
requirements nearly identical to those that
Kathleen Sullivan had earlier been struck down.Specifically, the Court upheld a statute
is a prferOr of law requiring doctors to give a woman seeking
at the Harnard an abortion a litany of facts about her fetus
University Law and about the alternatives to abortion-akind of reverse Miranda warning about the
School, consequences of exercising her rights. It
also upheld a requirement that a woman
wait 24 hours after hearine this informa-
tion before going ahead with an abortion
and a requirement that a detailed record of
the abortion be kept.
No Dancing in the Streets
How did the Court manage to split the
difference in this way? The key to the
outcome was an extraordinary joint opin-
ion by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter.
Four justices--Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Byron White, the
original Roe dissenters, plus Justices An-
SEE SULLIVAN, PAGE 524




Souter, and Kennedy: The three of
you have "grown in office" and
are basking in the praises of the liberal es-
tablishment. Even ultra-liberal law pro-
fessors, like Susan Estrich of the Univer-
sity of Southern California Law Center,
are cooing and high-fiving over your
"coming into your own" this past term.
You have been awarded the highest title
that the educated elite can bestow on
federal judges appointed as conserva-
tives-you are being called "moderates"
in the tradition of former Justice Lewis
Powell Jr. (by which they mean that you
vote with liberals in important cases).
Your vote to censor prayer at public-
school commencements was a hard pill for
many conservatives to swallow. But gov-
ernment-sponsored prayer goes to the core
of the incorporated establishment clause.
and at least your reasonine was arauable.
Your deadly decisioiIn this term's
abortion case, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60
U.S.L.W. 4795 (June 29, 1992). is an-
other matter. This was a blood decision,
one involving a choice between life and
death. Shamefully, the three of you
weighed in on the side of death, thereby
guaranteeing that our nation's abortion
holocaust will rage on longer. And the
abortion industry's cash registers will
continue to ring 1.5 million times each
year.
The Pennsylvania laws challenged by
the abortion industry in Casey did not
prohibit abortion; they merely regulated it
in a modest and reasonable way. The reg-
ulations required informed consent, a 24-
hour waiting period, informed parental
consent for minors, and spousal notifica-
tion. The strident screams of the abortion
industry and pro-abortion activists against
this modest regulatory scheme demon-
strate beyond a doubt the extremist posture
of the abortion-rights movement.
The Court could easily have decided
this case without reaching the ultimate
question of the status of Roe v. Wade. 410
U.S. i 13 (1973). But the troika of Sandra
Day O'Connor, David Souter, and An-
thony Kennedy joined forces with liberal
Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens to reach the issue and to retain and
reaffirm the "essential holding" of Roe.
Although a majority of the Court also
'upheld most of Pennsylvania's regulatory
scheme, the damage has been done---the
troika's majority opinion embraces the
nearly absolute right of a mother to choose
to take the life of her prebom child.
Exactly what is the "essential holding"
ol Roe v. Wade that the majority embraced
in Casey' ' Essentially, it is the extreme
position ot abortion on demand throughout
the entire -1t weeks of prenancy. Roe"s
trimester approach is affirmed in Casey as
a two-part test. Before viability, the state's
interest in protecting the life of the human
being in the womb is "not strong enough
to support a prohibition of abortion or the
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the
woman's effective right to elect the proce-
dure.'' That is troika-speak for estab-
lishing a right of abortion on demand-
for serious reasons, trivial reasons, or no
reason at all-for approximately the first
24 weeks of pregnancy.
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tonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas--stood
ready to overrule Roe root and branch. and
thus voted to uphold all of Pennsylvania's
restrictions. Two justices--Harry Black-
mun and John Paul Stevens-voted to re-
affirm all the Courts prior abortion deci-
sions and would have struck down the en-
tire Pennsylvania law.
The O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter opin-
ion, which reaffirmed Roe but overruled
several post-Roe abortion decisions, con-
trolled the case. Their opinion replaced the
previous regime of strict scrutiny for all
abortion restrictions-no matter how great
or small-with strict scrutiny only of those
amounting to "undue burdens.' Under
this new test, the three justices voted to
uphold informed-consent and reporting
requirements, but drew the line at spousal
consent.
When Casey came down, both sides of
the abortion battle claimed defeat. In no
quarter was there dancing in the streets.
Rather, in a news cycle that had an air of
surreality. Operation Rescue and the Na-
tional Abortion Rights Action League
competed with one another at press micro-
phones to see whose sound bite could
more bitterly excoriate the Court. What
was going on?
Conservative Fault Lines
In a sense, both sides were tight-each
had lost the outcome it most wanted.
Abortion opponents had endured a 19-
year quest only to be denied the holy grail
of the overrule of Roe. Beaten squarely
years ago on the human life amendment
and human life bill, Roe's opponents had
turned their hopes to the slow process of
turnover on the Court, waiting to amass an
anti-Roe majority.
This term, with Justice Thomas occupy-
ing Justice Thargood Marshall's seat, they
could almost taste victory. No wonder
they cried treachery when two Reagan
appointees and a Bush appointee snatched
it away, defying the administrations that
had appointed them and earning praise in-
stead for "personal courage" from Justice
To the dismay of Roe's opponents,
Casey made the fault lines in the
concept ofjudicial conservatism all too
apparent. The opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
emphasized libertarianism and
stare decisis.
Blackmun. the bartic-scarred author of
Roe.
To the dismay of Roe's opponents.
Casey made the fault lines in the concept
of judicial conservatism all too apparent.
The O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter opinion
emphasized libertarianism and stare deci-
sis. Taking their cue from Justice John
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 367
U.S. 497 (1961), the three justices argued
that the concept of liberty must be viewed
capaciously and that matters as "intimate
and personal" as continuing a pregnancy
must be left to individuals rather than dic-
tated by the state.
They argued further that adherence to
precedent in the face of political pressure
is essential to the legitimacy of the Court.
Law would collapse into politics, they
suggested, if the Court overruled its deci-
sions without "some special reason over
and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided." Such reasons, they
said. were present when Brown v. Board
of Education. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), over-
ruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), and Lochner v. New York. 198
U.S. 45 (1905), was laid to rest by West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379
(1937); a consensus had emerged in favor
of ending American apartheid and launch-
ing the regulatory state. But they found no
similar sea change warranting overrule
here.
The four justices dissenting from the
reaffirmation of Roe appealed to quite a
different strand of conservatism: literal
fealty to constitutional text and histor-
ical tradition. The abortion right is simply
nowhere to be found in the Constitution.
the chief justice and Justice Scalia wrote
in unusually strident and emotional dis-
sents. Nor. is it to be found in the origi-
nal intent of the 14th Amendment's
framers, for in their era, abortion bans
were commonplace.
Such a narrow concept.of text and tra-
dition is the jurisprudence not of Justice
Harlan but of Judge Robert Bork. who at-
tacked the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter
opinion as "radical" in a post-Casey op-
ed piece in The New. York Times. The
overruling of Roe fell one vote short only
because the Senate balked in 1987 at mak-
ing Judge Bork a justice and confirmed
Justice Kennedy instead.
So why didn't pro-choice advocates cel-
ebrate when Casey came down? Because
in a sense they had lost a battle, too. True.
Casey held that women seeking abortion
could not be sent to jail or relegated to
back-alley botch jobs. Nor could they be
put to the potential veto of a husband's
fist. But Casey also demoted abortion to a
rank below other fundamental rights.
The undue-burden test invalidates only
"substantial obstacles" to abortion. Thus
it permits states to impose upon abortion
some delay or cost, so long as it is not too
great. This is a departure from the usual
rule that, when it comes to interference
with fundamental liberties, even another
day or another dollar is too much.
For example, the Court probably would
not uphold a requirement that a voter wait
24 hours after her first visit to the polls
before casting a ballot. Nor does the Court
tolerate the imposition of even minor ex-
pense on free speech. Just weeks ago, in
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement.
60 U.S.L.W. 4597 (June 19, 1992). it
struck down a fee for public demonstra-
tions, noting that "a tax on the content of
speech does not become more constitu-
tional because it is a small tax." Abortion.
in contrast, is now unique among funda-
mental liberties in that the quantity rather
than the quality of a regulatory burden is
determinative.
In the end, which is more important-
what Casey did or did not do? What Casey
did was give states a little more leeway to
obstruct private abortions sought by adult
I . women. Under post*Rue Precedcangovernment had long had room to reacacces it) abortion for teen.ager and todeny public funding for abortions to thepoor. Pru-choice advocates are right ch.,laws like Pennsylvania's will hurt some
women at the margin-rural, poor. unedu.
cated women most of all.
But what Casey did not do is more im.
portant than what it did: It did not overruil
Roe v. Wade. After Casey as after Rw.
abortion cannot be made a crime. Criminal
prohibitions against abortion, such as
those recently enacted in Guam. Lu,,,.
ana. and Utah. are now clearly doorned.
and anti-abortion legislative tacticians
have been sent back to the drawing board.
To be sure. Casey's reaffirmation of
Roe may seem to some superfluous, or
even politically counterproductive. now
that the battle cry of "Roe is falling" has
awakened the long-slumbering giant of
pro-choice politics. The Freedom of
Choice Act pending in Congress would
codify the protections of Roe. and given
the predominantly pro-choice sentiments
of the electorate. President George Bush
vetoes it as his party's peril in November.
If a pro-choice majority commands the
polls, who needs a pro-Roe majority on
the Court?
The answer is that some things are too
precious and fragile to be left to politics.
and women's reproductive freedom is one
of them. Pro-choice advocates will no
doubt work hard this year to defeat anti-
abortion legislation and candidates, and to





choice. But they should not lose sight of
the other election-year issue that Casey
highlights: the composition of the Court.
Life tenure gives you a chance to
change your mind-a lesson that Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justice William
Brennan Jr. taught President Dwight
Eisenhower and that Justice Blackmun
taught President Richard Nixon. The tino
of O'Connor. Kennedy, and Souter like-
wise defied expectation this term by put-
ting brakes on the Court's rightward drift.
The reaffirmation of Roe hangs by a
single vote, and Blackmun, as he point-
edly reminded us in Casey. is now 83
years old. But the O'Connor-Kennedy-
Souter opinion sets a benchmark for judi-
cial moderation that will make it difficult
for even a Republican administration to
appoint another Justice Thomas. Court-
packing, it turns out, is harder than it
looks. 1i
Centrist'roika Cloaks Its Cowardice as Courage
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Even after the prebom child reaches the
point of viability, however, abortion must
be allowed "for pregnancies which endan-
ger a woman's life or health." Again, this
is right out of Roe. and the key question is.
what does the Court mean by "health"?
The answer is. of course, supplied by
Roe's companion case. Doe v. Bolton. 410
U.S. 179 (1973), in which the Court
defined "health" in terms of maternal
well-being "in light of all factors-physi-
cal, emotional, psychological, familial.
and the woman's age."
The abortion liberty created in Roe and
affirmed in Casey thus extends throughout
the entire 40 weeks of pregnancy subject
to only one minor limitation-after the
child is viable, a mother desiring an abor-
tion must find an abortionist who believes
her general "well-being" is furthered by
an abortion. The life of the human being in
the womb, even after viability (and even
moments before live birth), counts for
nothing against his or her mother's interest
in emotional, psychological. familial. and
general "well-being." This is not modera-
tion. It is utterdisregard for human life.
Roe's Resuscitation
The troika seemed almost apologetic (or
was it ashamed) about its decision to reaf-
firm a broad right to terminate prenatal
life. On a number of occasions the three
justices hinted that they might have de-
cided the matter differently in the "first
instance." but concluded that the "imme-
diatc question is not the soundness of Roe
... but the precedential force that must be
accorded to its holding." Their opinion
even goes so far as to suggest that over-
ruling Roe would cause "profound and
unnecessary damage to the Court's legiti-
macy." So devotion to the Court as an in-
stitution and a commitment to a stunted
view of the rule of law---not the substan-
tive validity of Roe as constitutional
law-appear to be the common ground on
which O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy
made their stand.
. However, it is the decision in Roe, not
its overnling. that has rendered the Su-
preme Court illegitimate in the eyes of
many. The most shameful decision in the
history of the Court is not Dred Scott v.
Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
and not even Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). It is Roe v. Wade (and
now Casey).
Like those other decisions. Roe treats
living human beings with disrespect and
disregard. But unlike the other decisions.
Roe is quite literally a life-and-death
matter. The so-called right to choose cre-






Casey is a right to choose to take the life
of an innocent human being in the womb,
a right that has been exercised more than
28 million times since Roe was decided in
1973.
Roe had been seriously, perhaps mor-
:ally, undercut by a number of recent deci-
sions, including Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
and Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186
(1986). It would have been easy to write a
reasoned opinion explaining why Roe was
an ideal case for reversal: It is a poorly
reasoned and clearly erroneous decision, it
had been seriously weakened by subse-
quent inconsistent decisions; it is a con-
tinuing source of bitter legal, moral, and
political controversy: it has imposed sub-
stantial costs on our society; and it is liter-
ally a matter of life and death for millions
of preborn human beings at the mercy of
their mothers' "reproductive autonomy."
In short, Roe was lingering in a state
of permanent vegetation, and the Court
should have respected its right to die by
weaning it from the respirator.
A Boost for Bush
Casey was bad news for those of us who
continue to believe in our country's long-
standing and fundamental commitment to
the inalienable right to life. It is likely,
however, to have a positive effect on pro-
lifers in the political arena for a number of
reasons. First. although the Court reaf-
firmed a woman's right to abortion for the
full term of her pregnancy, it also upheld
the right of the people to enact reasonable(i.e., not "unduly burdensome") laws
regulating abortion.
Thus, pro-lifers will be pushing state
legislatures to enact legislation providing
for informed consent. parental notice and
consent, waiting periods, and other rea-
sonable and moderate regulations on the
abortion industry. Popular support for
such laws is both wide and deep, and
when the abortion-rights movement lob-
bies against them, it will be seen as
strident and extremist.
A second tender mercy emanating from
Casey is a boost for the re-election of
President George Bush. The resuscitation
of Roe v. Wade and its extreme right to
abort will reawaken the millions of pro-
lifers who had been sitting on their hands
waiting for the Court to reverse Roe. They
will vote in droves come November for
President Bush. who has been faithful to
his strong pro-life commitment. Just as
Roe helped elect President Ronald Reagan
in 1980. Casey will help re-elect President
Bush in 1992.
Cowardice Cloaked as Courage
Finally, there is an important lesson to
be learned from Casev. As Professor Es-
trich recently observed, that lesson is
''confirmation battles matter." Each
member of the Casey troika is an acci-
dental justice. a man or woman who
should never have been elevated to the
high court and who was appointed for all
the wrong reasons.
Justice O'Connor was nominated on the
basis of her gender after President Reagan
made what can only be called a silly and
pandering campaign promise to appoint
the first woman to the Court. Suppose
Reagan had nominated Judge Roben Bork
instead of O'Connor. Bork would have
been confirmed by a Republican-con-
trolled Senate, and his influence would
have greatly enriched constitutional law.
Justice Souter was chosen apparently
because he had spent his life isolated in
the backwoods of New Hampshire where
he never wrote a word (or even expressed
an opinion) about the great issues of
our time. And Justice Kennedy emerged
from obscurity only after Judge Bork
was "borked" and Judge Douglas Gins-
burg was "soned' by the confirmation
process.
In future confirmation battles. President
Bush should display more courage and
employ more of the awesome power of the
presidency. He should make use of recess
appointments to place his nominees imme-
diately on the Court. He should not
nominate a blarik slate to the Court and
hope for the best. He should nominate
(and be willing to fight fort highly quali-
fied individuals with a priven commit-
ment to judicial restraint and the rule of
law. men and women who hase a commit-
ment to our written Constitution and the
courage to reverse enoneous and unconsti-
rutional decisions like Roe r. Wade.
The integrity of the Court was not the
issue in Casev. It was the integrity of the
Constitution that was at stake. And three
accidental justices who were supposed to
restore legitimacy to the Constitution
blinked under fire. The Court's decision in
Casey was cowardice cloaked as courage.
And sadly, Roe still lives. prborn chil-
dren still count for nothing, and the Con-
stitution is still stained with their innocent
blood. 01
JaticJeSralia isn' "justprivingpublic-itea-t grp of /tafding
inwironmentalcases. -He's advocatinga highly debatable theory
-f4Ppolisand she Consxitution zhat wouldvdically enlarge the powers
of one branch ofgovermnent.
Standing Up for the Executive
Continuing a recent trend, the Su-preme Court in Lujan v. Defendersof Wildlife, 60 U.S.L.W. 4495
(June 12, 1992). narrowed still further the
law of standing, raising new barriers to
environmental and other public-intcrest
groups that want to challenge government
policies in court. The high court also
moved closer to adopting a novel theory
that radically expands federal executive
power at the expense of public-interest
groups and Congress.
Standing requirements are supposed to
ensure that a lawsuit seeking judicial re-
view of agency action is a real "case or
controversy," rather than an abstract dis-
pute over policy-in other words, that it
is brought by people who can plausibly
claim a real stake in litigating the gov-
ernment's action because they have suf-
fered a distinctive injury from it. Until the
1960s. standing
doctrine made judi-
cial review very hard
rs of Wldlife to get. Plaintiffs had
to claim that the
agency had injured
them in a traditional
(common-law) prop-
erty or liberty right. In practical effect.
that meant only regulated interests ever
got to sue.
In the early 1970s, the federal courts
greatly liberalized the rules. The courts
recognized that regulatory statutes could
create novel interests (such as the right to a
safe and healthy workplace) and that the
beneficiaries of regulation could be as
much harmed by executive sloth or in-
action as regulated industries could by
executive overreaching. The courts also
allowed associations such as public-
interest groups to seek review on behalf of
their members, so long as some members
could plausibly assert that an agency's ac-
tion or inaction had hurt them.
Expanded standing thus became one of
many devices by which the federal courts
and Congress ensured that representatives
of diffuse and unorganized publics with
small individual but large collective stakes
in the design and enforcement of regula-
tory policies (radio listeners, victims of
discrimination, wilderness hikers) could
be active participants in-and monitors
of-a regulatory process that had hither-
to been mostly captured by regulated
industries.
A Schizophrenic Doctrine
Always ambivalent about liberalized
standing, the Supreme Court started back-
ing away from it in the mid-70s. Since
then, divisions on the Court have worked
to create a remarkably schizophrenic and
confusing body of doctrine. To acquire
standing to secure judicial review, aplaintiff must allege that: (1) it has a claim
in the "zone of interests" protected by the
statute, (2) an "injury in fact" has been
suffered, (3) the injury is fairly traceable
to the agency's action, and (4) a court or-
der to the agency can redress the injury.
The last two, the "causal nexus" and
''redressability" requirements, have
proved especially elastic; and the Burger
and Rehnquist Court majorities have
mainly manipulated them to keep plain-
tiffs-for example, parents of black
public-school children objecting to tax
exemptions for racially discriminatory
private schools--out of court.
Then in 1990, Justice Antonin Scalia
led a 5-4 majority to thicken the "injury in
fact" test into a significant roadblock for
environmental groups: In Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation. 497 U.S. 871
(1990), the Court denied standing to plain-
tiffs objecting to new Department of the
Interior rules opening federal lands to
mining and drilling, because the environ-
mentalists had not shown that they made
use of the particular 4.500 acres opened.
Their use of nearby lands wasn't good
enough. (Perhaps more significantly, the
Court allowed years of litigation effort to
go down the drain by rejecting as untimely
more particular affidavits that the National
Wildlife Federation had subsequently
filed.)
The present case, which might be called
Lujan II, builds on Lujan 1. In the second
case, wildlife-protection organizations
sought review of joint rules issued by the
secretaries of Interior and Commerce in
1983, pursuant to the Endangered Species
Act of 1973. Section (a)(2) of the act says
that each federal agency shall "in con-
sultation with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior" ensure that agency action is not
likely to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of any endangered species.
In 1978. the two secretaries gave the
section a broad reading to include agency
action affecting foreign countries. but
the new rules of 1983 scaled back the
scope to just the United States and the high
seas. The wildlife groups alleged standing
based on affidavits from members who
had studied and observed various endan-
gered species and based on the theory that
they occupied a "contiguous ecosystem
that could be harmed by the disappearance
of species elsewhere in the world.
Justice Scalia led a six-man Lujan II
majority (himself. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, and Justices Byron White.
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and
Clarence Thomas) in holding that the
plaintiffs should have been thrown out on
summary judgment because their affida
vits failed to show that they could prove
enough "injury in fact" to have standing.This conclusion depended on a minute
analysis of the plaintiffs' statements. One
naturalist, for example. said that she had
gone to Sri Lanka in the past to observe
species that might be wiped out by a de-
velopment project partially funded by the
Agency for International Development.
She added that she expected to revisit the
area but was not sure when because of an
ongoing civil war. This, said the Court,
indicated an insufficient "injury in fact"
because she had not formed concrete plans
to go back.
The majority rejected summarily the
'ecosystem nexus" theory with a cite to
Lujan 1: Being ecologically connected to
endangered species, like being in the vi-























cinity of public lands opened itOeiploita-
lion, just isn't close enough. Ile Court
thus seemed to be insisting on a very lit-
eral-minded notion of actual physical
presence as a condition of being able to
show injury.
The wildlife groups had also argued that
they had a right to sue because the Endan-
gared Species Act has a "citizen's suit"
provisiod allowing -any person" to sue to
.enjoin . . . any agency" alleged to be
violating the stature. The Court held that
such provisions do not independently con-
fer standing on anyone who sues. In a
separate par of his opinion (joined only by
Rehnquist. Thomas. and White). Scalia
also said that the plaintiffs had failed to
show redreasability, because even if the
interior secretary's rules were revised to
require consultation for foreign projects,
those rules might not be binding on the
agencies (though the secretary himself had
insisted they were).
L4jan I and Lujan I might be read nar-
towly as cases where a Court majority ob-
viously hostile to public-interest plaintiffs
is strewing pleading technicalities in their
way. In the future. wildlife groups will
have to dispatch their members physically
into the very path of advancing devasta-
tion before filing suit. The requirements
seem absurd if one supposes, as did Jus-
tices Kennedy and Souter in their concur-
ring opinion, that the main function of












reaDy care about an outcome will litigate
the issues ably and aggressively. Obvious-
ly, the major environmental organizations
fill that bill-indeed, likely fill it better
than isolated persons who may have physi-
cal presence but little expertise about the
big ecological picture.
Justice Scalia. however, has made it
plain that the views to which he is gradu-
ally persuading his colleagues spring from
much larger concerns, from a grand if
highly debatable theory of politics and the
Constitution that, if generally accepted,
would radically enlarge the powers of the
executive at the expense of public-interest
groups and Congress.
Scalia's theory is this: Congress legis-
lates, while the president (a concept that
includes the federal agencies) has the
discretion to decide how to execute the
laws. "Vindicating the public interest
(including the public interest in govern-
mental observance of the Constitution and
the laws) is the function of Congress and
the Chief Executive," Scalia wrote in
Lujan II.
The clear implication is that vindicating
the public interest is the exclusive prov-
ince of Congress and the executive. The
only function of courts, in overseeing ex-
ecurive compliance with legislative direc-
tions, is to ensure that the government
does not violate the rights of individuals
by causing them distinctive concrete
sunrn. Courtsexist only to redressinjuries.
ottornirpolicyemaking.
From such general premises. Scalia
would derive some quite specific conse-
quences: Plaintiffs using the courts to re.
view govemment actions might only chal-
lenge discrete agency actions, not broad
policy decisions. Such plaintiffs would
never have standing to seek review of
agency actions whose effects on them per-
sonally could not be reliably predicted.
even if they belonged to a subclass that
statistically had a high probability of being
hurt by the policy.
Difficulties in tracing causation would
also knock out most suits brought to re-
view government inaction or underregula'
tion, as well as government failure to fol-
low consultative procedures like those at
issue in Lujan II. Even if Congress were
by statute to authorize persons or groups
who suffered only indirect and probable
harms to bring suit, such laws would be
invalid as permitting Congress "to trans-
fer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive's most important consti-
tutional duty," Scalia contended.
This is strong docrine. It is aimed at
*dissolvingalrnsgements of noss han 25
years' standing. whereby represcatatives
of the beneficiaries ofregulatory statutes
are given institutional access to the reg-
ulatory process through the public-interest
suit for judicial review. Congress has
counted on such suits to ensure that hostile
agencies do not sidetrack or sabotage its
regulatory purposes, just as it generally
counts on the courts to safeguard statutory
purposes against executive distortion. As
Justice Harry Blackmun (joined by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor) pointed out in dis-
sent in Lujan II. "the principal effect of
foreclosing judicial enforcement of such
procedures fas the consultation require-
ment of the Endangered Species Act) is to
transfer power into the hands of the Exec-.
utive at the expense-not of the courts-
but of Congress. from which that power
originates and emanates."
The trend in standing doctrine runs par-
allel to that in other fields of adminis-
trative law: judicial deference to even fan-
tastic agency readings of statutory man-
dates (recall Ris v. Sullivan. III S. Ct.
1759 41991). where the Court upheld an
agency iule lorbidding federally funded
clinics from abortion counseling, a rule
that could never conceivably have been
enacted as legislation) and judicial refusal
to review agency inaction (see Heckler v.
Chaney. 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
Justice Scalia has yet to recruit a stable
majority of the Court to his most radical
views. Even in Lujan II. Justices Kennedy
and Souter felt compelled to point out in a
separate concurrence that "[als govern-
ment programs become more complex and
far-reaching," Congress must have the
constitutional authority to "define injuries
and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before."
If a group can get Congress to be ex-
plicit about how malfeasance or non-
enforcement may indirectly harm the
group's interests, that group can still sue.
In the meantime, one can be sure that
many cases long in the litigation pipeline
will be tossed out because the groups that
brought them failed to look sufficiently
like 19th-century plaintiffs. O
Ina little-wotriced baz vcial decision,justice O'Connr -rewrote the
complex law offederal-aate rlations. Congrss an induce 1heitates to act;
it can condition federal money on state compliance; it can pre-empt state



















Court has cited in
several opinions.
While Supreme Court pro-nouncements on cross burning,public prayer, and abortion cap-
tured national headlines, the Court quietly
issued an opinion with potentially greater
impact on federal-state relations, the po-
litical process, and constitutional juris-
prudence. In New York v. United States.
60 U.S.L.W. 4603 (June 19, 1992). the
Court revived constitutional protection for
state sovereignty by striking down a pro-
vision of the 1985 Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act.
The disputed statute directed states
either to establish adequate sites for dis-
posal of low-level radioactive wastes or to
assume title and liability for such wastes
generated within their borders. This un-
palatable choice, the Court ruled, ex-
ceeded Congress' authority under the
commerce clause by " 'commandeer-
ling]' state governments into the service of
federal regulatory purposes." The na-
tional government
could encourage
states to regulate ra-
lited States dioactive wastes by
conditioning the
availability of federal
funds on that regula-
tion or by threatening
pre-emptive federal legislation, but it
could not simply "compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory
program."
New York marks yet another turning
point in the Court's erratic pursuit of the
constitutional boundary between con-
gressional power and state sovereignty. In
1968, the Court rebuffed attempts to
shield state governments from congres-
sional control by holding that Congress
could constitutionally regulate the wages
and hours of some state employees. Eight
years later, in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). the Court
dramatically reversed direction and ruled
that the 10th Amendment imposed signif-
icant limits on congressional power to re-
strict both the wages of state employees
and other aspects of state sovereignty.
Less than a decade later, the Court
again changed course: Garcia v. San An-
tonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 469
U.S. 528 (1985), discarded Usery and re-
stored federal regulation of wages and
hours for state employees. More im-
portant, Garcia purported to find little
substantive protection for state sover-
eignty in the constitution's text. The
states' primary shield against federal
usurpation of state power, the Court an-
nounced, lay in the national political
process. Courts would consider over-
turning federal laws only when "possible
failings" in that process left state interests
vulnerable.
U.S. Government's Appendages
New York, in turn, deviates from Gar-
cia by recognizing explicit limits on con-
gressional authority to impair state sover-
eignty under the commerce clause. Not-
ably, the Court does not derive this limit
from any express prohibition in the 10th
Amendment's reservation of powers to the
states. This amendment, the Court admits,
is "essentially a tautology." Instead, the
commerce clause itself restrains Congress
by conferring power only to regulate pri-
vate parties; the clause does not authorize
Congress to "regulate Commerce" by
directing state governments to achieve
those ends.
Although New York thus revives con-
stitutional protection for state autonomy,
the opinion simultaneously acknowledges
the broad scope of congressional power.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's careful
opinion for the Court painstakingly af-
firms Congress' authority to achieve na-
tional goals by pre-empting state laws, by
employing conditional pre-emption, and
by hinging the receipt of federal funds on
state compliance with congressional ob-
jectives. With these weapons, Congress
can govern effectively without directly
forcing state governments to enact or ad-
minister federal programs.
New York also stops short of overruling
the specific result in Garcia. Justice
O'Connor characterizes the line of cases
from Usery to Garcia as one in which
Congress attempted "to subject state
governments to generally applicable
laws." Whatever the power of Congress
to submit state enterprises to general
health and safety laws, O'Connor sug-
gests, Congress' attempt to force state
enactment of a waste-disposal program cut
a far deeper rent in state sovereignty; it at-
tempted to treat state governments as mere
appendages of the federal government.
Reconsideration of the statute challenged
in Usery and Garcia awaits-another day.
Despite the limits acknowledged by
Justice O'Connor, New York v. United
States is a landmark constitutional deci-
sion. The opinion signals at least three
important changes in the constitutional
theory of federal-state relations.
First, New York cuts off a regulatory
technique that has tempted Congress dur-
ing the last 20 years. The national legisla-
ture may entice state participation in fed-
eral programs through conditional pre-
emption or spending, but it may not sim-
ply direct the states to enact laws or ad-
minister programs Congress desires. New
York makes clear that "sitate govern-
ments are neither regional offices nor
administrative agencies of the Federal
Government."
Second, New York casts a long shadow
over both Garcia and federal regulation of
state employees' wages and hours. The
Court's distinction between generally
applicable laws and unique commands to
the states may prove untenable; as Usery
argued, the former can impose formidable
burdens on state governments.
The challenged statute in New York,
moreover, offered the states a choice be-
tween designating waste-disposal sites or
taking title to private producers' waste.
The Court faulted the latter option because
it was "no different than a congressionally
compelled subsidy from state governments
to radioactive waste producers." Federal
regulation of state employees' wages sim-
ilarly could be viewed as a congressionally
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vpelled subsidy from state governments
their employees. Unless the CourtIntains its proposed exception for gen-
Ily applicable laws, continued regula-
1 ofstate employees appears doubtful.fibe reasoning in New York. moreover.
% Garcia's central premise that states
,rseek their primary protection through
poiticaf process. The New York ma-
s farly rejects the argument that
es should be bound by the Low-Level
fiiactive Waste Policy Amendments
awe their public officials participated
'ely in formulating the statute and en-
qed most of its provisions. The political
cass. the Conwt makes clear. does not
tet ail the parties who benefit from
eralsur. indeed. both state and national
cials sometimes have strong incentives
ompromise federalist principles. More
'artant. federalism is one of the con-
-rional restraints designed to check the
itical process: the process. therefore,
anm guard the principle.
ustice O'Connor's majority opinion in
r York. finally. articulates important
, rationates for the constitutional pro-
-ron of state autonomy. While User' y
used on the sheer fiscal burden of
cral regulation, together with its dis-
cement of state policy choices. Justice
aou stresses the value of federalism
diffusimg power and maintaining clear
-s of potirical accountability.
These rationales. drawn from
Connor s previous opinions in FERCv.
.aissippi. 456 U.S. 742 t1992). and
cr(Cr v. AshcroJ. Ill S. (t. 2315
199 r. are far more persuasive than those
,ered inlerT. The federal government
-eady possesses vast power to displace
aire policv choices and affect state treas-
:es through pre-emption and conditional
-anding. Premising a federalism theory
on policy choices and fiscal burdens,
therefore, is unfruitful.
Justice O'Connor's twin rationales. on
the other hand. explain why constitutional
protection for state autonomy is vital even
in an age of expanded national power.
Pursuit of those rationaics. moreover,
might justify the Court's proposed dis-
tinction between generally applicable laws
and unique commands to the states, the
latter.are much more likely to concentrate
power or distort political accountability.
Protecting Political Outcasts
Beyond these effects on the constitu-
tional theory of federalism, New York v.
United States carries practical implications
for the political process. One of those
ramifications is especially timely.
Political scientists have pointed out that
one advantage of our federal system is that
state governments provide a refuge for
political parties that lack power on a na-
tional basis. State and local governments
also serve as spawning grounds for politi-
cal newcomers-including women,
members of racial minorities, and gay or
lesbian politicians.
The last 25 years bear witness to those
advantages. While the Democratic Party
repeatedly failed to capture the pres-
idency. it retained its strength partly
through state and local governments-
insuring the vitality of our two-party sys-
tem. At the same time, state and local
governments gave female. minority, and
gay politicians their first toeholds of polit-
ical power.
By affirming the autonomy of state
governments. New York v. United Stairs
helps preserve these breeding grounds for
political outcasts and newcomers. It is
perhaps fitting that the Court took this step
just as a record number of female candi-
dates are vying for national power-and in
an opinion written by a justice who might
never have gained her path-breaking seat
on the Court without the ability to es-
tablish her credibility in state government.
Ramifications for Roe
Despite its repercussions on federal-
state relations and the political process.
the deepest significance of New York v.
United States may lie in its jurisprudential
roots.
Between 1976 and 1985. National
League of Cities v. Usery shared an un-
easy jurisprudential alliance with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Both deci-
sions recognized new limits on govern-
mental power by drawing upon constitu-
tional traditions or penumbras rather than
explicit constitutional text. Both sparked
heated controversy and provoked imme-
diate calls for reversal. Both were activist
State and local governments serve as
spawning grounds for political
newcomers-including women, racial
minorities, and gay or lesbian
politicians. The last 25 years bear
witness to those advantages.
opinions, one supported by the liberal
wing of the Court and the other by its more
conservative branch.
When the Court overruled Usery in
1985. it seemed to wash away one of the
fragile reefs protecting Roe. If the Court
could reverse one landmark constitutional
decision, what would prevent it from dis-
regarding an equally controversial prece-
dent of the same vintage?
In the same term that the Court marked
its third federalism tumaround in 16 years,
however, it explicitly refused to overrule
Roe v. Wade-partly on the ground that
overruling this longstanding but con-
troversial precedent would compromise
the Courts legitimacy. What judicial phi-
losophy explains the Court's willingness
to allow seismic convulsions in the field of
federalism while seeking stability for
Roe's right to privacy?
One answer, of course. is that stare
decisis may be more important when the
Constitution protects individual rights than
when it structures government relations.
As Justice O'Connor observed in refusing
to overrule Roe: "Liberty finds no refuge
in a jurisprudence of doubt."
On a more fundamental level, however,
the federalism principle of New York
comports with the continued existence of
Roe. Both opinions draw upon implicit
constitutional limits rather than explicit
constitutional text. The Court's reaf-
firmance of Roe recognizes "a realm of
personal liberty which the government
may not enter." while its decision in New
York preserves a "residuary and inviolable
Istatel sovereignty" that Congress may
not pierce.
Garcia was the stranger in this juris-
prudential garden. By limiting that deci-
sion, the Court returns to the constitutional
jurisprudence it fashioned during the
1970s-in which both Roe and Usery
played central roles. O
"Hatespeech' Case:
Twisted Path to Good Result
Free Speech Required
Because of Inequality,
Not in Spite of It
BY
DAVID COLE
In the past three years, the Supreme
Court has been asked to decide
whether the state may regulate three
types of controversial symbolic speech:
flag burning, nude dancing, and cross
burning. An innocent observer reading the
Court's answers might well conclude that
the Court is more concerned with protect-
ing flags and moral sensibilities than racial
minorities. After all, four justices felt that
the sanctity of the flag justified criminal-
izing its desecration and five justices
upheld a requirement that dancers wear
pasties and G-strings to protect public
morality, while all nine justices agreed
this year that prohibiting cross burning and
other racist speech was unconstitutional.
But the full picture is more com-
plicated. Each case sparked sharp dis-
agreements among the justices, none more
so than the June 22 decision R.A. V. v. City
of St. Paul, 60 U.S.L.W. 4667 (1992),
which reviewed a white juvenile's in-
dictment for burning
a cross on a black
family's lawn. The
V* R.A. V. decision was
. Paul "nnimous only as toits bottom line, and
only because the
statute was so poorly
drafted that every justice could find some
constitutional fault with it. On the case's
core question.-the legitimacy of regulat-
ing racist expression-the consensus frac-
tured into four divided opinions.
All three cases ask what might appear to
be an easy question under the First
Amendment: may government prohibit
expression because it concludes that the
message communicated is harmful or of-
fensive? Justice William Brennan's deci-
sion for the majority in Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989), the flag-burning
case, characterized the answer to that
question as the First Amendment's foun-
dation: "If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. "
Yet the only justice who voted consis-
tentiy in all three cases was Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, and she approved of pro-
hibiting all three forms of expression. It
appears that Justice Brennan's rhetorical
"if" was warranted; the First Amend-
ment's "bedrock principle" is not as set-
tied as his metaphor optimistically im-
plied.
Probably the most profound challenge
SEE COLE, PAGE S32
The Right Embraces This Right
SBY
MICHAEL McCONNELLThose who expected the new "con-
servative" Court to cut back on
protections for freedom of speech
had quite a few surprises in the last term.
In cases involving the "Son of Sam" law,
license fees for street demonstrations.
airport leafleting (though not solicitation),
and, most significantly, hate speech. the
Court handed down opinions that could
have been the work of William Brennan
Jr.
It is time to take notice: As demands for
censorship come more often from the
"politically correct" left, conservative
jurists have become the most stalwart de-
fenders of the free-speech tradition.
This term's "hate speech" case. R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul, 60 U.S.L.W. 4667
(June 22, 1992), is the most telling illus-
tration of this development. The case in-
volved the prosecution of a Minnesota
skinhead for burning a cross on the lawn
of a black family in St. Paul. As the Court
pointed out in the first paragraph of its
opinion, the defendant could have been
punished under several different statutes
that raised no apparent First Amendment
problems.
Instead, the prosecutor proceeded under
a recently enacted "Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance," which prohibited the display
of symbols known to "arouse anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion. or gender."
All nine justices agreed that this or-
dinance is unconstitutional on its face. But
there the agreement ends. The case pre-
sents three entirely different approaches to
this difficult issue of First Amendment
law. each with powerful roots and sup-
ported by powerful arguments.
Ku Kluxers v. Black Supremacists
The majority, in an opinion written by
Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Wil-
liam Rehnquist, Anthony Kennedy, David
Souter. and Clarence Thomas, analyzed
the ordinance as a species of content-based
discrimination, and struck it down on the
strength of numerous cases holding that
"[clontent-based regulations are pre-
sumptively invalid."
The majority did not treat this pre-
sumption as absolute. They outlined
several ways in which the government
may legitimately regulate the content of
speech. The guiding principle is that con-
tent-based regulation-even within less
protected categories like "fighting
words"-is impermissible unless "the
nature of the content discrimination is
such that there is no realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot.,"
The St. Paul ordinance violates this
principle, according to the Court. because
it is limited to abusive speech on certain
"disfavored topics." The ordinance pun-
ishes invective relating to race, gender,
and religion, but not to political affilia-
tion, union membership. or homosexual-
ity-other areas in which abusive speech
is not uncommon.
Indeed, the Court found that, in its
"practical operation" (and I think this is
the linchpin of the opinion), the ordinance
"goes even beyond mere content dis-
crimination, to actual viewpoint dis-
crimination." It singles out a particular set
of "messages** and makes the expression
SEE McCONNELL, PAGE S31
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PCELeft lakes Right into Free-Speech Protectors
MCCONNELL FROM PAGE S30
of tIose messages unlawful. even though
equally violent or hurtful "fighting
words epreasing opposing "messages"
wouldtbe permitted.
One can imagine Ku Klux Klan mem-
bets and black supremacists screaming
epithets bf equal odiousness at one an-
other, with the words of only one side be-
ing illegal. The city "has no such author-
ity to license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to fol-
low Marquis of Queensbury Rules." the
fmajoritysaid.
Categorical Approach
A concurrence by Justice Byron White.
joined by Harry Blackmun and Sandra
Day O'Connor. sharply disagreed. To
Justice White, the cornerstone of the
Court's free speech jurisprudence is not
content neutrality, but the "categorical
approach." Most speech is constitution-
ally protected, but "expression falling
within certain limited categories so lacks
the values the First Amendment was de-
ignd or. protect that the Constitution af-
frdsnomprotection to that expression."
In this case, if the ordinance were lim-
ited.to so-called fighting words-words
t"-by their very utterance inflict injury
or tead to incite an immediate breach of
the peace"-it would be constitutional.
The problem, according to White, is that
the SL Paul ordinance, as construed by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. reached be-
yond fighting words to speech that merely
'causes hurt feelings, offense, or re-
sentment." The ordinance is therefore
overbnoad-Justice John Paul Stevens, in an opinion
joined by no other justice but that bids fair
to be the favorite of the academic com-
mentators. agreed with White that the or-
dinance isoverbroad. But Stevens rejected
bothr the majority's "content neutrali-
ty'- analysis and White's "categorical
approach."
According to Stevens. the categorical
approach "sacrifices subtlety for clarity"
and is "ultimately unsound." Most fun-
danentally, it is insensitive to questions of
"coiret." It treats complex issues as an
"athernothing" proposition.
Sievens is equally disdainful of the ma-
amirty's "content neutral" approach.
which, he says, is "just too simple" and
absohrte." Contrary to what Stevens
discribes as "dicta" in earlier cases, con-
t-based distinctions "are an inevitable
aml indispensable aspect of a coherent
emierstanding of the First Amendment."
He would substitute "a more complex and
subtile analysis, one that considers the
content and context of the regulated
speech, and the nature and scope of the
rstriction on speech."
If it were not for the overbreadth prob-
km . Stevens would uphold the hate
speech ordinance on the ground that it
"segulates speech not on the basis of its
subject matter or the viewpoint expressed,
but rather on the basis of the harm the
speech causes."
he an analysis the majority dismisses as
-"'owdplay." Stevens argues that the or-
dinc '"regulates only a subcategory of
expression that causes injuries based on
'race, color, creed, religion or gender.'
not a subcategory that involves discus-
slons that concern those characteristics."
Stevens described as "eminently reason-
able and realistic" the judgment that
harms caused by racial, religious, and
gender-based invective "are qualitatively
different from that caused by other fight-
ig words."
Fsch of these approaches has a certain
Strnagth; but also a certain weakness. How
weIl do they stand up?
The two concurrences do a much better
ity and in each other than they do in mak-
ing an affirmative case for their preferred
approach. The categorical approach de-
fended by Justice White is notoriously ad
hoc. It consists of certain arbitrarily
defined pigeon holes based on prior
cases-"commercial speech." "ob-
scenity," "libel." "hate speech"-
which have no apparent unity or theoret-
ical grounding.
White has no response to Scalia's point
that content-based discrimination within a
supposedly unprotected category-for
example, a statute that punishes libel only
if it is directed against the govern-
ment-subverts basic principles of free-
dom of speech. The categories. may be a
good place to begin, but they are not a
good place to stop.
Justice Stevens recognized the analyti-
cal difficulties of White's categorical ap-
proach, but it is hard to fathom what test
he supplied in its place. No one will be
able to accuse Stevens' own analysis of
"sacrificing subtlety for clarity." It may
well be that courts with a great deal of
time on their hands (if they exist) would
reach better conclusions if they employed
a "complex and subtle analysis" based on
"the content and context of the regulated
speech, and the nature and scope of the
restriction on speech." But as someone
recently said in a different context, "Lib-
crty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt. "
How are city councils and state legisla-
tures supposed to tell what they can and
cannot regulate? How can would-be
speakers know what regulations they can
safely defy? How are appellate courts
supposed to review trial-court decisions
under so nebulous a standard? If the bot-
tom line is whether a judge finds the pur-
poses of a statute restricting speech to be
"reasonable and realistic," we have not
protected the freedom of speech. We have
simply transferred from legislatures to
judges the authority to decide what speech
should be limited.
Protection Against Orthodoxy
That leaves us with the majority opin-
ion. It. too, has its flaws. At first, the
opinion seems to preserve the basic struc-
ture of the categorical approach: Speech
can be regulated if it falls into certain
defined categories. But in the end. nothing
seems to hinge upon the categorization of
the cross burning in this case as fighting'
words.
The opinion leaves considerable un-
certainty about its scope and its ap-
plicability to future cases. Is the Court's
holding limited to laws banning certain
categories of speech, or does it also apply
to laws only requiring (or permitting) dif-
ferential punishments for speech that is
lawfully proscribed? Is the ruling limited
to laws specifically directed at speech, or
does it extend to !aws, such as the pr,-
posed federal "Hate Crimes Sentencing
Enhancement Act," that apply to broad
categories of unlawful conduct? Is it lim-
of viewpoint? The opinion offers only a
feeble and unpersuasive reason to dis-
tinguish the sexual-harassment regulations
under Title VII. Is the constitutionality of
those regulations now in doubt?
Nonetheless, the majority opinion
seems to offer the most comprehensive
and coherent protection for freedom of
speech against the dangers of official or-
thodoxy, The Court points the way
(though it is perhaps not yet there) to a
nuanced. but analytically workable ap-
proach based on distinctions of content,
subject, and viewpoint, in ascending order
of constitutional protection.
The government may ban all fighting
words, but it may not pick and choose ac-
cording to the majority's conceptions of
which messages are more worthy and
which are more pernicious. Far from being
a "radical revision of First Amendment
law." as the concurring justices charged.
this emphasis on content neutrality carries
The majority opinion seems to offer
the most comprehensive and coherent
protection for freedom of speech
against the dangers of official
orthodoxy. The Court points the way
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forward the free-speech legacy of Just
Brennan and provides far more robust a
predictable protection than the ol.
approaches.
The concurring justices appear to
blinded by their heartfelt support for I
worthy purposes of the ordinance in t0
particular case. They fail to recognize I
importance of protecting even the spee
that we detest. The defendant's speech
R.A.V. is profoundly subversive of c
constitutional values and recalls a tit
when organized hoodlums were able
supplant the laws of the land with the ra
hatred of an invisible empire. If the c
fendant's views gained widespread a
ceptance in the political process, we m
be sure that he and his ilk would never c
tend to the rest of us (especially those of
who are of a different color) the constil
tional protections now extended to him.
These arguments are familiar and ho
orable. They differ only in context frc
the arguments of those in the early years
the Cold War who sought the suppressi-
of another category of speech, no le
subversive of our constitutional values aj
no less committed to a program that wou
deny precious freedoms to the rest of u
The judgment of history is that tho
who sought to suppress the speech
subversives then were wrong. even
honorable.
The republic does not need the force
its laws to defend against even the me
subversive of ideas. We protect the righ
even of those who would take away t)
rights of others. There are legal remedi
aplenty for the vicious acts of the ski
heads of St. Paul. There is no need to sa
rifice our commitment to free speech
order to punish them. I
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in recent yeas to this would-be foundation
,of face-spocds jurisprudensce comes from
ihse who seek io regulatemacist speech
and pomography as civil-rights violations.
Am increasing number of progressive
,scholars have begun to ask why speech
may be regulated, for example. to protect
against intangible harms to reputation, but
not to remedy the injuries that racial epi-
thets inflict.
Similarly, they ask why it should be
permissible to regulate obscenity in the
interest of maintaining a community's
vague moral standards, but impermissible
to regulate pornography in the interest of
protecting women from sexual violence
and discrimination. At bottom. these
scholars charge that traditional First
Amendment doctrine fails to take scri-
ously the claim that racist speech and
pornography silence and subordinate ra-
cial minorities and women. thereby doing
harm to both speech and equal-protection
values.
All the justices in R.A. V. addressed the
racist-speech issue primarily in terms of
speech rather than equality. and some
might suggest that this limited perspective
explains the Court's unanimous result. But
given that four justices-Byron White.
John Paul Stevens. Harry Blackmun. and
O'Connor-concluded that some regula-
tion of racist speech is permissible, the
analysis is not so straightforward. A close
reading demonstrates that the justices'
disagreement about formal First Amend-
ment doctrine is as much about the un-
spoken issue of equality as it is about
-speech.
'Greater Includes the Lesser'
The doctrinal issue posed concerned the
Court's "categorical* approach to the
First Amendment. In reviewing regulation
of expression, the Court has developed a
general rule that government may not
proscribe speech on the basis of its content
and a series of "categorical" exceptions
to this rule, themselves defined by the
content of speech.
Certain categories of speech-such as
obscenity, libel, speech posing a clear and
present danger of illegal action, and fight-
ing words-ar said to be "unprotected"
by the First Amendment, and therefore
subject to regulation. Thus, for example.
while the state may not prohibit speech
because its content is politically objec-
tionable or sexually explicit, it may pro-
hibit speech whose content falls within the
unprotected category of obscenity.
In R.A.V., however, the implicit con-
tradiction between the content-neutrality
rule and its categorical exceptions came to
a head. In an attempt to save the St. Paul
ordinance from a First Amendment chal-
lange, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
narrowly interpreted it to apply only to the
unprotected category of "fighting
words." Fighting words are those in-
dividually targeted insults "likely to cause
an average addressee to fight." Chap-
linsAky v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568
(1942). This category is so narrow as to be
in truth almost academic---so narrow that
the Court has not upheld a single convic-
tion for fighting words since the category
was created in 1942.
The St. Paul ordinance was even nar-
rower; it proscribed only those fighting
words likely to provoke retaliation "on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender." It was this further selectivity,
however, which created the constitutional
issue: If the state may prohibit all fighting
words because they are unprotected, may)it prohibit a subset of fighting words
that poses a particularly serious social
problem?
St. Paul argued, and three justices
agreed in a concurrence by Justice White,
that because fighting words are unpro-
In the arenaof speech, a strict
adherence to content neutrality may
be justified, not because the playing
field is level, but precisely because it is
not. Speech is a powerful tool for
change for those dissatisfied with
their position in society.
tected, government may proscribe any
subset of them--including racist fighting
words-without worrying about the First
Amendment. But writing for a majority of
five, Justice Scalia rejected this "greater
includes the lesser" reasoning. He pointed
out the fact that the state may penalize li-
bel, an unprotected category of expres-
sion, does not mean it may penalize only
that subset of libel that is critical of the
government. Just so. he held for the ma-
jority, government may proscribe fighting
words generally, but cannot single out
specific fighting words on the basis of
their racist content.
As a First Amendment matter. Justice
Scalia appears to have the better argu-
ment. When the Court says that a category
of expression is '*unprotected." it does
not mean that the expression is open to any
and all. regulation, but only that regulation
along a specific content-based line is
permissible. The state may penalize ob-
scenity, libel, fighting words, and sub-
versive speech, so long as it uses the
specific content demarcations the Court
has approved for each. But once the state
chooses to penalize a subset of one of
those categories, it alters the content line
and raises new First Amendment ques-
tions. Scalia's decision therefore reaf-
firmed the importance of close judicial
scrutiny whenever the state seeks to reg-
ulate speech on the basis of a content line
not previously approved as a category of
"unprotected" speech.
Biased Acts, Not Biased Speech
The full implications of R.A. V. are less
than clear. A day after the decision was
issued, the Wisconsin Supreme Court re-
lied on it to invalidate a law that enhanced
penalties for criminal conduct motivated
by racial animus. But such bias crime
provisions should be permissible under
Justice Scalia's reasoning, which draws a
sharp distinction between regulations of
conduct directed at communicative con-
tent and all other regulations.
Where the government's interest in
prohibiting conduct turns on the conduct's
message, as in flag-burning statutes, the
law is treated as a regulation of speech.
But where the government regulates con-
duct for an important non-communicative
reason, such as banning all public burn-
ings, then flag burnings and cross burn-
ings can be banned too without infringing
the First Amendment.
The state's interest in penalizing a bias-
motivated physical assault does not stem
from the assault's communicative charac-
ter, but from the fact that the victim was
singled out for assault because of his or
her race. It is not so much what the act
communicates, but what it does, that gives
rise to the increased penalty. Bias crime
laws, like laws against discriminatory
housing practices, do not violate the First
Amendment because the regulatory inter-
est is directed at the act of discrimination,
not the communication of a discriminatory
thought.
R.A. V.'s rationale raises more serious
questions, however, regarding sexual and
racial harassment. In dicta, Justice Scalia
approved hostile work environment claims
under Title VII, which are predicated on
racist or sexist speech in the workplace.
But here his reasoning is questionable. He
maintained that when government prohib-
its conduct generally without reference to
its communicative element (such as em-
ployment discrimination), it may in-
cidentally restrict pure speech (racial and
sexual harassment) that falls within the
general prohibition.
This formulation, however, begs the
critical question of when pure speech may
be regulated as conduct. Surely the First
Amendment places some limit on the type
of speech that may be penalized as racial
or sexual harassment. Yet Justice Scalia's
analysis offers no guidance in divining
that limitation. While it makes sense to
direct First Amendment scrutiny to regu-
lations of conduct directed at commu-
nicative content, it does not follow that
where a regulation is not so directed the
government may include any speech it
desires within the prohibition.
Neutral Inequality
The core of the R.A. V. decision, how-
ever, is clear singling out racist speech is
unconstitutional because it fails the test of
content neutrality. Such regulation is de-
signed to protect particular groups by ex-
cising certain disapproved messages or
forms of expression from the social vo-
cabulary. By contrast, fighting words are
defined by the harm they cause to the
"average addressee," obscenity is defined
by reference to general community stand-
ards, and libel is defined by injury to rep-
utation. The latter categories maintain a
formal neutrality among the citizenry,
while regulation of racist speech pointedly
does not.
But if racial and gender divisions shape
our society, how do we even begin to
define the standpoint of "the average ad-
dressee" or "the community"? In adivid-
ed society, the delineation of any such
"neutral" standard is likely to be deeply
contested, so that permitting the state to
regulate speech along those lines may be
equivalent to permitting the dominant ma-
jority to suppress the speech of the subor-
dinate minority.
Viewed in this light, Justice Scalia's
strict insistence on content neutrality looks
like his commitment to formal equality in
equal protection jurisprudence. On equal-
protection issues, Scalia's formalism leads
him to treat affirmative action with as
much suspicion as discrimination against
African-Americans, making efforts to re-
dress racism through racially conscious
means extremely difficult. Just so, his
commitment to neutrality in speech regu-
iation frustrates legislative attempts to re-
spond to racial inequality by regulating
speech.
The four justices who would have ap.
proved of a more carefully drafted prohi-
bition of racist fighting words, by con-
trast, did so precisely because of the
reality of racial inequality. Justice Stevens
explained that "[olne need look no further
than the recent social unrest in the nation's
cities to see that race-based threats may
cause more harm to society and to in-
dividuals than other threats." And Justice
ing words was justilied 'Itu light of our
Nation's long and painful experience with
discrimination.
An Unrealized Ideal
Is the First Amendments content neu-
trality principle morally and intellectually
banknipt in a world divided by social in-
equality? Professor Charles Lawrence of
Stanford Law School has argued that in
weighing racist speech regulation. First
Amendment values cannot be considered
in the abstract, "by presupposing a world
characterized by equal opportunity and the
absence of societally created and cultur-
ally ingrained racism." He argues that in
the real world of racial subordination. the
First Amendment's "marketplace of
ideas" will be purified by eliminating at
least the most virulent forms of racist
speech. which serve only to reinforce in-
grained racism and to devalue and silence
black participation.
I have no doubt that not only the mar-
ketplace of ideas but also the world would
be a much better place without racist
speech. But it will not be a better place if
we get there by using the fact that the ma-
jority now disapproves of such speech to
suppress it by force of law.
If the history of political struggles over
speech teaches us anything, it is that the
majority will most often seek to regulate
the speech of the politically powerless. In
fact. in a democratic society, the only
speech government is likely to succeed in
regulating will.be that of the politically
marginalized. If an idea is sufficiently
popular, a representative government will
lack the political wherewithal to suppress
it, irrespective of the First Amendment.
But if an idea is unpopular, the only thing








constitutional norm of content neutrality.
In the arena of speech, then, a strict
adherence to content neutrality may bejustified, not because the playing field is
level, as Justice Scalia assumes, but pre-
cisely because it is not. Speech is a pow-
erful tool for change for those dissatisfied
with their position in society, but it will
remain that way only if we presumptively
forbid the majority from suppressing
speech when it disapproves of the mes-
sage. The principle of content neutrality
keeps open the possibility for political
change.
It may well be that as long as society
remains unequal, content neutrality will be
an illusion. Others might call it an unreal-
ized ideal. But whether an illusion or an
ideal, it is all that stands between the dis-
senter and the majority. And as long as
society remains unequal, disadvantaged
minorities will find themselves far more
often in dissent.
At this moment in history, the majority
appears to agree that racist speech is re-
pugnant, injurious, and deserving of sup-
pression. But to empower the majority to
regulate the speech of dissenters when the
majority's values happen to be aligned
with our own is a terrible mistake. This
once, we would do better to side with Jus-
tice Scalia. O
T he C un~rts speaedr istance j o.lozoing more government involvement
swiih aggionz2 ay otlast.JasticeX.ady's ajority opinion eaves open
the possibility that he might side with the four dissenters in a future case,
particularly one outside the school context.
A Precarious Ban on Prayer
In many ways, Lee v. Weisman. 60
U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24, 1992). typ-
ifies the Supreme Court's just con-
cluded term. The Bush administration and
conservative groups urged the Court to use
the case as the vehicle for overruling dec-
ades of precedents concerning the estab-
lishment clause. Given the high court's
opinions in earlier cases, there was every
reason to believe that there were now at
least five votes on the Court for allowing
much more government involvement with
religion.
To the surprise of all, the Court did not
take this position, but instead held that
clergy members' non-sectarian prayers at
public-school graduations violate the es-
tablishment clause. As in so many other
cases decided this term, a majority com-
prising Justices Harry Blackmun, John
Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, An-
thony Kennedy, and David Souter con-




ismanhthought to be injeopardy in Lee v.
Weisman was the
well-established
Lemon test. In Lemon
v. Kurrzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the
Court said that the government violates
the establishment clause if there is not
a secular purpose for a law, if the prin-
cipal effect of a law is to advance or in-
hibit religion, or if the government's ac-
tion involves excessive entanglement with
religion.
In Allegheny County v. American Civil
Liberties Union. Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), four Su-
preme Court justices expressed a desire to
overrule the Lemon test. In that case, Jus-
tice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Byron White and Antonin Scalia,
criticized the test for unduly limiting gov-
enment involvement with religion. Ken-
nedy urged the Court to abandon decades
of judicially imposed restrictions and to
allow government actions supporting re-
ligion so long as they did not coerce reli-
gious participation or literally establish a
church.
With just one additional vote, this ap-
proach seemingly would end most judicial
enforcement of the establishment clause-
for most cases under the clause do not in-
volve claims of coerced religious partici-
pation, and governments in the United
States long ago got out of the business of
running their own churches. The confir-
mation of Clarence Thomas--a constant
ally of the conservative wing of the
Court-made it likely that there would be
five votes to adopt Justice Kennedy's view
and radically reshape establishment-clause
law.
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
in Lee v. Weisman was widely regarded as
providing an occasion for Kennedy's posi-
tion to take control. In fact, the solicitor
general's office filed an amicus brief in
Lee urging the Court to adopt that view.
that only coerced religious participation or
government-created religious institutions
violate the establishment clause.
A Conflict of Conscience
Lee v. Weisman presented the question
of whether invocations by clergy at public-
school graduations violate the establish-
ment clause. Deborah Weisman objected
to having a local rabbi deliver prayers at
her middle-school graduation in Provi-
dence, R.I.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
held that prayers by clergy at middle-
school and high-school graduations are
unconstitutional. Surprisingly, Justice
Kennedy wrote the opinion for the major-
ity, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens.
O'Connor, and Souter. Kennedy empha-
sized the participation of public-school
officials-government officers-in the
performance of the prayer at the gradua-
tion ceremony. School officials had in-
vited the rabbi to deliver a non-sectarian
prayer and had provided him with a series
of guidelines for the event.
Justice Kennedy's opinion stressed the
coercive nature of the occasion: "Even for
those students who object to the religious
exercise, their attendance and participa-
tion in the state-sponsored religious ac-
tivity are in a fair and real sense oblig-
atory, though the school district does not
require attendance as a condition for re-
ceipt of the diploma." As the Court ex-
plained, there is a "real conflict of con-
science" when students have to choose
between missing graduation or participat-
ing in an unwanted religious ceremony.
Thus Kennedy distinguished government-
sponsored prayers in other contexts, such
as Chamber v. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
(1983), which had upheld invocations by
clergy at state legislative sessions.
There were two important concurring
opinions-one by Justice Blackmun, the
other by Justice Souter-with Justices
Stevens and O'Connor joining both. The
concurrences emphasized that coerced re-
ligious participation is sufficient for a
violation of the establishment clause. but
it is not necessary. Blackmun stated that
the government may not engage in reli-
gious practices; therefore, prayers by
clergy at government ceremonies are un-
constitutional even if there is no coercion.
Souter wrote to stress that the establish-
ment clause can be violated even if the
government does not favor one religion
over others and even if the government
does not coerce religious activities.
Justice Scalia wrote a vehement dissent,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White and Thomas. Scalia argued
that history should guide constitutional
decision-making and that prayer histori-
cally has been a part of government cere-
monies. Furthermore, Scalia ridiculed the
notion that students are coerced to attend
graduation ceremonies or coerced to re-
main during prayers they do not want to
hear.
Most significantly, Scalia condemned
the Court's banishing "from thousands of
similar celebrations throughout this land,
the expression of gratitude to God that a
SEE PRAYERS, PAGE S37
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Wheher brrmeitabandonedits visioni, lost its taste for economic
rgasening, or grossly mappik4 hedaanalysis, .he Court reacheWaecidedly
regressive result in ihis.antitrust case.
The Court's Economic Gibberish
In his 1978 book. The Antitrust Para-
dox: A Policy at War With Itself.
Robert Bork mused about the worst
antitrust opinions ever written. Focusing
on one unfortunate case, the Supreme
Court's 1962 decision Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, he con-
cluded. "It is not merely a bad case, it is
also a trend setter-as if the poems of
E. A. Guest had determined the course of
modem literature."
If Bork were writing now, he would
have to consider Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services Inc.. 112 5. Ct.
2072 (1992). not only the Court's most
noteworthy decision this term, but its
worst antitrust opinion of the last 15 years.
In 1977, with its seminal decision in Con-
tinental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc..
433 U.S. 36. which recognized that non-
price restraints on distribution tend to
benefit consumers, the Court began to
reshape antitrust law into a coherent pol-
icy. informed by eco-
nomic principles and
Eastman Kodak (o. v. guided by a vision of
sensible and obtain-
Image Technical Services Inc. able objectives.The task was far
from complete, and
there were setbacks
along the way, but the trend was un-
mistakable. The Court was willing to use
economic theory to mold substantive
doctrines promoting consumer welfare and
to interpret procedural rules in ways that
prevented firms from using the antitrust
laws to harass their competitors. In East-
man Kodak. whether because it abandoned
its vision, lost its taste for economic rea-
soning, or grossly misapplied the analysis,
the Court reached a decidedly regressive
result.
job- Lopatka is
a professor of law




The facts of Eastman Kodak are
straightforward. Kodak manufactures and
sells high-volume photocopier and micro-
graphics equipment. It has a small share of
any plausible equipment market-de-
pending on the market definition, it es-
timated its share at between 2 percent and
23 percent. Kodak also provides repair
service and sells replacement parts. The
parts fit only its machines; similarly, parts
manufactured for other brands fit only that
equipment.
At one time, Kodak sold parts to any-
one, and a network of independent service
organizations (ISOs) sprung up that
bought parts from Kodak and provided
repair services to Kodak equipment own-
ers. Kodak then began selling parts only to
equipment owners who use Kodak service
or repair their own machines. The new
policy eliminated the demand for ISOs,
who sued, claiming that Kodak had ille-
gally tied the sale of Kodak parts to the
purchase of Kodak service.
In a 6-3 decision written by Justice
Harry Blackmun that sent the case back to
District Court for trial, the Supreme Court
held that "a defendant's lack of market
power in the primary equipment market
[does not) preclude-as a matter of
law-the possibility of market power in
derivative aftermarkets. " In other words,
Kodak may not force owners of its
equipment to buy repair service from it.
even though it has no power to compel
anyone to buy its machines.
The Court's insensitivity to the business
realities underlying Kodak's new policy
was regrettable, and a bit surprising. As
every office manager knows, photocopiers
break down; they break down a lot. Kodak
apparently believed that if it minimized
malfunctioning by ensuring proper repairs
it could sell more equipment. Conversely,
if a machine failed because of an improper
repair, Kodak did not want the consumer,
unsure of the source of the problem, to
blame the equipment. Realizing that it
could control the quality of service pro-
vided by its own employees, but not that
of scores of independent repair firms.
Kodak sought to induce owners of its
equipment to use Kodak repair.
The Court was unmoved by this busi-
ness argument. Its conclusion was less
disappointing than its reasoning. The
Court's principal response was to point to
evidence that some ISOs provided high-
quality service and that some equipment
owners preferred to purchase service from
some ISOs. That evidence is completely
consistent with Kodak's rationale for its
policy. Kodak undoubtedly would con-
cede that some providers were highly
competent, but it was concerned with the
bulk of service provided in a large and
atomistic market. Since Kodak could not
readily distinguish high-quality ISOs from
low-quality ones, it could not channel its
equipment purchasers to the former.
The Court's misapprehension of the ev-
idence, however, would have been in-
nocuous had the Court properly analyzed
whether Kodak's policy could cause anti-
competitive harm. If it couldn't, the anti-
trust claim would be doomed regardless of
the merits of the business justification. But
the Court's reasoning on the policy's anti-
competitive potential amounts to econom-
ic gibberish.
The Court defined three separate prod-
uct markets consisting of (1) all brands of
the relevant kinds of equipment. (2)
Kodak replacement parts, and (3) service
of Kodak machines. It invoked the eco-
nomic truism that when Product A and
complementary Product B are used in
varying proportions, a monopolist of A
can sometimes increase profits by reduc-
ing the price of A and forcing purchasers
of A also to buy B at an inflated price.
Given that Kodak had a monopoly over its
own parts and that parts and service are
used in varying proportions, the court
reasoned, Kodak was able to increase
profits by use of this tying arrangement.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent.
however, this analysis does not hold when
the markets for the tying and the tied prod-
ucts are merely derivative of a competitive
foremarket. Kodak's economic impotence
would have been more glaring had the
Court simply defined two broad markets
for photocopying and micrographic ser-
vices. Even if one adopts the artificial
characterization of separate, relevant


















Inketa in equipment, parts. and repair
service. though. any attempt to raisepies in the parts or service markets
above competitive levels would result in
ai immediate loss of equipment sales.
making the strategy unprofitable and.therefore. irrational.
The Court thought that Kodak's be.
havior and its sales record belied the as-
sr-ion that atipment sales respond to the
ofice Opars and service. If higher service
paces result in lower equipment sales. the
Court surmised, then lower service prices
should result in higher equipment sales.
Kodak therefore should have aided ISOs.
who offered low-priced service. instead of
driviag them away. Moreover, service.
prs ae. yet there was no evidence that
spipment sales dropped.
be Court missed the point. Kodak ar-
in effect that it could maximize sales
by eauring that high-quality service was
provided at a competitive price. Inferior
selvce can be supplied at a lower price. of
caomis. because better service costs more.
If Kodak succeeded in restricting the
MPiPy of low quality, low-priced service,
0n would have expected to see higher
average service prices and increased
espuipment sales. One would also have
capacted to see a higher average quality of
svce, but service quality is difficult to
measure directly. The combination of
higher service prices and no loss in
eqipment sales did not disprove Kodak's
teybutsupported it.
Utadertying the Court's opinion is a
cimm that purchasers of Kodak equip.
aent am locked in to Kodak replacement
parts. Even if these consumers pay a
compeirlive price for equipment because
the? bave the option of purchasing a dif-
renI make. the theory goes, once they
ama Kodak equipment. Kodak can gouge
tenson sales of parts and service because
switching to another brand would be
casetly. The Court's premise is that con-
as cannt take into account the sub-
seqen costs of parts and service when
dciidag the brand of equipment to buy,
and that evec if they can, a manufacturer
like Kodak could raise its prices for
pats aid service after the equipment is
IPuwhasedt
Plt aside the Court's quaint notion that
purchasers; of expensive business equip-
ment are unsophisticated dupes. The Court
also seemsto be implying that consumers
can. acquire information about a manu-
facturme's future prices only through
competitors who may not have the in-
etive-to convey it. That suppliers would
th disinclined to compete on the dimen-
skin of cost and frequency of repair,
however, is doubtful.
And whatever the incentives of com-
ettors, a prospective purchaser of
aipmwt surely can acquire information
forn1 the manufacturer itself, the manu-
61CtWWt s previous customers, or perhaps
Mhtdpendeist product evaluation firms.
sbit5 it tries, the Court cannot refute the
ineauable logic that if Kodak were to
cbarge equpcompetitive prices for parts
0nt service it could not survive in a com-
petitaquipment market.
...DtawKodak could choose to raise
partersales to existing equipment owners.
BaI as astice Scalia notes, the exploita-
tioaifsach a monopoly is simply not the
kind of harm the antitrust laws are de-
sinal to address. This is post-contractual
apportunism-a seller taking advantage of
a purchaser by raising price after the buyer
has made unrecoverable investments in
anticipation of the seller's promised
The potential for it is ubiquitous in the
economy. If I select a garage based on a
quoted price for a brake job. once the me-
chmnic has it on the lift. he might demand
more to fix it. I might not be able to take
tnr-neff fme Afoond another
garage. so Inmight -pay the 4%igher price.
though next time I'll surely find service
elsewhere. As Judge Richard Posner has
written, this kind of conduct produces
only "'a brief perturbation in competitive
conditions." It is the sruff of contract and
tort law. not antitrust.
Left to the Jury's Vagaries
The dangers of Eastman Kodak are
many and serious. Every exploitation of
circumstantial 'monopoly" power is now
a potential antitrust action. Moreover.
since 1986, an antitrust defendant has
been entitled to summary judgment when
the plaintiffs theory is economically irra-
tional. The Court declared that this prin-
ciple has not changed, but the Court's
decision at least clouds it.
The Court not only rejected an alto-
gether sound position-that lack of power
in the foremarket dooms the complaint--it
rejected a modest alternative-.that to de-
feat summary judgment. a plaintiff lacking
power in the foremarket must articulate a
specific market failure, a credible reason
why the market may not behave as general
theory would predict. The result is that an
antitrust plaintiff, with no more than a
prayer for a theory. can now take his case
to the jury and bank on the vagaries of that
institution.
4tossiblythceamnjoity-sI Weacting to
what seemed an ntduly 4tutcated dis-
covery process. The District Court granted
the defendant summary judgment without
a hearing after permitting the plaintiffs one
set of inrerrogatories. one set of document
requests, and six depositions.
In addition, though the plaintiffs had
conceded below that Kodak has no power
in an equipment market, they sought to
contest that issue in the Supreme Court.
The Court rebuffed the attempt. but its
decision may have been colored by that
II th-hour factual dispute.
Kodak also bears some responsibility
for the result. Besides asserting the en-
hancement of its reputation justification.
Kodak argued its policy lowered inventory
costs and prevented free riding on Kodak's
investments in the equipment markets. At
least as recounted by the Court, these
explanations were opaque, if not a pretext.
and thus tended to impeach the quality ra-
tionale. Whatever the possible non-
doctrinal reasons for it. however. the
Court's opinion is ominous.
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by jus-
tices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence
Thomas. has its own shortcomings. It in-
timates, one hopes inadvertently, that ef-
ficiency-enhancing justifications cannot
save a tying arrangement when the seller
does have legitimate market power in the
tying product market.
That would be bad policy. Indeed. one
can argue that. because tying arrange-
ments rarely cause economic harm, and
those that do cannot be isolated by courts
and litigants anyway, they should be
deemed per sc legal. Even better, firms
should be allowed to restrict the distribu-
tion of their own products in any way they
think best, for such restraints usually
benefit consumers. Nevertheless, the dis-
senters grasped the essence of this case,
and maybe a majority of the justices will
soon come to recognize that.
In the meantime, the Court has taken a
big step backward. Over the last 15 years,
it was busy redefining the antitrust laws as
a prescription for consumer welfare. The
Court does not here overtly reject that
premise. but it is telling that the plaintiffs
in Easunan Kodak were competitors of the
defendant, not consumers.
The antitrust laws are about consumer
welfare, and more precisely, economic
welfare, not fuzzy notions of grand social
fairness or the protection of competing
suppliers injured in the drive toward
greater efficiency. When the Court loses
sight of this: it makes mistakes. If Brown
Shoe's claim to insitrust infamy is that it
set a trend. Eastman Kodak's is not yet
that. At least for now, Eastman Kodak's
notoriety stems from the fact that it was
written in 1992. when the Court should
have known better. O
Nether manalfAbuasts nor prosezors noraVId 1tigants may ise
ri4MfJ.as.fions n mang _permptory .challenges. What about
gender? What about other ategories? Looking ahead, it appears that this
time-honored trial technique may not have long to live.
No More Peremptories?
S ince Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S.79 (1986). trial lawyers around thecountry have been watching their
longstanding right to an unfettered ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges slowly
disappear. In Batson itself. prosecutors
were told they could not use their strikes to
exclude jurors on the basis of race. In
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.. III
S. Ct. 2077 (1991), civil attorneys fell
under the same regime. And this term, in
the important case of Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 60 U.S.L.W. 4574 (June 18, 1992).
the Supreme Court completed the circle.
holding that criminal defendants were
bound by Batson.
The McCollum decision was long an-
ticipated. Against the backdrop of the Los
Angeles riots caused in large part by a
perceived unjust verdict from a jury that
did not include blacks, the Supreme Court
was unlikely to approve defendants' delib-




W 085111by trial attorneys be-ficautim cause it gives every
indication that the
peremptory challenge
belongs on the en-
dangered species list.
The facts of McCollum are straight-
forward. In August 1990, a Georgia grand
jury indicted Thomas, William, and Ella
McCollum on charges of aggravated as-
sault and simple battery. The indictment
alleged that they had beaten two blacks.
The state expected to prove that race
played a role in the assaults and filed a
pretrial motion asking the trial judge to
block the McCollums from exercising
their 20 peremptory challenges on the
basis of race. The trial judge denied the
state's motion, and the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
holding that defense attorneys no less than
prosecutors may not consider race in ex-
ercising peremptory challenges. In a
decision by Justice Harry Blackmun, the
Court explained that Edmonson had ex-
tended Bartson to civil defendants, con-
cluding that the peremptory strikes even
by civil litigants constituted "state ac-
tion" so as to implicate the Constitution's
prohibition of racial discrimination. That
decision's rationale was that "[bly en-
forcing a discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenge, the court has not only made itself a
party to the biased act. but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige be-
hind the alleged discrimination."
The holding in Edmonson applied in-
exorably to criminal defendants even
though, as the dissents of Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia argued,
this meant that a "criminal defendant, in
the process of defending himself against
the state, is held to be acting on behalf of
the state."
The Court's opinion in McCollum re-
solves an important issue expressly left
open in Batson, but raises a series of
questions that will no doubt reach the
Court in the near future.
To begin with, the opinion raises ques-
tions about whether the already lengthy
process of voir dire in this country will be
expanded. Justice Blackmun's opinion
recognized that "there should be a mech-
anism for removing those on the venire
whom the defendant has specific reason to
believe would be incapable of confronting
and suppressing their racism." (Of
course, before McCollum. that mechanism
was the unfettered use of the peremptory
challenge.)
Justice Blackmun found a defense
mechanism for removing racially biased
jurors in Ham v. South Carolina. 409 U.S.
524 (1973), which required trial courts to
ask jurors whether they could try the case
without racial prejudice. But such ques-
tions are of dubious effectiveness. As one
legal encyclopedia has recognized, "The
answers to these questions (which are in-
variably yes) provide the trial attorney
with no useful information about the
prospective juror." For example, a black
defendant generally concemed about ra-
cial animus among whites in the jury pool
is hardly likely to be reassured by rate
recitations of impartiality.
To create the "specific" reasons neces-
sary to strike such jurors, defendants will
likely seek to ask (or have the court ask) a
whole series of questions about racial
matters, hoping to find some answer to use
as a basis for strikes against the possibly
biased jurors. Defendants may inquire in
open court about interracial friendships,
voting patterns, detailed views on race re-
lations in this country, and other matters
that are often considered to be private.
This will surely compound the difficulties
already inherent in administering voir
dire.
McCollum also creates the anomaly that
while the rights of prospective jurors
struck by prosecutors can be asserted on
appeal, the rights of those struck by de-
fense attorneys cannot. Assume that a trial
court has erroneously allowed a defense
attorney to strike members of a particular
racial group from the venire. If the prose-
cutor succeeds in obtaining a conviction,
he will have no interest in taking an appeal
because the only remedy the Court has
identified for a Bartson violation is a new The most
trial. As a result, a decision of the trial intriguing a,
court in favor of defense counsel is es-
sentially unreviewable. important
In contrast, a trial judge's ruling sus- question lefttaining a prosecutor's strikes is, of course,
appealable. This asymmetry raises serious unanswered 1
questions about whether a new trial is the
appropriate remedy for a Batson violation. whether a wh
The Court should consider whether other slew of other
sanctions-perhaps fines imposed directly
on offending attorneys-are more nar- Characteristic,
rowly tailored and appropriate for a Bat- o which
son violation.
Gender-Based Challenges peremptories o
The most intriguing and important rat are "offquestion left unanswered in McCollum is i i ,
whether a whole slew of other character- I
istics on which peremptories often rest are
"off limits." Gender is the most promi-
nent of these. The lower courts are already
split on the issue of whether Batson pre-
cludes peremptories based on gender.








PEREMPTORIES FROM PAGE 536
Interpreting Butson to bar gender-based
challenges are: United States v. DeGross.
960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en band
and People v. Irizarry. 560 N.Y.S.2d
279. 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). Other
courts. however, have found that Batson
does not apply to gender-based chal-
lenges. including: United States v. Ham-
ilton. 850 F.2d 1038. 1042 (4th Cir.
1988); United States v. Nichols, 937 F. 2d
1257. 1262 (7th Cir. 1991). ceni. denied,
1(2 S. Ct. 989 (1992); State v. Culver.
444 N.W.2d 662. 666 (Neb. 1989); and
State v. Oliviera. 534 A.2d 867. 870 (R.I.
1987).
During oral argument in McCollum.
three justices-Scalia, O'Connor. and
Anthony Kennedy-all asked questions
about whether Batson applied to gender-
based challenges. Michael Dreeben, as-
sistant to the solicitor general, appearing
on behalf of the United States as an amicus
in McCollum. argued that Batson only
covers race because it is a "particularly
suspect and invidious ground" on which
to base a challenge.
Race is a logical stopping point. and
one that would limit Batson. But after
hearing Dreeben's conclusion that Batson
did not extend to challenges based on
gender, Justice O'Connor commented, "I
think that's rather hird to defend."
The argument that Batson applies to
strikes based on gender follows as swiftly
from the Court's prior decisions as did
McCollum's holding. Since Batson holds
that it is a false assumption that members
of the same race will be partial to one of
their own, logically it must also be a false
assumption that members of the same sex
will be partial.
A stike based on gender would there-
fore run afoul of the requirement of the
equal-protection clause that distinctions
based on race or sex be justified-end of
discussion. Any decent law student can
make the argument easily. (See, for ex-
ample, Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating
Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges.
105 Harvard Law Review 1920 (1992).)
The McCollum Court's willingness to fol-
low Batron wherever it logically leads
gives every indication that the Court will
swiftly extend Batson to block peremp-
tories resting on considerations of gender.
Strikes for Politics, Profession?
The only difficulty with extending Bat-
son beyond race-based strikes is that it
almost inevitably leads to the total aboli-
tion of the peremptory challenge. Chief
Justice Warren Burger forcefully made
this point in his Batson dissent: "Illf
conventional c 4ual protection pnrinciples
apply. then presumably defendants could
object to exclusion on thc basis of not only
race, but also sex. age, religious or politi-
cal affiliation. mental capacity. number of
children. living arrangements, and cm-
ployment in a particular industry or pro-
fession. In short, it is quite probable that
every peremptory challenge could be ob-
jected to on the basis that. because it ex-
cluded a venireman who had some char-
acteristic not shared by the remaining
members of the venire, it constituted a
*classification' subject to equal protection
scrutiny."
The rhetoric in McCollum gives every
indication that the Court is prepared to
travel quite a long distance down this path.
At one point, the decision condemns chal-
lenges based on "group bias" and at an-
other says that justice in a court of law
cannot "turn upon the pigmentation of
skin, the accident of birth. or the choice of
religion."
The opinion fails to recognize that every
peremptory challenge rests on some kind
of "group bias" and that any articulated
basis for a challenge is susceptible to the
response that justice cannot "turn" on
some kind of "accident of birth" or other
irrelevant "choice." McCollum is by no
means unusual in this regard, as it follows
on the heels of a series of Barson decisions
in which the Court has harshly condemned
"offensive stereotypes" (Edmonson). If
the Court's rhetoric is to be taken seri-
ously, the future of the peremptory chal-
lenge does not look good.
I suspect that most trial lawyers would
find the abolition of the peremptory chal-
lenge to be quite troubling. It is no acci-
dent, as Justice Scalia observed in his dis-
sent in a recent Bartson case, that the
"tradition of peremptory challenges for
both the prosecution and the accused was
already venerable at the time of Black-
stone, was reflected in a federal sratute
enacted by the same Congress that pro-
posed the Bill of Rights, was recognized
in an opinion by Justice Story to be part of
the common law of the United States, and
has endured through two centuries in all
the States."
The peremptory challenge, if properly
used, leads to a jury that is perceived by
both sides to be fairer and more impartial
than the panel initially selected at random
from the jury pools. It allows attorneys to
remove jurors whose impartiality seems
questionable, but not so much that a chal-
lenge for cause can be sustained. One
hopes that the Court will come to recog-
nize the need for the institution before it
blindly follows its rhetoric condemning
stereotypes and sweeps the challenge
away. 0
Prayer Ban Is
PRAYERS FROM PAGE S33
majority of the community wishes to
make." The dissenters were emphatic that
religion is a permissible and, indeed, a







What does Lee v. Weisman mean for the
future? First, at least until the composition
of the Supreme Court changes. prayer in
public schools is unconstitutional. Con-
servatives long have criticized the Court's
rulings invalidating voluntary school
prayers. Undoubtedly their hope was that
Lee would be the first step to allowing
religion back into the schoolroom. The
Court. however. unequivocally reaffirmed
the precedents from the early 1960s hold-
ing that govemment-initiated or govern-
ment-supervised prayer in public schools
is unconstitutional. But it must be noted
that Lee also shows the precariousness
of the ban on school prayer; four jus-
tices have made clear that they are ready
and willing to discard these precedents.
With one more vote, school prayer will be
allowed.
3till Precarious
Second, the implications for the estab-
lishment clause outside the school context
are much less clear. A close reading of
Justice Kennedy's opinion reveals that he
did not repudiate his earlier view. stated in
Allegheny County, that the establishment
clause is violated only by government
coercion or government-created churches.
Rather, Kennedy found non-sectarian
prayers by clergy at graduation cere-
monies to be coercive. The two concurring
opinion-reflecting the views of the other
four justices in the majority-contended
that the establishment clause can be vio-
lated even without government coercion.
Kennedy. however, neither supported nor
repudiated that position.
Nor did Kennedy reaffirm the Lemon
test for evaluating establishment-clause
cases. He simply stated that the Court did
not need to "reconsider" the Lemon test
because "[tlhe government involvement
with religious activity in this case is per-
vasive, to the point of creating a state-
sponsored and state-directed religious
exercise in a public school." Kennedy left
open the possibility that he could join with
the dissenters and ovenule Lemon in a fu-
ture case, especially one arising outside
the school context.
The Unexpected Middle
Therefore, the future of the establish-
ment clause remains very much in doubt.
Ultimately, the Court must decide whether
there should be a metaphorical wall sep-
arating church and state. For the Lee ma-
jority, perhaps except for Justice Ken-
nedy, religion and especially prayer be-
long in places of worship and homes, not
at government events. The dissent, how-
ever, attacked this view as relegating re-
ligion to a "purely personal avocation that
can be indulged entirely in secret. like
pornography, in the privacy of one's
room."
Finally. Lee v. Weisman is important
for what it reflects about the Rehnquist
Court. Lee, like other cases this term,
shows that the conservative block on the
Court is not monolithic. The right wing of
the Court consists of Rehnquist. White.
Scalia, and Thomas-the dissenters in Lee
and several other cases this term. An un-
expected middle, consisting of O'Connor,
Kennedy. and Souter, has emerged. These
justices very much control the Court's di-
rection. Although it is too early to know
the details of their jurisprudence or even if
their apparent alliance is long-term, it is
clear that their independence means the
Rehnquist Court will be far less predict-
able than anyone expected. 0
J us t asthe pope is not without sin, sojustice Scalia, the vicar of judicial
-zrraint, an't esist the temptatin ofiadicialatinism from ime to time
in property-rights cases.
S FStraying From the Right Religion
any property-rights advocates
expected that the Supreme Court
term just ended would see a great
expansion of property holders' rights. All
tolled, four cases asserting unconstitu-
tional infringements on property rights had
been granted review. Claimants sought to
invoke not only the takings clause but
substantive due process and the contracts
clause as barriers to government regula-
tions weakening property rights.
Prior to the last day of the term, their
quest had met with nothing but disappoint-
ment. Twice the Court had unanimously
rejected property claims and upheld the
challenged regulations. Once it had dis-
missed its own writ of certiorari as im-
providently granted, conveying an unmis-
takable disinterest in the plaintiffs sub-
stantive due-process challenge to delay in
processing an application for a develop-
ment permit.
But the remaining case. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal
Council. 60
U.S.L.W. 4842Lucas v. (June 29. 1992),
South Carolina Coastal CounCil which had been con-sidered the property
holders' best shot,
more than made up
for the three prior defeats. In a majority
opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. the
Court seems to have established a bright-
line rule awarding compensation where
regulation results in the loss of all property
value.
Unfortunately, that result was achieved
by giving short shrift to principles of
judicial restraint and the fair interpretation
of authorities-usually the source of Jus-
tice Scalia's persuasiveness. Scalia's cre-
ativity and flexibility prove that. just as
the pope is not without sin, neither can the
vicar of judicial restraint resist the sin of
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Lucas involved the South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act, which pro-
hibited permanent construction too close
to the coast for a broad range of reasons
including safety, conservation, and recre-
ational use. The plaintiff, David Lucas,
had purchased two lots on the Isle of
Palms zoned for residential use. After the
beach-front statute was enacted, he found
his property in the zone of prohibited
construction.
Lucas brought suit alleging a taking of
property without just compensation. The
trial judge ruled that the legislation re-
sulted in the foss ofessentially all Lucas'
property value and awarded him more than
S1 million as just compensation. The
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
on the ground that it was bound to accept
the legislature's "uncontested findings"
that construction in the coastal zone
threatened a serious public harm and that
no compensation was required for losses
resulting from regulations serving such a
public purpose.
In his opinion for five members of the
Court (with Justice Anthony Kennedy
concurring in the judgment), Justice Scalia
rejected a number of substantial arguments
for declining to reach the merits of the
case. Lucas had not tried to get a special
permit to allow construction, a provision
enacted by the state legislature before the
case was argued in the South Carolina
Supreme Court. Justices Harry Blackmun
and John Paul Stevens in dissent took
special note of the Court's prior decision
in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County. 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). find-
ing Supreme Court review inappropriate
absent a "final and authoritative deter-
mination of the type and intensity of de-
velopment legally permitted on the subject
property."
Also weighing against review on the
merits was Lucas' failure to challenge the
location of the setback line by formal ad-
ministrative and then judicial proceedings.
Had this remedy been exhausted, there
would have been a more complete record
of the basis for the state's action. Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and David Souter
would have declined to reach the merits
for the additional reason that the finding of
a taking of all value was almost Lerrainly
incorrect, given that the property still had
uses other than the building of a perma-
nent residence. This finding was the es-
sential predicate of the Court s ruling. As
Blackmun stated. "IcIlearly. the Court
was eager to decide this case."
More striking than its decision to decide
the merits was the rule the Court chose to
announce. Prior to this decision. it was
well-established that takings claims were
to be resolved upon the consideration of
three factors, none of which was disposi-
tive except in the context of the other two.
Under Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robbins. 447 U.S. 74. 83 (1980). these
factors were "the character of the gov-
ernmental action, its economic impact,
and its interference with reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations." This kind
of analysis, which is unavoidably sub-
jective and requires a weighing of public
and private interests, has been viewed as
unavoidable.
But Justice Scalia has reserved perhaps
his greatest hostility for just such balanc-
ing approaches to the determination of
constitutional issues, which are anathema
to his idea of the law as a set of rules ap-
plicable with substantial certainty and
predictability. For example, in Morrison
v. Olson. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Scalia's
dissent attacked the Court's balancing test
for substituting for a legal rule "the un-
fettered wisdom of a majority of this
Court, revealed to an obedient people on a
case-by-case basis." While those inter-
ested in legal certainty and the rule of law
must respect this inclination, Lucas poses
the question of how much judicial creativ-
ity and rewriting of precedent can be coun-
tenanced in pursuit of that goal.
For Justice Scalia arrived at his con-
stitutional rule announced in Lucas only
by both rewriting and ignoring history.
Despite Scalia's assertion, there is no
longstanding rule that the denial of eco-
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nomically viable use of land is itself ade-
quate basis for finding a taking. As both
Justices Blackmun and Stevens noted in
dissent, this conclusion is supported only
by dicta in a number of recent cases. (In-
deed, while Justice Scalia's language in-
dicates otherwise, his case citations con-
firm this fact.)
The only other authority giving super-
ficial support to Scalia's categorical rule
is the well-established proposition that,
where all value is not taken, there is no
regulatory taking. Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Association,
452 U.S. 264, 295-297 (1981). Of course.
it does not follow from this proposition
that the inverse is also true--that a reg-
ulatory taking necessarily Occurs where all
value is taken. On the contrary, the
Court's jurisprudence in this area makes
clear that a taking can only be found after
consideration of multiple factors, includ-
ing but not limited to whether the property
has been rendered worthless.
Uncategorical Rule
While stating his holding in terms of a
categorical rule, Scalia recognized that
this rule must be subject to a substantial
exception-indeed one that makes the rule
decidedly uncategorical. And in defining
that exception, the Court again departed
from established precedent by confining
allowable regulatory actions to those im-
plicit in state-law concepts of property and
nuisance.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out in a
separate concurrence, the Court's takings
jurisprudence has looked more broadly to
a property owner's "legitimate invest-
ment-backed expectations," a concept
that requires the owner to take into ac-
count anticipated government actions in
determining his property expectations.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City. 458 U.S. 104. 125 (1978).
Such an approach gives regulators some
leeway to change policies in light of
growing knowledge and changing public
concerns, in a way that the standard enun-
ciated by the Court in Lucas does not.
The Court's most striking rejection of
history is its open acknowledgment that
the entire body of takings jurisprudence is
a judicial construct without basis in the
intentions of the framers or the practice at
that time. This is all the more noteworthy
coming from one who has made historical
practice the alpha and omega of constitu-
tional limitations on governmental action.
In a footnote to his opinion in Lucas.
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Black-
mun "that early constitutional theorists
did not believe the Takings Clause em-
braced regulations of property at all."
Scalia went on to state that neither Black-
mun nor the Court is prepared to renounce
the contrary conclusion reached in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S.
393 (1922)-that "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."
Even if one agrees with this latter conclu-
sion, the absence of historical basis makes
the Court's attempted announcement of a
bright-line rule, in the face of a legion of
contrary precedents, an even bolder piece
of judicial engineering.
Justice Scalia's descent into judicial
creativity is all the more arresting given
the limited practical benefits-and the ar-
guable mischief--of the rule that he an-
nounced. As the Court itself conceded. the
finding of a taking turns on whether the
regulation has rendered the property
worthless, and that itself is by no means
clear-cut.
The first question is how one defines the
property at issue. A regulation's impact
may be total, modest, or virtually inconse-
quential depending on whether the prop-
erty interest at stake is conceived broadly
or narrowed to the interest or estate most
directly affected. The Court's new rule is
an invitation to manipulate the definition
of property interests to bring within this
bright-line definition of taking such regu-
lations as are plainly permissible when the
same owner's property interests are con-
ceived more broadly.
Likewise, the concepts of nuisance and
property law, while offered by the Court
as fairly fixed, are, in fact, evolving con-
cepts. The common-law courts resolve
these issues daily, using reasoning not
very different from the well-established
but now inapplicable inquiry into whether
a regulation offends legitimate invest-
ment-backed expectations. Unless Justice
Scalia intends to freeze nuisance and
The Court's most striking rejection of
history is its open acknowledgment
that the entire body of takings
jurisprudence is a judicial construct
without basis in the intentions of the
framers or the practice at that time.
property law absolutely at some point
history or, for each party, at the time
he buys his land-two unimaginable
thoughts-one can anticipate that takings
claims will continue to involve difficult
and subjective judgments about appropri-
ate uses of property. On balance, it seems
that Justice Scalia has played very fast and
loose witb the Court's takings precedents
in the quest for a bright-line rule that is
both an illusion and an invitation for liti-
gatory gamesmanship.
The greatest irony about Lucas is that it
was announced on the last day of the term.
in the shadow of the abortion decision.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W.
4795 (June 29, 1992). That was fortunate
for Justice Scalia, because journalists ex-
hausted themselves and their space limita-
tions reporting on Casey's joint pluralitN
opinion and the brickbats thrown at it byScalia for giving vent to individual value
preferences. Had there been time. sonic oi
those brickbats might have turned into
boomerangs coming at Scalia for his sim-
ilar handiwork in Lucas.
In fact, both cases offer good illustra-
tions of the complexity of the process 01
judging and the unavoidable, if untidy.
role that factors other than words on paper
sometimes play in shaping major deci-
sions. However much we might like it to
be otherwise, good judges of varying po-
litical stripes periodically respond to other
than interpretivist concerns.
Justice Scalia's ruling in Lucas, which
was joined by Chief Justice William Reh
quist and Justices Byron White and CI
ence Thomas (along with Justice Sand
Day O'Connor), shows that even that re-
strained group of strict constructionists is
not beyond building a constitutional sand
castle now and then, even as they assail
others for shoring up a similar edifice
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'Federal Jurisdiction Is Addressed
By LINDA S. MULLENIX
SpTa t The Naioal ou
term again told those involvedTHE SUPREME Court thisIn domestic relations disputes
that federal judges will not be
bothered to hear such mun-
dane and messy matters.' On the other
hand, the American Red Cross - re-
spending to people who sue after re-
ceiving tainted blood from the Red
Cross - can have its day In federal
court. In this pair of bookend cases
dealing with federal court jurisdiction,
the justices upheld two ancient and
long-standing precedents that bar the
federal courts from hearing domestic
relations cases but enable governmen-
tally chartered entities to gain access
to a federal court by Invoking certain
"magic words" in their corporate
charters.
And, for the fifth time in four years,'
the nine justices chastised a hapless
client and his somewhat sloppy lawyer
'for their misadventures while they
were briefly, but Inadvertently. in fed-
eral court. In Willy v. Coastal Corp.' -
involving a bizarre appeal resonating
in Greek mythology and the literature
of Kafka. Dante and Joe Heller - the
Supreme Court handed down the rule
in WiyU: As a lawyer or litigant, it a
person finds himself or herself in fed-
eral court - It doesn't matter how he
or she got there - the person Is subject
to Rule 11 sanctions. For the untidy
and possibly distracted attorney. Willy
was bad news.
The court's two cases on federal ju-
risdiction - one concerning the scope
of diversity jurisdLiction; the other. fed-
eral question jurisdiction - came with
great expectations: Would the court
overturn Its long-standing resistance
to hearing domestic relations cases?
Would the justices overturn the vener-
able 1824 decision. Osborn u. Bank of
the U.S.7' Would the justices open the
federal courthouse doors to dueling
spouses? Would. they abut the court-
house doors to certain governmentally
chartered groups under a paralmoni-
ous reading of what It means to "sue
and be sued" in federal court?
For court watchers interested in who
has access to a federal forum, Anken-
brandt v. Bichants' and American No-
tiosal Red Cross v. S.G. and A.B.' pre-
sented fundamental challenges to who
gets in and who stays out of federal
court. Unfortunately, it appears that
the two jurisdiction cases promised
more than they eventually delivered.
Diversity Jurisdiction
The more tantalizing of the two caa-
es was Akersbrandt. In that case, the
Supreme Court raised the possibility
that, in granting certiorari to revisit
the domestic relations exception to
federal court jurisdiction, the court ac-
tually might overturn the exception
Ifi
But in foresight as well as hindsight
very few people actually believed that
the justices suddenly would fling oper
the federal courthouse doors to case.
involving divorce, alimony, child cus
tody and the like.
Ankenbrandt involved a child abusf
case.' Carol Ankenbrandt, a divorcec
mother, sued on behalf of her twc
young daughters in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Loui
siana to recover damages from her ex
husband, Jon A. Richards, and hit
girltriend for alleged physical and sex
Ual abuse of the girls while they wert
in their father's custody.
Ms. Ankenbrandt claimed a right tc
have her case heard in federal cour
based on diversity jurisdiction; she I.
from Missour, and her husband and
girlfriend are from Louisiana. Wher
Mr. Richards and his girlfriend movec
to dismiss, the district court in an un
published opinion granted the motior
based on, among other things, the do
mestic relations exception to federa
court jurisdiction.
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appealk
affirmed this dismissal without opin
Ion.' Ms. Ankenbrandt then appealec
the dismissal to the Supreme Court
where the case appeared in the infelici
tous posture of seeming to challeng,
the domestic relations. exception.
The so-called domestic relations ex
caption to federal court jurisdiction, a
doctrine of more than 100 year's stand
ing, is an exception to the courts' diver
Aty jurisdiction that does not permi
federal courts to hear most cases in
valving domestic disputes or famil:
relations. The exception is founded nel
ther in the Constitution nor in the stat
utes conferring jurisdiction on the fed
eral courts. Rather, it is a judiciall
created doctrine, cobbled tram histor.
cal argument, dicta in various ancier
opinions, interpretations of preceder
and vaguely stated constitutional car
cerns about intersystem comity,'
For decades, federal courts ala
have justified their refusal to hear dt
mastic relations cases based on polic
arguments relating to the superic
competency of state courts to adjud
cate domestic relations matters." B'
cause the domestic relations exceptic
is neither constitutionally nor statut,
rily based, the exception has come t
der increasing attack from femini:
organizations, academics and other
who would like to see domestic rel:
tions cases accorded the dignity of fe
eral court access and federal Ca.
status.
Potential Implicatians
Thus, Askenbrandt seemed to ha%
potentially far-reaching implications
the justices decided to end the dict
But they didn't. Ankenbrandt, it seem
is a rather unfortunate decision in th
Ms. Ankenbrandt got more than a)
bargained for when she sued in feder
court.
Ms. Ackenbrandt did win in the E
preme Court, and she did get the ni
justices to agree that she had propei
invoked the federal court's divers
jurisdiction to hear her tortious injt:
lawsuit But her appeal inadverten
caused a six-justice majority not on
to reaffirm the existence and wisdc
of the domestic relations exception, I
for the first time to set forth a basis
the exception grounded in the divers
Continued on follooing page
Ms. Mullenix is the Bernard L We
**-*-- 7 ".1-r of Law at the U
statute. What before had been merely
amushy Aoctrine has mow en shared
esp rith areful tttory muguc.
than.
The ramifications Of ids ortmfca-
tion of the domestic relations excep-
tion, which some find to be alarming.
was not lost on Justice Harry A. Black-
mun, who chose to write a separate
concurrence distancing himself from
the majority's statutory handicraft
and interpretation of congressional in-
tention. Justice Blackmun wrote. "The
longstanding. unbroken practice of the
federal courts in refusing to hear do-
mestic relations cases is precedent at
most for continued discretionary ab-
stention rather than mandatory limits
on federal jurtadiction."
Of the three separate opinions writ-
ten in Ankenbrandt, some observers
feel that only Justices John Paul Ste-
vens and Clarence Thomas got it right.
and they did so in six simple sen-
tences." In what is now becoming a
familiar refrain in Justice Stevens'
concurring opinions concerning what
he views as badly decided procedure
cases," he announced that Anken-
brnadt 'should be an exceedingly easy
case." In his view, the case presented a
simple diversity tort, and as such, did
not come within whatever domestic re-
lations exception might or might not
exist. Justices Stevens and Thomas,
then, would have left consideration of
the domestic relations exception for
another day.
Ironically, the Stevens and Thomas
concurrence placed them solidly be-
hind the position of the American Civil
Liberties Union, which appeared as an
amicus. The ACLU basically stood on
the sidelines, urging the justices not to
say anything at all about the scope of
the domestic relations exception.
The ACLU apparently figured that
with a conservative Supreme Court,
the less said on the domestic relations
exception, the better. The last thing the
ACLU wanted was for a court majority
to provide some legally reasoned basis
far the domestic relations exception.
But that's what happened. Thus, in the
end. Ms. Ankendbrandt won: federal
judges won; but domestic relations dis-
putants are still out of federal court,
only now more soundly so.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
American Red Cross v. B.G. and A.E."
provided Justice Antonin Scalia with
an opportunity to lecture about the use
of certain "magic words" to confer ju-
risdiction. But because he could not
commnand a majority of his colleagues
concerning his views, he was com-
pelled to deliver his deconstructionist
discourse in dlssent 'J
As linguistic cases go. the American
Red Cross decisimsi is somewhat rivet-
ing because the majority and dissent-
ing opinions pit dueling rules of statu-
tory construction against each other.
The conference on this case must have
been very interesting: Justice David H.
Souter's footnotes certainly evidence a
heated testiness and Irritation among
the justices concerning just what
words actually mean."
American Red Cross arose from the
sad circumstance of a young Concord.
N.H., woman who contracted the AIDS
virus through a tainted blood transtu-
ason during surgery." After she filed
suit in state court against the Ameri-
can National Red Cross, the Red Cross
removed the case to the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire. invoking the federal court's Art.
III "arising under" jurisdiction.
The single issue in the Red Cross ap-
peal was whether the language in the
corporate charter of the Red Cross -
which specifies that it has the right "to
sue and be sued in courts of law and
equity, State or Federal" - vests fed-
eral courts with original jurisdiction
over lawsuits in which the Red Cross is
a party. The legal debate centered on
whether, an a matter of precedent and
congressional intent, this specific lan-
aganeaIgm pacetysoue2ytyed-
Vral court on the Red Croes, or con- lpiceshold be read, tpossible. to
ferred oainal jarldiction Over the give It some effect.
Heafer. 1 ghegenajorityoeusidon todut the
-Hwever m thiswuulit.- edIur" rs1aitimc
pears at first blush, the Red Cross case. ferring moved Justice Scaliaand three
like Ankewirbradt, has potentially wide- colleagueS to atX)umn Of liuistic
sweeping Implications. Not only are pique." Justice Scalia. horrified at the
dozens of tainted blood supply cases notion that the mere invocation of car-
currently being filed against the Red tam "magic words" might suffice to
Cross, but more significant, there aiso confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts stated "This wonderland of oln
guistic confusion - In which words are
sometimes read to mean only what
terin mand other times read also toThe justices chastised mean what they do not say - is baned
on the erroneous premi that our
a hapless client and Canes in this area establish a 'magic
__________________________ words' jurisprudence that departs
from ordinary rules of English us-his somewhat sloppy In Justice Scallas view, the "natural
lawyer for their reading" of some "sue and be sued
clauses" is that they both confer capac-
misadventures.ity and Jurisdiction, and the natural
misa ventres.reading of the Red Croas provision is
__________________________ that It confers only capacity."
At any rate, for pages of dissent, Jus-
tice Scaia goes on about the perils of
are hundreds of congressionally creat- using magc words" to Confer jurin-
ed organizations with corporate char- dicti Justice Scaia's strongly word-
ter language identical to that in the ad dissent culminates in a repetitive.
Red Cross charter. Thus, the Red inevitable. but more erudite reference
Cross appeal presented a problem: If t lending "talismanic significance" to
the Red Cross was to be let into federal ay mention of federal courts In a cor-
court on the strength of its corporate porate charter.
charter language. the floodgates would It apparently wan a bad day for stat-
be open to thousands of new litigants. utory construction at the court with
Although this important policy issue Justice Scalia stating that his rule of
of federal court access provided the statutory construction was better than
backdrop for this appeal, the court in- Justice Souter. Thus, Justice Scalla
stead seized upon the narrowest, concluded his diatribe by declaiming
technical and linguistic view of the that eve ibngrag of t
case. In almost 200 years of Supreme render
Court decision-making, the court has the 1947 amendment superfluous. -I
been faced with a corporate charter would consider that a small price to
language question four times. To make pay for adhering to the competing
jurisprudential life difficult, the court (and more Important) canon that stat-
has twice held that certain charter lan. utory language should be consted in
guage did not confer federal court ju- accordance with Its ordinary mean-
risdiction." and twice held that other ing"
phraseology did." But what Is one to make after all, of
These four precedential decisions in- the ordinary mea04ng of the Red Cross
volve extremely technical word-mine- charter language. which say simply,
ing. The first example of fatally flawed that the Red Cros has the right "to
charter language that did not pass ju- sue and be sued In courts of law and
risdictional muster was in the charter equity. State or Federal"? Justice Sau-
of the first Bank of the United States. ter and his colleagues, it would seem.
The charter stated that the bank could did the better job with Justice Scalia
sue and be sued in "courts of record. preferred rule of statutory construc-
but it did not spcif "tederal courts ton
The second example of detective
phraseology was contained in a clause
of a federally chartered railroad; its
clause stated that the railroad could
sue and be sued "in all courts of law
and equity within the United States"
but did not expressly refer to the feder-
al courts.
Court held that charter lan-BYCONTRAST, the Supremeguage conferred jurisdiction
when the relevant provision
stated that the governmental
entity could "sue or be sued...in all
State Courts having competent juris-
diction, and in any circuit court of the
United States." or when another char-
ter clause permitted suit "in any court
of law or equity, State or Federal."
Canvassing the four precedents. Jus-
tice Souter's majority opinion real-
firmed the rule in Osborn U. Bank of
the US. and simply concluded that
"(t]hese cases support the rule that a
congressional charter's 'sue and be
sued' provision may be read to confer
federal court juriadiction if, but only it.
It specifically mentions the federal
courts."
The Red Cross majority held. in con-
struing the 1947 congressional amend-
ment to the organization's charter that
provided the current disputed lan-
guage, that the amended provision
"extends beyond a mere grant of gen-
eral corporate capacity to sue, and suf-
fices to confer jurisdiction." Uphold-
ing Osborn's "longstanding and settled
rule." Justice Souter further grounded
the majority's decision in the rule of
winy Case
If there are two hapless participants
among this term's many federal liti-
gants, they surely must be Donald J.
Willy of Houston. Texas, and his law-
yer. They are the latest litigants to get
their knuckles rapped by the Supreme
Court for violating Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12." What is so distinc-
tive about Willy" however. in that nei-
ther Mr Willy nor his lawyer ever
wanted to litigate in federal court. In-
stead, they found themselves there
quite inadvertently and against their
will. Unfortunately. Mr. Willy and his
lawyer sojourned in federal court just
long enough to collect a passel of Rule
1 sanctions.
Then, the 5th Circuit belatedly deter-
mined that their presence in federal
court was a big mistake after all. But
no matter. said the 5th Circult, the
sanctions still stood. For Mr. Willy and
his lawyer. litigation turned out to be
one revolting development after an-
other.
Donald J. Willy's Rule 11 nightmare
began innocently enough when he sued
his former employer, Coastal Corp, for
wrongful discharge in violation of fed-
eral and state whistleblower provi-
alons." Mr. Willy sued in Texas state
court and. predictably, Coastal Corp.
removed the case to the federal dis-
trict court in Houston. Mr. Willy then
just as predictably challenged the re-
moval. claiming that the court lacked
jurisdiction. Apart from the jurisdic-
tional challenge. Mr. Willy's lawyer
filed responsive papers to a Coastal
Corp. summary judgment motion.
'Ihe Mhirct 4court granted ComItal
Corp. motion to dismiss. rejected Kr.
Willy's assertion of pendent state
tlalnmeand gmated Coastal Corp.'s re-
,quest'for Rule 1 sanctions against Mr.
Willy and his attorney for sloppy law-
yering.
The district court judge took Willy's
lawyer to task for the summary judg-
ment papers which, in the court's view.
"create[d] a blur of absolute confusion."
What truly irritated the court was a
"1,200-page, unindexed, unnumbered
pile of materials" that the court char-
acterized "to be a conscious and wan-
ton afront to the judicial process, this
Court, and opposing counsel" and was
"irresponsible at a minimum and at
worst intentionally harassing."
On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed
that the district court had lacked juris-
diction, reversed the district court's er-
roneous jurisdictional determination
and ordered the case sent back to state
court. Mr. Willy had won one. But to
his extreme dismay, the 5th Circuit
also upheld the Rule 11 sanctions, and
even worse, remanded the case to the
original district judge to recompute
the sanctions.
Pyrrhic Victory
Mr. Willy's case then began to take
on literary qualities. In the mythologi-
cal realm. Mr. Willy had gained some-
thing of a proverbial pyrrhic victory.
From German modernism, surely it
was a Kafkaesque wrinkle to be sub-
jected to Rule 11 sanctions if the feder
al court had no jurisdiction. From Joe
Haller, certainly it was a bizarre
"Catch-22" to be sanctioned while pro-
testing the court's authority, only to be
told that the court did indeed have no
authority. Mr. Willy appealed the issue
to the Supreme Court.
But in the realm of high constitution-
al theory, the Supreme Court again re-
affirmed that the federal court'd Rule
.1 sanctioning power does not trans-
grass the Rules Enabling Act." This
portion of the opinion will interest law
professors who like constitutional ar-
guments and dismay public interest
lawyers who would like to see Rule 11
go away.
For workaday practicing federal liti-gator., however, the heart of Willy lies
in the court's pronouncement that -(a]
final determination of lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction...does not auto-
matically wipe out all proceedings had
in the district court at a time when the
district court operated under the mia-
apprehension that it had jurisdic-
tion." Or. in other words, just because
the court was wrong doesn't mean that
the court can't punish someone for
misbehaving while they were here.
Viewing the federal court's analo-
gous contempt powers, the Supreme
Court declared: "We think the same
concern expressed in these canes - the
maintenance of orderly procedure.
even in the wake of a jurisdiction rul-
Ing later found to be mistaken - justi-
fies the conclusion that the sanction
ordered here need not be upset" And
further. "The Interest in having rules
of procedure obeyed, by contrast, does
not disappear upon a subsequent deter-
mination that the court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction."
No doubt WiWy will lead to scholarly
commentary concerning the conun-
drum of sanctions without jurisdiction.
This focus, however, will neglect the
truly interesting aspect of Willy- that
Mr. Willy and his lawyer were sanc-
tioned for a messy pile of papers. WiUy
appears to provide the best and most
graphic support for a proposed amend-
ment to Rule 11 that would allow mis-
creant lawyers to clean up their papers
before being dunned by the court." Per-
haps the district court judge should
have allowed Mr. Willy and his lawyer
to take their pile back and index It. If
Willy leads to such an ameliorative
provision, then those 1.200 unnumbered
pages, and the sanctions they inspired.
Continued on page S16
By IRA MICKENBERG
l A -Years, the U.S.
rme Court'scriminal law
decisions have been charac.
terized by radical departures
from procedures set during
the Warren years. In almost all of
these cases, the court drastically re.
stricted the rights of criminal defen-dants and interpreted existing law in
such a way as to give prosecutors a
virtual wish list of investigatory and
trial options.
The 1991-*92 term. however, was dif.
ferent. Although most of the criminal
cases still were decided in favor of the
prosecution, there were no earth-shak.
ing changes in criminal law. Instead,
the court embarked on a "mopping up"
operation, in which it clarified issuesleft unresolved in previous cases and
Closed off avenues that might havebeen used to avoid prior holdings.
Not many of these decisions will
make their way into law school case.
books. They establish few of the broad
theoretical guidelines of which law
professors and Supreme Court justices
are fond. On the other hand, many of
the 1991-'92 cases should be of great
interest to practicing lawyers, because
they address specific trial defenses
and procedures.
Before the current term the subjects
of these cases were largely a matter of
state law. Now there are federal consti.
tutional pronouncements as to the lim.
Its on these practices.
On a more theoretical level, the opin.
ions of the past term seem to give a
good Idea of the direction in which the
newest justice. Clarence Thomas, will
lean in criminal cases. In this respect,
the outlook for the defense bar is not
bright
Entrapaent Ruling
In Jacobson r. US.,' the court re-
viewed the status of the entrapment
defense. Sting operations and under-
cover agents are now staple tools of
law enforcement agencies. The law of
entrapment provides that the govern.
ment may induce someone to commit
a crime, as long as the suspect was
predisposed to commit the crime onhis or her own absent the government
Inducement
Thus, it is perfectly proper for a gov.
ernment agent to buy cocaine from a
drug dealer, if the dealer was predis.
posed to sell cocaine without the
agent's offer. That this particular sale
would not have occurred without the
governmenta help Is irrelevant The
defendant's predisposition - not the
goveranet's behavior - is the key to
entrapment. Given this standard, it is
extremely diffcult for a defendant to
gain an acquittal on entrapment
groundiL
In Ja rbas the defendant a -
year-old Nebraska farmer named
Keith Jacobson. ordered two maga-
ine containing nude photographs of
Young boys. At the time he bought the
magazines In 1284, the purchase was
lawful. Several months later, Congress
,made the receipt of sexually explicit
depictions of children through the t
malls a crime. Soon after that law was
Tassed the federal government, which
found Mr- Jacobson's name on the r
mailing list of an adult bookstore, em- a
barked on a 2i-year effort to induce I
him to violate the new law.q
The government sent repeated mail-
ings under the guise of five fictitious
organizations and created a non-exis. t
tent pen pal. For about 26 months, Mr. d
Jacobson received the governments5
mailings but neither ordered nor re-.
quested child pornography. Finally, in I]
1987. he bought a prohibited magazine P
and was arrested. b
A five-justice majority of the Su. J
b
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preme Court held that under the cir
cumatances of this case, Mr. Jacobsot
was entrapped. It noted that his 1984
purchase of a magazine was lawful
and that throughout more than two
years of government inducement, he
demonstrated no predisposition to
break the law. Only after persistent en-
couragement did he finally accept as
offer the government placed before
him. Because "the government may
not play on the weakness of an inno-
cent party and beguile him into com-
mitting crimes which he other-wise
would not have attempted" (emphasis
added), Mr. Jacobson's conviction
could not stand.
Significantly, the majority went out
of its way to explain that it was not
changing the law of entrapment. Sting
operations and undercover investiga-
tions are still permissible. The court
simply held that in this particular
case, the government went too far.
Indeed. had Jacobson been decided
differently, there would be few, if any,
circumstances in which a court could
find that as a matter of law, a defen-
dant had been entrapped. If the govern-
ment can spend 2% years unsuccessful
ly enticing someone with no criminal
background until the person finally
gives in to temptation, it is difficult to
imagine what kind of government con-
duct would not be allowed. Thus, while
Jacobson was a victory for the defen-
dant, it also amounts to a statement
that the court is content to maintain
the status quo with regard to the use of
entrapment as a defense - a status
quo that is quite favorable to the gov-
ernment.
Peremptory Challenges
In one of the few cases decided this
past term that will have a major im-
pact on the development of criminaljurisprudence, the Supreme Court
ruled in Georgia v. McCollum that
when selecting a jury, defendants In
criminal cases may be prohibited from
exercising their peremptory chal-
lenges in a racially discriminatory
zmanner.
Litigants in criminal cases may
challenge prospective jurorsin two
ways. Each party has an unlimited
number of challenges -for cause" in
which he or she claims that a potentiail
uror is biased or Otherwise legally dis-
qualified from serving. Each party
u1so has a limited number of peremp-
ory challenges, which permit the
striking of a juror for any or no reason
at aL Traditionally, the number of Pa-
emptory challenges afforded each
ide is fixed by statute, and the chal-
enges may be exercised without re-
uhring counsel to give any reason for
its or her decision.
Peremptory challenges have permit-
ed lawyers to challenge jurors who
-7y having any bias but may still
arbor attitudes that would Interfere
'ith fair consideration of the case. On
he other hand, peremptories also have
ermitted a lawyer prosecuting a
lack defendant to ensure an all-white
ury simply by challenging every
lack person in the venlre.
In 1986, the Supreme Court departed
romn the traditional unr-estricted view
IPeremptory challenges. In Biatson t,.
Kentucky." it held that the prosecution
in a criminal case may not perempto-
rily challenge jurors on the basis of
race. This past term, In Georgia v.
McCollun. the court extended the rul-
ing of Batson to defense lawyers, After
McCollum, the defense may not exer-
cise Its peremptories in a racially dis-
criminatory way.
The main hurdle the majority had to
overcome in reaching this conclusion
was the claim that because a defen-
dant Is a private party, not a govern-
ment entity, his or her peremptory
challenges do not constitute "state ac-
tion." Thus, in this view, the Constitu-
lion cannot limit the way the defen-
dant uses those challenges.
The majority avoided this problem
by first noting that "peremptory chal-
lenges are not constitutionally protect-
ed fundamental rights; rather, they arebut one state-created means to the con-
stitutional end of an impartial jury and
a fair trial"
The court then focused not on the
defendant. but on the prospective ju-
rors. The majority determined that
when a lawyer uses a peremptory
challenge for racial reasons, the chal-
lenged juror has been discriminated
against - as has the integrity of the
jury, which is "a quintessential gov-
ernmental body." Consequently, said
the majority, it is appropriate to limit
the previously unbridled discretion the
defense enjoyed in using peremptory
challenges.
Majority Questioned
The dissenters noted that "defending
an accused is essentially a private
function, not state action." They ob-
served that the defense In a criminal
trial does not act as an agent of the
state, but as the adversary of the state.
It is therefore Illogical, they said, to
claim that a defendant's exercise of pe-
remptory challenges is the kind of gov-








As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in
his dissent "In the Interest of promot-
ing the supposedly greater good of
race relations In the society as a whole
... we use the Constitution to destroythe ages-old right of criminal defen-
dants to exercise peremptory chal-lenges as they wish, to secure a jurythat they consider fair"
It is likely that McCollum will have
several consequences not intended bythe majority. Although it Is meant to
-may well have the opposite effect. As
explained in an amicus brief filed *on
behalf of the defendant by the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund:
The ability to use peremptory
challenges to exclude majority
race jurors may be crucial to em-
panelling a fair jury. In many cas-
eas an African American, or other
minority defendant, may be faced
with a jury array in which his ra-
cial group is underrepresented to
some degree, but not sufficiently to
permit challenge under the Four-
teenth Amendment The only possi-
ble chance the defendant may have
of having any minority jurors on
the jury that actually tries him will
be if he uses his peremptories to
strike members of the majority
race.
Even if McCollum doesn't lead to an
increase in the number of all-white ju-
ries, it may well lead to the abolition of
peremptory challenges in all criminal
cases. Now that challenges on the basis.
of race are prohibited. It is reasonable
to believe that challenges on the basis
of gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation
and myriad other categories also will
be banned. Should this happen, jury se-
lection could become a morass of
claims, counterclaims and accusations
- not about the qualifications of jurors
but about the motives of the lawyers.
Should this happen, states may find it
easier simply to do away with
peremptories.
One last factor must be considered
when evaluating the ultimate impact
of McColum on criminal trials. Al-
though no appellate court will admit it,
most trial judges dislike peremptories
not for arcane constitutional reasons,
but because they are time-consuming.
The way many trial courts deal with
this Is to routinely deny even the most
obvious challenges for cause, in order
to force the lawyers to use up their
peremptories as quickly as possible.
Should McCounm result in the aboli-
tion of peremptories or even their se-
vere limitation, this practice by trial
judges could result in a dramatic in-
crease in the number of biased juries.
McCollum could be one of those rare
Supreme Court cases that have an im-
mediate and noticeable impact on the
practice of law in the state trial courts.
Criminal justice organizations would
be wise to monitor closely the effects of
this case on the actual makeup of state
juries in order to determine whether
the abolition of racially oriented per-
emptories results In more or fewer ra-
cially homogeneous juries.HAVING DECIDED a major
Callum, the Supreme CourtProceeded to resolve a pair
of much narrower cases
that clarify the manner In which men-tally impaired defendants are to be
tried,
Although the issue of criminal insan-
ity gets the most spectacular publicity,
mentally WI defendants firs must bejudged competent to stand trial before
they can even raise the insanity de-fense. For amentally handicapped de-
fendant to be found competent in most
Jurisdictions, he or she must be able tocomprehend the nature of the charges,
understand court procedures end ac-
tively assist In his or her own defense.A frequently contested issue in compe-
tency cases concerns which side hasthe burden of proof, and just what each
side must establish.
In Medin-a v. California. the court
upheld a California law that assigns
the defendant the burden of proving
that he or she is incompetent. More-
over, the California law requires that
the defendant overcome a legal pre-
sumption that all defendants are com-
petent to stand triaL
It is not at all surprising that the
court ruled this statute constitutional
Confinued on following page
Wver sic John Hinckley was laund
not guilty by reason of Insanity of the
tenpaed nItnurder of Ptesident Rea-
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ditricult. if not tapoesible, to raie
Oyr~magityeaseleteme to
crimninal Varges. Laws that place the
burden Of proof on the defense or estab-
lish a statutory presumption that all
defendants are competent and sane are
among the most common methods
states have used to eviscerate mental
health defenses.
Virtually all of these laws have been
deemed constitutional by state courts.
Medina, as expected, put the Supreme
Couta seal of approval on the process.
1sx another case. Biggina v. Nevada,'
the court explained some of the limits
on the manner in which a state can
conduct the trial of a mentally ill de-
tendant. David Riggins. a homicide de-
tendant, claimed that he was insane at
the time he committed the crime.
Amang the manifestations of his Inan-
ity were auditory hallucinations and
aleep; disorders. While awaiting trial,
however, the state forced him to take
Melaril. an anti-psychotic drug that
controlled his illness and these symp-
tomna
After his conviction, the defendant
claimed that by Involuntarily medicat-
Ing him, the state deprived him of the
opportunity to present an insanity de-
fense tairly. He asserted that by using
drugs to make him appear sane, the
prosecution prevented the jury from
seeing how he looked, acted and sound-
ed at the time of the crime, when he
was unmedicated. Moreover, Mr. Rig-
gins claimed that the sedative-like side
effects at Mellaril made it impossible
for him to play an active part in his
defense.
The majority held that if the state
can asow an overriding interest in
medicating a defendant, it is permissi-
ble to do so. There was no such show-
ing. however. in this case. Accordingly.
the maaority said. "Because the record
contains no finding that might support
a conclusion that administration of
antipsychotic medication was neces-
sary to accomplish an essential state
policy__.we -have no basis for saying
that the aubstantial probability of trial
prejudice in this case was justified."
This decision is in many respects
similar to that In Jacobson. In both
cases, the Supreme Court determined
that the state overstepped the bounds
at propriety. At the same time, though.
the majority opinions were crafted In
such a way as to guarantee the prose-
cution substantial leeway for action in
future cases.
The Thomas Dissents
One at the more noteworthy aspects
of Rippisn was Justice Thomas' dis-
sent Admitting that Mellaril may
have affected the defendant's demean-
or, Justice Thomas nonetheless argued
that there was nothing in the record to
show that Mr. Riggins did not receive
a fundamentally fair trial.
From the point of view of a trial ob-
server, this contention may seem as-
toniahing. The issue in Mr. Riggins'
case was whether he was so crazy
when the crime was committed that he
was not legally responsible. During tri-
al, he suffered from the same mental
disease that he had when he performed
the criminal act. Yet the jury was al-
lowed to see only a defendant from
whom the state had medically re-
moved the outward signs of insanity.
Justice Thomas' assertion that this
could not have affected the fundamen-
tal fairness of the trial has led some
commentators to object that he does
not understand that presenting one's
defense to the jury is an Integral part
of a fair trial.
Justice Thomas also attracted a con-
siderable amount of publicity for his
dissent in Hudson v. McMillian.' Hud-
son was an otherwise unremarkable
case in which a prison Inmate. Keith J.
Hudson. was handcuffed and beaten by
guards, while their supervising officer
looked on and warned them -not to
have too much fun."
A 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court
held that although Mr. Hudson did not
suffer serious injury from the beating,
his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment
was still violated. He therefore could
recover damages in a federal civil
rights action. In so ruling, the court
held that so long as an inmate's dam-
age is not de minimia, the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain provides
a baais for an Eighth Amendment
claim. even without proof of additional
serious injury.
One might think that regardless of
their ideological leanings. virtually all
jurists would agree that unauthorized
beatings inflicted on state prisoners by
state officials constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment. Yet Justice Thomas
dissented, holding that absent a show-
ing of serious physical Injury, the Con-
stitution is not Implicated by such
conduct. He asserted, "In my view, a
use of force that causes only Insignifi-
cant harm to a prisoner may be im-
moral, it may be tortious, it may be
criminal, and it may even be remedia-
ble under other provisions of the Fed-
eral Consitution, but it is not 'cruel and
unusual punishment.' -
Justice Thomas began his opinion in
Budson by expressing doubt about
whether the Eighth Amendment
should protect a prisoner from mis-
treatment that was not formally a part
of his or her sentence. He continued by
arguing that even It that amendment
may be violated by particular state
treatment of inmates, such a violation
must be predicated on the existence of
serious injury. He rejected the notion
that wanton and unnecessary Infliction
of pain. or other outrageous or de-
meaning treatment of Inmates, to suffi-
cient to call the "cruel and unusual"
clause into play.
Justice Thomas' views on this mat-
ter may well be shaped by unspoken
policy concerns. Justice Harry A.
Blackmun noted in his concurrence in
Hudson that many states admit to
using a "serious injury" requirement
as a means of limiting prisoner peti-
tions and lawsuits. Justice Blackmun
said, however, that the notion that en-
forcement of the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by a desire to prevent
prisoner litigation "has no appropriate
role in interpreting the contours of a
substantive constitutional right."
Even if Justice Thomas' opinion was
guided by policy concerns, it has been
vehemently attacked as cold-hearted.
Writing for the majority, Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor was surprisingly
harsh, stating that '"t)o deny, as the
dissent - does. the difference between
punching a prisoner in the face and
serving him unappetizing food is to ig-
nore the 'concepts of dignity. civilized
standards, humanity and decency' that
animate the Eighth Amendment."
That Justice Thomas voted as he did
in both Hudson and Biggins is not sur-
prising. His earlier record In criminal
cases was very favorable to the gov-
erinent, and he was nominated by an
administration that promised to ap-
point judges who are tough on crime.
What is surprising, however, is how lit-
tie sympathy he appeared to show for
defendants and prisoners who were
mistreated by the criminal justice
system.
During his confirmation hearings,
Clarence Thomas told a touching story
about how he watched from the win-
dow of his comfortable chambers as
young black prisoners were brought to
and from the courthouse, and thought.
"There but for the grace of God..."
From his ruling in Hudson, it is clearer
what he thinks can go on in jail. It is no
wonder that he is thankful to be on the
outside.
(1)112 S. CL. 15 (1992)
(2) 112 3. CL 2368 (192)
(3) 478 U.S. 79 (1988)
(4) 112 S. CL 2172 (1992).
(S) 112 S. CL 1810 (1992)
(M) 112 S. CL 9M5 (19921
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Amendment.
It has always been true in constitt
tional decision-making - and eve,
more so regarding the rules of ;e
speech - that doctrines slowly evolv
case by case from "undoubted... gra:
areas" to a workable standard.' Th
Rehnquist court appears to be break
ing the mold: It does not wish to wrea
tle with the workable standards a
precedent nor slowly render clarit]
from evolving areas of First Amend
ment law.
Instead, it seems that the couri
wants to tinker, to boldly create, tt
substitute new theory for evolving
precedent That these inventions ofter
produce sharp clashes with pre-exist
ing principles does not appear to gen
erate enough concern to ward off a
majority in the cases in which the as
chitecture is deemed relevant The jus-
tices have fallen victim to the
"irresistible impulse... to tinker with
the First Amendment"'
Two cases in the 1991-'92 term - Si.
man d Schuster u. New York State
Crime Victims Board' and R.A.V. v
City of St. Paul' - provide instructive
glimpses of this pattern of judicial pa.
nache and the dangers it may herald.
Each decision offers reasoning unlike-
ly to cut a path trod confidently by
bench or bar, and each decision seem-
ingly Is at odds with recent decisions
and established doctrine. This ap-
proach raises the question* Is a deci-
sion "right" even when its reasoning is
flawed - or worse. inscrutable? Or. ar-
ter all, is it just the result that mat-
ters? Unfortunately, it seems the
Rehnquist court has come to be char-
acterized as one preoccupied with out-
comes.
Questions Remain
Simon 4 Schuster was thought to be
a case about whether there is room for
a narrowly tailored version of the oft-
stated polICy that "crime does notpay." The provisions of the "Son of
Sam Law" of the state of New York
required that an accused or convicted
criminals Income from works describ-
ing his or her crime be deposited in an
escrow account for five years for thebenefit of victims and creditors.' TheSimon d Schuster decision was expect-
ed to provide a blueprint to guide decl-
sion-makag about holding criminals
responsible for the effects of their
crimes, a rather long-standitg policy
in most states.
The decision of the court in Simon 4Schuster was concise- The New York
law was unconstitutional because it
was content-based. The court also ac-knowledged the compelling interest ofthe federal government and the "8
states with similar laws, but the opin-Ion ended without discussing the con-
stitutionality of these laws. The opin-
Ion offered no Instruction an how to go
about furthering government interests
without violating the First Amend-
ment. Justice Harry A. Blackmun's
concurrence of three sentences voiced
concern not with what the court did,but with how it presented its rationale.Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, similarly
motivated, concurred to offer a de-
tailed. alternative analysis in support
of the result.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul was framed
as a case about the validity of blas-
motivated crime laws. which - like
the St Paul, Minn. ordinance at issue
Mr. James is a professor at Pepper-
dine University School of Law in Ma-
libu, Calif., where he teaches Constitu
tional law. He serves as the contribut-
ing editor of the Preview of UnitedStates Supreme Court Journal for the
American Bar Association.
2'peecbhseded to be brought to a anlm.
Justie Byron R. White noted in his
Q concurrence that "the Court's insis-
em Anwenting its brand of First
Asmendament underinclusiveness puz-
ales me.. .[the assortment of excep-
tions the Court attaches to its rule
belles the majority's claim... that ItsD ecisons lashnew theory is truly concerned withWithnt dsrecedaton.sWS It can be argued that the majority IntSA.V. did not advance the position ofspeech previously deemed unprotect-ed. States may still punish, through
apunish nti-social conduct that ithatpunsh nt-soialcoduc tat s ad ndeerinate nature. m eets the Miller standard for obscen-intended to "arouse anger, alarm or The Perils that this tinkering creates ty.- that satifies the libel test of Nowresentment in others on the basis of should be Immediately clear. It in one rO-I Times and Get-" or that fallsrace, color, creed, religion or gender." thing to say, as A normative matter, within the Chaplinasy definition ofThat the harm caused by such acts that laws that discriminate on the ha- fighting words - wo bycould be punished independently A1sofcontentarebadandwilbestct thi e rc ic
through other. content-neutral ordi- hi eyutrnc nlc nuyothrough oters contveentn uite brdi ly scrutinized and routinely Lnvalidat- tend to Incite an immediate breach ofnances appears to have beenuite he ed, while laws that are content-neutral the Peace.be The .V. majority citedsides the point - the assumption by will survive. itzis quite Another t with approval the prior law tat holdsthe policy-makers in .V. was thatn ssuch conduct should be discouraged by ive matter, to provide A principled ha- sentlal part of any exposition ofofficial sanction. Moreover, their ob- sis for distinguishing what ia permit- Idea."jective was to tailor the law narrowly ted from what In proscribed. Eventhe But the majority repudiated the CAt-enough so that bias-motivated acts smallest distortion can make the job of egorical model of free speech protec-could be prosecuted as unprotected governing difficult and the protection tion, and with it much of the clarityspeech. As such. E.LV. was expected of individual liberties problematic. based on such a framework. Accordingto provide guidelines for furthering the 
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_400 - to Justice White In his concurringinterest of protecting communities opinion the majority "obscures thefrom bias-motivated threats to public HE ROUTE selected by the line between speech that [can] be regu-safety and order. RLV. majority" to Invalidate lated freely on the basis of content andA unanimous Supreme Court held in the St. Paul ordinance may be that which [can] be regulated on theB.A.V. that St. Paul's blas-motivated viewed as hazardous, largely basis of content only upon a showing ofcrime ordinance was facially invalid. because It includes no clear a Compelling Interest.- What isubsti-But the justices sharply disagreed on monuments of recent doctrine to light tuted In a scheme based on ' the prop-the way. osition that a particular instance ofSThe Juvenile In rA.V. was accused speech Can be proscribabe on the basis
of burning a cross inside of the fenced of one feature.. but not on the basis of






the rationale. A majority of five jua-
tices reasoned that Tajsuming ar-
guendo that all of the expression
reached by the ordinance is proscriba-
ble under the lfighting words' doctrine.
nonetheless the ordinance is facially
unconstitutional in that it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely onthe basis of the subjects the speech ad-
dres "' The novelty of this rationale
lies In the fact thai, previously. "tight
ing words" were included In the unpro-
tected category of speech and were
subject to reasonable regulations.
This rationale was variously at-tacked by the four remaining justices
as resting on points not properly before
the court' as an abandonment of prece-
dents without the benefit of briefing
as resting on an unnecessary, untried
theory that disrupted well-settled prin-
ciples of First Amendment law-" and
as unworkable in any event because of
the conditions and exceptions attached
to It"
Some observers regard it as ironic
that two cases concerning content-
based laws should merit such atten-
tion. It should be well settled at this
point that the First Amendment im-
poses certain limits on the ability of a
government to regulate the expressive
activities of its citizens based on the
content of the message. The estab-
lished dichotomy between content-
based restrictions and content-neutral
time, place and manner restrictions
had settled expectations about the
kinds of regulation on expression that
would be tolerated.
But settled expectations in First
Amendment doctrine under the Rehn-
qulat Court appear to have deteriorat.
ed quickly. Cases that once were some-
what predictable now seem to present
issues of a surprisingly speculative
tempted prosecution under the St. Pau
Blas-Motivated Crime Law seemet
vulnerable to a challenge under estab
lished precedent only if the juvenile
could claim that his expression was
protected under the First Amendment
or only if, despite the unprotected na-
ture of the expression, the law proved
to be overbroad The juvenile took the
latter course and argued that the law
was facially invalid. In defense, the
city of St Paul offered a construction
of the law by the Minnesota SupremeCourt that limited its enforcement to
unprotected "fighting worda."
The majority's route through the
First Amendment landscape In RA.V.
redefined traditional markers. The
majority accepted the limiting con-
struction of the law and conceded that
the polICy interests behind the law
were compelling and were promoted
by the prosecution, but it decided that
the "dangers of censorship" required
invalidation."
The reasoning in RA.V. appeared to
cut a circuitous path. Approaching thefork In the road that identities, at onejuncture. strict protection of speech
against content-based regulations and,
at the other, unprotected speech sub-ject to reasonable regulations, the ma-jority explained that these are not
literal choices but only contextual
ones. This explanation makes it possi-
ble to end up at the same destination -
Invalidation - without regard for the
route chosen.
The unprotected categories of
speech, as stated by the EA.V. major-
Ity, are not "entirely invisible to the
Constitution"" and cannot be regulated
with impunity. Conspicuously avoiding
use of the word "categories," the ma-
Jority concluded that the unprotected
"areas of speech can, consistently with
the First Amendment, be regulated be-
cause of their constitutionally proacri-
bable content (obscenity, defamation,
etc.) - [but] not. .. made the vehicles
for content discrimination unrelated to
their distinctively proscribable con-
tent.""
One might well speculate that the
tinkering with the rules of content-
based regulations in RA. V. has less todo with dissatisfaction over the cate-
gorical approach and more to do - asJustice Blackmun wrote - with the
perception by the majority that the
A New Scheme
This new scheme does not appear to
have either substantive clarity nor as-
l certainable contours. Even when a
government has a compelling interest
- as the majority found for the city ofSt. Paul - "[t]he dispositive question
... is whether content discrimination is
reasonably necessary in order to
achieve [the city'] compelling inter-
ests; it plainly Is not An ordinance not
limited to the favored topics would
have precisely the same beneficial
effect.
The majority's approach does re-
move lawmakers from the politically.
correct-speech movement But it ap-
pears to do so at great cost. by re-
articulating the nature of police powerfor state and local governments when
regulating speech. Health, safety and
welfare remain a valid basis for regu-
lating speech that meets the definition
of the unprotected areas of speech.
Even cross-burning can still be pun-Ished. but only as a violation of the fire
code. And a government may punish
only those violations of the fire code
that take place on someone's front
lawn and are motivated by hate. But
under BA.V. it seems the government
loses its capacity to express moral
outrage.
To use an example supplied by the
majority, a city council could enforce a
broad general policy against obaceni-
ty, but "could (not) enact an ordinance
prohibiting only those legally obscene
works that contain criticism of the city
government," or those that advocate
physical harm to women, or promote
racist messages. A government cannot
rest on its morals as a proxy for prose-
cuting specific expressive acts even if
the acts fall in an area of speech that
can be regulated through a reasonable,
generally applicable law. This is puz-
zling because in its previous term, the
court upheld a content-based regula-tion that prohibited non-obscene nude
dancing on the basis of the state's mor-
al interest."
By any standard. the tinkering inRA.V. can be criticized as unwarrant-
ed. First, the unprotected areas of
speech are so deemed because they are
capable of categorization. The need for
Continued on following page




pression. Second, there Is atready an
effective safeguard In place to respond
to the imprecision that results when a
government attempts to regulate ar-
eas that defy categorization the over-
breadth test
The overbreadth rules represent a
threshold requirement that state laws
provide a clear description of the stan-
dard of conduct to which they apply, so
that the constitutionality of a law does
not depend on the discretion of a police
officer or other government official.
and so that the public knows what con-
duct is permitted or required. The
*'R.V. case, as urged by the four con-
curring justices." could easily have
been decided on these terms. There
does not seem to be a need to make
viewpoint neutrality an Issue when any
government interest outweighs the
alight value - as a matter of law for
unprotected speech - found in fighting
words.
A viewpoint often supplies an essen-
tial element In laws that regulate
Speech Solely -n the nsin of the sub-
jects the speech addresses. The court
maybe obilged lo cbLrify the matter.
IMON ad .SCHirummn wepe-
sents a fair predictor of how.
after R.AV., It will be more
difficult for the court to make
a clarifying statement or re-
turn to rudiments. The apparent dis-
tortion resulting in Simon d Schuster
stems from the court's failure to clari-
fy prior tinkering on the standards for
determining a content-based regula-
tion. After Simon d Schuster, the confu-
sion remains.
There is no doubt that the Son of
Sam Law of the state of New York la
keyed to storytelling about crimes. The
gist of the case was summarized by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
A statute is presumptively inconsistent
with the First Amendment if it imposes a
financial burden an speakers because of the
content of their speech... This is a notion so
engrained in our First Amendment juris-
prudence that last Term we found it so "ob-
vious" as to not require explanation."
'TLecmnrth rationate.Swuwever.dioes
require some explanation. The nature
of the courts characterization of the
Jaspacter fhe)iewYorkdowenalpeech
.conflicts with a lurry ,t recent deci-
-gonsdneshichtheasMr-twhsdggdegla-
tions an free speech less harshly."
These decisions influenced an argu-
ably mistaken consensus as to what
the rules permitted. This consensus in-
volved nearly all of the states. Con-
gress and the federal court judges in
Simon d& Schuster who created. the low-
er court record for review by the Su-
preme Court.
The problem in Simon d Schuster
may be that the First Amendment
landscape was so cluttered with modi-
fications to the established rule that it
was hard to recognize the rudiments.
The pre-Sinon & Schuster decisions
of the court provide, as Justice Wil-
liam Z. Brennan once observed, "count-
less excuses for content-based suppres-
sion of. .. speech.. .whenever censors
can concoct 'secondary' rationaliza-
tions for regulating the content."" U.S.
v. O'Brien" introduced a relaxed stan-
dard for regulating symbolic speech
when the interest of the government is
unrelated to the suppression of expres-
"~'~"A
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provided a similar blueprint for regu-
lations on so-called "pure" speech an-
Bter the following rationale:
To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters
that specialize in adult films diferently
from other kinds of theaters. Neverthe-
less... the Renton ordinance is aimed not at
the content of the films shown at "adulf me-
tion picture theaters," but rather at the sec-
ondary effects ofsuch theaters on the Sur-
rounding community...{Tjhe City Coun-
cil's... (prevailing concerns) were with the
secondary effects of adult theaters, and not
with the content of adult films themselves."
In addition to the above cases, Cohen
v. Comles Media Co." allowed the gov-
ernment to bypass the First Amend-
ment altogether, punishing protected
speech under a generally applicable
law because "enforcement of such gen-
eral laws against the press.Is not sub-
ject to stricter scrutiny than would be
applied to enforcement against other
persons or organizations.""
-*---*****---I SIMONV d SCHUSTER. the trial
court judge applied O'Brien with
the following analysis:
The state's interest in compensating
crime victims is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression and any burden on
free expression is merely incidental. [The
New York statute] is not designed to sup-
press speech which it finds abhorrent or
obscene, or that the community is simply
hostile to. The speech itself is not the target
of (the astatutek the profit-making aspect is
the target. It Is not necessarily abhorrent to
the public to read about (the author's]...ac-
tivities as a mobster. To many, that is a
source of Interest and of news value. The
clearly abhorrent and repulsive aspect is
that with the admission of his crimes. [the
author... is able to profit The Court finds
that the statute does not reflect legislative
hostility to the viewpoint of an author who
writes about criminal activity."
Some observers believe that the Su-
preme Court should have been obliged
to discuss the proper role of the lower-
standard cases. But the matter is side-
stepped in the only footnote of the
opinion-
Because the Son of Sam law is so overin-
elusive, we need not address the Boarda
eantention that the statute Is content neu-
tral under our decisions in Ward v. Rock
ainsut Racism.. .and Renton v. Playtime
Theatres Inc...A regulation is not "narrow-
ly tailored" - even under the more lenient
tailoring standards applied in Ward and
Renton - where, as here "a substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not
serve to advance (the state's content-nec-
tral) goals." Thus whether the Son of Sam
law is analysed as content neutral...or con-
tent based... It le too overinclusive to satis-
ty the requirements of the First Amend-
ment.,
The court's avoidance seems to com-
pound the confusion. A lower standard
of review would matter to the analysis.
Under the lower standard "the require-
ment of narrow tailoring is satisfied
'so long as the regulation promoted a
substantial government Interest that
would be achieved less effectively ab-
sent the regulation.' - Under this stan-
dard, the New York law would be valid
The court specifically limited applica
tion of the overbreadth doctrine at this
level of review to complete bans or
protected speech." Any financial disin
centive created by the statute's five
year escrow policy falls short of this
standard.
Ultimately, the description of con-
tent discrimination should be a
straightforward task. Former Justice
Brennan criticized the type of ap-
proach taken by the Simon d Schuster
court:
(The current] analysis provides none of
Continued on page S12
-Ax Poised Over Habeas
BY ViviAN BEItGER
pea m The Nation Law Journal
defense bar, the loudestACCORDING to the capitalnoise from the U.S. Su-
preme Court last term was
made by the shoe that did-
O't drop - in a penny-ante larceny
case, Wright v. West,' that did not in-
volve the death penalty.-
In West. the justices unanimously
upheld a conviction yet declined to lim-
it the scope of habeas corpus review in
a way that would have turned the clock
back to the early part of the century.
Although averting disaster general-
ly, defendants as a group received seri-
oua, If expected, setbacks in two habe-
as decistns. Mlssisppi's death row
imates, however, achieved a victory
In this area.'
Capital litigants whose cases arose
on direct attack fared much better
than those whose cases arose on collat-
eral attack. losing in only a single in-
atance.' The overall scorecard reads as
follows: 1-4 against petitioners in habe-
as actions and 5-1 for death-sentenced
prisoners in other settings, a bottom
line of six wins and five losses in the
1991-12 term.'
It would exaggerate the positive to
view these results as a more than 50
percent success rate. The habeas de-
feats dwarfed the triumphs in direct
litigation. Several of these triumphs.
moreover, did not turn on issues specif-
te to capital punishment.
In addition, recent grants of certiora-
suggest that the Supreme Court may
ntinue to chip away at habeas pro-
rather than ax them in one fell
swoop. This tack will cause equivalent
damage to defendants in the long run.
Further. as many anticipated, re-
tired Justice Thurgood Marshall's re-
placement, Justice Clarence Thomas,
hews thus far to the government's side
- Indeed. to Its most extreme position
- to the same extent that his predeces-
sor espoused the cause of capital de-
fendants.'
Challenge to Habeas
Advocates of death row inmates can
take some comfort from the fact that
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Jus-
tice Anthony M. Kennedy have shown
an Increasing independence from the
hard right wing of the Supreme Court.*
Nowhere was this disposition - It is
premature to call it a trend - plainer
than in the highly significant habeas
area and, above all, in Wright v. West.
As originally litigated. West raied
the relatively trivial issue of whether
the 4th US. Circuit Court of Appeals
erred in holding the evidence Insufd-*
clent under Jackae v. Virpinia' to sus-
tain a larceny conviction. In Jackson,
the Supreme Court held that a convic-
tion violates due process If it is sup-
ported only by evidence from which
"no rational trier of fact could have
found proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt."'
But, after agreeing to hear West, the
court sent shock waves through the
capital defense bar by asking the par-
ties to brief and argue another issue:
Should a federal district court continue
Ms. Berger is a professor and vice
at Columbia University School of
o, specializing in the death penaltyfield. She also serves as a general coun-
sel to the American Civil Liberties
Union and is of counsel to the NAACP
Legal Defense A Educational Fund Inc.
to give de novo review to a state
court's application of law to specific
facts - or, instead. should the rules be
changed to allow a district court to
honor a state court's reasonable deci-
siaon regarding these so-called mixed
questions of law and fact?
The Bush administration and other
proponents of habeas restrictions, ap-
pearing as amid for Virginia in sup-
port of a changed approach, essential-
ly sought to end-run Congress - which
has for years considered and rebuffed
similar so-called reforms. Indeed. In
its last session, Congress refused to en-
act legislation that would require fed-
eral district courts to defer to "full and
fair" state court adjudications.
The Supreme Court, in the end. de-
clined its own invitation to make
sweeping changes. It simply held the
evidence in West adequate under the
traditional Jackson rubric."
Had the justices endorsed the revi-
sionist tack, they would have sounded
the death knell for habeas corpus. The
statute already prescribes deference to






thermore, to the extent that purely le-
gal questions are distinguishable from
mixed questions, it is inconceivable
that a federal district court willing to
defer on the latter would not do the
same on the former.
Indeed. Virginia and her allies relied
heavily on the claim that the retroac-
tivity doctrine recently launched by
the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane"
already amounted to virtual adoption
of a hands-off approach to matters of
law. Except in the rarest of circum-
stances, Teague's principle bars habe-
as petitioners from relying. on new
rules of criminal procedure and deems
new any rule that a state court had
reasonably rejected.Y ET WRIGHT v. West re-Ymains important because Itspointed battle of dicta yieldsInteresting Insights into the
future prospects of habeas,
absent legislative amendment.
Justice Thomas, writing the plurali-
ty opinion for himself, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice An-
tonin Scalia, gave the narrowest possi-
ble account of the pedigree of de novo
review. His opinion clearly implied
that these three will embrace defer-
ence with open arms, when and if they
succeed in amassing two more votes.
Surprisingly, however, Justice
O'Connor - no tan of habeas - con-
curred only in the judgment. She wrote
separately, together with Justice Har-
ry A. Blackmun and Justice John Paul
Stevens. solely to express sharp dis-
agreement with Justice Thomas' ver-
sion of history.
Using such words as "mischaracter-
izes" and "errs" to describe the "Tho-
mist" account, Justice O'Connor de-
picted as longstanding the principle
that federal courts should consider fed-
eral constitutional Issues independent-
ly. She also viewed that principle as
unimpugned by developments in retro-
activity law. Perhaps most critical,
she suggested that Congress' reluc-
tance to alter the rule should dissuade
the Supreme Court from taking precip-itate action.
Justice Kennedy authored his own
opinion concurring in the result Unex-
pectedly hoisting the state and Its ami-
ci with their own petard, he remarked
that a stringent retroactivity doctrine
"provides added justification for re-
taining de novo review, not a reason to
abandon it." He reasoned that Teague,
with Its fLnality-enhancing safeguards,
helps to define a limited and, thus, ap-
propriate sphere for re-examination of
state court decisions.
No more than Justice O'Connor,
therefore, does Justice Kennedy ap-
pear inclined to administer the ulti-
mate blow to habeas.
Eseasy v. Tamayo-ieres
In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes," anoth-
er non-capital case, Justice O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy once again paired
to voice a view of the writ more gener-
ous than the one urged by the govern-
ment Unfortunately for criminal de-
fendants, this time they were in the
minority.
In Keeney, a Cuban Immigrant, who
had pleaded nolo contendere to a man-
slaughter charge, later attempted to
obtain an evidentlary hearing on his
claim that the plea was invalid be-
cause the court-appointed translator
had not accurately explained to him
the Intent element of the crime. The
defendant had almost no knowledge of
English.
The 9th Circuit, finding that the ma-
terial facts had been inadequately de-
veloped in the state collateral chal-
lenge, held that the defendant was
entitled to a federal district court hear-
ing because counsel's failure to make a
sufficient factual record did not
amount to a deliberate bypass of state
procedures under the criterion of Pay
v. NOWa," as adopted in Totonsend v.
Sain."
The Supreme Court. speaking
through Justice Byron R. White. re-
versed the appellate court's decision.
Five members of the court overruled
Townsend in pertinent part.
In the name of uniformity of habeas
law, the Supreme Court substituted the
much stricter test for relief governing
state procedural detauits and repeti-
tive federal writs. Under this standard,
a prisoner can get a new hearing as of
right only If able to demonstrate
"cause for his failure to develop the
facts in state-court proceedings and
actual prejudice," or a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" in the absence
of such a hearing."
Echoing his insight in Wright v.
West. Justice Kennedy, as well as Jus-
tice O'Connor in her separate dissent"
stressed the important distinction be-
tween threshold inquiries governing
whether a habeas court will even hear
the merits of a claim, and rules re-
garding the manner in which a habeas
court should resolve a matter that is
already properly before It. In the sec-
ond situation - presented by Tamayo-
Reyes - concerns for finality, comity
and federalism are somewhat weaker
than in the first. Therefore, they must
yield to the overriding goal of accura-
cy in determinations.
Justice O'Connor also noted that fed-
wal 4I0trict tourts continue to have
discretion to hold hearings "even
where they are not mandatory.-
Sewyer v. Whiley .
Habeas applicants in papital cases
lost further ground In Sawyer v. Whit-
ley." In that case, the Supreme Court
for the fIrst time issued a unanimous
plenary decision upholding a defen-
dant's sentence of death.
In Sawyer, the defendant argued that
he met the standard of miscarriage ofjustice. which the court earlier had
equated with a demonstration of "actu-
al innocence." Such a demonstration
would have permitted his abusive and
successive claims to be considered in a
second habeas petition, even absent a
showing of cause and prejudice. Saw-
yer required the court to define the elu-
sive concept of actual Innocence as
applied to a capital sentence - a task
that It had sidestepped in several pre-
vious cases.
Although the justices all agreed that
the Sawyer defendant had not carried
his burden, they differed markedly on
what that was - in terms of both the
substance and the persuasiveness of
the requisite showing. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnqulst, a majority of
six held that a death-sentenced habeas
petitioner "must show by clear and
convincing evidence that but for a con-
stitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found [him] eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable
state law."
Emphasizing the narrowness of the
miscarriage-of-justice doctrine, the
Supreme Court disavowed the defen-
dant's proposed inquiry into whether
the jury had been presented with a
"factually inaccurate sentencing pro-file." Chief Justice Rehnquist also re-
jected as too limited the government's
suggested test, which looked only to
whether the petitioner could impugn
his guilt of the underlying murder.
Purporting to adopt a middle ground,
the court nonetheless announced an ex-
tremely strict standard.
Justice Stevens, concurring In the
judgment with Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor, faulted the majority in sev-
eral respects. First, the concurring jus-
tices criticized the opinion for forcing
the defendant to cast doubt either on
his commission of the crime or on all
of the aggravating factors, reasoning
that the court had slighted the critical
significance of mitigating evidence in
capital punishment jurisprudence. The
concurrence also charged that the
court inexplicably had abandoned pri-
or precedent by demanding clear and
convincing proof of actual innocence,
rather than merely proof of a probable
miscarriage of justice.
The Stevens group would have let
the prisoner prevail on a demonstra-
tion that. taking account not only of
eligibility criteria but also of mitigat-
ing circumstances, the capital sen-
tence more likely than not was clearly
erroneous. Justice Blackmun. writing
separately, grimly observed that the
more the Supreme Court restricts the
power of federal courts to reach death-
sentenced Inmates' claims, the more it
"undermines the very legitimacy of
capital punishment"
Other Cases
The one decision finding for a habeas
corpus petitioner does not materially
belle that assessment. Stringer v.
Black" allowed Mississippi defendants
whose judgments had become final to
take advantage of earlier holdings and
argue that if a sentencing court weighs
a vague aggravating circumstance,
the death penalty is Invalid. While wel-
come to defense attorneys, the case did
not pronounce any novel principles.
Perhaps, however, the majority opin-
ion by Justice Kennedy does portend a
slight relaxation of the post-Teague
court's hostility to capital prisoners'
requests to benefit from previous fa-
vorable rulings."
Continued on following page
whan asse sony 4ales waam anear-
ring dicta. Issued in the previous term.
"The detmace glaisamdaals
venaining 4m
The broadest _1itel asi..- 4n for-
pan v. oWhte
and five of his colleagues held that an
Illinois trial court's refusal to ask po-
tential jurors whether they would au-
tomatically impose the death sentence,
If they convicted the accused of mur-
der, violated due process. Such voir
dire was necessary, the Supreme Court
held, to effectuate the defendant's right
to challenge for cause any juror who
could not impartially "consider the ev-
idence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances as the instructions re-
quire(d] him to do.-
Justice Scalia. dissenting with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thom-
as, viewed the outcome with dismay as
4tly hIe i eM1WIJ'toa INe~enitted to
sit in judgment.
Sbmwadditfialaed ehmsaldressed
-hodgepodge of Issues. In Socodr v.
Jrerida,"a slm anajority held that a
Florida trial judge's erroneous weigh-
ing of an unsupported aggravating fac-
tor was not cured when the Florida
Supreme Court failed to perform
harmless-error analysis.
In Datwson v. Delaware," the defen-
dant also prevailed. Over Justice
Thomas' lone dissent, the Supreme
Court struck down a death sentence be-
cause it violated the First Amendment
The court determined that the bare
stipulation to the defendant's member-
ship in a white racist prison gang was
irrelevant to the question of the appro-
priate penalty. Chief Justice Rehnqulst
emphasized. however, that the result
<ert apretrier t.o theadminstan
of evidence concerning one's beliefa
amdwaociations at aentencing."
Figppns v. Nevada" and Media v.
California," which only incidentally in-
volved capital defendants, both dealt
with mental illness. In Biggins, the
court upset the conviction and sen-
tence because the Nevada courts had
failed to make findings sufficient to
justify forced administration of anti-
psychotic drugs to the accused during
trial. In Medina, the court ruled that a
state constitutionally may place upon
the accused the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he
or she is competent to be tried.
Next term's docket reveals that the
justices will continue to grapple with
habeas. Among other things, they will
Dea Sweraman
litigation confronting Fourth Arn
ment claims," and even to revisit
global issue ducked in West. The
tices - also will face the questics
whether a capital defendant may
actual innocence as a sword, not on
shield. to obtain relief in habeas
ceedings."
Thus, by next summer, a num
heavy shoes may have dropped -
likely on the heads of death-senten
prisoners.
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the clear lines or sanctuaries the First
Amendment demands. The traditional ap-
proach sets forth a bright-line rule: any re-
striction on speech, the application of which
turns on the content of the speech, is a con-
tent-based restriction regardless of the mo-
tivatian that lies behind it That, to my
mind, has always been Implicit in the fact
that we term the test a "content- based" test
rather than a "motivation-based" test The
trdlitional rule thus provides clear guid-
sance. Governments can ascertain the scope
at Iapermissible regulation. Individuals
can ascertain the scope of their constitu-
Ional protecion.
The conclusion suggested by the
court's First Amendment decisions
this term seems to be: When tinkering,
If the opposition can't be convinced,
then confuse them.
(1) Jusice Slackmna obraved that, May con-
atiutiSnal nsadards Involve "'undoubted eray
area,...ad despite the diffoulties that this
Court sad Other COrts have encountered so tar, itermaly Might be fair to venture the aesumptua
that case'br'ase development would lead to a
Wortable Steadard. Garei a. San Antanto Mtro-
pontan Treasit. 4se U5 520, S3 (1985), quoting
from Ply v. UA. 421 UAS 042. 558 (117).
(2) AV. v. city of St. Paul. 0 U.1W. 467(1192). Jusnte White coacurtoag.(s) in a C. son (151).
as  A..L.W. a?.() N.Y. eo. se .ansal pratese "*6:-
sy parau firs. Corporatio. partneship ameod*
aioen o ther legal eaty conr'cter with a
peronn.. .aewlving the reenaeet so su.ch
crala b way ofa aemvie, hook. agnsal selod.
tape rscweeg. pboaograph recod. radio or tel.
visona 3menaion, live etertaineaen ot any
load, or beem the expesalon ofsec accusemd or
coaved p.eson' a thoughta. teelings. opintens or
emoins regardag sch Cr1Ie, shall etthsit a
cpy at Such Contract to the board snd pay over to
the board say moneye wach would otherwie, by
tems of teh Cotrse, be owing to the persen s.
aeesed or convicted or hiswpesentauv'
( Z L Paul. Mi1. tas. Code 20502 (1990).
which, in all. provided "Whoever plae son pubic
or private property a syMoL otoect. appellation.
charactertralion or graffiti. Including, ba not lim-
lied to. b uning cras or Mag swastika. which
ne koa or has reaeonable rods to kno
a &# age, mala or rsenotment in other. on
the bais at race, color. creed. rtlgon or geder
coassits disorerly conduct and shall be guilty of
a isadaessanor."
(7) 00 U.&A.W. at 4f68
() Id. a mIS (White, J. Concurring).
(0) Id.
(10) Id. at 171
(11l Id. at e0 (Stevens. J. concurriag).
(121 Justlew Sealis wrote the majority optaton
He ws lted by Chief Juetice Rehnqutst and
Jsotices Knsaedy. Souter and Thomas.(13) 00 t...LW. at 4072.
(14) rd. at 454e.
(15) Id. temphaeis added).(1) Id. at 0578.
(27) Id. at 4874. ft. &
(2) MIller v. Calforiaba. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).(10 New York TImes v. sualano. 570 US. 255(104): Gerts v. Robert Welc. 628 US. 323 (174).
(I) Chapiasky v.7 ew Hampshire, s U.S. 588.
70 (2942).
(25) so U.LW. at 44e". citing na US. at sm(21 Id. at 4074.
(2S) Id. at 449.(24) Id. at 4072.
(25) Id. a 4400
(2) Barnes v. Glen Theater. 111 S. CL 2454
(121).
(27) Juasees White, Blackmun. O'Connor and
Stevens See WD U.S.L.W. at 4673.
(20) 11S . CL S0L 500 (1091) (Citations omitted).
(29) See III & CL 245e (1991): Ward v. Rock
Against Ractsm 109 & CL. 2746 (1989); Pri.by v.
Schultc, 108 S. CL. 2495 (1988).
(30) Booe v. Barry. 45 U1.S. 312. 354 (1088)
(Brennan. I.conscurrtag).
(31) 391 U.S. 367. (1908).
(32) 475 U. 5. 41 (1080).
(33) Ed at 47 (Cliations omitted: emphasis
(34) 111 S. CL 2513 (1991).
(35) Id.
(30) Slmon & Schuster v. Member, of the Noew
York Stalte Cries. Victse Board. 724 F. Supp. 10.
t7y (1919).
(27) 112 S. CL '01. 311 (citaioln olitted).(38) 491 U.S. at Too (1gag'.(38) Id. at C. 7.
(40) 83 U.S. 312. 338 (Breenan, .. concurring).
By PAMELA S. KARLAN
Sp.al o The Na.a L. joul
tions of doom. reports ofCONTR.ARY to the predic-the deaths of Brown U.
Board of Education' and
Roe v. Wade' have been
greatly ixaggerated.'
No modern U.S. Supreme Court cas-
es have sparked more controversy or
more intense popular resistance than
Brown and Roe. This past term, the
Supreme Court dealt once again with
the legacy of these decisions.
In U.S. v. Fordice,' the Supreme
Court reversed an en banc decision of
the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
and held that Mississippi had not met
Its obligation to dismantle its dual sys-
tem of higher education. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey.' the court declared that
"the essential holding of Roe v. Wade
should be retained and once again
reaffirmed."
These two cases show that although
the court may be interested In rethink.
Ing Its approach to controversial con-
stitutional issues, it is not willing to
ignore the dictates of stare decisis in
response to political pressures.
Forai actually involved two law-
suits. In one, the U.S. government
brought an action against Mississippi
state officials to enforce Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. which forbids
racial discrimination In federally as*
sisted programs. In the other, black
Mississippi citizens Instituted a class
action to dismantle the state's dual
education system.
Resistance to Desegregation
In finding for the government and
the private plaintiffs. Justice Byron R.
White's majority opinion began by not-
ing Mississippi's history of resistance
to the court's 194 command in Brown
that "the concept of 'separate but eq-
ual' has no place in the field of public
education."'
The majority pointed out that de
spite Brown. MississippI's university
system remained entirely segregated
until protracted litigation forced the
admission of James Meredith to the
University of Mississippi In 1962. Even
after the massive show of federal judi-
cial and executive force expended to
gain Mr. Meredith's admittance, an-
other dozen years passed while Missis.
sippi retained Its segregated system.
The court noted that 'Tb]y the mid-
1980s. 30 years after Brown. more than
99 percent of MississippI's white stu-
dents were enrolled" at the system's
historically white universities while
'[s~eventy-one percent of the State's
black students" attended the three his-
torically black colleges, "where the ra-
cial composition ranged from 92 to 99
percent black.'"
In holding that Mississippi had not
yet shown the "complete] abandon-(mentr' of Its segregated system. the
court identified four "constitutionally
suspect" elements.
First, the court noted that admis-
Ms. Karlan is a visiting associate
professor of law at Yale Law School for
the fall of 1992 and an associate profes-
sor of law at the University of Virginia.
She and Eben Moglen were co-authors
of an ameicus brief supporting Planned
Parenthood in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v- Casey,
filed on behalf of 178 organizations.
sas policies set cutoff scores On stan-deadized tests that barred more than
percent of the state's black high
sool seniors from the state's three
,ajor. traditionally white Institutions.
The court also pointed out that the
sate had preserved all eight pre-exist-
1:4 institutions in the state system de-
spite the fact that historically white
a-=d historically black institutions
were geographically close to each Oth-
er This situation encouraged students
tc choose an Institution at which their
This past term, the
Supreme Court dealt
once again with the
legacy of Brown and
Roe.
race was in the majority..
The court further remarked upon the
rkdespread duplication of programs at
bhack and white institutions, which re-
znaved a significant Incentive for stu-
dents to choose traditionally other-
race institutions in order to receive
uzique educational benefits.
And the court observed that, in 1981.
Klssissippi may have both Influenced
s=dent choice and perpetuated the
re limited scope of black institu-
ti-ns by adopting a scheme of "Institu-
tinal misaion classification." This
scheme ranked three of the state's five
historically white Institutions - and
nine of Its three traditionally black in-
sutions - as "comprehensive" uni-
Tw'sities authorized to offer doctoraldegrees and "to assert leadership In
certain diseiplinaea."
Consistently. the court spotted the
a-ecedents of these ostensibly race-
nextral policies within the deliberately
daicriminatory measures of the peri-
o's of de jure segregation and overt
z=assive resistance to desegregation.
Trus. when the court referred to its
IS declaration in Lane v. Wilson' -
tZau the equal protection clause out-
laws "'sophisticated as well as simple-
z=ded modes of discrimination' " - it
seemed clear that Mississippi's history
Of *esistance to the commands of the
1w:h Amendment provided the essen-
ti. backdrop to the court's holding In
F.-dice.
By contrast. in the other desegrega-
ti- case this past term, Freeman v.
P-s," the Supreme Court approved
th.e partial withdrawal of judicial con-
t-: over Georgia's DeKalb County
S=ool System in light of the "dedica-
ti:~c and good faith that the school
sr-em had shown in dismantling Its
p"riously segregated schools.
Ccmaitmient to Stare Decisis
1992. Brown Is sacrosanct. Dis-
ag-ement with its fundamental pre-
ce-:a is simply outside the pale of
cr:cemporary legal discourse."
Sut. as the great legal historian Sir
F--deric W. Maitland once remarked,
it s very hard to remember that
erats now long in the past were once
fat n the future. Thirty-five years ago,
B en was every bit as controversial
a-- 2'oe is today. For the Supreme Court
re.-'atedly to reaffirm Brown in a
string of cases throughout the late
1950s and the 1960s required not only a
commitment to principles of stare de-
cisis and Institutional self-protection,
but also a firm belief in the essential
rightness of Its holding.
That may be what is happening - at
least for a majority of the current Su-
preme Court - to the second most di-
visive constitutional issue of contem-
porary times: abortion. Handed down
three days after Fordice, Casey both
Implicitly and explicitly wrapped itself
in the mantle of Brown as the court
refused to retreat from the principles
announced in Roe.
In Casey. the Supreme Court gener-
ally reaffirmed Roe's holding that a
woman's decision to obtain an abortion
is constitutionally protected as a liber-
ty interest Specifically, the court up-
held certain provisions in a Pennsylva
nia statute restricting a woman's abili-
ty to obtain an abortion, while striking
down other provisions In the statute.
The provisions upheld Included the
requirement that a doctor wait to per-
form an abortion until 24 hours after
receiving informed consent trom the
woman. Those struck down Included a
requirement that a woman's spouse be
notified before an abortion could be
performed.
Casey's caption alone Illustrates the
Supreme Court's consciousness of the
extraordinary pressures it faces when
dealing with the issue of abortion. The
caption begins: "Justice O'Connor. Jua.
tice Kennedy. and Justice Souter... de-
livered the opinion of the Court."
Normally, one justice delivers the
opinion of the court. Indeed. not since
Cooper v. Aaron in 1958," the famous
Little Rock schools case, has an opin-
ion of the court been captioned in this
collective fashion. Cooper, too, was a
case in which the court stressed that
"'the vitality of [controversial] consti-
tutional principles cannot be allowed
to yield simply because of disagree-
ment with them.'-IN ITS DISCUSSION of the impor-
tance of stare decisis, the Caseyjoint opinion explicitly invoked
Brown and Its history. The court
contrasted Brown's repudiation of
Plessy v. Ferguson" with the post-
Brown court's fervent championship of
Brown. Plessy was properly aban-
doned, the Casey court suggested, be-
cause it failed to reflect the facts of life
for blacks as they existed in the middle
of the 20th century in the United
States." By contrast, in the court's
view. Brown was fundamentally
right"*
In the same way, Casey's holding
rests on a nuanced - if, for those in
favor of abortion rights, somewhat In-
complete - assessment of the facts of
life for women in this country in the
late 20th century. This practical under-
standing provided a foundation for
portions of the opinion, such as the
general discussion of the Roe liberty
Interest, in which the court stated that
'tt]he ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by
their ability to control their reproduc-
tive lives.""
An awareness of practicalities also
informed the court's treatment of at
least the spousal notification provision.
The court extensively recapitulated
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania's findings re-
garding spousal abuse to support its
Continued on following page
conctusion tnat spousal nouICAnUn
woaMiniave the epracticaletffect of de-
idvaefmemano thlerwtigbtto deckie
aIr teaelf 1wtetter toelainen aboyr-
TIts, despite peaional vserwations
about the morality of abortion," all of
the justices in the Casey majority pro-
flesed commitment to the constitution-
al, and perhaps moral. correctness of
learing decisions about abortion in in-
dvtidul. private hands.
Moreover, as Intimated in Casey's
warance to the firestorm of contro-
veasy that followed Brown, constancy
tan Rsia holding was morally, as well
strategically, required. The joint
apitnon states that a "terrible price
wtld be paid for overruling.-
Casey also noted that when a deci-
slan by the Supreme Court engenders
ponpular resistance. it is hard to show
that "a later decision overruling the
first was anything but a surrender to
political pressure... So to overrule un-
de fire in the absence of the most
compelling reason to reexamine a wa-
tarshad decision would subvert the
Cauct'slegitimacy beyond any serious
quesdioa"
Perhaps remembering the bravery
anid. suffering endured in the decade
after- Browtn by blacks and other Indi-
vtduals. who supported their struggle
far justice - including federal judges
- the court added In the next para-
graph that "[some cost will be paid by
ayone who approves or implements a
canatitutional decision where it is un-
papalar-. .The price may be criticism
or astracism, or it may be violence
-- To all those who will be so tested by
following, the Court implicitly under-
takes to remain steadfast, lest in the
end a price be paid for nothing.""
Undue Burden
Casey ultimately may implicate the
wisdom of Brown and its progeny in
another fashion. Part IV of the joint
optaion, endorsed solely by the three
authors, adopted a new "undue bur-
den" standard as the test for assessing
abortion regulations. Under this test, a
state regulation is invalid if it "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus at-
tatus viability"
Part IVs analysis of the actual
Pennsylvania provisions under attack
in the case reveals that the undue bur-
den standard requires an intensely
fact-bound, local appraisal of the de-
sign and impact of state regulations. It
is possible that a fresh challenge to a
24-hour waiting period requirement
Identical to the one upheld in Casey
could succeed, if sufficient evidence is
adduced to show that the requirement
does pose a "substantial obstacle."
Asserting such a challenge, however,
will require a very different style of
litigation than groups favoring abor-
tion rights have used in the past. Im-
mediate injunctions against newly
passed restrictions may become quite
difficult to obtain because the undue
burden standard may require develop-
ing a factual record under the existing
statute before inatituting a challenge.
Additionally, the undue burden stan-
dard's intense fact-specificity means
that federal district courts will wield
substantial power. Their findings in in-
dividual cases - protected as they are
from reversal on appeal unless clearly
erroneous under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) - will determine the
ultimate outcome of challenges to
state abortion lawa.
The contours of Brown's guarantees
were hammered out In district court
litigation over a generation without
constant Supreme Court Involvement.
It may have been the hope of the five
justices in the Casey majority to do the
same with abortion.
The presence of four justices fer-
vently committed to overruling Roe
may render this hope Illusory." Indeed,
the most pointed difference between
Brown and Roe may be that for 15
years after Brown, the Supreme Court
presented a completely unified front to
the. public about desegregation -
something it has never done for an In-
stant with regard to abortion.
Capital Punishment Comparison
It is possible to contrast the Supreme
Court's enduring and steadfast reac-
tion to popular, state and judicial resis-
tance to Brotwn and Roe with its re-
aponse to widespread disapproval of
its involvement In yet a third constitu-
tional controversy - capital punish-
ment.
At the same time that the court has
renewed the judicial commitment to
continuing involvement In the enter-
prise of desegregation and in protec-
tion of women's control over reproduc-
tive decision-making, it has sought
through a variety of procedural and
substantive devices largely to retire
from Intensive federal supervision of
the imposition of the death penalty.
Within Tour years of its decision in
Furman v. Georgia." effectively strik-
ing down all the then-existing death
penalty schemes, the court acknowl-
edged the prevailing sentiment in up-
holding a new generation of capital
punishment laws."
Ironically, the greatest resistance to
the court's substantive position in this
area seems to come from lower federal
courts that continue to grant habeas
relief to death row inmates. In a widely
publicized ruling this past term. the
court essentially enjoined the 9th Cir-
cult and the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California. which
repeatedly had granted last-minute
stays, trom interfering with Califor-
nia's execution of Robert Alton Har-
ris."
In one of his most celebrated and
perceptive aphorisms, Alexis de
Tocqueville observed that 'sacarcely
any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved.
sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
tion." It is hardly a surprise, then,
that resistance to the Supreme Court's
resolution of these political questions
forms a leftmotif of American law.
(1) 347 U. 483 (1944) (Brown I); 349 U.S. 294
(155) (Brow- I).
(2) 410 U.S. 118 (273).
(3) Sen. e4. Rust v. Sulivan. 111 5, CL 1739
(1992) (upholdlg federal -gg rule- prohlbitig
doctors to federally tunded clintee from enrging
in abortion-related counseltng or referrals): Web-
ster V. Reproductive Health Services. 492 US 490
(1958) (tpholdlag Miussour restrictions on abor-
ttons.): oard of Education of Oklahoma City v.
Do.wIL 111 . CL 4N (1901) (reversag the 10th
Ciecuita refusal to terminate judicial oversight of
Oklahoma City pubUc schools.
(4) 122 C. 2727 (1002).
(5) 11 S CL 2791. 380d (1M2)
(6) 112 & CL at 2732 (quottag Bown3 L 341 U.S. at
4,8).
(7) Id. a 2734
(5) Id. a 273-43. The admissions polidies had
frst been Dmposed 1 19. at the hight of M.-
sippra redstance to the civil rights movement.
when te erage standatised sore for whitbs 10
Missdaesppi wee IS and the average score tor
black. was eves. The federal district and Appel*
late cours had Identitled a cuttof of 18 s a 1970s
response to student unpreparedness As Jutice
Wbte a opialon trenchantly noted. however. ftPhis
mid-passage justincaion for perpetuating a poll-
cy enacted origtnally to discriminate against
black students does not make the present admis-
sions standards coy les constitutionally suspecLt
Id. at 27 8.
(9) Id. at 2736 (quoting Lane v. Wilon. 30 U.S.
256. 275 (21939)).
(10) CL Id. at 743 (O'Conoe. J. concuriag)
(nottag "the State a long history of discrimina-
Continued on page 316
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in Jatson v. ilentuckyr taradaig rose-
cutersfntasingiperemptories (juror
strikes for which .so reason must be
given) on account at race.
The high court last year had applied
Batson to private parties in civil litiga-
tion. Because they felt compelled to fol-
low that most recent precedent, the
chief justice and Justice Thomas
signed onto the majority opinion. Jus-
tice Thomas, however, writing sepa-
rately, wondered If black defendants
would "rue the day" the court had
weakened a tool that they had used to
select the fairest possible juries.
Also in the last several years, the
high court has been changing the face
of federal habeas corpus by erecting
new hurdles in front of state prisoners
seeking federal review of their convic-
tions or sentences.
In the term just ended, a 5-4 court
continued that trend by reversing a
major Warren Court precedent that al-
lowed federal courts to consider any
constitutional claim not deliberately
waived by a defendant. Keeney v. Ta-
mayo-Reyes, 60 U.S.LW. 4339.
Led by Justice-White, the court said
federal habeas courts could not review
any claim that could have been raised
earlier, unless the defendant could
show good cause for falling to raise it
and actual prejudice resulting from
that failure.
Although she has been a leader of the
court's effort to restrict federal habeas
review, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Kennedy, Blackmun and Ste-
vens, dissented. She accused the ma-
jority of moving recent decisions in a
new and wrong direction.
Thomas Emerges
But in Wright v. West, 60 U.S.LW.
4639, a Bush administration attempt to
virtually end federal habeas review
fell flat when Justices White and Sou-
ter joined the four dissenters in Tama-
yo-Reyes. Only Justices Thomas and
Scalia and the chief justice agreed
with the administration that federal
judges should deter to state judges' ap-
4tlication of dederal aegnlitutional A&w
'to 'the tacts of a case.
"It'shlard to tell what the votes nean
lhere," mays babess scholar Prof. Ira
Robbins of American University Wash-
ington College of Law. "Justice O'Con-
nor ends up in the liberal camp, which
just shows how far the court has
moved to the right."
The bottom line in federal habeas is,
he says, that it is almost impossible for
prisoners to get into federal court and
if they do get lucky, they will run up
against Tamayo-Reyes, which serious-
ly undermines the role of the federal
courts in those proceedings.
And finally, in a trio of prisoner
rights cases. Justice Thomas showed a
rather steadfast adherence to the gov-
ernment's position. He was the only
justice who would require a prisoner
who has been beaten by guards to show
"significant injury" before being al-
lowed to bring a claim under the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusu-
al punishment clause. Hudson v. Mc-
Millian. 60 U.S.L.W. 4131. He and
Justice Scalia were the only dissenters
in a ruling that a defendant's rights
had been violated when he was forced
to take anti-psychotic medication dur-
ing his murder trial without an "over-
riding justification." Biggins v. Nev-
ada, 60 U.S.LW. 4374. And. he dissented
from a 5-4 decision that a defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity
must be released from a mental hospi-
tal once he is no longer mentally ill.
even if he cannot prove he is no longer
dangerous. Foucha v. Louisiana, 60
U.S.IW. 4359.
Justice Thomas' votes here and in
the abortion and religion decisions, say
Professor Howard and others, show he
has joined the least influential and
most conservative wing of the court -
so far - one taking an extremely nar-
row view of tundamental rights and
the role of the court in protecting them.
Burning Crosses
In contrast to the court's criminal
docket, important First Amendment
and businmse cases seemed to abound
early in the tenn. By the term's end.
there were Sew real varprises and
heavy sighs of relief ere heard from
the civil liberties and business camps.
In the First Amendment area, the
justices continued to show strong sup-
port for free speech by holding the gov-
ernment to a standard of neutrality in
its attempts to regulate or restrict
speech in various settings.
The court's first look at the so-called
hate-crime controversy led it to strike
down a St. Paul, Mina., ordinance that
banned speech or behavior that
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment"
in others on the basis of race, color.
creed, religion or gender. R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 60 U.S.LW. 4667.
Although the court's vote was unani-
mous, its reasoning was not. Justice
Scalia. along with the chief justice and
Justices Kennedy. Souter and Thomas,
took a broad, somewhat untraditional
approach likely to cast doubt on the
legality of all hate crime regulations.
Even when the state attempts to regu-
late unprotected speech, as here. It
cannot do so on the basis of content
Justice White, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, used a narrow-
er. more traditional First Amendment
analysis to strike the ordinance.
In Simon d Shuster v. New York
Crime Victims Board, 60 US.L W. 4029,
the court also unanimously struck
down New York's "Son of Sam" law,
saying it unconstitutionally restricted
speech-related earnings of criminals
and not other sources of income in an
effort to ensure criminals don't profit
from their crimes.
The court held 5-4 in Forsyth County
v. Nationalist Movement, 60 U.S.LW.
4597, that local officials could not im-
pose fees of up to ;1,000 for permits for
public demonstrations. Because the
permit fee varied by the estimated
costs of maintaining order, the court
said, the system penalized unpopular
speech. And, in ISCON v. Lee. 60
U.S.LW. 4749, the justices, after finding
that airport terminals are not public
forums and speech restrictions are
tIerminais 14-3j. butstruck down a ban
on the distribution of literature (5-4).
Unlike other areas on the court's
docket last term, the justices seemed
much closer to achieving consensus
when dealing with the First Amend-
ment and speech, says Steven R. Sha-
piro, associate legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union.
The term also offered generally good
news for business. State attempts to
tax mail-order sales by out-of-state
companies and the income of out-of-
state companies doing some business
in-state ran afoul of the commerce
clause and the court's unitary business
principle. Quill Corp. u. North Dakota,
60 US.LW. 4423; Allied-Signal Inc. v.
New Jersey, 60 U.S.LW. 454.
In Morales v. TWA, 60 U.S.LW. 4444,
the justices held 3-3 that federal law
pre-empts state regulation of airline
fare advertising, but in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group Inc, 60 U.S.W. 4703, the
court found that a federal cigarette la-
beling act pre-empted some, but not all
state lawsuits against manufacturers
for fraudulent or deceptive advertising
about the dangers of smoking.
"The court has been very solicitous
of businesses feeling pulled in opposite
directions by regulators," says Rich-
ard Samp of the conservative Wash-
ington Legal Foundation.
Mr. Samp says he does not include
himself among those who define the
court by its actions on abortion. reli-
gion and other social questions. "Those
issues make up such a small percent-
age of the docket that this 'center co-
alition' is not a major development in
my mind," he explains. "This court is
still well to the right on criminal, civil
rights and property rights issues."
Indeed, agrees the ACLU's Mr. Sha-
piro, what the term reveals is a battle
among competing visions of conserva-
tivism. Which shall prevail? States'
rights, an imperial presidency. con-
gressional supremacy?
"While the emergence of a centrist
force is encouraging," he adds, "it's
also true it is a center that is consider-
ably more conservative than the cen-
ter has ever been."
'Magic Words' Allow Access to Federal Courts
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will not have been in vain.
(1) Aekebranedt v. Aichards, 122 S. C. 2206
(1992).
(2) American National Red Cross v. 0.G. and
A.E, t0 U.S.LW. 4431 (1992).
(3) Se generally. Chambers v. Nasco, 211 S. CL
212. rehg dented. 122 S. CL 12. 27 (1991) (taheraet
sctioning powers of the federal courts): Bust-
iss. Goulde len. V. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises Inc. 2ll S. CL 922 (1191) (Rule 11
sanctions applied to client conduct): Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmn4 Corp., 494 U.S. 384 (1900) (Rule 11
sanctions applied to voluntary case dismissal);
Pavelic & E.dFlore v. Marel Entertaaiment
Group. 493 U.S. 220 (1989) (Rule 11 0anctions AP-
plied to idivtdual attorney signer, rather than to
law form).
(4) 112 S CL 1079 (292).
(5) 9 8Whe44. Ta (1824) (tederal court jorie*"
tBon under bank charters "te and be sued"
langauge).
(a) 122 & CL 2206.
(7) s0 U.S.LW. 4451.(5) Bee Mulleatz. Federal Courts and Family
Law* Will the Court Open Federal Court Doors to
Domestic Relations Disputes' 9 Preview of United
States Supreme Court Cases 32 (2en so: ale
112 S. CL. at 2209.
(9) Ankeabrandt v. Richards, 934 F.2d 122 (3th
Ctr. 1991).
(10) See e.g.. Ohio ex eL Pepoitl v. Agler. 280
U.S. 38 (1930) (domestic relanone cases do not
come within statutory jurtediction of federal
courts); Stams v. Simmna, 175 U.S. 162 (1899) (de-
ellnteg federal court jurtediction over domestic
relations cases); ex parte BuLs. 124 U.S. se0
(1890) (domestic relaton01 Of huabaend and wife
belonge to state law): Barber v. Barber. (2 U.S. (21
How.) 582 (2159) (federal courts Cannot decide
questions of marital stts a matter of first
instance).
(11) See generally. C. Wright, A Miller and E.
Cooper, 13B Federal Practtee and Procedure See.
3009 (2d e 194).
(12) 112 B. CL at 2200-2217. The majority also
dimised any abtetloo claLms. noting the com-
plate absc of any pending parallel tate prm
ceeding to form the basis for appilcation of
abetentio doctrine. II at 2215-221
(13) Id. at 2217 (Blackmn J concurrin.l
(14) Id. at 2222 (Stevens J., and Thomas J.
concursuta).
(15) Jmtiee Stet seems particularly food of
this constructle See Burnham v. Supertor Court.
110 S. CL 2104. 220 (1990) (S9tes . concur-
lant).
(16) 00 U.S.LW. 44st.
(IT) t. at 4434-4341.
(18) See I4 at 4433 a.T: "lhe dissent acee us
of repeating What It anonons as Chief Justie
Marshail misuaderstanding. to Osborn. of hit
own previous opinion In Deeaeu...We ar hos-
ared. he also 9.9. where Justee Souter writes
that -the diaent is playful In manufacturing a
conflict between ou synthes of the cases ad the
opinion in Banker's Ttrus." Justice Souter than
goes oto suggest that It]hts Interpretation of to
iaterpretation methodology to simply tllegtl.
mate, originattg not in our opinion but to the
diasent's whimsy. Lke our predecetors, we are
construing A charter, not a paraphrase."
(19) See Mulea, Corporate Charters and the
problem of Talsaneic Federal Queston Jurts-
dletion. 7 Preview of United States Supeme Court
Cases 23 (1992): 00 US.LW. at 4432-4432
(20) See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaox. 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 01 (1809). and Bankers Trust Co. .Teas
& Pac. Ry. 241 US. 2150 (196)
(21) Se 9 Whos. T38 and D'Oanch. Dub-m &
Co v. Fed. Deposit les. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (19).
(22) to U.S.LW. at 44sa.
(21) Id. at 634. In reaching this concluioaln the
Souter majority rjected the argument that & 147
amendment to the Red Cross charter was Intend-
ed to clarify the Red Cros capsetty to so in
federal court, rather than Is Jur iudtional ae..
Id. at 413.
(24) Justce Scalia as joined in disent by Jus-
tie. W1111am L Rhequit. Sandr. Day O'Connor
and Antbony ML Kennedy. See 0 U.S.1W. at 483.
(25) Id
(26) Id(27) ee 111 a.CL 212. rh g denied. 112 & CL 12
111 & CL 921: 498 U.S. 160 4ea U.A. 120. See alto
Mullents. On Beatg In the Wrong Place at the
Wrong Time Willy's Wrongrul Removal and Rule
n, 5 Previe of United States Court Cases 182
(1982).
(28) 112 5. CL 1078 (2192).
(21) See Id. at 1077-1079. Muinus, S Preview of
United States Court Cases 182.
(30) Id. at 10L. Mr. Willy and his lawyer were
sanctieoned far careless pleading. and also for rell-
tae on .a ea tent Federal Role of Clyil Pre-
e.d- .
(31) Id. 0 1079-1080. See alto 111 S. CL 922 (up-
holdiag Rule 11 sanctioning power against a Rules
Enabling Act cbalenge).
(32) 112 S. C. at 1000.
(3) Id
(34) Is. at 101.
(25) See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11))
Sanctions 'IX, after reasonable notice and to op-
portunity to respond" (Proposed amendment to
Rule 1% Advisory Commiltt on Civil Rules. May
1992): see als Committee's Notes to the proposed
revltos; descerting a "safe harbor" provisio.
Rights of Individuals Are Upheld
Continued from page 313 cormation ocacs foemy suceor waltar (2) Id. at 201.
lon" sad highlighting ts "obligation to dismantle focus0o the 10.0. before us today. That. I repet (22) (d. at 315.
the discrimluatory system that should. by now. be maybe exactly wher the choic betwee the two (221 14
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(11) 122 S. CL 4130, 1440-41. 149-0 (1992). (5) 30 US. at 0 (qoting BrowEL 340 U.S. tt 122) he 14 at 2844 (Aeheqolot. CJ. latitg.
(12) Se Poa.er. "Bork and Beethoven," &I S 10). he Ctaey. 122 S. CL a2613 ("t quoting (hi J0i0ed by Wite. Scalia tod Thomas. ta (Iwle
L Re. 1341, 1374 (1910). patage). batle. that Aeo wat wrongty ded. ted that it
(13) 112 S. CL at 280L (20) 191 U.S. 37 (189). ea and should be overrled-). Because toor 10.-
(14) 151 U.S. 1 (1958). In Cooper the opinion of 117) 112 S CL at ISIS; t 3mBak. "'ho Law. (lee. sr (hi.).e. they hae the powe to force
the court was styled as "by" all nine Justices. See (olsootho Segreghtion Dectskoo&" 09 Yal tJ. the cort to hear to abetos. 84.4 pracay e
Id at 4. Paul Gwtdrts has commented on the tronic 421. 4V (lead). cr (- thereby keeping allv, the preesure to
consequence of maessing seeral names at the be- 110) 5.. Cae. 12 S CL a) 2011-" thick ovroole. he Aoa, ted Karla -Nooalortty
taining of to opinion It drives home a se s P ey was -C the ofy tt ea decided" aid. R.I- -4 tho Sopreme Court." 120 U. Pa. L Ro
the contingency of the outcome. dependent as It is Brows. - oto -"ot only insuned Ios. p10-ma a p decussingte. the tleof
on the preaese of "a few transient individuals hot required").
who believed In It. but who well might have not." (19) 140 2"00. 120) 08 U.S. 221 (1072)
G-erts."lRmedles and Resistance." 92 Tale lw (20) 14 at 280 (noting that Il2sme of 01 to (27) he Gregg v. Ocia. 428 U.s. 113 (170).
J.. 55, 29 a.111 (1993). Compare this obeervtio dtviduals fod abortio offenstve to 001 moet and its compelol a
with Justlee Harry A. Blachmun a statement In basic prineiples 01 mocallty"); i4 at 40 (rer (20) he Vaqwx v. Harris. 212 S. CL 112 (1002)
Casey that "I am 3 years old. I cannot remain on rieg to "whatever degree of personal retoetaee (20) A. Toeqoovtle. Democracy In America.
this Court foe..,. and when I do stop down. the noy o tgh hae" fo0 o esdlg Roe). P. 1. yh. xvt (1044).
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a Traditions reaching back to
the Founders are laid waste.
T he Supreme Court "lays waste a tradi-tion" as old as the country itself. So
said Justice Antonin Scalia writing in
dissent from Lee vs. Weisman, the decision
that forbids prayer at public-school cere-
monies. Writing for the narrow majority of
5 to 4. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said
that the issue was essentially decided in
the early 1960s. when the court outlawed
government-sponsored prayer in public-
school classrooms. Kennedy's role in the
decision surprised many, because he had
earlier said that court decisions too often
indicated a "hostility to religion."
In the last 45 years, few areas of law
have been so fraught. with confusions as
church-state rulings. At issue is the reli-
gion clause of the First Amendment with
its two provisions, one prohibiting the
"establishment" and the other guarantee-
ing the "free exercise" of religion.
The conventional wisdom is that these
are two clauses that must somehow be
"balanced" against one another. In that
~ili lgove rnment4e&neduneb-
stitutional, with the result that the free
exerciseof religion is excluded from large
sectors of public life. Against the conveia-
tional wisdom, a growing number of legal
scholars contend that there is only one
religion clause and that the "no establish-
ment" provision is in the service of "free
exercise." They agree with former Chief
Justice Warren Burger that the religion
clause has been "turned upside down" in
decisions that give priority to "no estab-
lishment" at the expense of the free
exercise that the Constitution guarantees.
In Lee vs. Weisman, the conventional
wisdom prevailed, at least for a time.
It may not be what lawyers calla sale
decision. Not only was it decided by. a
majority of one, but two of the majority
(Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John
Paul Stevens) may retire in the near
future. And, although she joined the major-
ity in this decision, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has indicated that she is not
happy with* the precedents on which
Weisman is based. In addition, in his
majority opinion Kennedy emphasizes that
this is a very narrow ruling, aimed only at
avoiding government coercion in sponsor-
ing explicitly religious ritual.
The minority of four (Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Scalia. Clarence
Thomas and Byron R. White) raises sever-
al challenges to Weisman. The claim that
aple from giving public
expression to their deepest
convictions and aspirations is
profoundly anti-democratic.'
the graduation prayer involved coercion,
they convincingly argue, is based on
psychological speculations outside the
competence of the court. (They suggest
that Weisman can be effectively nullified if
schools merely state that participation in
prayer is voluntary.) They further note
that the same logic that prohibits gradua-
tion prayers must prohibit. the recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance with its reference
to a nation "under God." The minority
opinion saves its heaviest fire. however, for
rebutting Kennedy's claim: "The design of
the Constitution is that preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and wor-
ship is a responsibility and a choice com-
mitted to the private sphere."
That claim, the minority contends, is
patently false. The contention is backed up
by a review of American history that cites
the Declaration of Independence, numer-
ous policy provisions such as military
chaplaincies, and the practice of presidents
from Washington to Bush. That is. the
tradition to which Weisman "lays waste,"
. according to the minority. The minority
asserts that an interpretation of "no estab-
lishment" that makes it unconstitutional
for Americans and their government to do
what they have been doing from the
founding to the present is manifestly
wrongheaded. Moreover, the majority
opinion is alarmingly "statist." It suggests
that "public" means "governmental" and
whatever is not governmental is shoved
out of the public square into "the private
sphere." But, as the minority persuasively
argues, religion is not just individualistic
and private; it is also communal and public.
For the court to prohibit the American
people from giving public expression to
their deepest convictions and aspirations is
profoundly anti -democratic.
The secularist bias prolonged by Weisman
is strongly opposed by the great majority of
Americans who, like the minority of the
court, favor a more flexible accommodation
between religion and government. In the
next case that comes along, only one more
vote is needed for the court to make clear
that the separation of church and state does
not mean the separation of religion from
public life. Meanwhile, Weisman will no
doubt intensify the push for school choice as
more and more parents reject a government
school system that is indifferent or hostile to
the convictions and practices that they






Scalia and Free Speech
Continued from page 17'
tility.to labor unions' and homosexuals.
Would including these groups have re-
deemed the ordinance in Justice Sca-
ia's eyes? Probably not.
To be sure, the constitutionality of
the ordinance was not without doubt.
Justices John Paul Stevens, Harry A.
Blackmun, Byron R. White and Sandra
Day O'Connor all found the ordinance
overly broad, in that it could have been
construed to condemn statements oth-
er than fighting words. Moreover, the
fighting -words doctrine itself is prob-
lematical. Despite the doctrine, the
court has upheld many forms of politi-
cal- speech, from burning the flag to
shouting "Fuck the draft," despite the
anger, alarm or resentment" they
arouse. As Justice Scalia rightly stat-
ed, the line between fighting words and
constitutionally protected expression
is fuzzy. Drawing the line is never
easy.
Indeed, it is particularly difficult in a
case such as R.A.V., in which the First
Amendment values :are invoked in the
nae of racial supremacy But.unde-
terred by' that subtlety, 'and without
even -a quick'mention of the devastat
ing harm cross-burning has played in
our history, Justice; Scala- found the
ordinance facialltbvalid 'simply be-
"cause-it= was'. aeg. What, is
iurpilling-about-, ,hwnclusion fs
Sthat in-provdingiclstrong protec-
tions for the First Anendinefit'Justice
Scalia seemed to ignore many of the
pillars of his own jurisprudence.
Take, for example, his professed be-
lief in the political process. Two years
ago, in Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990),
Justice Scalia rejected a First Amend-
ment challenge to a state's right to
prohibit Native Americans from using
peyote in their worship.
Earlier Opinion
Despite the First Amendment, he
stated at that time, "values that are
protected against government interfer-
ence through enshrinement in the Bill
of Rights are not thereby vanished
from the political process .... It may
fairly be said that leaving accommo-
dation to political process will place at
By WENDY E. PARMET
AND JUDITH OLANS BROWN
Special to The National Law Journal
LAST MONTH, in a rare display of
unanimity, nine members of the Su-
preme Court voted to strike down St.
Paul, Minn.'s,"hate crimes" ordinance.
The majority opinion was written by
Justice Antonin Scalia, the intellectual
leader and enfant terrible of the court's
conservative wing.
We wish we believed that Justice
Scalia and those who joined his opinion
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 90-7675, the
recent hate-crimes case, cared pas-.
slonately about the First Amendment.
It would also be nice to think that the
majority was seriously wrestling with
the admittedly difficult problems
posed by the fighting words doctrine
and content-based restrictions on free
Ma. Olans Brown and Ms. Parmet.
teach constitutional law at Boston's
Northeastern University School of Law.
a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engagec
in; but that unavoidable consequences
of' democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which eact
conscience is a law unto itself or ir
which judges weight the social impor
tance of all.laws against the centralit3
of all religious beliefs." Such deference
-to- the-political-process is notably ab
sence in R.A.V.
O* rconsider the justice's deference t<
criminal law. Throughout his tenur(
on the high court, Justice Scalia hai
-onsistently trumpeted his concern for
law and order. He has raiely found foi
criminal defendants. But in R.A.V., the
skinhead defendant managed to pre
vail, despite the majority's disappro
bation of their acts and the clear crimi
nal nature of their trespas and arson
Or consider the First Amendment it
'selfU Last 'year Justice .Scalla .eagerly
*johiid tlid rejectilanRastor Sullivan
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), of First Amend
ment challenges to content-based re
strictions on physiins working i
federally funded' family planning clin
ics. Somehow Justice Scalla's'categori
cal denunciation of content-based re.
strictions simply didn't apply.
What, then, are we to believe? Has
Justice Scalia reconsidered his judi-
cial philosophy? Has he become a
strong supporter of First Amendment
values? Or will this newfound concern
for individual liberty prove fleeting? Is
Justice Scalia's concern just the open-
ing salvo in the war on political cor-
rectness, as Justice Blackmus said in
an opinion concurring with the judg-
ment but disagreeing with the reason-
ing? Only future decisions will let us
know for sure. But it's awfully hard to
believe otherwise.
speech. Unfortunately, the tortured
opinion offers no such solace.
The issues raised by the case were
not easy. The defendant had been pros-
ecuted for allegedly burning a cross on
a black family's lawn in violation of a
city ordinance prohibiting the display
of a symbol that one knows or has rea-
son to know "arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in otheris on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender."
Construing the ordinance narrowly,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found it
constitutional under the fighting words
doctrine. On review, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
held that the ordinance violated the
First Amendment.
Not Content-Neutral'
According to Justice Scalia, even
prohibitions against fighting words
must be content-neutral. This ordi-
nance failed that test because it pro-
scribed only certain forms of hate
speech. Justice Scalia was disturbed
by the ordinance's failure to cover hos-
Continued on page 18
The Cotts.2 .Msits dFree Speech
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 23- Two com-
)eting visions of the First Amendment,)f the rolegof speech in a democratic
society, were on display Monday as the
Justices of the Supreme Court wrestled
with the question of whether the Consti-.
tution . permits govern-
ment to declare that some
Newi s speech is so hateful that it
Analysis may be punished as a
crime..
. n: fournseparate. .opiri-
ions filling 61'pages, these'two visions
clashed, in emotional and even vitriolic
terms. When the smoke cleared, one'
was the winner, although by the- nar-
rowest of margins. The result was a
Suprepie Court decision'of landmark
dimension, a declaratior in favor of
morespeech rather than less, even if
the speech sometimes carries a pain-
fully high price. -: .:
Government may not opt for 'silenc-
ing-speech on the basis of its content,"
Justice Antonin Scalia said for a five-
member majority. The remaining four
Justices, .while agreeing that the St.
Paul -"bias-motivated crime ordi-
nance" was unconstitutional, would
have' struck it; down on the far: less
sweeping ground. that this particular
law was written'in too broad and slop-
py a manner; they accepted its goal as
worthy while finding its means flawed.
But to the majority, the goal itself
was illegitimate. "The point of the
First- Amendment'is that.. majority
preferences must be expressed in
some '.fashion. other . than . silencing
speech on the. basis of, its- content,"
JVstice Scalia.said.,
An End,'or'a Means? ;
The -ault line that 'split the Court
reflects a debate with deep roots in
political theory and the history of the
First Amendment. Essentially, the de-
bate is between those who see free
speech as an end in itself and those who
see it as a means to an end.-
In an article in The New York Re-
view of Books this month, the constitu-
'tional scholar Ronald Dworkin wrote
that there have been two principal his-
toric justifications for free speech,
sometimes overlapping and sometimes
in tension with each other. One theory
sees free speech as an essential part of
*a free and just society that treats all its
members, as "responsible moral
agents," according to Professor Dwor-
kin.
"Government insults its citizens, and
denies their moral responsibility, when
it decrees that they cannot be trusted
to hear opinions- that might persuade
them-to dangerous or offensive convic-
tions," he wrote, .
, The other theory, which Professor
.Dworkin calls "instrumental," justi
fies free speech on the ground that it
serves a greater good and creates a
better, country, helping to produce a
better informed electorate or a more
,accountable government, for example
Without ever being so theoretical,
the Court's majority opinion on Mon-
day in R.A.V. v. St. Paul was an en-
dorsement of the first theory, of free
speech- as valuable for its own sake.
From that starting point, the major-
ity's conclusion flowed: if free speech
itself is the good, rather than the par-
ticular ends to which speech is put,
then it follows that government may
not legitimately pick - and choose
among the words that autonomous
adults can be permitted to say.
But, despite its expansiveness; the.
maJority opinion does not indicate that
the Court is about to embrace every
free-speech argument it hears in cases
concerning libel, the press or other
First Amendment matters. Just last
year, for example, the Court ruled in
Rust v. Sullivan that the Federal Gov-
In a hate-crime
case, Justic es
split on the First
Amendment. .
ernment was free to suppress speech
about abortion at family planning clin-
ics as a condition of the receipt of
Federal funds.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Da-
vid H. Souter and Clarence Thomasjoined Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court. The Chief Justice was perhaps
the most surprising. supporter of an
opinion with strong libertarian over-
tones.
Three years ago, he and Justice Sca-
lia parted company on another impor-
tant First Amendment issue,.the ques-
tion of whether the Government could
make it a crime to burn an American
flag as a political protest. Justice Sca-
ha joined Justice William J. Brennan's
majority opinion, which declared that
"the Government may not prohibit ex-
pression of any idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive oi
disagreeable." Chief Justice Rehnquist
filed an emotional dissenting opinion
that included the patriotic poem "Bar-
bara Frietchie":
"Shoot, if you must, this old gray
head,
But spare your country's flag,"she
said.
Speech as Instrument
In their separate opinions on Mon-
day, the other Justices expressed the
"instrumental" view of free speech,
that speech has value insofar as it
serves a constructive, civilizing or de-
cent purpose, and little or no value if it
hurts or destroys.
Justice Byron R. White, in an opinion
that Justices Harry A. Blackmun, San-
dra Day O'Connor and John Paul Ste-.
vens also signed, said it was entirelyjustifiable for St Paul to have placed
hateful speech on the subject of race,
religion or. sex in a category separate
from all othe. speech.
"This selective regulation reflects
the city's judgment-that harms based
on race, color creed, religion or gender
are more nressimg public concerns
than 'the hains caused -by other (ight-
ing words, "Justice, White said. "In
light of. our piation's long and painfu!
experience' rnith discrimination,: this
determmatign is plainly reasonable."
Justice Stevens, in his separate opin
ion, expressed a similar idea. "Conduc
that creates special risks or cause.
special harms may be prohibited byi
special rules," he said.
In a long' footnote referring to the
Los Angeles riot, Justice Stevens said,
"One need look no further than -the
recent social unrest in. the nation's cit-
ies to see that race-based threats may
cause more harm to society and to
individuals than other threats." While
that is "'regrettable," he said, "until
the nation matures beyond that condi-
tion, laws such as St. Paul's ordinance
will remain,. reasonahie and justifi-
able.'
Justice:Stevens' choice of image,' the
urban racehiotemphasized the fuida.
mental difference in perspective be-
tween the two sides of the Court. Tc
Justice- Stevens and his allies, the
greatest danger presented by' hate
speech was the hurtful, destructive nai
.ture of the speech or expression itselfI
in this case a.cross burned on the lawn
of a blaclC family who, had :recently
moved.intoa. white neighborhood.
But tothe majority, the greater dan
ger' lay'in~the. threat that a Govern-
ment-imposed orthodoxy would be put
in the service of stamping out the hate-
ful speech.
While Justice Scalia acknowledged
in passing that hate speech directed at
race or religion was hurtful, he did not
concede.that there was any difference
in kind between a racial epithet and an
insult directed at union membership or
political affiliation, two examplhs he
gave. The "only interest distinctively
served" by the St. Paul ordinance, he
said, "is that of displaying the city
council's special hostility towards the
particular biases thus singled out."
It was this bland insistence on the
moral equivalency of all speech thai
appeared particularly to trouble, ever.
enrage, the Justices on the other side
They wanted some recognition front
the majority of the terrible power ol
words in the mouths of bigots. Thai
they got no'such acknowledgement un
derscores a paradox at the heart of at
opinion that will probably stand as on(
of the Supreme Court's most far-reach
ing interpretations of the First Amend
ment.
In expanding the freedom of speech
this decision, in its tone of arid absolut
ism, may have made freedom mori
painful to bear.
f1lGH COU RT VODS
LAW SINGLING OUT
CRIMES OF HATRED
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the
opinion in the hate crimes case.
PLIT IN REASONING




Special to The New YorkTimes
WASHINGTON, June,1-2.- Declar-
ing that the First Ar 1idment prohib-
its the Government ..from "silencing
speech on the basis of- itscontent," a
five-member majority of the Supreme
Court ruled today that legislatures.
may not single out racial, religious or
sexual insults or threats for prosecu-
tion as "hate speech" or "bias
crimes."
Although sharply divided in ap-
proach, the other four Justices agreed
with the Court in declaring unconstitu-
tional a St. Paul ordinance making it a
crime to engage in speech or behavior
likely to arouse "anger or alarm" on
he basis of "race, color..creed, religion
gender."
The challenge to the 1989 law was
brought on behalf of a white teen-ager
who was accused of violating the law
by burning a cross on the lawn of a
black family's house.
Deep Rift in Court
In the Court's first ruling concerning
hate crime laws, which have become
increasingly common in recent years,
all nine Justices agreed that the St.
Paul ordinance was unconstitutional.
But the unanimous result could not
mask a deep philosophical split within
the Court, which had wrestled with the
case for nearly seven months. lEx-
cerpts from the opinions, page A16.]
Although they expressed their dis-
agreements in the abstract language of
constitutional theory, the Justices were
split over an issue at the heart of the
debate on hate crimes and hate speech
in society as a whole: whether it is
legitimate for a legislature, or a uni-
versity, to make the essentially politi-
cal judgment that some insults are
worse than others, that some words
and deeds tear so sharply and painfully
at the social fabric that they may be
singled out for special punishment.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the ma-
jority opinion, for himself and four
other Justices, finding the constitution-
al flaw in the St. Paul ordinance to be
its "content-based discrimination."
Threats Versus Obnoxiousness
"St. Paul has not singled out an espe-
cially offensive mode of expression,"
Justice Scalia said. "It has not, for
example, selected for prohibition only
those 'fighting words' that communi-
cate ideas in a threatening, as opposed
to a merely obnoxious manner."
Noting that the law bars only words
that "communicate messages of ra-
cial, gender, or religious intolerance,"
Justice Scalia said:
"Selectivity of this sort creates the
possibility that the city is seeking to
handicap the expression of particular
ideas. The point of the First Amend-
ment is that majority preferences
must be expressed in some fashion
other than silencing speech on the basis
of its content."
Justice Scalia's opinion was joined
by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy,
David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas.
The majority's approach would ap-
Continued on Page Al7, Column I




When Supreme Court Justices William Brennan Jr. and
Thurgood Marshall retired in. 1990 and 1991, First Amend-
ment advocates sounded the alarm: Protection of free
speech in America, they feared, was in jeopardy.
Among the evidence cited: the fact that the court's rul-
ings in 1989 and 1990 that struck down laws against flag-
burning were decided by one-vote majorities. Two of the
justices in the majority: Brennan and Marshall.
On Monday, however, the Frst Amendment landscape
shifted dramatically, leaving some advocates very much re-
lieved. A unanimous court, led by conservative leader An-
tonin Scalia, struck down a hate crime law from St Paul,
Minn, on First Amendment grounds.
There are ways for cities to punish cross-burning, Scalia
declared, "without adding the First Amendment to the fire."
Suddenly, protection of free speech - traditionally
championed by liberals - had been transformed into a
cause for the court's conservatives. The majority in favor of
striking down flag-burning laws now seems solid, joined im-
probably enough by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
new justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas.
The ramifications of the ruling may take a long time to
sort out Laws restricting everything from sexual harass-
ment to obscenity could become vulnerable under the
court's sweeping rule against selective curbs on speech.
Several commentators - including court justices who
wrote cautionary statements - scoured the decision for its
nuances, fearing Scalia's opinion will turn out to be a Trojan
horse that will ultimately diminish speech protection.
But for now, many are content to view the decision as a
clear statement that any government effort to single out
some kinds of speech for punishment is suspect
What accounts for the conservatives' new voice in favor
of First Amendment values? Some see it as a sign of the
First Amendments universal appeal.
"If there is any part of the Constitution that ought to be
beyond partisanship, a bedrock principle, it is the First
Amendment," said Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe.
Others offer a more political explanation.
Hate crime laws like St. Paul's were born of the same
concerns that have spawned "speech codes" on university
campuses that prohibit racially or sexually offensive
speech. In many cases, it has been conservatives who have
been the target of these codes.
"In society generally, it has been the case that on hate
speech, liberals have been more willing to restrict speech
than conservatives," said Rodney Smolla, head of the Insti-
tute of Bill of Rights Law at the College of William & Mary.
"What you are seeing today is a conservative backlash
against political correctness."
Justices Void an Ordinance
Singling Out Crimes ofHate
Continued From Page Al nance "was fatally overbroad" be-
____cause, in addition to prohibiting speech
that did not deserve protection, "it also
pear not only to have invalidated ordi- makes criminal expressive conduct
nances of the St Paul type, in which that causes only hurt feelings, offense
activities are defined as hate crimes or resentment and is protected by the
and added to a city or state's criminal; First Amendment."
code butalsoto ve ealtwhatwas In their separate opinions, these Jus- -code, but also to have dealt hat was
probably a fatal constitutional blow at tices were sharply critical of the ma-
another popular legislative approachand appeared to beanoter opuar egilatve pprachsearching for a constitutional rationale '
to the hate crime issue. Under the under which hate crime laws could be
second approach, existing crimes like upheld.
vandalism or harassment are punished
more severely if the prosecution can Scalia's premise that distinctions on
show that bias was a factor in the the basis of content are presumably
crime. New York State has taken th invalid "has simplistic ap
approach.approach. lacks support in our First Amendment ~~
The -opinion was also likely to have jurisprudence." Justice Stevens said
invalidated many of the speech codes that St. Paul had drafted its law "in
that have beensadopted at public uni- recognition of the different harms
versities, under which students face presented by different types of speech,
punishment for insults or harassment
on the basis of race, religion or sex.
Private universities would not be di- sweeping.
rectly affected, because their behavior Justice Blackmun said, "I see no
is not constrained by the Constitution. First Amendment values that are com-
In Justice Scalia's view, the St. Paul promised by a law that prohibits hood-
ordinance was constitutionally flawed lums from driving minorities out of
in making a crime out of insults hurled their homes by burning crosses on
in some directions but not in others. their lawns, but I see great harm in
People who express hostility toward preventing the people of St Paul from
others "on the basis of political affili- specifically punishing the race-based
ation, union membership or homosex- 'fighting words' that so prejudice their
uality are not covered" by the law, he community."
noted, adding, "The First Amendment He added, "I fear that the Court has Steven Zachary, right, president
does not permit St. Paul to impose, been distracted from its proper mis- of the St Paul N.A.A.C.P., was
special prohibitions on those speaker sion by the temptation to decide the saddened by the Supreme Court
who express views on disfavored sub- issue over 'politically correct speech'
jects." d o."tsee iete gjects." ~~~and 'cultural diversity,' neither of noetheetr ac htht
Different Means, Same End which is presented here."
Four other Justices - Byron R. Justice White said that by departing crimes exist and people should be
White, Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul from the view that epithets or insults protected from them." Mayor Jim
Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor -: described in previous Supreme Court Scheibel listened at left.
took a completely different path to decisions as "fighting words" had no
finding the St. Paul ordinance unconsti- constitutional protection at all, the ma-
tutional. Justices White, Blackmun and jorty opinion "legitimates hate speech 90-7675, overturned a 1991 ruling by the
Stevens each wrote a separate opinion, as a form of public discussion." Minnesota Supreme Court, which up-
while joining parts of one another's. The Court's earlier decisions in this held the ordinance after, in effect, re-
Justice O'Connor joined Justice area treat "fighting words," along with writing it to make it considerably nar-
White's separate opinion. obscenity and defamation, as essential- rower in application than it appearedly outside the boundaries of the First from the actual words of the statute.For these four Justices, the flaw in Amendment. Justice Scalia said today The Minnesota court interpreted the
the ordinance was that it was "over- that while these categories of speech law to apply only to "fighting words."
broad," posing too great a risk that it can indeed be banned, that does not The teen-ager who challenged the
might deter speech or expression that permit the Government to make dis- law, Robert A. Viktora, has not yet
deserved constitutional protection. tinctions within the Categories on the been tried. In his opinion, Justice Scalia
Had their view prevailed, it would basis of "hostility - or favoritism - noted that prosecutors could have
probably have been possible for legis- toward the underlying message ex- charged the teen-ager with violating
latures to draft hate crime laws with pressed." several state laws, including those coy-
more precision to avoid the constitu- Justice White sharply disputed this ering "terroristic threats" and crimi-
tional defect of the St. Paul approach. conclusion, asserting that the Govern- nal damage to property. Burning a
The laws under which sentences are ment should be free to make distinc- cross was "reprehensible," Justice
enhanced for crimes that are already tions within categories that did not Scalia said, but, he added, "St. Paul has
on the books would have been in a deserve constitutional protection in the sufficient means at its disposal to pre-
much stronger constitutional position. first place, vent such behavior without adding the
Justice White said the St. Paul ordi- The decision, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, No. First Amendment to the fire."
Coris thiug Assures
More Abortion Litigation
'Undue Burden' Awaits Judicial Definition
By Ruth Marcus
Washnmgton Pot StB Writer
Monday's abortion ruling by the
Supreme Court guarantees one
thing: more abortion rulings by the
Supreme Court.
The decision, adopting an "undue
burden" test for judging abortion
restrictions, will usher
ANALYSIS ma new era of litiga- i
tion about how that
standard applies in practice.
If a 24-hour waiting period prior
to getting an abortion does not im-
pose an undue burden, what about a
delay of 48 hours, or 72? What if it
can be shown that, in a state where
abortion providers are few and far
between, the 24-hour delay in prac-
tice adds up to much more?
If states may have "informed con-
sent, provisions requiring doctors
to describe to women the develop-
ment of the fetus and the dangers of
abortion, how much may they tilt
such counseling against abortion?
May states require that abortions
be performed only in hospitals-or
impose stringent licensing require-
ments on abortion clinics that might
cost them so much to upgrade they
will go out of business instead?
COURT. From At
stacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion before the fetus at-
tains viability.-
Disagreement about how to apply
that test n practice, they noted. "is
to be expected in the application of
any legal standard which must ac-
commodate life's complexity."
That was apparent in the ruling
itself. Justice John Paul Stevens. in
a concurring opinion. said that the
undue burden test doomed the wait-
ing period and part of the informed
consent requirement. Justice Harry
A. Blackmun said he was "confi-
dent- that those challenging the
Pennsylvania law would be able to
prove that in practice, the 24-hour
waiting period would "operate as a
And if such restrictions do not
constitute an undue burden stand-
ing alone, what about their effect in
combination?
These questions and others are
certain to confront state legislators
and federal courts, and ultimately
they will wind up back at the Su-
preme Court as activists on both
sides of the divisive battle struggle
over the meaning of the new stan-
dard.
"Really, what this all means is full
employment for reproductive rights
lawyers," said Kathryn Kolbert of
the Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy, who argued the case
against the Pennsylvania law at is-
sue in the case decided Monday.
The court itself seemed to rec-
ognize the inevitability of future
litigation-and to attempt to pro-
vide at least some guidance to low-
er courts struggling to apply the
new standard-in the plurality
opinion by Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy
and David H. Souter.
"An undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is in-
valid," they said, "if its purpose or
effect is to place a substantial ob-
See COURT, A6, Col. I
substantial obstacle"-in other
words, an undue burden.
Although O'Connor had proposed
an undue burden standard in pre-
vious cases, the test set out Mon-
day was far more stringent than her
earlier formulations, under which
she constistently voted to uphold
restrictions.
While O'Connor previously had
defined "undue burden" as an abso-
lute obstacle or severe limitation,
that was downgraded Monday to
substantial obstacle.
She also had previously sug-
gested that even an undue burden
could be justified if it was supported
by a compelling state interest, such
as the state's desire to protect po-
tential human life. Such an interpre-
tation might have justified even an
COURT. From A6
's a sorh tougher test than undue burden test outlined voi,
O'ZConnor etmr Asuggested previ- appears to be new and improved,
ously." said Burke Balch, state leg- that the application of it reins
1
'
islative director of the National as troubling as the old approach.
Right to Life Committee Inc. They pointed in particular to
"Nothing except the name is the court s wilingness to find that
m.* 'waiting period was not an un
Balch was glum about anti:bor- hAurden, despite findings by the
tion activists' ability to go much er court that it was "particul
beyond the provison that ii~o burdensome" for poor wort
court approved in Monday's ril- those in rural areas and "those'1
ing--or even to get those re.r have difficulty explaining tiing-r een o gt toserestric- whereabouts to husbands, emp
tions actually in operation any time w
soon as abortion-rights advocates ers, or others.t
battle them in court under the new "The burdens that are not obbtadatte tcles for many women can be a c
Asked about waiting p ods plete barrier for the most vub
slonger than 24 hours, he riod At able women, those who are hosiloner han24 our, h sad. Atto geography, youth and pover
this nMoment. we'll be lucky to keep said Duke University law profe
this one." Currently. he said, 10
states have enacted waiting periods 1 ':..: in
ranging in length from two hours to ant aovocate. 'It mYZV
48 hours. be possible to convince a Ic
"We're back to where we were in court in some places that rej
the '70s and '80s testing the limits tions like waiting periods impos
if what the court will allow and obstacle, but the facts will alv
pointing out the extremism of what be shifting" and abortion-rights
the court has done," Balch said. yers will have to undertake the
One possibility, he noted, is en- duous task of proving that c
acting laws that prohibit abortions nearly county-by-county basis,
for the purpose of sex selection-a said.
provision that was contained in the Moreover, said Dawn John
Pennsylvania law but not chal. legal director of the National A
lenged. That would be a direct as. tion Rights Action League, the
sault on the court's apparent view "leaves an incredible amount to
that outright prohibitions on abor. discretion of lower court judge
tion are invalid. the majority of whom have t
Abortion-rights activists said the appointed by Reagan and Bush.'As a result, she said, "I have i
little hope for invalidating the ra
of different kinds of restrictionw
know will be enacted.... I t
they'll be very creative in con
up with new restrictions to pile
outright ban, but on Monday, the
court made clear that once a burden
is found to be undue, it is unconsti-
tutional.
The court said a burden could be
undue if it is designed to interfere
with abortion rights-an approach
reminiscent of its ruling in a 1985
school prayer case, when it struck
down Alabama's moment-of-silence
law because it was passed with the
intent of returning prayer to public
schools.
Finally, the burden is undue if it
places the substantial obstacle in
the path of any individual woman;
challengers need not show that all
or even most women are so bur-
dened.




By TIMOTHY B. WHEELER
rancis 'Nick" Codd was overjoyed last
week when he heard that the Su-
preme Court ruled that property
owners may be entitled to compensation if
government regulations deprive them of all
use of their land.
The Arnold optician has been trying tro
vain for two years to get the permits hi
needs to build a house on the Severn River
His family has owned a quarter-acre wat*
front lot In Severna Park for three decadei
long before passage of the state and federh
laws designed to protect wetlands and thd
Chesapeake Bay that have denied him his.
dream home.
Now, armed with the high court's deci-
sion in David H. Lucas vs. South Carolina
Coastal Council. Mr. Codd says. 'I'm hop-
ing to break the logjam with regulations ser
we can getvur building permit"
But Mr. Codd shouldn't hold his breath.
For while the Supreme Court's Lucas ruP'
ing may ultimately help his case. the court
did not deliver the sweeping victory that
property rights advocates had hoped for
or that environmentalists had feared -
when the justices agreed last year to hear it
and two other cases claiming that govern-
ment regulations amounted to an unconsti-
tutional -taldng" of thdr land. ...
Like an approaching storm. the proper-
ty rights movement hasbeen gradually
building nationwide since the mid-1980s.
fueled by landowners' resentment of tight-
ening government restrictions on destroy-
ing wetlands and budding along shorelines.
Encouraged by powerful farming. oil and
real estate Interests. it has mounted a
growing political and legal challenge to the
environmental movement and to regula-
tions aimed at preventing pollution or de-
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iruciafmfItaliisandanimals.
In last week's closely watched case, the
oitadecdeddiat avidlucas. who awns
two waterfmnt lttsn the isle of Pahns near
Charleston, may deserve to be compensated
because of a 1988 South Carolina beach
protection law that barred him from building
on them.
Mr. Lucas had paid nearly 81 million for
the lots in 1986. with the idea of erecting
houses alongside other beachfmnt homes al-
ready there. But two years later, that state's
legislators enacted a law aimed at halting
waterfrnt development considered harmful
to the ecologically fragile beach and dunes.
The state also claimed that homes built too
far seaward threatened the life and property
of other homeowners if the area was hit by
more * storms such -as Hurricane Hugo.
whose winds and waves ripped buildings
apart and flung them into each other.
Historically, the courts have held that
government may restrict or even ban activi-
ties deemed harmful to the community. Last
week. however, the Supreme Court majority,
in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. de-
clared that prevention of -nuisances" or
'noxious uses" was an insufficient reason to
deny someone all use of their land without
paying them for it.
But while the Supreme Court's 6-3 deci-
sian rejected the state's legal Justification for
denying Mr. Lucas building permits, it did
not flatly rule that South Carolina had effec-
tively "taken* his land without compensa-
tion. In violation of the Fifth Amendment
protection. against government seizures of
private property.
Instead. the case was sent back to South
Carolina's supreme court for reconsideration
of that question. The Supreme Court said
the state may still be able to avoid paying
Mr. Lucas or granting him a building permit
if it can find some justification in other stat-
utes or In that state's traditional common
law for preventing possibly harmful beach-
front construction.
Perhaps the most telling sign ofJust how
murky was the court's ruling is that both
sides in the growing legal and political dis-
pute over property rights found something in
It to cheer them.
Environmentalists contended it would
apply to only a few 'extreme" cases where
government regulations have rendered land
essentially worthless by forbidding any use
ef it.
'it's pretty rare for a court to find all
economically viable' use is gone,' said Ann
Powers, vice president and general counsel
for the Chesapeake Bay Foundation. That
was the finding of the South Carolina trial
court on which the Supreme Court relled.
In Maryland. Attorney General J. Joseph
Curran Jr. hastened to declare that the Lu-
cas ruling was no threat to the state's 1984
"critical area" law. which sharply restricts
development within 1.000 feet of the Chesa-
peake Bay and its tidal tributaries.
The reason for that reassurance was that
the critical area law "grandfathered" or ex-
empted lots that were eligible for building
permits before the law took effect, explained
Robert Percival. a University of Maryland
law professor.
Property rights advocates acknowledge
they failed to get the Supreme Court to de-
clare that government must pay when regu-
lations reduce the value of a piece of land.
even though it may not be rendered totally
"valueless.' Such 'partial takings" might oc-
cur when wetland laws restrict hoy much of
a parcel can be developed, they said^
'It certainly has not been as good a year
arpwrtyaghtsas we would have hoped.'
said Paul Kamenar. executive legal director
of the Washington Legal Foundation, a con-
servative public-interest la: firm. 'Itwas
somewhat lackluster.' '
The court essentially ducked the issue in
the other two property rights cases it int
agreed to hear this session. In one, invol
a resort planned in a Puerto Rican en:
mental preserve. the court changed its mind
and decided not to rule. In the other, the
court upheld rent controls on mobile homes,
but on different and limited grounds.
And the court has left so much unsettled
that Robert Meltz. an attorney with the Con-
gressional Research Service who follows
property-rights cases, said It was a virtual
draw. While It may encourage other ag-
grieved landowners to file suit, the court's
ruling requiring historical legal research will
only add to the already steep costs of pursu-
ing such litigation, he said,
Still, property-rights advocates took heart
from a footnote in Justice Scalia's opinion in
the Lucas. case, which seemed to invite fu-
ture cases claiming compensation for gov-
ernment regulations that restrict develop-
ment. Mr. Kamenar said the decision con-
tains "nuggets" like that which could ad-
vance the cause. but which are 'going to
need some polishing in the lower courts.'
An increasingly conservative U.S. Court
of Claims. which reviews demands for com-
pensation from the federal government. may
be the mother lode for such cases. The num-
ber of suits accusing the government of "tak-
ing" property has gradually grown over the
past decade; 52 were filed last year.
In one case already. the claims court
awarded an eye-popping 8150 million to
Whitney Benefits Inc.. which was barred
from exploiting some land by the federal sur-
face mining law. The Supreme Court refused
to review that case, but it remains unreA
solved because of a continuing dispute ov4
how much the land was worth. In two othe
cases, the claims court has ordered the gov-
ernment to pay for protecting wetlands.
If the Supreme Court takes one of those
cases and broadens its deflnition of takings
to include partial losses of value. then last
week's ruling may lead to significantly
weakening land-use laws, environmental-
ists say.
But their biggest fear is that legislators
and regulators will be spooked by the Lucas
ruling or by a new flurry of lawsuits and
back away from trying to protect wetlands
or limit suburban sprawl development.
which Is one of the chief sources of runoff
and air pollution degrading the Chesapeake
Bay.
'The real danger is if this is misinter-
preted as changing all the rules of the game.
which it really doesn't at this point." said Mr.
Percival. the Maryland law professor.
Environmentalists also counter that the
courts need to balance 'takings' with what
they call "givings." mainly that government
also gives land much of its value by building
roads or utilities or by providing flood Insur-
ance to storm-prone beachfront property.
Meanwhile, the court's fuzzy Lucas nl-
ing seems destined to keep the lawyers busy
for years to come.
"Many landowners across the country
were counting on this and assuming their
land that was being held hostage would im-
mediately be relieved." said Margaret Ann
Relgle, head of the Fairness to Land Owners
Committee, a group formed in Cambridge
three years ago to fight wetlands restrictions
on the Eastern Shore. The court's ruling
was "evolutionary rather than revolution-
ary." she said. but by itself 'It doesn't free
up anybody's land."
IContinued From Page Al
inent itself fails in its "duty to guardBan ol zraers and respect that sphere of inviolable
conscience and belief which is the
r-ww1'mark of a free people."In Public School He added, "To compromise that
______________principle today would be to deny our
own tradition and forfeit our standing
By LINDA GREENHOUSE to urge others to secure the protections
Special tolhe New York Tims of that tradition for themselves."
WASHINGTON, June 24 - Re- Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
affirming its precedents that bar state- Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul Ste-
sponsored prayer in the public schools, vens, Sandra Day O'Connor and David
the Supreme Court ruled today that a H. Souter, played a surprising and sig-
clergyman's invocation and benedic- nificant role as the author of the opin-
tion at a Providence, R.I., junior high ion today. He has been among the lead-
school graduation transgressed the ers on the Court in calling for a reap-
constitutional boundary between praisal of the Court's establishment
church and state.precedents.churh ad stte.Three years ago, he wrote an angryThe 5-to-4 ruling was a decisive, if dissent from a decision that invalidat-
narrow, rebuff to the Bush Administra- ed the display of a Nativity scene in a
tion, which had seized on the case as an Pittsburgh courthouse. The decision,
occasion to urge the Court to abandon he said then, reflected "an unjustified
its longstanding approach to deciding hostility toward religion," and added
when an official practice amounts to an that "substantial revision of our estab-
"establishment" of religion, prohibited lishment clause doctrine may be in
by the First Amendment. The Adminis- order", to permit government sponsor-
tration had urged the Court to adopt a ship of religious practice as long as noofficial religion was established and no
standard permitting a much greater unwilling person was coerced into par-
role for religion in public life. tipating.
Writing for the Court today, Justice Justice Kennedy's fellow dissenters
Anthony M. Kennedy said there was no in the Pittsburgh case were Chief Jus-
need to revisit those precedents. Under tice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
any framework of analysis, he said, the Antonin Scalia and Byron R. White. But
First Amendment was violated by those three parted company with him
what he called "pervasive" govern- today, in a dissenting opinion filed by
ment involvement in a religious activi- Justice Scalia. Justice Clarence Thom-as joined the dissent.ty that left students no real choice but
to participate. (Excerpts from the Dissent by Scalia
opinions, page Bll.] Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
struck an angry, at times sarcastic
'One Timeless Lesson' tone. He accused the majority of em-
"The, First Amendment's religion barking on a "psycho-journey"
clauses mean that religious beliefs and through the minds and emotions of
religious expression are too precious to avesat thogh a praye they
be either proscribed or prescribed by liked without suffering from the "sub-
the state," Justice Kennedy said. tle coercive pressures" that Justice
"The lessons of the First Amend- Kennedy had found particularly trou-
ment are as urgent in the modern blesome.
world as in the 18th century when it Justice Scalia said that the country's
was written," Justice Kennedy said. He founders "knew that nothing, absolute-
said that "one timeless lesson" is that ly nothing, is so inclined to foster
it citizens are "subjected to state-spon- among religious believers of variousfaiths a toleration - no, an affection -for one another than voluntarily joining
in prayer together, to the God whom
they all worship and seek."
While no one Should be compelled to
participate, he said, "it is a shame to
deprive our public culture of the oppor-
tunicey and indeed the encouragement,
for people to do it voluntarily."
The decision. Lee v. Weisman, up-
held rulings by two lower Federali
courts in a lawsuit brought againsti
Providence school officials by a su-
dent at the Nathan Bishop Middle
School. The student, Deborah Weis-
man and her father, Daniel, objected
The Bush Administration, support-
ing the Providence school board's ap-
peaw, urged the Court to overrule Lem-
on v. Kurtzrnan. In its place, tta Ad-
ministration proposed a new approach.
In his brief to the Court, Solicitor Gen-
eral Kenneth W. Starr said "Ciad ac-
knowledgments of religion in public oife
do not offend the establishment cl4use,
as long as they neither threate.the
So establishment of an official religionor
coerce participation in religious activi-
ties."
sIn his opinion today, Justice Kennedyin effect said that prayer in the public
schools was a matter of such particular
constitutional concern that the'Ease
Scould be decided without re-examining
the full range of the Court's church-
state precedents.
So while Justice Kennedy rejected
the Administration's proposed new
standard in the context of this case, he
did not necessarily foreclose a re-ex-
TbefimYork'.mn amination or even reversal of Lemon v.
Kurtzman in other contexts.justice Anthony M Kenneay He took care to say that the rationale
wrote the majority opinion sxf the of the decision today did not necessar-
school prayer case. ily extend to cases involving adults who
object to a government religious prac-
tice. "We do not hold that every state
to the school's practice endorsed by action implicating religion is invalid if
the city's school board, of inviting one or a few citizens find it offensive,"
members of the clergy to offer prayer he said, adding, "A relentless and all-
at graduation ceremonies. -- pervasive attempt to exclude religion
Ms. Weisman and her father, who from every aspect of public life could
are Jewish, filed suit in 1989 after a itself become inconsistent with the
local rabbi, Leslie Gutterman offered Constitution.
an invocation and benediction at that New Look at issue Possible
year's graduation The rabbi's brief,
nonsectarian prayers thanked God
"for the liberty of America" and asked whether it wants to take a fresh look at
God's blessing "upon the teachers and the establishment clause in other con-
administrators" who had helped the texts. Cases involving church-state
new graduates, questions have been piling up at the
The Weisman family's lawsuit was Court for more than a year, ever since
handled by the American Civil Liber- the Justices agreed to review the Prov-
ties Union. The union's associate coun- idence case and put all others on hold.
sel Steven R. Shapiro, said today that These range from the display of a
he wras i"ecstatic at the outcome. Hen- Hanukkah menorah in a public pa'k in
ry Siegman, executive director of the Vermont to the use of religious in-
American Jewish Congress, praised agery on city seals in Illinois and.Texas
the decision as "a welcome reaffirma- to Hawaii's declaration of Good Friday
tion that the nation's public schools as an official state holiday, Before-it
may not serve as surrogate houses of completes its term next week- ushe
worship." Court will probably announce whetherit will hear any of these casesppond
Lower Court Rulings them back to the lower courts for ae-
The Federal District Court in Provi- consideration or simply deny revie,-
dence and the United States Court of.Despite the boundaries that Justice
Appeals for the First Circuit, in Botonj Kennedy drew around his opiniona the
both ruled that the prayers were un-1 opinion was nonetheless striking-for its
constitutional on the basis of the analy- pointed refutation of some of thAd-
sis the Supreme Court had set out in a ministrations central arguments
1971 decision, Lemon v. Kurtzinan.d For example, the Administration
That decision established a three-part had argued that because no student
test for deciding whether a govern- had to atiend the graduation ceremony,
ment-sponsored religious practice vio- no one could be said to have been
lated the establishment clause. . -'- corced into joining in the prayers
To pass constitutional muster under "The argument lacks all pertia-
the Lemon v.IKurtzman test, theogovp sion," Justice Kennedy said. ".Law
rnment practice must have a sec ulart reaches past formalism."
purposec it must neither advance nor He added, "Everyone knows that in
inhibit religion as its primary ffect, our society, and in our culturehigh
aod it must avoid "excessive entangle- school graduation is one of life's most
ent" of government with religion.. -significant occasions."
Applying this test over the years. the
dourt has invalidated a range of.gov-
arnment activities that supportedoreli-
Kion, including some forms of aid to
Harochial schools and the Pittsburgh
ihrislmas display in the case that pro-
toked Justice Kennedy's dissent three
years ago.




BY DANIEL J. POPEO
AND PAUL D. KAMENARIt has been said that a man's home is his
castle, and thanks to the Supreme
Court, David Lucas, the owner of two
undeveloped beach-front lots, will not
have to content himself with building his
oatosand.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Courcil, the Court held that a compen-
sable taking occurs under the Fifth
Amendment when the land-use regulation
in question (here, South Carolina's beach
erosion set-back line) deprives the owner
of all economically viable use of his
property. More importantly, the Court
imposed a heavy burden on the state to
show,,.in order to escape liability, that
ther prohibited uses of the property fell
withir' traditional common-law nuisance
principics.
After disposing of the first two takings
cases on this term's docket in lackluster
fashion (Yee v. City of Escondido: PFZ
Properties Inc. v. Rodriguez), the favor-
able Lucas ruling was good news indeed.
Yet many property-rights advocates re-
main disappointed and dissatisfied even
with this victory. They fault both its ap-
parent limited application to "total tak-
ings- situations and the Court's failure to
articulate coherent guiding principles to
F ist lower courts adjudicating the more
n situation of partial takings. And
ey fear that government regulators and
environmentalists will brush aside the rul-
ing by claiming that many land-use reg-
alatory schemes leave the property owner
with some economic value.
But property-rights advocates need not
be so disheartened. A closer reading of the
majority opinion by Justice Antonin
Scalia, the concurring judgment by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, and the vigorous dis-
sents by Justice John Paul Stevens and
Harry Blackmun, will give regulators
pause if not heartbum. And Lucas should
provide renewed hope to property owners
faced with a growing array of confiscatory
environmental regulations requiring them
to leave their property in its natural state.
Lucas is more a victory than a defeat for
two basic reasons. First, although the
plaintiff chose to win or lose solely on the
test previously articulated in Agins v.
Tiburon (1980)-that a taking occurs
when the regulation "does not substanti-
ally advance legitimate state interests or
denies an owner economically viable use
of his land"-the Lucas Court, in fact,
left intact an arsenal of other arguments
that property owners and their attor-
neys can employ to establish a regulatory
taking.
Second, those arguments can be used to
establish a partial, as well as a total, tak-
ing. Indeed. the Court's rationale for its
new categorical rule-that the regulation
is the "equivalent of a physical appropri-
ation' ' that requiring private property to
be left in its natural state carries with it
"the heightened risk that private property
sbeing pressed into sonic form of public
ervice. and that the numerous state and
federal law' aumhorizin purchae of ce-
manipulate the economic-impact argument
by leaving the property with some eco-
nomic value.)
As a preliminary observation, we sug-
gest that the total-takings categorical rule
that the Court firmly established (which,
Justice Harry Blackmun argued, was. in
prior opinions. so much dicta) will be in-
voked much more often than one might
initially think. Scores of property owners
in South Carolina alone are in the same
predicament as David Lucas, not to men-
tion thousands more in other coastal states
with imoilar developmental restrictions.
Nunicrous wetland cases would also
come under this categorical rule, such as
Lo/ildiev Harbor Inc v. United States.
no, aailti, the decision of the U. S
Cou.'- \ped for the, F:deru! C7::jir
benefit hundreds of landowners who have
been blocked from building retirement
homes on the Eastern Shore of Maryland
and on the Florida coast because of wet-
lands restrictions.
Nor should the regulators delude them-
selves into thinking they can escape this
categorical rule by imposing their own
perverse form of the just-compensation
clause. Should the government arbitrarily
require property owners to compensate it
by agreeing, for example, to create one.
two, or more acres of wetlands for each
one they wish to fill. a property owner
could refuse to go along with such ex-
tortionist demands. He ,uld then be
denied a permit and would be unable to





BY JEREMY PAULToday's property-rights advocates
aspire to a simple message. In the
name of the Constitution, they ask
courts to invalidate all uncompensated
government interference with private
property rights as those rights are defined
by statute or at common law.
Time and again, and rightly so, such
pleas have fallen on deaf judicial ears. The
property-rights position is historically and
conceptually tenuous. Early American
history is rife with examples of un-
compensated takings of property that
today's advocates would quickly con-
demn. Moreover, the common law itself
often fails to provide a sufficient definition
of property against which to measure
constitutional claims. It is hard to say, for
example, whether an environmental regu-
lation limiting sulfur dioxide emissions
restricts an owner's property rights when
the common law of nuisance may as of yet
not determine whether an owner has such
rights.
Most important, the property-rights
position is impractical. Virtually all con-
temporary zoning, environmental, and
other economic regulation would be un-
constitutional were the courts to adopt a
total ban on uncompensated interference
with property rights. Even reductions in
the speed limit might give rise to valid
constitutional claims to compensation
from trucking companies whose profits
were diminished as a result.
Recognizing these difficulties, the Su-
preme Court has granted government
broad latitude to regulate private property
in pursuit of public good. To police gov-
ernment overreaching, the Court has
embraced an ad hoc. multi-factor analysis
that investigates (1) the character of the
government action, (2) the severity of the
economic impact on the claimant, and (3)
the extent to which the government has
disrupted reasonable, investment-backed
expectations. Using Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes' terminology, the Court
weighs these factors to determine whether
a regulation has gone "too far," so that
compensation is required
After years of unsuccessfully attacking
this multi-factor approach as too messy.
too subject to judicial discretion. and in-
consistent with the Constitution's sup-
posedly unequivocal protection of private
property, property-rights advocates hoped
that 1992 would be different. A newly
constituted conservative Court accepted
three cases involving the takings clause,
and many anticipated a significant shift in
the constitutional balance.
When the dust settled, however, only
the Court's June 30 decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council was
decided in favor of a property owner. (One
of the cases was dismissed, and the gov
ernment won the other.) And the Lucas
case itself represents a half-baked victory
that buys minimal additional property
protection at significant cost to the
intellectual integrity of takingsjurispmdence.
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other similar limitations on owvership that
Scalia alieed "ibackgmrund qiriples -of
law."* Thus. as is already the case when
the omtrmenteumaantly phtysically
invades private property, the Court
adopted a categorical rule that prevents
inquiry into the rationale for a new regu-
lation if that regulation creates a total loss
in value of the landowner's property.
All this means for David Lucas is a
remand to the South Carolina courts. In
1986, he had purchased for $975,000
beach-front land zoned for residential de-
velopment. The challenged 1988 statute.
however, prohibited him from building on
his two lots because of the likelihood that
construction close to the shore would
worsen beach erosion.
The South Carolina Supreme Court
rejected Lucas' claim for compensation,
relying on the timeworn distinction be-
tween regulations that confer benefits and
therefore require owners to be com-
pensated and those that prevent harm and
are non-compensable. The state court
found that the challenged Beachfront
Management Act was aimed at "prevent-
[ing] serious public harm" caused by such
beach-ftont construction.
The U.S. Supreme Court found this
explanation unacceptable and in so doing
partially repudiated the harm/benefit dis-
tinction. It sent the case back to the state
courts to consider whether the construc-
tion of the homes would have constituted a
nuisance or violated some other back-
ground principles of South Carolina law.
Writing for the majority, Justice An-
tonin Scalia correctly lambasted the idea
that Lucas should be denied compensation
merely because South Carolina's regula-
tion can be characterized as harm-
preventing. As he rightly points out. "the
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and
*benefit-conferring' regulation is often in
the eye of the beholder." Consider, for
example, a zoning regulation requiring a
landowner to keep her land vacant so as to
increase the amount of open space in the
town. Does this regulation confer a benefit
on the town for which it should have to
pay, or does it merely "prevent the harm"
of excessive congestion?
Scalia's Impure Religion
Scalia's attack on the harm/benefit dis-
tinction might appear to signal judicial
dissatisfaction with the entire edifice of
takings jurisprudence built on the idea of
broad government power to promote pri-
vate conduct. As a practical matter, how-
ever, Lucas goes nowhere near that far.
Scalia's opinion is confined to the very
narrow class of cases where the govern-
ment deprives a landowner of virtually
100 percent of the value of the affected
property. 'This means that typical zoning.
environmental, and other Jand-use regula-
4ions are not affected by Lucas at all.
Instead. she dulleaight .of Scalia's cri-
tique, 'which logically applies across the
peardehmarthbeg ernen tseguates
to promote the public good, is felt in those







ulation, flood control, or protection of
endangered species, where the govern-
ment is forced to ban all construction.
There is no warrant for this artificial cate-
gorization. Depending on subsequent in-
terpretation, its real-world effect may be
to sacrifice these few important areas of
government regulation at the ideological
altar of property rights. Alternatively,
Scalia's version of the property religion
may turn out to be so impure as to leave
everyone wondering what all the fuss was
about.
As Justice John Paul Stevens pointed
out in dissent, the first problem with the
per se rule against government regulations
that supposedly take 100 percent of prop-
crty value is that such a rule is wholly ar-
binary. If I own a half-acre of land that a
government commission determines must
stay vacant to prevent possible injury due
to flooding. I may claim the benefits of the
per se rule when seeking compensation.
But if you own 100 acres, the town zoning
commission, without risking invocation of
the per se rule, may decide to preserve
open space by limiting you to one house
for every 10 acres even if this decreases
the value of your land by 90 percent. Jus-
tice Scalia said that takings law is full of
such all-or-nothing situations. But this
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nlatant arbitrariness is nothing to brag
about.
Moreover, the rule's arbitrariness belies
Scalia'sassrted justification for its
adoption. He argued that regulations that
-take OOpemrent of the value of property
"carry with them a heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm."
The Lucas facts themselves offer an
example of why this isn't so. Shouldn't we
be more suspicious of South Carolina's
claim that it sought to prevent beach ero-
sion if it allowed some kinds of construc-
tion, say hospitals or senior-citizen cen-
ters, rather than banning construction out-
right, as it does? In short, the circum-
stances surrounding a given regulation
will much better inform courts of the le-
gitimacy of governmental motives than a
blanket rule against so-called 100-percent
bans.
Exception Swallows the Rule
Finally, and most important, the nature
of the exception built into the Court's new
per se rule reveals the futility of attempt-
ing to escape the nuanced, multi-factor
analysis that has long characterized the
Court's takings jurisprudence. Scalia
conceded that some activities performed
on private land will so conflict with a
neighbor's property rights that these ac-
tivities are not properly part of the owner's
protected bundle of rights. We would
hardly expect, for example, that com-
pensation be paid to an owner legislatively
prohibited from turning her backyard into
a firing range.
This so-called nuisance exception,
however, threatens to swallow Lucas' new
rule. For despite Scalia's protestations.
ownership rights are often effectively lim-
ited by the principle that one owner may
not act to harm the rights of her neighbor.
Accordingly, virtually every government
regulation, even one that purportedly
deprives an owner of all economic use,
can be defended on grounds that it merely
codifies limits already inherent in the na-
ture of ownership.
In Lucas, for example, South Carolina
is likely to claim on remand that the
Beachfront Management Act simply
prevents property owners from building in
a way that the legislature now understands
will "endanger adjacent property." Given
the unchallenged legislative findings con-
cerning erosion, South Carolina courts
would therefore have good reason again to
deny Lucas compensation. although this
outcome would be difficult for the already
chastened lower courts to reach.
Scalia struggled mightily to contain the
nuisance exception so as to prevent this
result. He contended that compensation
must be paid unless nuisance rules or other
background principles of law already in
place prevent beachfront construction.
And Scalia won't accept the background
principle that an owner may not harm a
neighbor, he demands greater specificity.
But this imaginary world in which clear
and specific rules are supposedly settled
prior to the onset of government regulation
is merely a small-scale version of the
property-rights pipe dream that the Court
has consistently and correctly rejected
over the last 70 years.
The reality is that the world changes
rapidly, with the law sometimes leading
and often following. The only constant is
our conflicting desires to promote col-
lective good and preserve individual
rights. Scalia acknowledged, even
boasted, that if the government burns
down a private house, destroying all
economic value, it need not compensate
the house's owner if the government's ac-
tion was necessary to prevent the spread of
a fire. Scalia implicitly recognized that the
sudden conflagration changes things so
that what was once a secure private in-
vestment is now a subject for ollctive
sacrifice.
The question here is why South Car-
olina's new understanding of bcarl ero-
sion isn't just like the sudden fire. There
may be answers. Perhaps South Carolina's
goals are insufficient to justify singling out
a small group of owners to pay the pr
collective welfare. Perhaps the sheer
of Lucas' loss combined with the
percent decline in the value of his
investment should mean that the state
needs very good reasons to prohibit
development.
Or perhaps, as Justice Anthony
Kennedy's concurrence suggested, the
drastic shift from zoning rules that allowed
construction to a statute that imposes a to-
tal ban was simply too disruptive of settled
expectations. Combining these points, the
Court might have written a persuasive
opinion that was actually helpful to Lucas.
Instead, Scalia insisted on extending the
search for property's Holy Grail. He wants
categorical rules that will enable judges to
decide takings cases coherently based on
already settled principles rather than on
new circumstances facing courts and leg-
islatures. He will never find them.
Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar
respond:
While Professor Jeremy Paul ascribes
to properry-rights advocates an absolutist
position that most do nor hold, even he
believes that David Lucas has a good tak-
ings claim that could have been resolved
in his favor using a multi-factor analysis
rather than a categorical rule: we agree.
Justice Scalia is on no mission, how-
ever, to find categorical rules to resolve
takings claims. After all, it was the pre-
Reagan-Bush Supreme Court in 1980 that
unanimously reaffirmed in Agins v. Ti-
buron the categorical principle adopted in
Lucas that a land-use law effects a taking
when it "denies an owner econom
viable use of his land." And it was
Thurgood Marshall who wrote the
reasoned Loretto v. Teleprompter opinion
in 1982 (joined by Justice John Paul
Stevens) that adopted the first categorical
rule that a taking occurs whenever there is
a permanent physical occupation of the
property, however minor (which in that
case was a mere one-eighth of a cubic foot
of cable TV equipment affixed to a large
apartment building).
In any event, claims for partial takings
remain viable, including the hypothetical
proposed by Professor Paul. despite Jus-
tice Scalia's "all or nothing" stray com-
ment. After all. even in Loretto, the minute
space taken up by the cable equipment was
a partial taking of the owner's discrete
property interest in exclusive possession
surely the effective dispossession of Lucas
from all his property deserves no less
protection.
As for Professor Paus attack on the
nuisance exception, he questions why
South Carolina's understanding that a
building set-back line, computed on the
basis of estimates of beach erosion over
the next 40 years. "isn't just like the sud-
den fire" example described in Scalia's
opinion. The question answers itself. The
immediacy of the harm. the degree of the
harm, causation, the benefits obtained,
and other principles of nuisance law
clearly distinguish the two cases. as well
as offering sound principles that can
prevent environmental extremists from
imposing uncompensated land-use con-
straints, however minor the environmental
harm and however attenuated the ca
After all, if Lucas' home would cause
serious damage, why can't the state
all the owners of beach homes alred
built next to Lucas' empty lots to tear
down their homes to abate the alleged
nuisance?
Jeremy Paul is a professor at the Uni-
versity of Connecticut School of Low
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suspect. What if Lucas had. for example,
anexpeaedly sold. ,given or devised -I-
property to his children or a homeless
person after the astrictive land-use laws
were enacted? Surely none of these new
rswould have had any investment-
expectations, reasonable or oth-
e. Under Kennedy's scenario, the
government could avoid paying com-
pensation by waiting until the current
owner dies or otherwise transfers the
property.
It Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission (1987), the Court rejected this
specious argument. Although the Nollans
had acquired their property long after the
restrictions were put in place, they weren't
but of luck, according to the Court; the
Nollans had acquired all the rights in the
property that the prior owner possessed
when it was conveyed.
Nuisance in the Common Law
Probably the most significant part of the
Lucas decision deals with the so-called
nuisance exception to the takings clause.
The Court ruled that use of property that
causes harm to neighbors or to neighbors'
property has never been considered part of
the original bundle of rights acquired
when the property was obtained. Accord-
ingly, when the state, relying upon com-
mon-law principles of what constitutes a
nuisance, prevents such noxious use, no
compensation is due.
The key, though, is that the state must
base its action on common-law principles.
"Any limitation so severe cannot be
newly legislated or decreed [without
compensation]," the Court stated, "but
must inhere in the title itself, in the re-
strictions that background principles of the
States' law of property and nuisance al-
place upon land ownership."
ile this part of the ruling will cause
s on both sides of the issue to dust
off old state law reporters to unearth their
respective state's nuisance law, it has
other important features as well. First, al-
though the Court technically remanded the
case to the South Carolina courts to deter-
mine whether building a home can con-
stitute a nuisance under common-law
principles, the Court expressed strong
doubts that such a showing could be made.
Indeed, as explained in our arnicus brief, a
rich tradition in the common law supports
the right to build a home on one's prop-
erty, and that property interest may even
be distinctfrom or in addition to the right
to economically viable use of land-the
focus of the Court's attention in Lucas.
Justice Kennedy (as well as the two
dissenters) objected to the majority's reli-
ance on common-law principles to deter-
mine what constitutes a nuisance. He
would have greatly expanded the notion to
include uses of property that may have
remote environmental impacts: "Coastal
property may present such unique con-
cerns for a fragile land system that the
State can go further in regulating its de-
velopment and use than the common law
of nuisance might otherwise permit."
But such an elastic standard would al-
low the state to escape takings liability in a
variety of cases. The state could require,
for example, a wooded lot to remain un-
developed because cutting down the trees
would affect a spotted-owl habitat or con-
ribute, however remotely, to the so-called
greenhouse effect.
Second, and more important, the Court
the burden on the state to prove at
that the prohibited use of the property
:onstitutes a nuisance. No longer can
regulators hide behind conclusory and
fuzzy legislative findings that characterize
land-use restrictions as harm-preventing;
such findings can be crafted easily, said
the Court. unless the "legislature has a
stupid staff." Placing the burden on the
_4g i tasoblav e salutary effect
of cmbing the cavalier attitude about pri-
vate property rights epitomized by one
,regulator wbo, in Tesponse to a 4uery
about the legitimacy of a state's critical-
zhabitat Jewlithely replied: "We don't
have to justify everything we want to
protect" in the name of the environment.
In two lengthy footnotes, the Court
even left several nuggets that suggest its
categorical rule does not foreclose partial-
takings claims. The Court reiterated the
well-known three-part test articulated in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City (1978), which it described as
"keenly relevant" in determining whether
a partial taking has occurred. The Court
left unclear, however, which situations
would require the categorical rule and
which ones would demand a balancing
test.
For example, if a land-use restriction
denies the owner 50 percent of the use of
the property, the justices said that it was
"unclear whether we would analyze the
situation as one in which the owner has
been deprived of all economically bene-
ficial use of the burdened portion" (in
which case the categorical rule would
presumably apply) "or whether the owner
has suffered a mere diminution in value of
the tract as a whole" (in which case, the
balancing test of Penn Central or some
other rule would apply).
Most notably, the Court disclaimed as
"extreme" and "unsupportable" i rule
that would calculate the diminution in
value by looking at a claimant's "other
holdings in the vicinity," rather than the
discrete parcel at issue. The South Caro-
lina Coastal Council thus could not avoid
liability, for example, by giving David
Lucas a permit to develop only one of his
two lots. Even if the council could dem-
onstrate that the fair market value of that
permitted lot is more than what Lucas
originally paid for both lots, it still could
not claim that the second non-permitted lot
had not been taken. Again, the Court
implied that whether a regulatory taking
occurs should not depend on the fortuity of
the property owner or the extent of the
owner's holdings.
The Court also indicated that such par-
tial takings may be analyzed by looking at
how state law has recognized the "par-
ticular interest in land" in question. Thus,
the Court seems to suggest that restrictions
on an owner's mineral rights, water rights,
and other discrete interests in land recog-
nized under state law (such as the right to
protect one's property from the destructive
forces of nature) could amount to a com-
pensable taking without considering the
value remaining in the other unrestricted
interests.
Indeed, the Court stated that impair-
ment of even "non-economic interests
. . . will invite exceedingly close scrutiny
under the Takings Clause," citing to
Loretto v. Teleprompter. In that 1982
case, the Court laid down its first cate-
gorical rule that the government's slightest
physical invasion of property, even if the
economic value of property is greater due
to the invasion, nevertheless constitutes a
taking.
While the Lucas decsion may not be
everything hoped for, the tide is clearly
turning toward judicial protection of
property rights. If the government con-
tinues to enact and enforce confiscatory
land-use controls. that tide will most
surely bring a flood of new litigation.
Jeremy Paul responds:
Although amicus advocates for David
Lucas, Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D.
Kamenar say nothing to persuade us itat
the Supreme Court even reached the right
result. They prefer instead to characterize
the case as "good news" while assessing
the extent to which it constitutes a victory
for property rights. On the latter point, it
seems somewhat mysterious for a move-
wnt seeding to "awnhe lconsiurionall
ride" to celebrate the Court's having "left
intact" arguments that were not at issue.
The crux of the matter. of course. is
Avhedrtr Lacas -srikes the right balance
between private rights and public needs so
as to be good zewsforthe corntmy. Popeo
and Kamenar simply dodge this question.
They avoid assessing the merits of the
categorical rule by pretending, as Justice
Scalia tried to, that it's a mere extension
of longstanding precedent. But Agins v.
Tiburon and its progeny held merely that a
land-use regulation that otherwise sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state in-
terest will not be held a taking if the owner
retains significant economic value. Lucas,
as I argue, unwisely flips this result to
adopt a categorical rule blocking gov-
ernment from advancing legitimate rea-
sons for depriving owners of all economic
value.
Popeo and Kamenar also overplay the
problems with judicial reliance on claim-
ant expectations. Governments passing
general regulations such as those protect-
ing beaches from erosion will not be able
to calculate which properties to regulate
based on Tecent ownership transfers.
Moreover. had Lucas held the properry
vacant for 50 years under the current re-
strictions and then transferred it to his
children, the courts would have every
reason to find diminished expectations.
These things should be a matter of degree.
Nollan v. Califomia Coastal Commission
does not hold otherwise, rejecting ex-
pectations analysis only in the narrow
context of a regulation the Court found
would not alleviate any harm allegedly
caused by the proposed construction.
Finally. I take some pleasure in Popeo
and Kamenar's response in that they seek
to join issue on the merits of South Caro-
lina's regulation and Lucas' situation. It
is precisely such discussion that I fear
Justice Scalia's narrow-minded opinion
serves to foreciose.
Daniel 1. Popeo is chairman and gen-
eral counsel and Paul D. Kamenar is ex-
ecutive legal director of the Washington
Legal Foundation, which filed an amicus
brief in the Supreme Court supporting the
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High Court Backs Compensation for Loss of Land Rights
a Property: Justices rule
that a state must prove it is
blocking development to
prevent public harm or




W ASHINGTON-In a decisionwidely anticipated both by
property rights advocates and en-
vironmentalists, the Supreme
Court on Monday made it easier for
property owners to win compensa-
Lion when government forbids
them to develop their land.
Officials can prevent develop-
ment without compensation if the
land use would be a "nuisance" and
cause clear harm to others, the
court said, but they cannot refuse
compensation simply because ban-
ning the development would bene-
fit the-public.
^When the owner of real proper-
ty has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good," he
must be compensated for his loss.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for
the majority.
The 6-3 decision reverses a rul-
ing by the South Carolina Supreme
Court, which found that no com -
pensation was owed to a man who
pqid $!75,000 for two beachfront
lots in 1986 but was blocked two
year. later by a new state law from
bdilding onthem.
Returning the case (Lucas vs.
South Carolina Coastal Council,
91-453) to the state for possible
further action, the high court said
that South Carolina would have to
do more than demonstrate that
banning construction would bene-
fit the public interest-in this case,
preserving the shoreline from ero-
sion..
Instead. Scalia said, the state
would have to show that the devel-
opment would coqstitute a public
nuisance, that is, actively do harm.
In a concurring opinion, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that a
key test of compensation is wheth-
er the deprivation of property "is
contrary to reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations" by the
property owner.
The sharply circumscribed opin-
ion was hailed as a victory by both
sides in the philosophical dispute
over ownership rights versus pub-
lic interest.
In a prepared statement, Interior
Secretary Manuel Lujan/r. said:
"For too long, governfnents at
every level have taken land or
water for special purposes and left
landowners high and dry with
empty pockets. Now they will have
to be fairly compensated."
Similarly. American Farm Bu-
reau Federation President Dean
Kleckner said that the decision
"delivers a message to regulators
that they have gone too far in
taking private property without
awarding just compensation to
landowners."
But environmentalists, who had
feared that a court ruling might
sharply inhibit efforts to protect
wetlands and combat beach ero-
sion. hailed the decision because it
was closely confined to the South
Carolina law.
G lenn Sugameli, an attorney forthe National Wildlife Federa-
tion, said that he sees the ruling as
"a major setback to the special
interest groups that . . . fraudu-
lently claim that they are wise
users of natural resources. Not
even a conservative court accepts
the extreme argument that proper-
ty owners must always be compen-
sated whenever regulations de-
signed to protect the public affect
the use or value of property."
The case leading to Monday's
opinion arose from David H. Lucas'
1986 purchase of two lots on the
Isle of Palms. a barrier island near
Charleston. S.C.Since the late 1970s. Lucas had
been a residential developer in the
area. He paid $975.000 for the two
parcels and planned to build sin-
gle-family homes on them.
But in 1988. the South Carolina
Legislature passed the Beachfront
Management Act, designed to pro-
tect the state's coastal area from
overdevelopment and erosion. Un-
der that law. no building was
permitted on land.subject to beach
erosion. Overnight. Lucas' lots had
become virtually worthless.
Lucas filed suit. relying on the
Fifth Amendment, which prohibits
the taking of private property for
public use without just compensa-
tion.
The lower court ordered that he
be paid $1.23 million. But the state
Supreme Court overturned that
decision on grounds that the gov-
ernment need not pay compensa-
tion when it- seeks "to prevent
serious public harm," in this in-
stance to unstable coastline.
In a sharp dissent from the
majority opinion on Monday, Jus-
tice Harry A. Blackmun said that
with the decision "the court
launches a missile to kill a mouse."
T he majority, he said. had reliedon "an unreviewed land im-
plausiblel state trial court finding"
to grant a review of whether
compensation must be paid in cases
where state actions block the eco-
nomic use of real estate."
Scalia's opinion was joined by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justices Byron R. White. San-
dra Day O'Connor and Clarence
Thomas. Justice John Paul Sie':
also dissented. saying there is zi
inherent investment risk when
people buy property likely to
subject to government regulation
Justice David H. Souter said in a
separate statement that the court
should have refrained from decid -
ing the case for technical reasons.
Passage of South Carolina's
Beachfront Management Act
touched off a spate of lawsuits, and
the Lucas case. best known among
them. had become a rallying point
for a property rights movement
dedicated to the proposition that
government regulation. spurred by




Special toThe New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 22 - The Su-
preme Court ruled today that states
may presume that criminal defendants
are mentally competent to stand trial
and may require a defendant to prove
his incompetence.
By a 7-to-2 vote, the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a California
law that has the effect of placing the
burden of proof on the competency
question on the defendant.
A convicted murderer on Califor-
nia's death row, who had failed to per-
suade a jury that he was too mentally
ill to stand trial, brought the challenge
and argued that the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law re-
quired the state to bear the burden of
proof on the question.
The California Supreme Court re-jected that argument in a 1990 ruling
that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's ma-jority opinion upheld today.
Lack of 'Settled Tradition'
In addition to California, several oth-
er states, including Connecticut, as
well as Federal law, place the burden
of proof in competency proceedings on
the side seeking to show incompetence
- in nearly all cases, the defendant In
New York and New Jersey, by con-
trast, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution.
In his opinion today, Jur*ice Kennedy
said that the lack of any "settled tradi-
tion" on the question showed that there
was no "fundamental" principle in-
volved. "Historical practice is proba-
tive of whether a procedural rule can
be characterized as fundamental," he
said.
The constitutional guarantee of due
process should be interpreted narrowly
in the context of criminal law and state
practices were entitled to "substantial
deference" from judges, Justice Ken-
nedy said. He added: "The JBill of
Rights speaks in explicit terms toj
many aspects of criminal procedure,.
and the expansion of those constitution-
al guarantees under the open-ended
rubric of the due process clause invites
undue interference with both consid-
ered legislative judgments and the.
careful balance that the Constitution
strikes between liberty and order."
Separate Opinion by O'Connor
As has been the case in a number of
decisions this term, the Court's ap-
proach to this case disclosed a philo-
sophical split within the Court's conser-
vative majority, not so much over out-
come but over approach.
Justice Kennedy's opinion wasjoined by four others: Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices By-
to Assume Competency
ron R. White, Antonin Scalia and Clar-
ence Thomas.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor con-
curred in a separate opinion, which
Justice David H. Souter joined. They
disputed the majority's heavy reliance
on history, and said the state's defense
of its law should have been subject to a
. more searching inquiry.
"While I agree with the Court that
historical pedigree can give a pro-
cedural practice a presumption of con-
stitutionality, the presumption must
surely be rebuttable," Justice O'Con-
nor said. She said the issue was wheth-
er placing the burden of proof on the
defendant was "fundamentally un-
fair," a question that she said required
the Court to weigh-the arguments care-
fully and not simply defer to the state.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun filed a
dissenting opinion, which Justice John
Paul Stevens joined. "I do not believe a
Constitution that forbids the trial and
conviction of an incompetent person
tolerates the trial and conviction of a
person about whom the evidence of
competency is so equivocal and un-
clear," Justice Blackmun said.
The defendant in this case, Teofilo
Medina, had a six-day competency
hearing at which some psychiatrists
testified that he was a schizophrenic
who was not competent to stand trial,
and others said he was malingering
and competent. After a jury found him
competent to stand trial, another jury
rejected his defense that he was insane
at the time of the crime, found him
guilty of three murders, and sentenced
him to death. The case was Medina v.
California, No. 90-8370.
The four decisions the Court issued
today left it with 10 cases remaining to
be decided by the end of the term. The
Justices have scheduled Wednesday
and Friday for more decisions, and will
carry the term into next week if the
.remaining cases are not decided by
Friday.
These were among the other devel-
opments today:
Habeas Corpus
In its latest ruling on the ability of
state prisoners to challenge their con-
victions through petitions for writs of
habeas corpus in Federal court, the
Couri took a narrow view of the cir-
cumstances under which prisoners can
file more than one petition.
Previously, the Court had ruled that
the bar it has erected against multiple
petitions could be excused on the
ground that there would otherwise be a
"miscarriage of justice" in the case of
a prisoner who could demonstrate "ac-
tual innocence." The question in the
case today, an appeal by a convicted
murderer on Louisiana's death 'row,
was how that excuse should be aliplied
in death penalty cases in which the
prisoner asserts not that he is innqcynt,but that he was erroneously sentenced
to death. -
Lower Federal courts had adopted
different interpretations. Under. the
most generous standard, which the
Court rejected today, a death r6y.Jn-
mate was permitted to argue in a sec-
ond habeas corpus that the jury's deci-
sion to impose a death sentence was
based on inaccurate information
The Court today, in a decision by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, adopt6a an
approach used by other courts: The
Chief Justice said an inmate shoad be
allowed to argue that he was "innotent
of the death penalty" in the sense of
having been legally ineligible tO re-
ceive a sentence of death. For example,
an inmate might argue that there "Was
no "aggravating circumstance" to the
crime, making the crime one for which
no death penalty was available dder
state law.
The Court rejected the Bush Admin-
istration's argument, which no lower
court had accepted, under whieh no
inmate who could not demonstrdt6 in-
nocence of the offense itself could be
permitted to file a second habeak cor-
pus petition,
The decision, Sawyer v. Whitley 'No.
91-6382, upheld the approach used by
the United States Court of AppeaTs-for
the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, in
turning down the inmate's second ha-
beas corpus petition. Justices Wtfite,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas
joined the majority opinion. Juttices
Stevens, Blackmun and O'Connor-vot-
ed for a broader interpretation bf the
"miscarriage of justice" excuse, but at
the same time said that the inmate had
failed to meet that standard.
Alien Asylum
The Court agreed to hear the Bush
Administration's appeal from two low-
er court rulings under which some
300,000 illegal aliens regained the right
to apply for amnesty, leading to. cgal
residency and eventual citizenship, un-
der the 1986 immigration law. The rui-
ings by the United States Coti'tt of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in' San
Francisco, were based on earlie"Tind-
ings that the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service had issued invalidreg-
lations under the law, which had, the.
effect of making hundreds of thousands'
of aliens who might have been eligjble
for amnesty to think they were ineligi-
ble and so to miss the filing deadone.
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A 1942 advertisement for Chesterfield cigarettes. Rose Cipollone
started smoking that year, and Chesterfields were her brand.
Warning Labels Do Not
Oeferl'otal Protection
- From Legal Claims
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 24 - The Su-
preme Court today opened the door
wide to damage suits by smokers
against the cigarette industry, in a
surprisingly broad decision rejecting
many of the industry's arguments that
such lawsuits were barred by Federal
law.
The decision, in its most significant-
aspects, overturned rulings by a Fed-
eral appeals.court in a case brought
against three cigarette manufacturers
by the family of Rose Cipollone, a Little
Ferry, N. J., woman who died of lung
cancer in 1984 after smoking for four
-decades. The vote in most parts of the
decision was 7 to 2.
The appeals court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the.Third Circuit,
in Philadelphia, had ruled that smok-
ers could not sue cigarette companies
for injuries that stemmed from their
smoking after Jan. 1, 1966. On that day,
the first Federal law requiring warn-
ing labels on cigarette packages and
advertising took effect. The appeals
court found that the law, as well as a
tougher law that Congress passed in
1969, served to pre-empt suits for dam-
ages "relating to smoking and health"
that challenged the way cigarettes
were advertised or promoted.
Sorting Out Two Laws
In its decision today, the Court ruled
that the first law, the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, did not
pre-empt damage suits at all, because
it did nothing more than bar states
from setting their own requirements
for the contents of cigarette labels.
The 1969 law, the Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act, was more broadly
worded and did have some pre-emptive
effects, the Court said today in an opin-ion by Justice John Paul Stevens.
But while the opinion did foreclose
some legal claims by individual smok-
ers, principally claims based on the
theory that cigarette makers had a
legal duty to go beyond the warning-label requirements and to issue more
urgent warnings about the dangers of
their products, the Court found no bar
against suits based on legal theories
that could prove particularly damag-
ing to the industry.
Among the lawsuits that will now be
permitted are those based on a theory
that by concealing facts about smoking
and health, or by actually lying about
damaging information in their posses-
sion, the manufacturers breached a
legal duty not to deceive. Also permit-
ted will be lawsuits alleging a conspir-
acy among cigarette manufacturers to
Continued on Page 310, Column I
Com Opens Wayfor.Suts
For Damages Over Smoking
Continued From Page Al
misrepresent or conceal the truth
about smoking and health.
Justice Stevens said that in the 1969
law "Congress offered no sign that it
Nished to insulate cigarette manufac-
.urers from longstanding rules govern-
ng fraud."
The decision apparently sent mixed
signals to Wall Street, which had been
watching the case with intense interest.
Most tobacco stocks were off slightly
for the day, although Philip Morris
Companies closed up 5/8, at $73.75.
Industry spokesmen sought to mini-
mize the scope of the decision, assert-
ing it would neither lead to more law-
suits nor help plaintiffs win. Philip
Morris called the decision "a signifi-
cant victory" because "the court held
hat smokers can't sue cigarette com-
panies claiming that after 1969 they
weren't adequately warned of the risks
of smoking."
Charles Wall, vice president and as-
sociate general counsel of Philip Mor-
Cigarette makers
voice optimism,
but others see a
clear defeat.
ris, said the ruling that lawsuits could
be brought charging the tobacco indus-
try with fraudulently concealing the
medical dangers of smoking was not a
threat.
"The company did not engage in that
kind of activity," Mr. Wall said. "I am
not concerned about it."
But Matthew Myers, counsel for the
American Heart Association and other
healthy organizations, called that as-
pect of the ruling "the potential Achil-
les heel" of the tobacco industry. The
industry was vulnerable, he said, if it
had information on the negative effects
of smoking and if the companies inten-
tionally misled the public about that
information, as plaintiffs have charged
in some recent cases.
Alan Morrison, litigation director for
the Public Citizen group in Washington,
said the ruling was "a major victory
for the antismoking forces" in permit-
ting suits to be brought for concealing
medical information, the legal theory
most likely to win a sympathetic hear-
ing for jurors.
Most of the previous suits had been
brought under the theory the court
barred today: that cigarette compa-
nies should have provided more exten-
sive warnings than required by the
Federal law. Juries were largely un-
persuaded by these "failure to warn"
cases anyway. In the more-than-300
cases filed since 1954, a plaintiff has
yet to collect a cent from suing a
tobacco company for health problems.
. The Cipollone family's lawsuit,
against the Liggett Group Inc., Philip
Morris Companies Inc. and the Loews
Corporation, the parent company of
Lorillard, can now be revived in a new
trial. In its 1990 ruling, the Third Cir-
cuit had also set aside a $400,000 judg-
ment that the family won based on
Mrs. Cipollone's smoking before 1966,
ordering a new trial on that part of the
case. The pre-1966 liability issue was
not before the Supreme Court today.
Laurence H. Tribe, a Harvard law
professor who argued the family's ap-
peal in the Supreme Court in January,
said today that he expected that the
new trial would be successful. He said
the majority today had analysed the
pre-emption question in a way that
created a favorable climate for plain-
tiffs, not only in smoking cases but also
in suits for damages from other prod-
ucts for which the Federal Govern-
ment requires warning labels, like
some kinds df food and alcohol prod-
ucts as well as items like children's
pajamas.
Three Factions on Court
Pre-emption is a complex legal area,
and the Court's rulings, even within the
current term, have not been particular-
ly consistent. The fact that there was
no single majority opinion for the most
important aspects of the ruling today
underscored the degree to which the
Court is divided on the issue.
Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality
of four Justices that also included Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Byron R. White and Sandra Day'
O'Connor. This group controlled the!.
outcome of the case by occupying the
middle ground between two other
groups of Justices. On one side, Jus-
tices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas viewed the two Federal laws
as pre-empting all aspects of the smok-
ers' lawsuits. On the other side, Jus-
tices Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M.
Kennedy and David H. Souter found
none of the claims to be pre-empted.
Consequently, when the Stevens four
found that a particular claim was not
pre-empted, there were seven votes to
support that conclusion. When they
found that a claim was barred, there
were six votes for that holding.
Three of the nine Justices smoke.
Chief Justice Rehnquist smokes ciga-
rettes, Justice Scalia smokes ciga-
rettes and a pipe, and Justice Thomas
favors cigars.
State Courts vs. Federal Ones
The case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group
Inc., No. 90-1038, was initially argued
last October, before Justice Clarence
Thomas joined the Court. After he took
his seat, the Court ordered reargument
in tihe case, giving rise to speculation
that the.Court.was deadlocked 4 to 4,
with the new Justice holding the bal-
,ance. That was evidently not the case.
Federal.oourts have uniformly found
pre-emption in smokers' lawsuits, but
the cigarette industry was beginning tolose on the question in state courts.
Despite having won before the ThirdCircuit, the industry urged the Su-
preme Court to hear the Cipollone ap-
peal to resolve the matter.
Some of the claims the Court decided
to permit today are among the most
worrisome to the industry. For exam-
ple, earlier this year, a Federal districtjudge in New Jersey, H. Lee Sarokin,issued a pretrial ruling ordering theindustry to release a'number of inter-
nal documents to the plaintiff in an-
other case, a suit on behalf of a smoker
who died in 1982.
In his ruling, Judge Sarokin said that
his review of the documents indicated
to him that "the tobacco industry maybe the king of concealment and disin-
formation" and that the dOcuments
- contained evidence of fraud. The indus-
try said the judge had drawn unsup-
ported inferences from the documents.
- The legal question for the Court wasthe meaning of a pre-emption provision
that Congress wrote into the 1969 law.
The provision said that "no require-
ment or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under
state law with respect to the advertis-
ing or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in con-
formity with the provisions of this act."
When Pre-emption Applies
The question was whether a lawsuit
alleging that a cigarette manufacturer
had breached a legal duty under state
law was in effect an effort to subject
the manufacturer to a "requirement or
prohibition" of the sort that the 1969
law did not allow.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Ste-
vens said that there was no one answer
to this question, and that each claim in
the Cipollone lawsuit had to be exam-
ined separately to see if it sought to
impose a "requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health."
Supreme Court ConseTvauves
Dealt Business Some Setbacks
By PAuiL M. BAItrr
Staff Reportercf 'rses:IV As.I.Srm11oeNAt
WASHINGTON-Consunmers won some
critical victories (hiring the Supreme Court
term that ended Monday, as the conserva-
tive majority continued to demonstrate
that it isn't necessarily the friend of big
business.
But despite defeats in recent weeks for
tobacco companies fighting smokers' law-
suits And mianifacinfers defending
Court's Turn to Right Stalls
The appoinfers of the itengnn aid Bush
administrations show increasingly dif-
ferent judicial personalities that don't
neatly match conventional political la-
bels. Clarence Thomas's first year
showed him to be a confident, aggressive
revisionist. Articles on page 138.
against antitrust actions, the 1991-92 term
as a whole didn't turn out too badly for
industry.
The court reined in aggressive state
regulators and tax collectors. It reassured
businesses (and individuals) whose land is
rendered useless by environmental regula-
tion that the government must pay them
for their loss. And it gave a significant
victory to employers by restraining union
organizers and curbing certain claims
on pension plans.
The single most promising develop-
ment for business was the court's em-
phasis on upholding precedent in cases
that have economic consequences. Busi-
nessmen tend to favor stability, because
they base their investments and strategies
on existing legal rules. The court indicated
this term that it values stability as well.
Chief justice William Reinquist had
signaled the court's philosophy on this
issue in a controversial statement he made
a year ago. Mr. Rehnquist enraged liberals
and made headlines with his declaration
that in individual-rights cases, the court
shouldn't feel bound to follow past deci-
sions. But less attentioti was paid at tle
time to the flip side of his pronounce-
ment - that ''considerations in favor of
Ipreedentli are at their ;ime in cases
involving property and contract rights.
where reliance interests are involved."
'Mntiliily was at the heart of fl
colirt 's 8-1 decision that a state van't force
an out-of-state mail-order company to col-
lect taxes from in-stale customers unless
I lie company has a "physical presence" ii
the state. More than $3 billion a year in
uncollected taxes was at stake, according
to the states.
A quarter-century old. tie
physical-presence requirement may seem
outdated now that direct-marketers can
bomibard consumers not just with catalogs
btil witlli atiomated phone calls and cable-
TV pitches. The court noted. however, that
direct marketers have relied heavily on
the requirement in making business deci-
sions and that the simple rules have
helped businesses plan more effectively.
In a similar spirit, the justices unani-
mously rebuffed a bid by New Jersey to
overhaul tax principles and allow a state to
tax a portion of the entire income of an
out-of-state company, even if the earnings
aren't related to the concern's in-state
business. Separately, the court extended a
197S precedent frowning upon barriers to
interstate commerce by striking (town Ala-
P/ease Turn1.1 to Page /I, Column I
Setbacks Muted Business's Legal Triumphs
Continued Froi Page BI ment. That could lead to more competition wasn't a big change in the law. With a few
bama's surcharge on disposal of hazardous and lower prices in some lines of insurance paragraphs, he made volumes of lower-
waste generated in other states. Toxic and transportation. court opinions and scholarly articles obso-
goop is commerce, too, the courts said, and Of even broader concern to big busi- lete.
states may not practice protectionism. ness - and reason for cheer among con- The practical upshot of the decision is
State regulators who tried to go beyond sumers and smaller companies - was the that more antitrust cases will have the
federal standards got.yanked back by the court's decision making it easier to sue potential of going to trial, putting pressurejustices this term. Hazardous waste was manufacturers for locking out concerns on defendants to settle. That could help
again at issue in a ruling that federal that want to sell repair services or spare smaller companies and their customers; it
workplace safety laws preclude states Parts. The 6-3 ruling cleared the way for a is also certain to give a boost to the
from independently imposing tougher civil trial in which Eastman Kodak Co. has plaintiffs' antitrust bar.
standards on disposal companies. been accused of illegally refusing to sell Another uncertain legacy of the 1991-92
The court separately said that the 1978 replacement parts for its photocopiers and term is the court's ruling last week on
federal law deregulating the airlines pre- other equipment to independent service tobacco liability. Despite its protests to the
vents state attorneys general from suing companies. The decision probably will contrary, the tobacco industry suffered a
carriers for allegedly fraudulent price ad- spark similar lawsuits against manufac- setback. The court said that while the
vertising. turers of cars, consumer electronics and federal cigarette-labeling law precludes
Pro-Employer Opinion computers, some smokers' claims against tobacco
RookieThe Kodak decision was startling be- companies allegations of fraud and con-(lsaRoiet usines Cadvceoas whodhad cause it undermined a central defense that spiracy to hide health risks may go todisappoint business advocates who had hsbe sdi eetyasaant til
high hopes for him. The former chairman hsbe sdi eetyasaant tiihig hpe fo . ef m  ira  antiti-ust allegations. No longer will a The tobacco companies, which until
of the Equal Employment Opportunity manufacturer be able to get a suit thrown now have resisted making any payments
Commission wrote a strong pro-employer out before trial solely on the ground that to smokers claiming health damage. insist
majority opinion in a decision that said the plaintiff's claims are implausible as a they will win those trials. But Consumer
companies generally can't be forced to matter of economic theory. the ad at laaew ris
allow non-employee labor organizers onto
their property. Devastating Defense and once punitive damage awards are a
Business's celebration of these and That defense had been devastating to real threat, the companies will start set-
other triumphs was muted, however, by plaintiffs-and a severe obstacle to govern- tling cases out of court.
some setbacks in the past month, When the int enforcement - since it was intro- A larger question is whether the Su-
court sided with consumers and against (uced in what was seen as a watershed preme Court will take a similar approach
business. A pair of antitrust rulings cre- Supreme Court decision in 1986, which to injury suits filed under state laws
ated legal dangers for companies in a wide elied heavily on free-market views associ- against manufacturers in other industries
range of fields. Concerns that set rates ated with the University of Chicago. Writ- that are subject to federal safety or
under nominal state supervision were told ing fo' the majority in the Kodak c. cars
in one case that they aren't necessarily Justice Harry Blackntin said the 1986 iedical devices and drugs all face poten-
shielded from federai antitrust enforce- rmlint. had been misinterpreted - that it tial ne liability.





NEWMAN GROVE, Neb. - Folks
trusted Keith Jacobson with their chil-
dren. For 11 years, he drove a school
bus in this tiny corn-and-soybean com-
munity - until something happened
that stunned Jacobson's neighbors,
drove him into -temporary seclusion '7
and now takes him to the highest court
in the land.
Jacobson, a 20-year military veter- -t
an, part-time farmer and law-abiding
citizen, became one of thousands of
targets of government undercover op-
erations aimed at drying up the market
for child pornography - and one of
hundreds to be convicted since 1985.
Today, in a case with potentially
high stakes for law enforcement and
citizens, the Supreme Court will hear
arguments on whether government
undercover agents unconstitutionally
enticed Jacobson into committing the
crime of receiving kid-porn by mail.
The case of Jacobson vs. U.S. tests
the legal authority of government sting
operations to target and tempt citizens,
and invites the court to clarify the
meaning of entrapment.
University of Arizona law professor .
Paul Marcus, author of "The IAw of
Entrapment," predicted that, in the
Jacobson case, the conservative Su-
preme Court would back law enforce-
ment, as it usually does.
But he said the justices first must
confront "one of the most outrageous
and arbitrary acts of government I
have seen - and I have seen some
beauts. ... What happened here was
that the government had no basis to
believe Jacobson was engaging-in ille-
gal activity. If it can happen to him, why Associated Press
not others like him?" Marcus said.
"I felt betrayed by my own govern-
ment," the' 61-year-old Jacobson said
ruefully last week in his small home on
the edge of a brown-stubbled cornfield
in a shrinking town about 125 miles
northwest of Omaha.
"It was hard for me to accept. that
the government had done this to me. I
consider myself a decent person. I'm
notacriminal.Iobeythelaws.Ipaymy
taxes religiously. I'm patriotic. Then I:
get caught up in something likethis and.
it's just devastating.to me."
The kid-porn. stings have caused
extraordinary oiainfliTi987, foithi
targets committed suicide rather than-
face indictments or trials. One left a
suicide note saying he had been
"cursed with a demon for a sexual
preference."
At the same time, Project Looking
Glass, the sting that snared Jacobson,
uncovered 35 instances in which chil-
dren were being sexually molested,
abused and photographed, said U.S.
Postal Inspector Daniel Mihalko.
Jacobson, a round-faced, gray-
haired bachelor with a taste for X-rated
films, first came to the attention of
postal inspectors in 1985, when police
found his name on the mailing list of the
Electric Moon porno bookstore in San
Diego.
Answering an ad in a publication fo:
homosexuals, Jacobson had ordered -
lawfully - two magazines described
by his lawyer, George Moyer Jr., as.
"nudist magazines depicting boys ...
in outdoor settings" and by govern-.
ment lawyers as showing naked boys.
For more than two years afterward,
e a me astweek, said the
U.S. government lured him into buying a child pornography magazine.
postal inspection teams masquerading cards in the town library. But he said he
aifictitious organizations dedicated to wants the Supreme Court to impose
sexual freedom - the American He- sme limitations "n stijws
d6nist: Society, .Midlands Data Re-
search and the Heartland Institute for a fm inmlestg ctaren,
New Tomorrow - se Jacobson ! h otojbsppd. Ifmaterle ae
asking whether he wa idr
. Wqst _.. hould be stopped. But the government
tegn and preteei sex. He wrote back tosay .fig ihould. perfect their. inethodsi mo apply
"I sppo~.i ad .veim o~ tosesorts bG.*0pep ,'1acobson
sort of latent interest in"lok",
pictures of nude boys," Jacobson Government lawyersisay he was nc
~~~~~ 'twi rin'butWman-who had
bad. I know myself better than anyone a "predisposition" to buy child pornog-
else anid I never bather kids4 touch raph T g-a." o predsposi-
them .or fool around in some unnatural tioh" the h of t legal dispute.
way.". If it existed, the government acted
In May 1987, Jacobson ordered properly. If it didn't, there was entrap-
from the bogus Far Eastern Trading ment
Co. Ltd. a $25 magazine called "Boys Police organizations argue they
Who Love Boys," described in a cata- need to use similar stings in cases
log as "11-year-old and 14-year-old involving narcotics traffcking, auto
boys get- it on in every way possi- thefts and fencing of stolen property
ble. ... If you love boys, you will be when there are no specific suspects.
delighted with this.". In Newman Grove, residents sy
Jacobson had snapped at the bait. pathize with Jacobson. "People think.
But he was no big catch. Postal inspec- Keith was set up," said farmer Gary
tors who searched his home found onlB Duhachek.
the two nudist magazines- plus the "He usedto up u y two kidson
mailthey hadsent hi the bus and - there was never any
Thiat same year, an" Omaha jury - trouble," said Tom Barnes, -owner of
rejected his entrapment defense and Barnes Mini-MarLThis thing ruined
convicted him of receiving mailed ma- him. He wouldn't come downtown for a
terial depicting minors engaged in sex- year. It doesn't seem fair."
ually explicit Conduct. Government lawyers disagree. All
Jacobson has served his two yearj Jacobson had to do they said ina legal
on probation, performing 250 hours of brief, was to dump the undercover mail
communPty service by painting oa par- in the trash can.
sonage garage and computerizing Replied Jaobson 'ieish.I had i"
